联 合 国 S/2019/171*

安全理事会

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安全理事会主席的说明

安全理事会在第 2407(2018)号决议第 2 段中请第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组向安理会提交附有结论和建议的最后报告。

据此，主席谨分发专家小组提交的报告(见附件)。

* 由于技术原因于 2019 年 9 月 26 日重发。

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附件

2019 年 2 月 21 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨根据第 2407(2018)号决议第 2 段随函转递其工作的最后报告。*

所附报告于 2019 年 2 月 1 日提交安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 2019 年 2 月 21 日审议了该报告。

请将本函及其附文提请安全理事会成员注意并作为安理会文件分发为荷。

第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组
协调员
Hugh **Griffiths**(签名)

专家
Olaf **Andrieu**(签名)

专家
Dmitry **Kiku**(签名)

专家
Stephanie **Kleine-Ahlbrandt**(签名)

专家
Maiko **Takeuchi**(签名)

专家
Jong Kwon **Youn**(签名)

专家
宗佳虎(签名)

* 2019 年 1 月 18 日秘书长任命了专家小组第八名成员 Yvonne Yew 女士，她于 2019 年 1 月 28 日在纽约正式就职。

附文

2019 年 2 月 1 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会主席的信

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第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组的报告

摘要

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的核计划和弹道导弹计划保持原状。该国继续违反安全理事会决议，大量增加石油产品和煤炭的非法船对船移交。此违规行为无视对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国石油产品和原油进口的上限限制和煤炭禁令，导致联合国的最新制裁措施低效。这些措施是安全理事会 2017 年针对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国空前的核试验和弹道导弹试验而规定的。除几个会员国向专家小组提供了关于船对船移交的资料外，一个会员国指出，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2018 年已购买了 50 万桶以上的精炼石油产品，但另一个会员国对此提出质疑。一些全球性银行继续无意中协助为规模空前巨大、价值数百万美元的石油产品非法船对船移交以及日益增多的船对船煤炭移交和转运进行付款，全球性保险公司也无意中为涉事船只提供保险。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反武器禁运，企图通过外国中间人供应小武器和轻武器及其他军事装备，包括通过叙利亚军火贩运人侯赛因·阿里向也门胡塞叛军供应，以及向利比亚和苏丹供应。专家小组继续调查秘密为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国核计划采购离心机并试图向中东和非洲武装团体和政府出售多种军事装备的被指认亚洲实体和个人。专家小组调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国参与刚果民主共和国金矿开采、在塞拉利昂建造军营、在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国周围水域出售捕鱼权、被指认实体开展活动、在世界各地进行其他违禁活动的情况。专家小组还调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购买劳斯莱斯、梅赛德斯-奔驰、雷克萨斯等主要奢侈品牌产品的情况。世界上最大的集装箱航运公司继续无意中运输后来被会员国扣押的违禁物品。

在制裁制度的各项措施中，金融制裁仍属执行最不力、面临最多逃避的措施之列。被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金融机构授权为代表的个人至少在 5 个国家开展活动，似乎不受惩罚。侦察总局继续从事国际金融业务，把在欧洲联盟关闭的账户中的资金转入在亚洲金融机构持有的账户。尽管专家小组以往曾报告过 Glocom 和马来西亚-高丽伙伴公司集团(Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies)(MKP)的非法活动，但此两者的全球业务仍在进行，显示继续利用海外公司和个人来掩盖为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政权赚取收入的活动。专家小组还调查了可能作为合作实体或合资企业行事的公司，其中一些公司正式登记为合资企业，另一些则想方设法隐瞒与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国合作的性质。其中一些实体还违反了相关决议的其他规定，包括与被指认实体保持联系。专家小组还调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国为逃避金融制裁而对多个会员国进行精心策划的网络攻击一事。

在船对船移交方面采用的规避技术越来越先进。大多数全球和区域大宗商品贸易公司、银行和保险公司未考虑到通过船舶身份盗窃和传输虚假自动识别系统信息来伪装船只的问题，其尽职调查工作极为不足。操纵船只的自动识别系统传输仍是非法移交活动的一个主要特征，这一做法违反了国际海事组织(海事组织)关于海上人身安全的条例，其中规定自动识别系统在任何时候都须处于运行状

态。这种行为的存在突出表明船旗国监测不力。此外，保险公司不对其提供保险和服务的船只的自动识别系统进行监测。其他规避手段包括：对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的油轮进行实体伪装、使用未经注册的小型船只、采用非法更名等身份欺诈方法、夜间移交、用更多船只实施转运。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国及其海上船队除逃避制裁外，还屡次违反《联合国海洋法公约》，经常悬挂双国旗并为被劫持船只提供安全港。专家小组检查了因从事违禁煤炭交易而被扣押的船只，查明其曾经过"洗船"以掩盖身份，即船东向海事组织骗取新的船只身份号，以免再次被发现。专家小组发现朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的港口和机场被用于肆无忌惮地实施违反相关决议的行为，从非法进口石油和出口煤炭，到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民偷运大笔现金，不一而足。此外专家小组还发现，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用机场等民用设施装配和试验弹道导弹，目的是有效防止"斩首"攻击。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官在规避制裁方面继续发挥关键作用。虽然一些会员国按照决议要求限制了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆和外交官的银行账户数目，但后者通过控制在多个国家的账户，包括在其未获认证的国家控制账户，规避这一规定。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官和被指认实体的代表还规避资产冻结和对外交人员银行账户数量的限制，以家庭成员和幌子公司的名义开设账户，并在多个司法管辖区开设账户。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官继续以护照上假的认证身份旅行，并协助该国通过转运以掩盖其来源的方式非法出口大量煤炭。

会员国、联合国机构和人道主义组织表示关切，尽管决议作出了某些豁免规定，委员会也作出了努力，但联合国机构和人道主义组织在满足朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弱势民众的关键生存需求方面持续遭遇困难。

本报告提出了一系列关于指认和采取其他实际措施的建议，以协助会员国和安全理事会克服执行工作中的挑战和不足。

目录

* 附件仅以来件所用语文分发，未经正式编辑。

一. 导言

1. 安全理事会第 2407(2018)号决议第 2 段请第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组向委员会提交一份载有调查结果和建议的最后报告。本报告所述期间为 2018 年 2 月 2 日至 2019 年 2 月 1 日。[1]

二. 部门制裁和海上制裁

2. 悬挂外国国旗的船只使用方便旗进行石油产品的船对船移交是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国逃避制裁的首要方法。这些移交的范围、规模和复杂程度都有增加，50 多艘船和 160 多家关联公司正在接受调查。日本、大韩民国、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和美利坚合众国向专家小组提交的报告以及专家小组自己的调查均表明，2018 年，非法船对船移交石油产品活动大幅加速。3 月 30 日，委员会指认了 27 艘船和 21 个实体，主要因其从事船对船移交石油产品活动。10 月 16 日，委员会又指认了 3 艘船。

3. 2018 年 7 月 6 日，美国告知专家小组，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违反了第 2397(2017)号决议规定的石油上限，称 2018 年 1 月 1 日至 5 月 30 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮至少 89 次停靠朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口，可能是为了运送通过船对船移交非法购得的精炼石油产品，[2] 并指出，“必须停止这些销售，因为据我们估计，销售量已经突破了联合国安理会第 2397 号决议规定的配额”。2018 年 7 月 30 日，专家小组收到俄罗斯联邦的普通照会，要求澄清美国提供的预测数。俄罗斯联邦还告知专家小组，根据向委员会报告的数字，销售量尚未正式达到上限，因此没有理由停止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供精炼石油产品。2018 年 9 月 17 日，美国告知安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会，“2018 年 6 月 1 日至 8 月 18 日，至少又向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行了 59 次油轮运送，使 2018 年的总交付次数至少达到 148 次，所有交付都涉及向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口运送和卸载通过联合国禁止的船对船移交获得的精炼石油产品”。美国向委员会提供了一些图像(见图九)和三种情景说明，这些信息“清楚表明，朝鲜获得的石油已远远超过其在 2018 年获准采购的 50 万桶”(见附件 2)。[3] 俄罗斯联邦在 9 月 21 日给委员会的来文中指出，“美国提供的关于所谓向朝鲜船只进行非法船对船移交精炼石油产品案件的零散资料以及美国的计算机模拟结果不足以使委员会决定在年底前完全停止对朝鲜的精炼石油出口……需要由 1718 委员会专家小组进行全面调查并做出相应结论”(见附件 3)。

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[1] 针对专家小组的网络攻击继续妨碍其根据任务规定报告制裁执行情况的能力(见 S/2018/171)。此外，专家小组注意到，未经授权披露委员会议事情况和专家小组内部报告和活动具有破坏性。

[2] 附件 1 载有一份表格，其中罗列了各交货港以及交付量的保守估计数。

[3] 关于美利坚合众国 7 月和 9 月提交的“装满 33%时的交货量”一栏的数据之间的差异，这些差异似乎是采用不同的计算公式(7 月提交数字用的是÷3，9 月提交数字用的是×0.33)以及数字保留小数点后两位数造成的。

4. 虽然专家小组没有确凿证据得出上限已被突破的结论，但自 2018 年 9 月以来，专家小组获得了关于以下情况的证据：船对船移交越来越频繁，而且仅一次前所未有的违禁石油产品移交就多达 57 623.491 桶，价值 5 730 886 美元。专家小组对那次移交进行的调查揭示出迄今为止与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的最复杂的船只身份造假案件，突出表明出现了新的规避制裁手段，导致该区域主要大宗商品贸易商以及为支付燃料货款提供便利的美国和新加坡银行和为其中一艘涉事船只提供船东责任保险的主要英国保险公司的尽职调查努力付之东流。这一案件还再次反映出方便旗国对明显在其管辖下行驶的船只的报告、监督、监测和控制极为不力。这些挫败进一步表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和与其合作的跨国犯罪网络可以在全球物流供应链内自由运作，[4] 而且在其中一艘船的船东被指认适用资产冻结和旅行禁令措施后，这些船只竟然能在国际水域明目张胆地规避了 8 个多月。

巴拿马冒名顶替者

5. 2018 年 11 月 11 日，一个会员国报告称，2018 年 10 月 28 日发生了疑似非法船对船移交，涉事船只为 2018 年 3 月 30 日被指认适用全球入港禁令限制摘旗措施[5] 的“Yuk Tung”号(海事组织编号：9030591)[6] 和“Ocean Explorer”号(海事组织编号：9388792)(见图一)。

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[4] 专家小组在其 2018 年最后报告中指出，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国“通过利用全球石油供应链、外国国民同谋、离岸公司登记处和国际银行系统，一再藐视最近的各项决议”。在这方面，专家小组指出，“由于利润幅度大，加之涉事的石油、海事和金融行业的大部分业务具有离岸性质，私营部门有必要大力加强尽职调查、信息共享和自我督察”。(S/2018/171，摘要)。

[5] 该船的船东 Yuk Tung 能源有限公司(Yuk Tung Energy Pte.)也被指认适用资产冻结和旅行禁令制裁。“安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会在制裁名单中增加 22 个条目，指认 27 艘船只”，SC/13272，2018 年 3 月 30 日。见 https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13272.doc.htm。

[6] “Yuk Tung”号上涂有“Maika”号的名字和假冒的海事组织编号。

图一
2018 年 10 月 28 日的“Yuk Tung”号和“Ocean Explorer”号



资料来源：会员国。


6. 专家小组调查发现，至少从 2018 年 5 月 22 日开始，“Yuk Tung”号在东海进行船只“冒充”，通过其自动识别系统发送虚假身份信息，自称是名为“Maika”的悬挂巴拿马国旗的船只，使用海事组织编号 9033969，并改变了航线和目的地。[7] 与此同时，获得合法授权、以海事组织编号 9033969 登记的船只，即悬挂科摩罗国旗的“Hika”号[8] 停泊在 7 000 多英里外几内亚湾的洛美附近(见图二)。

[7] 船旗登记处发放海上移动业务标识(MMSI)号码。这些号码并不是唯一的，可能会重复。当一艘船更换船旗时，可将其 MMSI 号码分配给另一艘船。这导致“冒充”现象，即显示一艘或多艘船只同时在两个位置出现。见 Maritime Intelligence，“Understanding AIS (Automatic Identification System)”，2017 年 3 月 10 日。可查阅 https://maritimeintelligence.informa.com/resources/product-content/understanding-the-automatic-identification-system。

[8] 在最后一次航行中，“*Hika*”号在自动识别系统传输中更名为“*Mahika*”号。这一更名意味着“*Yuk Tung*”号的船员只需更改一个字母“h”，就可以暗示“*Mahika*”号已成为“*Maika*”号。专家小组正在调查“*Hika*”号的船东可能与“*Yuk Tung*”号的船东串谋的情况，在“*Yuk Tung*”号被指认前，两艘船在东非和亚洲采用了相似的贸易模式。

图二

“Yuk Tung”号(别名“Maika”号)开始冒充“Hika”号(别名“Mahika”号)




资料来源：Windward。

7. 商业海事情报平台、船舶雷达、专门的海事数据库和船舶报废信息表明，2018年6月至11月这种欺骗行为一直持续。在10月份的船对船移交之前和移交期间，“Yuk Tung”号以一个假报的海事组织编号运行，而它所冒充的“Hika”号则进行了从几内亚湾到孟加拉国吉大港报废场的最后一次航行，[9] 并于2018年10月9日在那里被拉上岸做报废处理(见图三)。

[9] 关于船舶报废的信息，见附件8。

图三

2018 年 8 月至 10 月“Yuk Tung”号假报自动识别系统信息；2018 年 10 月 28 日和 29 日的情况；2018 年 7 月 24 日至 10 月 9 日“Hika”号前往吉大港的最后一次航行(从左往右顺时针方向)



资料来源：海洋搜索者、专家小组、Windward。

8. 上面的图像反映了“Yuk Tung”号传输自动识别系统信号的方式，以前的专家小组报告记录了自动识别系统信号失联的情况，认为这种失联是非法船对船移交和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海上相关活动的一项风险指标。[10] 这一更为精密的欺骗手法获得了成功，因为“Yuk Tung”号假报了“Hika”号的海事组织编号，因此没有引起船旗国、商业海事情报平台或其他海事服务提供方的警觉。

实体伪装和文件造假

9. 欺骗行动的最后一个要素是实体伪装和文件造假。这一活动似乎经过预先精心策划，因为“Yuk Tung”号和“Hika”号的外观独特：两艘船是同一家造船企业按照相同的设计规格在同一年建造的一模一样的孪生姐妹船，其外形、吨位和设备完全相同。另一个会员国提供的图像分析表明，在 2018 年 3 月被指认后，“Yuk Tung”号经过了实体伪装，其排气管油漆圈中的缩写字母“YT”被清除，船尾上的船名和海事组织编号被改为“Maika”及其海事组织编号(见图四)。“Yuk Tung”号还获得了一份虚假或伪造的赤道几内亚船籍证书(图五)。[11] 虚假


[10] 包租船不间断地进行自动识别系统传输已成为少数全球大宗商品贸易公司的要求，这些公司的区域办事处主要集中在新加坡。这些公司主要通过船上交货价格合同，在针对东亚船对船移交市场的全球石油和石油产品供应链中占据重要地位。

[11] 赤道几内亚的方便旗在向国际海事组织(海事组织)报告船舶登记或年度吨位方面的记录很差，而且对专家小组关于该文件是伪造文件还是以虚假借口签发的文件提出的询问未予答复。

的登记文件、[12] 伪造的自动识别系统传输信息加上对该船进行的实体伪装为之提供了必要的掩护，骗过了大多数全球和区域大宗商品贸易商目前采用的屈指可数的尽职调查和积极遵守措施。这些欺骗手段没有引起全球和区域银行的警觉，这些银行在不知不觉中为与此次移交活动有关的多项金融交易提供了方便；它们也没有引起提供船东责任保险和船舶保险的保险公司和再保险公司的警觉。

图四

“Yuk Tung”号图像分析




资料来源：会员国。

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[12] 根据“Maika”号(别名“Yuk Tung“号)的虚假赤道几内亚登记资料，船东是塞舌尔的 Virtue Base 发展有限公司(Virtue Base Development Ltd)。Virtue Base 公司的通信转交地址为高雄市汎德船舶安全管理公司(Vanguard Shipping Safety Management)。12 月 3 日，专家小组致函汎德公司，要求该公司说明其在成立 Virtue Base 公司方面的作用及其与其他四艘悬挂外国国旗、涉嫌参与从 2017 年开始的多次非法船对船移交的船只的关系。汎德公司的答复是，他们应“赖先生”的要求成立了 Virtue Base 公司，但已不再与“赖先生”接触。关于其他悬挂外国国旗、参与船对船移交的船舶，汎德公司指出，在两起案件中，他们只是船舶管理者，对货物不负责；在其他案件中，文件是伪造的，其他案件有法律争议，其中涉及船对船移交的一艘船实际上是中国船，没有悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗(见附件 6)。

图五

“Maika”号(别名“Yuk Tung”号)的虚假船籍证书



资料来源：专家小组。

“Yuk Tung”号的大宗商品和中介链

10. 此次向“Yuk Tung”号移交的货物价值 5 700 000 美元，所涉及的大宗商品交易和中介链与前几份专家小组报告中记录的价值数百万美元的交易相类似。[13] 该区域的主要石油和原油贸易商兴隆集团(Hin Leong)同意向另一家已知客户，即也是在新加坡注册的远泰燃料贸易有限公司(Yuantai Fuel Trading)供应石油产品。一些人曾与远泰公司接洽，称他们代表的是一家在伯利兹注册但明显位于中国台湾省的实体——金豪有限公司(Golden Luxury Corporation)。[14] 金豪有限公司后来向远泰公司提供的文件表明，在此次移交中，他们的客户是设在阿拉伯联合酋

[13] S/2018/171，第 71-73 段。

[14] 金豪有限公司在其文件中提供的地址似乎位于基隆市 CSBC 公司的造船厂(见附件 4)。远泰公司提供了可独立核实的财务文件，以证实其作用和有关金豪有限公司的声明。

长国的实体——Zeeshan 建筑材料贸易有限责任公司(Zeeshan Building Matters Trading LLC)。这些文件没有得到核实，也没有提供任何相关银行记录或其他可信或独立的文件来核查货物的实际最终用途交付。专家小组致函金豪有限公司，但未收到任何答复(见附件 5)。自那时以来，兴隆集团和远泰公司一直与专家小组合作，提供了充分的透明度。2018 年 12 月 10 日，兴隆集团表示，其“已停止船对船业务，并已将我方船只撤出东海”和另一个受影响地区。[15]

制裁对“船上交货价格”合同的影响

11. 这类事件可能会继续发生，原因有二。第一，尽管大宗商品贸易商及其相关银行、保险公司和船只采取了各种机制以遵守与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的制裁规定，但“Yuk Tung”号采用的欺骗手段骗过了这些机制。第二，东亚市场“船上交货价格”合同法律定义的实质是，在船对船移交过程中，当货物通过管道从一艘船的护栏向另一艘船的护栏输送时，对货物的责任即从卖方转给买方。然而，安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会指认某些船只适用全球入港禁令和注销登记制裁并指认其中一些船东，意味着如果委员会或会员国认定所涉的移交行动违反制裁，则对非法移交货物的责任不会随着货物越过护栏而终止。如果移交货物的一方被判定违反了相关决议所载措施，那么，这种特别针对东亚市场的船上交货价格合同可能会丧失合法性，“船上交货价格”背后的概念也就不再适用。例如，在 1 月向“Rye Song Gang 1”号进行了船对船移交后，“Yuk Tung”号及其船东于 2018 年 3 月被指认。虽然兴隆集团通过其充分透明的披露证明其是不知情的当事方，但专家小组注意到，兴隆集团没有执行专家小组在 2018 年 5 月 10 日给该公司的信中概述的最终用户交货核查条款“最佳做法”(见附件 7)。调查仍在进行。

建议

12. 会员国和相关国际组织应确保在其管辖范围内在船上交货价格市场存在风险的环节开展业务和(或)在有关国际水域从事船对船移交活动的全球和区域大宗商品贸易公司和油轮船队采用包含有效最终用途交货核查的合同语言。

13. 会员国和相关国际组织应确保在其管辖范围内在受影响的船上交货价格市场的那些环节开展业务的全球和区域大宗商品贸易公司和油轮船队评估它们打算向其供应决议所禁止产品的所有船只的自动识别系统历史。

非法船对船移交的频率：66 天概况

14. 2018 年 11 月 30 日，一个会员国向专家小组提供图像(其中包括一些船只连续几天进行非法活动的图像)，表明悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和外国国旗的油轮在 2018 年 6 月 2 日至 8 月 9 日的 66 天内进行了船对船移交。已查明的船只包括“Ji Song 6”号、“Myong Ryu 1”号、“An San 1”号、“Yu Phyong 5”号、

[15] 已存档的来往公文。

“Sam Jong 2”号和“Nam San 8”号。在若干案件中，东海一些身份不明的小型船只参与了移交活动(见图六)。

图六

2018 年 6 月至 8 月悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮与身份不明的船只进行船对船移交的情况



资料来源：会员国。

15. 三次记录在案的移交涉及以下悬挂外国国旗的大型船只：“Shang Yuan Bao”号(海事组织编号：8126070)、“New Regent”号(海事组织编号：8312497)和“Xing Ming Yang 888”号(海事组织编号：8410847) (见图七)。

图七

悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮与悬挂外国国旗的船只进行船对船移交



资料来源：会员国。

方便旗登记

16. “Shang Yuan Bao”号已因伪造船只身份在 2018 年 5 月 18 日与悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮“Paek Ma”号进行船对船移交而受到专家小组的调查(见附件 13，第 4 段)。“Shang Yuan Bao”号在 2018 年 5 月 18 日和 6 月 2 日以及“New Regent”号在 2018 年 6 月 7 日进行船对船移交活动时的方便旗国均是巴拿马，2018 年 8 月，专家小组致函巴拿马。巴拿马在 2018 年 11 月 2 日的答复中指出，“Shang Yuan Bao”号“于 9 月 6 日从巴拿马商业登记册中被删除”，“删除”“New Regent”号的程序则从“9 月 4 日”开始(见附件 9)。2018 年 8 月 16 日，专家小组致函“Xing Ming Yang 888”号的方便旗国塞拉利昂。塞拉利昂没有答复专家小组的多次询问。

船东、运营方和管理方

17. 专家小组调查了这些船只的船东、运营方和管理方。关于 2018 年 5 月 18 日涉及“Shang Yuan Bao”号的船对船移交，中国台湾省的瑞荣船舶管理有限公司(Jui Zong Shipping Management)答复称，第一次移交是“一个大误会”，当时他们的船是通过输送石油产品的软管提供饮用水(见附件 10)。关于发生在 2018 年 6 月 2 日的第二次船对船移交，瑞荣公司 2018 年 10 月 15 日作出答复，但没有提供任何要求其提供的文件，只表示“司法部调查局正在调查此案，我们相信他们会还我们清白”(见附件 11)。关于“New Regent”号，该船的运营方、注册船东和管理方均未对专家小组的询问作出答复。[16] 关于“Xing Ming Yang 888”号，香港启航国际航运管理有限公司(Hongkong Qi Hang International Shipping Management Co. Ltd)代表香港名称的船东及运营方做出答复，提供的理由与瑞荣公司为“Shang Yuan Bao”号提供的理由相同(见附件 12)。专家小组提醒他们注意，第 2375(2017)号决议规定，禁止与悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只进行任何船对船移交。

船只情况

18. “Shang Yuan Bao”号、“Xing Ming Yang 888”号和“New Regent”号都具有类似于参与非法船对船移交的大多数悬挂外国国旗船只的特征，或类似于所载燃料最终被运至朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的船只的特征。这种船只特征包括：它们都是通用沿海商品油轮，出港后在先前查明的东海区域 600 海里范围内作业。[17] 这些船只通常在不存在遵守制裁标准或标准很低的方便旗国管辖下航行，2011 年至 2017 年期间，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制的船只频繁利用这些船旗国。这些船只往往比较老旧，在港口国管制安全检查方面得分很低，或曾因污染而被港口国或沿海国罚款。它们已在欧洲、北美和东亚注册的船东责任保险公司购买保

[16] 船舶运营方和管理方是中国台湾省的海升国际船舶安全管理顾问有限公司。巴拿马指出，注册船东福满集团有限公司(Mega Glory Holding Ltd)在英属维尔京群岛注册(见附件 9)。该公司亦作为“New Regent”号及其他三艘船的船东在中国香港注册。

[17] 这些船只相对较小，载重量在 5 000 至 20 000 吨之间。

险或再保险。海运业的一些惯例传统上保护受益船东免于潜在环境和税务责任，[18] 有助于掩盖可能最终从向悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只进行违禁燃料移交中获利的外国国民的身份。

悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮、朝鲜民主主义人民共和国中介网络和悬挂外国国旗的船只

19. 2018 年 11 月，一个会员国通知专家小组，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正在利用大约 23 艘该国油轮进行违禁船对船石油产品移交。该会员国点了以下六艘船的名，指出它们是最活跃的船只，占所有移交活动的 50%：[19]“An San 1”号、“Chon Ma San”号、“Sam Jong 2”号、“Yu Son (Yuson)”号、“Kum Un San”号和“Saebyol”号(“Chong Rim 2”号)。在 2018 年 10 月 4 日提交给委员会的另一份材料中，该会员国提供了关于两艘悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮(“Sam Jong 2”号和“Ji Song 6”号)分别在 2018 年 9 月 12 日和 5 月 24 日与身份不明的船只进行非法船对船移交的图像(见图八)。

图八

在 2018 年 9 月 12 日和 5 月 24 日进行非法船对船移交的“Ji Song 6”号(上)和“Sam Jong 2”号(下)



资料来源：会员国。

20. 有船对船移交记录的其他悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮包括“Myong Ryu 1”号、“Yu Phyong 5”号、“Nan Sam 8”号(见第 14-17 段和图六至图七)、“Yu Jong 2”号、“Rye Song Gang 1”号和“Paek Ma”号(见附件 13)。

[18] 这往往涉及将一艘船的“注册船东”地位给予在伯利兹、英属维尔京群岛、中国香港、马绍尔群岛或塞舌尔等领土设立的离岸空壳公司。

[19] 该数字是运货次数比例，不是运货量比例。

除了不遵守规定，这些船只还经常从事身份欺诈和其他违反《联合国海洋法公约》和海事组织条例的活动。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国中介网络

21. 2018 年 11 月，一个会员国告知专家小组，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的海外银行代表处在第三国中介的帮助下安排船对船移交交易。该会员国称，已知的一个人是 Ko Il Hwan[20] (고일환)，他是被指认的朝鲜大成银行驻中国沈阳代表。专家小组以前曾因其代表大同信贷银行处理付款事宜而对朝鲜大成银行沈阳代表处[21] 特别是 Ko Il Hwan 进行过调查。朝鲜大成银行至少使用了两个假名来掩盖其在与航运相关活动中的身份：조선녹색산업무역 (朝鲜绿色产业贸易)和조선신용투자회사(朝鲜信用投资公司或朝鲜信用投资会社)。[22]

22. 该会员国给出了这类中介使用的几家已知公司的名称。其中之一是位于俄罗斯联邦的 Gudzon 航运有限责任公司(Gudzon Shipping Company LLC)。2018 年 6 月 22 日和 11 月 18 日，专家小组致函 Gudzon 公司及其附属公司 Primorye 海运物流有限公司(Primorye Maritime Logistics Co. Ltd)，询问从其船只“Patriot”号向“Wan Heng 11”号进行船对船石油产品移交的情况(见附件 13-14)，以及据报于 2018 年 8 月 22 日向悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮“Chong Rim 2”号和“Chon Ma San”号进行两次船对船移交石油产品的情况。[23] 专家小组在信中要求提供有关参与这些移交的中介的资料(见附件 14)。专家小组尚未得到答复。

船对船移交的通信方法

23. 专家小组的调查表明，微信(一个通讯、社交媒体和移动支付应用程序)是在东海和黄海进行船对船移交活动的主要通信手段，有关方面在该平台上使用了各种技术来掩盖相关活动。在专家小组调查的至少一起案件中，当事方以地理坐标代替船只身份进行沟通。此外，收货船通过微信将一张显示人民币钞票最后四位数的照片传给一艘供货船，以便在移交燃料之前对收货船进行认证。一家在 2018 年参与同朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的船对船移交企图的外国石油供应商(同时也是船东)告知专家小组，2017 年，有关中介至少有两次在微信上要求他关闭其船只的自动识别系统。这些中介代表的是企图避免在中国渔业保护区内被发现非法捕鱼的捕鱼船队油轮。他们的保密工作并不局限于微信平台，然而却使调查和追踪代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行事的中介的努力更加复杂。

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[20] 出生日期：1967 年 8 月 28 日，护照号码：PS927220424。

[21] S/2017/150，第 225、227 和 230 段。

[22] 见附件 43。关于朝鲜大成银行的更全面信息，包括其使用的其他别名，另见附件 42。


[23] 专家小组没有得到所报告的这些移交活动的图像证据。一个会员国报告指出，移交活动发生在 2018 年 1 月中旬。根据俄罗斯联邦 9 月 28 日的来文，“已根据标准光船租赁协议，于 2017 年 7 月 5 日将‘Patriot’号的所有权和使用权移交给 PML 有限公司(PML Co. Ltd)。自那时以来，Gudzon 有限责任公司(Gudzon Company LLC)一直没有参与该船的商业运营，因此不可能在 2018 年 1 月发出装载石油产品和随后向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只移交这些产品的指示。”

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口：非法活动中心

24. 一个会员国提供的图像显示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国某些港口特别是南浦港是疑似非法活动的中心。有一些图像强烈表明有关方面一贯利用南浦港来装载违禁出口的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭(见第 31-34 段和附件 15)。此外，一个会员国提供的图像还表明，有参与非法船对船移交记录的油轮广泛使用南浦的海运进口码头。图像显示了这些船只是如何使用附在卸货浮标上的水下管道将燃料从船只转移到南浦港的综合码头的(见图九)。

图九

南浦港的海运进口码头：非法船对船移交卸货中心



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口官员考察访问新加坡

25. 此类明目张胆的违规行为只有在南浦港官员充分知情并予以合作的情况下才能发生。2018 年 10 月 12 日，一个会员国告知专家小组，“新加坡可能发生了违反制裁情况”，此事涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和新加坡之间的一个科学或技术培训项目，其中包括南浦港官员对新加坡港口的一次考察访问。在给新加坡的信中，专家小组提及在南浦发生的系统性违反决议情况，并指出，根据专家小组先前的若干报告，该港口也是会员国查获的各种集装箱的进出口地点，这些集装箱被发现载有来自或运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的物品，违反了相关决议的规定，包括旨在制止核、弹道导弹和其他武器相关材料的措施。

26. 2018 年 12 月 4 日，新加坡答复专家小组，确认朝鲜民主主义人民共和国负责监督本国港口、航运和船舶业务的陆海运相姜宗宽率领代表团访问新加坡。专家小组以前的报告指出，远洋海运管理有限公司等被指认实体由陆海运省控制。[24] 新加坡在答复中表示，它“已经核实代表团成员不是被联合国指认的个人”。对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口活动及其高级管理人员的调查仍在继续。

27. 除了指挥从事违禁活动的船只外，据报告，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国至少有一名船长在 2018 年 10 月因携带未申报的大量现金而从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只下船后被捕(见图十)。[25] 针对专家小组的信函，俄罗斯联邦答复说，2018 年 10 月 2 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国公民 Kim Kwang Il 在佩尔沃迈斯基海关被拘留，“从他手中缴获了大量现金”。俄罗斯联邦指出，“根据《俄罗斯联邦刑法》第 200.1 条第 2(a)款，此人因未申报现金 179 900 美元而被提起刑事诉讼”。俄罗斯联邦在答复中表示，调查仍在继续，“尚未证实有联合国安全理事会综合名单所列的朝鲜个人参与其中”。[26]

图十

从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船长手中缴获的大量现金



资料来源：http://dvtu.customs.ru。

[24] S/2016/157，第 136 段指出：“自 2014 年 7 月 28 日被指认以来，远洋海运继续运营和调整。专家小组证实，远洋海运在被指认之前和其后，一直在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国陆海运省的领导下工作并受其控制。该省在帮助远洋海运逃避制裁措施方面发挥了不可或缺的作用。”

[25] 见 http://dvtu.customs.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24856:180---------&catid=49:press-cat&Itemid=100；Oliver Hotham，“朝鲜人因“大规模”走私现金被符拉迪沃斯托克海关拘留”，NK News，2018 年 10 月 3 日。

[26] 据媒体报道，另有一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民因携带 192 300 美元和 1 000 欧元在符拉迪沃斯托克国际机场被拘留。(消息来源：http://dvtu.customs.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25205:-200-------&c atid=49:press-cat&Itemid=100；“朝鲜人因“大规模”走私现金被符拉迪沃斯托克海关拘留”，NK News，2018 年 11 月 26 日。)专家小组于 2018 年 12 月 10 日致函俄罗斯联邦，调查仍在继续。

船舶交易区块链平台：Marine Chain 公司

28. 2018 年 10 月，一个会员国告知专家小组，“一家初创公司正将自己打造为一个名为‘Marine Chain’的香港注册区块链平台，其背后至少有一名朝鲜人”。[27] 该会员国表示关切的是，“这一平台可能被用来为该政权创收，并通过创造一种掩盖船只所有权的新方法，成为逃避航运制裁的潜在手段”。

29. 专家小组调查了 Marine Chain 公司首席执行官新加坡籍“船长”Jonathan Foong 涉嫌违反第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段的情况。专家小组要求提供一名涉嫌此事的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的资料，此人自称是 Marine Chain 公司的顾问。

30. Foong 在给专家小组的答复中提供了相互矛盾的资料和文件，不符合专家小组的证据标准。他声称 Marine Chain 公司已经关闭，称“公司关门是因为所有者/投资者没有支付账单”。[28] 关于“所有者/投资者”的下落和他与“所有者/投资者”的通信情况，他表示，“尽管我已经通知所有者，请他结清所有未付账单(拥有(原文如此)将近 50 万美元)，但他未作回应，此后不久我们就失去了联系”。关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用网络活动逃避制裁的信息(见第 109 至 115 段)。

船对船煤炭移交

31. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国已将其大部分海上煤炭贸易转为非法船对船移交，作为规避第 2371(2017)号决议第 8 段的主要手段。这种非法运输在 2018 年变得常规化和系统化(见附件 15)。记录显示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船队中的一些最大型船只继续每月在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口装载煤炭，然后进行非法船对船移交，主要移交地点是北部湾(见图十一)。

图十一

北部湾船对船煤炭移交



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。


[27] 该会员国还指出，Marine Chain 公司“声称是一个基于以太坊的区块链平台，拥有自己的加密货币令牌，将通过数字令牌化技术促进全球海洋船舶买卖”。

[28] Marine Chain Platform Limited 于 2018 年 4 月 12 日在香港注册，于 2018 年 9 月 17 日关闭。

32. 在其他情况下，卫星图像显示，此前曾悬挂外国旗的船只，例如 2018 年 3 月 30 日被指认适用全球入港禁令和摘旗措施的“Hua Fu”号(海事组织编号：9020003)，在 2018 年 8 月和 9 月继续多次进行非法船对船移交(见图十二)。

图十二

“Hua Fu”号于 2018 年 8 月和 9 月进行非法煤炭移交



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。

33. 记录显示，其他悬挂外国旗或现在无国籍的身份不明船只，例如此前悬挂巴拿马国旗的“Forever Lucky”号(海事组织编号：9003653)、此前悬挂多哥国旗的“Lucky Star”号(海事组织编号：7942843)和此前悬挂科摩罗国旗的“Oriental Treasure”号(海事组织编号：9115028)(见图十三)，也伙同参与了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的非法煤炭出口业务。包括朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在内的任何船旗国都没有向海事组织报告过这些新船旗。

图十三

“Forever Lucky”号、“Lucky Star”号和“Oriental Treasure”号进行非法煤炭业务



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运煤船只悬挂假旗：“Wise Honest”号

34. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只采用“悬挂双国旗”等欺骗做法运输了大量煤炭和其他违禁货物，这些行为违反了相关各项决议和《联合国海洋法公约》的规

定，实际上使这些船只成为无国籍船只，容易受到登临权的影响。这一趋势的一个例子是“Wise Honest”号(海事组织编号：8905490)，2018 年 4 月 1 日左右，该船在运输 25 500 吨煤炭途中被印度尼西亚扣留。根据一个会员国提供的资料和图像(见图十四)，专家小组于 2018 年 6 月 14 日和 8 月 27 日分别致函印度尼西亚。2018 年 9 月 12 日，印度尼西亚报告称已检查了该船，发现其在两个管辖区进行了登记，拥有一套悬挂塞拉利昂国旗的登记和船员文件，还有一套悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的登记和船员文件。[29] 与所有从事违禁贸易且违反海事组织条例的悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只一样，据报该船在航行“进入印度尼西亚领水的过程中关闭了”自动识别系统，并且“没有向目的地港务局提交报告以办理适当的船只清关手续”。[30] 2018 年 11 月 29 日，印度尼西亚告知专家小组，“Wise Honest”号船长因“故意悬挂假旗”而受到起诉。

图十四

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只“Wise Honest”号 2018 年 3 月 11 日在南浦装载煤炭(左)，4 月 9 日出现在巴厘巴板港口设施(右)




资料来源：会员国。

[29] 见附件 16。

[30] 印度尼西亚还表示，“没有向目的地港务局提交报告以办理适当的船只清关手续”。

图十五

“Wise Honest”号可能的航线



资料来源：会员国。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭：中介活动和出口链

35. 专家小组对煤炭中介活动和出口链的调查突出表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国获得了大量收入，商品贸易商也从这些交易中寻求佣金或套利。合同显示，“Wise Honest”号运输的货物价值 2 990 000 美元(见附件 17)。关于这批货物的出口文件和中介活动链条，印度尼西亚说，它找到了“来自一艘俄罗斯货船的货物单据和清关文件，该船打算在东加里曼丹巴厘巴板水域进行船对船移交”。专家小组要求提供进一步的说明和(或)文件，但迄今尚未收到。印度尼西亚还称，大韩民国的 Enermax 公司是“在巴厘巴板进行船对船煤炭移交后，煤炭的最终目的地/接收方”(见附件 16)。2018 年 12 月 3 日，Enermax 公司告知专家小组，国家当局对其进行了调查，没有进口煤炭。[31] 合同显示，货物卖方名为香港诺瓦国际商贸有限公司(Hong Kong Nova International Trade Company)，是一家销售香烟制造机械的实体。该公司告知专家小组，它“不知道合同来自何处，也不知道为什么有我们公司的印章”(见附件 18)。

36. 专家小组查明，煤炭运输中的一个关键人物是 Hamid Ali，他是印度尼西亚商品贸易商和经纪人，定期与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻雅加达大使馆的外交官

[31] Enermax 公司表示：“我们只是从一个似乎是印度尼西亚当地经纪人的人那里收到了一份印度尼西亚原产煤炭报价”。

会面。[32] 2017 年 12 月，这些外交官将 Ali 介绍给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 Jinmyong 贸易公司及 Jinmyong 联合银行总裁 Jong Song Ho，作为“建立西爪哇朝鲜文化中心工作”的一部分。[33] 一个月后，Ali 再次会见了 Jong，并讨论了煤炭转运事宜；[34] 这项服务的费用是 760 000 美元，由 Jong 安排通过一家名为 Huitong Minerals 的公司转入 Ali 的账户(见同上)。据 Ali 称，另一名经纪人 Eko Setyatmoko 随后参与了转运。Setyatmoko 收到了 Huitong Minerals 的至少一部分付款，自“Wise Honest”号 4 月份被拦截以来一直与该船及其船员保持联系，他没有对专家小组的询问作出回应。专家小组告知印度尼西亚、Ali 和 Setyatmoko，根据各项决议，这 25 500 吨煤炭应予没收，经纪人不得将其出售。专家小组尚未收到任何关于煤炭已从船上卸下的确认。调查仍在进行。

37. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2017 年通过俄罗斯远东港口转运违禁出口煤炭的情况，[35] 其中包括通过霍尔姆斯克转运。[36] 2018 年 12 月 10 日，大韩民国起诉其 4 名国民和 5 家商品贸易公司非法进口煤炭和生铁(见表 1)。据报告，检察官办公室列举的动机是“利用朝鲜煤炭和其他材料因难以在国际上交易而价格低廉的情况进行套利，从中获利”。[37]

表 1

受到起诉的违禁商品：类型、数量和价值

商品	数量(吨)	价值(美元)
煤炭	29 843	4 610 000
型煤	8 275	(煤炭和型煤)
生铁	2 010	971 000
违禁进口总值	—	**5 581 000[a]**

[a] 在 2019 年 1 月 7 日给专家小组的答复中，大韩民国报告称，检察官办公室表示，来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的 29 843 吨煤炭、8 275 吨型煤和 2 010 吨生铁“被非法运往韩国——这些都是临时数字，有待司法部门作出最终判决”。

[32] 通过朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆，Ali 先生被介绍给一些在中国、印度尼西亚和越南旅行的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国商人(见附件 19)。

[33] Jong Song Ho 在印度尼西亚的当地代表是 Kwak Chol Su，电话：+ 62 813 803 00501(见附件 19)。

[34] Jong“讨论了分销朝鲜产品的可能性，他询问是否可以租用船只转运来自俄罗斯的煤炭，而不使用朝鲜船只(原文如此)”(见附件 19)。

[35] S/2018/171，第 59 段。

[36] 据报告，这批货物“从未通过俄罗斯海关，在伪造了原产地文件后被运往韩国”。见 Baek Kyung-Seo 和 Shim Kyu-Seok，“四人因购买北方煤炭被起诉”，《韩国中央日报》，2018 年 12 月 11 日。可查阅：http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3056743。

[37] Joyce Lee，“韩国检察官指控四人进口朝鲜煤炭”，路透社，2018 年 12 月 10 日。可查阅：https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-coal/south-korean-prosecutors-indict-four-for-importing-north-korean-coal-idUSKBN1O90TP。

38. 2018年9月，一个会员国告知专家小组，上述违禁货物仅是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国更大规模商品贸易的一部分。在这些贸易中，一些国际银行在不知情的情况下为一个更广泛的跨国贸易网络提供信用证，该网络通过英属维京群岛和中国香港等离岸管辖区以及其他地点开展业务。从事此类贸易的船只所有人试图通过“洗船”方式掩盖其船只的真实身份，欺骗海事组织为后来根据第2397(2017)号决议第9段扣押的船只提供新的海事组织编号(见附件28)。调查还在继续。

劫持船只和使用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗

39. 专家小组继续对此前悬挂伯利兹国旗的“Wan Heng 11”号(海事组织编号：8791667)进行调查，该船于2018年2月13日首次被发现与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国“Rye Song Gang 1”号油轮(海事组织编号：7389704)进行非法船对船移交。尽管伯利兹于2018年2月19日撤销了其登记，但该船仍然偶尔以伯利兹登记船只身份发送信号，包括在4月10日与俄罗斯联邦登记船只“Patriot”号进行船对船移交时。这种情况一直持续到2018年6月21日，该船在当日将身份转换为悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只“Kum Jin Gang”号。

40. 值得注意的是，这一重新登记是在没有正式通知海事组织的情况下进行的，[38] 也没有征得船舶合法所有人浙江万恒海运有限公司(Zhejiang Wanheng Shipping Company)的同意。该公司与专家小组合作，提供了证据证明，2017年11月29日，该公司与香港新宇国际船务有限公司(Hong Kong Cosnewvi International Shipping)签订了光船租赁协议，代表后者的是中国台湾省人 Chen Chun-han，此人还持有台湾居民来往大陆通行证。[39] 光船租赁协议包含一项“非法贸易条款”，该条款于2018年2月19日生效。当天，船只所有人通过船只撤销登记通知，从伯利兹当局获悉其船只有违反制裁的行为。经过中国当局多次调查，合法所有人试图找到并收回其船只，但没有成功。[40] 根据企业登记处的资料，香港新宇国际船务有限公司于2018年8月24日解散。Chen Chun-han 没有对专家小组作出回应。

41. 这一案例突出表明该区域大型船舶所有人频繁从事光船租赁会遇到一种新风险。该案表明，违反制裁相关条款的租船人在因记录在案的违规行为而被取消合同后，不会归还船只。重要的是，长达12个月的“Wan Heng 11”号被劫持事件说明了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船旗登记处和港口现在如何为这些船只提供安全港，包括供应燃料和食品补给，并确保联合国指认的撤销登记措施不会使这些船只成为无国籍船只、因而更有可能根据《联合国海洋法公约》的规则受到针对非法活动的检查。[41] 此外，对“Wan Heng 11”号和其他此类船只实施的全球

[38] 《联合国海洋法公约》第91条第(2)款要求船旗国不仅对船舶进行登记，还应向已登记的船舶签发证明登记情况和国籍的文件。

[39] 这两份文件均由专家小组存档。

[40] 根据光船租赁安排，船只所有人没有向“Wan Heng 11”号提供职员或船员，而该船在事件发生后关闭了自动识别系统。该公司提供了证据，证明他们曾试图通过 Chen Chun-han 的台中商业地址与其联系，要求提供船只位置并立即予以归还，但挂号信件被退回。

[41] 《联合国海洋法公约》，第110条。

入港禁令意味着，这些船只不能进入受商事法院和其他法庭管辖的港口，这将为合法所有人提供法律追索权。

船旗国、商品贸易商、保险公司和船级社的尽职调查和自动识别系统监测

42. 关于上述逃避制裁策略，特别是持续关闭自动识别系统的问题，专家小组在 2018 年进行了一次书面调查，调查对象包括所有曾为被查明参与违反第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 和 14 段规定的悬挂外国旗船只进行登记的方便旗国或为其提供服务的保障与赔偿保险公司。作为调查的一部分，专家小组还致函在相关区域运营的全球主要商品贸易公司和炼油厂，包括其产品已被非法运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易公司和炼油厂，要求它们提供资料，说明为确保其服务或合同下的相关船只和货物不被运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国而采取的任何尽职调查和减轻风险措施。专家小组在信函中提出了“自动识别系统关闭条款”这一最佳做法，以及关于确保全球商品贸易商、炼油厂和生产商对石油产品进行最终用途交货核查的合同条款，并在 2018 年 2 月至 6 月与业界和会员国协商期间进一步倡导这些做法。

43. 在对专家小组关于自动识别系统监督的信函作出答复的方便旗国中，目前没有国家对在其管辖下航行船只的自动识别系统进行监测，因此无法确保这些船只遵守《国际海上人命安全公约》等相关国际条约所载的自动识别系统条例。对东北亚国际水域可能从事违禁活动的船只自动识别系统缺乏监测，这意味着即使自动识别系统被关闭或被操纵，提示可能会出现非法船对船移交活动，这些方便旗国也无法发现。同样，在作出答复的保赔协会保险和再保险公司中，没有一家表示对运输其承保货物的船只的自动识别系统进行监测。

44. 一些实体表示采用了某些形式的自动识别系统关闭条款，其中包括 3 家最大的全球商品贸易公司以及少数亚洲石油贸易商和炼油厂。此前只有一家全球主要商品贸易公司向专家小组表示，对适用于特定亚洲地点交货的合同制定了全面的最终用途交货核查证明文件要求，而另外两家主要贸易商在其合同中列入了目的地限制条款。一家全球主要商品贸易公司既制定了自动识别系统关闭条款，也规定了最终用途交货核查要求，这表明私营部门有能力以相对较低的成本加强尽职调查。

45. 如果上述措施得到更广泛的采用，可能会大大减少愿意关闭或以其他方式操纵自动识别系统以进行非法船对船移交的包租船的数量。如果相关船旗国采取类似措施，船长可能会明白，关闭或操纵自动识别系统以进行非法船对船移交，可能会导致船只被撤销登记、失去保险以及因租船和运输合同终止而蒙受经济损失。

46. 专家小组还进行了另一项调查，调查对象包括向参与违禁船对船石油移交以及违反决议出口和转运煤炭的船只提供船级服务的所有公司。在大多数情况下，专家小组发现这类合同已经撤销，船只已被“取消船级”。虽然船级社可能将取消船级一事通知船旗国和船只所有人，但通常不会给出理由(违反决议)，这使得其他船级社可能会在不知情的情况下向船只或船只所有人提供服务。为了确保更好地协调信息，船级社在根据船只违反决议行为对其取消船级时，应通知委员会以及船旗国、船只所有人、相关国际和区域组织以及行业协会。

违禁捕鱼活动

47. 专家小组发现，2018 年全年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续进行第 2397(2017) 号决议明确禁止的转让捕鱼权行为，这构成了该国的潜在收入来源。专家小组分析了两个会员国的报告，注意到在 2018 年 1 月至 11 月期间，两国检查了 15 艘以上的中国渔船，发现这些渔船持有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的捕鱼许可证。[42] 通过检查和报告，获得了关于这些船只在多个区域作业的详细资料，包括在日本和中国、朝鲜半岛及俄罗斯联邦之间海域的渔场作业。一名渔民在接受一个会员国询问时表示，大约有 200 艘中国渔船在“朝鲜水域”作业。另一名被询问者表示，一张捕鱼许可证的每月费用为 50 000 元(约合 7 250 美元[43])。可观察到的证据包括驾驶台上悬挂的捕鱼许可证号码牌(见图十六)，而在另一张照片中，船只悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗(图十七)。

图十六

悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国捕鱼许可证号码牌和国旗的渔船



资料来源：会员国。

48. 专家小组注意到两种混淆手法：一是外国渔船使用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国当局签发的捕鱼许可证，二是悬挂假旗。例如，在一艘由中国公民当船长的船只上发现了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国当局签发的捕鱼许可证(见图十七)。在另一起案件中，专家小组正在对基于俄罗斯联邦海岸警卫队录像片段的媒体报道进行调查，录像片段显示，至少有一艘中国渔船悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗，以混淆其国籍(见图十七)。

[42] 在一个会员国询问的船员中，发现一些个人在下列船只上工作：福远渔 679、福远渔 680、合兴 88、闽霞渔 1067、Urongyu61006(鲁荣渔 61006)。

[43] 2018 年 12 月 11 日兑换率。

图十七

捕鱼许可证(左)和中国渔船船头悬挂的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗(右)



资料来源：会员国(左)；YouTube(右)。

49. 专家小组致函中国和俄罗斯联邦，要求提供与调查相关的资料。中国告知专家小组，“中国一贯认真执行安全理事会有关朝鲜的各项决议。安全理事会通过第 2397(2017)号决议后，中国主管当局立即发布公告，禁止从朝鲜购买捕鱼权，中国实体已根据公告停止从朝鲜购买捕鱼权。如果任何中国公民或船只被证实从朝鲜非法购买捕鱼权，或未经许可在朝鲜海域非法捕鱼，中国将依照法律法规处理有关问题”。专家小组尚未收到俄罗斯联邦的答复。

建议

给安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会的建议

50. 指认下列船只违反第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段，非法转让石油产品：

“Myong Ryu 1”号，海事组织编号：8532413，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗

“Song Won”号，海事组织编号：8613360，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗

“Jin Yang 36”(金洋 36)号，国旗不详

“Xing Ming Yang 888”号，海事组织编号：8410847，塞拉利昂

51. 将第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段的规定纳入船只指认标准，并酌情将其纳入现有的被指认船只名单。

52. 修正除名程序，使会员国能够代表船只所有人申请除名(专家小组关于修正船只除名程序的建议，见附件 20)。

给会员国的建议

53. 船旗国应将其撤销登记船只情况通知委员会和专家小组。

54. 船旗国应对其船只的自动识别系统进行监测，以更好地确保决议得到执行。

55. 会员国应考虑对保障与赔偿保险和再保险公司提出监管要求，将自动识别系统筛查和“自动识别系统关闭”条款纳入其对在相关区域运营的风险船只的合同中。

56. 会员国应考虑对石油产品贸易、精炼和生产公司提出监管要求，在其合同中纳入关于最终用途交货核查措施和自动识别系统筛查的内容以及“自动识别系统关闭”条款。

57. 海事组织成员国应考虑采取措施，改善船旗国和其他有关方面的信息共享和海事条例执行工作。

58. 会员国应考虑制定立法，确保在其管辖范围内运营的全球和区域银行针对在受影响区域风险较高的船上交货市场进行石油和石油产品贸易的全球和区域商品贸易商及经纪人，在信用证、贷款和其他金融工具中引入自动识别系统筛查和船只尽职调查风险评估条款。

59. 为了让船旗国、其他会员国和海事相关行业能够更有效地开展尽职调查，委员会应考虑将被指认船只合并到一份文件中。关于船只的信息应包括相关决议规定的措施，如资产冻结、禁止入港以及撤销登记或船只服务。还应反映向委员会报告的撤销登记事件，以防止因疏忽而重新登记。

贸易数据所反映的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国商品进出口情况

60. 关于本报告所述期间朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进出口的详细资料，见附件 21。

三. 禁运、被指认的实体和个人

阿尔及利亚

61. 针对专家小组 2017 年 8 月 10 日关于万寿台海外开发会社的信函，阿尔及利亚在 2018 年答复说，“阿尔及利亚境内没有安全理事会制裁名单所列的朝鲜公司或实体”。不过，阿尔及利亚还指出，一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民“声称是万寿台海外开发会社的代表”，此人名为 Choe Song Il，是一名公司经理。他的正式职务是“MOP Group Algeria LLC”公司经理。该公司于 2015 年 8 月 20 日注册，专门从事“大型公共工程、建筑设计、采矿和家具制造”。此外，Choe 的继任者 Kim Chol Jin 于 2017 年 2 月 3 日抵达阿尔及利亚，Choe 在同一天离开该国。专家小组注意到，据阿尔及利亚称，该公司于 2018 年 1 月 8 日正式解散。Kim Chol Jin 于 2018 年 3 月 18 日离开阿尔及利亚。

安哥拉

62. 专家小组继续对一个由大约 80 名成员组成的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军事顾问团进行调查。据一个会员国称，顾问团于 2017 年 1 月离开安哥拉，目的地不明。2018 年 8 月 27 日，安哥拉答复专家小组称，“我们不知道 2017 年有任何军事顾问从安哥拉前往莫桑比克，或到莫桑比克旅行”。安哥拉告知专家小组，派驻安哥拉、代表朝鲜青松联合会社工作的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官 Jon

Chol Yong[44] 于 2017 年 4 月 20 日离开安哥拉领土。安哥拉还指出，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆工作人员“大幅减少，2016 至 2017 年期间有 12 名外交官，目前只有 6 名”，并向专家小组提供了获得认证的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官名单(见附件 22)。

博茨瓦纳

63. 关于万寿台海外开发会社在博茨瓦纳的活动，博茨瓦纳与专家小组进行了合作，于 2018 年 2 月 6 日回信答复说，政府于 2004 年与设在温得和克的万寿台海外开发会社签订了合同。该公司设计并建造了“三酋长纪念碑”，总经理 Kang Hyo Song[45] 担任该公司代表。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的两名工人 Ri Ung Si[46] 和 Sin Yong[47] 在项目的最后阶段访问了博茨瓦纳。博茨瓦纳还告知专家小组，2007 年，Kang Hyo Song 获得了博茨瓦纳居留证，并在哈博罗内注册了“朝鲜艺术与纪念碑有限公司”(Korean Art and Monument(Proprietary)Limited)，专家小组目前正在就此进行调查。博茨瓦纳在 2017 年 10 月 27 日提交的执行情况报告中指出，[48] 三酋长纪念碑合同是与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有记录的最后一次接触。

柬埔寨

64. 柬埔寨在答复专家小组的询问时说，万寿台新技术有限公司(Mansudae New Tech Corporation Ltd)是一家投资公司，是万寿台海外开发会社在柬埔寨发展理事会和商业部注册成立的子公司，该公司“与柬埔寨王国政府签订了在暹粒省建立大吴哥全景博物馆的协议”。柬埔寨提供了曾在该公司工作的 12 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民(2 名管理人员[49] 和 10 名工作人员)的个人资料，但尚未对专家小组最近的信函作出答复。

中国

从事秘密核采购的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国被指认实体

65. 专家小组继续对第 2270(2016)号决议指认从事核采购活动的被指认实体南川江贸易公司、南兴贸易公司和相关幌子公司及其代表进行调查，其中包括 Kang Mun Kil。据一个会员国称，Kang Mun Kil 采购了第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)段禁止的用于核计划的物项，包括压力传感器。[50] 根据该会员国获得的文件，2013 年

[44] S/2017/150，第 103 段；S/2018/171，第 85 段。

[45] 出生日期：1971 年 10 月 13 日，护照号：827220297(2007 年 5 月 3 日签发，2012 年 5 月 3 日到期)。

[46] 结构工程师，出生日期：1942 年 2 月 28 日，护照号：211130196。

[47] 建筑师，出生日期：1964 年 1 月 4 日，护照号：463130133。

[48] S/AC.49/2017/95。

[49] Kim Sang Gyu，出生日期：1966 年 3 月 25 日，护照号：563320017；Ri Kyong Il，出生日期：1981 年 3 月 3 日，护照号：PS836220044。

[50] 关于受限制的压力传感器的规格，见 S/2006/814，附件(2006 年)和 INFCIRC/254/Rev. 8/Part 2(2010 年)，附件 3.A.7。

和 2016 年，他至少两次从名为“上海振太仪表有限公司”(以下简称“上海振太”)的中国公司采购压力传感器。[51] 在一个商业网站上，上海振太还被宣传为向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出售真空设备的出口商。根据该会员国的说法和证明文件，Kang Mun Kil 利用一家名为“億億順有限公司”的香港公司[52] 进行采购活动。截至 2014 年 9 月，Kang Mun Kil 已正式将億億順有限公司更名为“順熠有限公司”(Shunyi Limited)，该公司提供了一个中国的银行账户，用于从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转账。该会员国告知专家小组，Kang Mun Kil 在中国的继任者是 Chong Won Ryol，此人是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，除了代表南川江贸易公司工作外，还是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻大连的官方贸易代表。专家小组要求中国提供上海振太真空设备销售和最终用户资料、億億順有限公司[53] 与上海振太之间的往来通信以及该公司的压力传感器目录、相关海关文件、移民和签证记录、出入境信息以及财务资料。中国答复专家小组说，“有关当局已对此案进行了全面认真的调查”，“上海振太仪表有限公司不具备中国法律法规规定的出口资格。自成立以来，振太没有直接从事任何出口贸易，也没有委托贸易代理公司代为出口”，“关于香港的億億順有限公司和順熠有限公司，经中国深入调查发现，没有证据表明它们代表南川江贸易公司在中国经营”。中国还告知专家小组，“上述两家香港公司在中国一家银行开设的银行账户已经关闭”，“Kang Mun Kil 于 2016 年离开中国，现在不在中国境内”。

66. 作为这项调查的后续行动，专家小组目前正在面向世界上制造核采购“瓶颈”物项(例如压力传感器)的公司进行调查，以查明、确定并最终分享良好的企业内部筛查系统和其他主动进行最终用途交货核查的实例。

刚果民主共和国

67. 专家小组正在调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国参与刚果民主共和国金矿开采的情况。专家小组查看了一家在金沙萨注册的金矿公司 Medrara 的信件，该公司的主管是黎巴嫩公民 Fouad Dakhlallah。有一封信是 Medrara 公司 2017 年 9 月 9 日写给 Kim Chol Su 的，此人是联合国指认实体 Saeng P’il(又称朝鲜青松联合会社)的代表。信中概述了对 Medrara 公司金矿的拟议投资，指出“金矿面积为 16 000 公顷”，并任命叙利亚军火贩运人侯赛因 • 阿里为指定中间人，称“经你核准后，大马士革的侯赛因 • 阿里先生将为在贝鲁特的会面作出一切安排”。这封信由 Dakhlallah 发出，提供了侯赛因 • 阿里的详细联系方式。还有一封更早时候于 2016 年 10 月 15 日给“Chong Ryong”的信。一个会员国评估认为，“Chong Ryong”很可能是此前经确认代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与侯赛因 • 阿里一道在苏丹开展活动的 Chongryong 技术公司。该信邀请朝鲜民主主义人民共和国地质学家小组访问，要求提供地质学家的姓名和护照号。Dakhlallah 还控制着一家名为

[51] 地址：中国上海市同普路 1358 号 1 号楼，电话：021-52707750，传真：021-52701844。

[52] 地址：香港九龙旺角道 33 号凯途发展大厦 7 楼 04 室，电话：+85-2-27935511，传真：+85-2-35902333。他还使用传真号码 04-1183-6555。该公司于 2014 年更名为香港順熠有限公司，并于 2017 年解散。注销文件上的公司主管是蒋萍(中国身份证号码：21060419730627002X)。

[53] 億億順有限公司于 2014 年更名为順熠有限公司。

Compagnie d’exploitation de bois d’Afriqu 的林业公司。专家小组写信给他，要求提供资料，说明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国参与其业务的情况，以及有文件证明的该国在非洲的中间人侯赛因 • 阿里参与其业务的情况，但没有收到任何答复。

68. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国为刚果民主共和国总统卫队提供军事训练并为总统卫队和警察特种部队提供 9 毫米枪支的情况，其中一些部队被部署到联合国中非共和国多层面综合稳定团。[54] 刚果民主共和国尚未对专家小组的询问作出答复。

埃及

69. 专家小组继续对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官 An Jong Hyok[55] 进行调查。An Jong Hyok 是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军事装备部派驻中东和非洲的总代表[56]，经授权代表 Saeng Pi’l 贸易公司(青松联合会社的别名[57])行事。一个会员国称，An 于 2016 年 8 月前往埃及，试图进行谈判以使埃及当局拦截的“Jie Shun”号船只及其所载 30 000 枚火箭榴弹获得释放，专家小组于 2016 年 11 月对所截船只及货物进行了检查。[58] 2018 年 4 月，埃及与专家小组合作，确认 An Jong Hyok 仍在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻开罗大使馆担任三等秘书。埃及又于 2018 年 7 月 13 日告知专家小组，An Jong Hyok“已不再是获得认证的朝鲜驻埃及大使馆成员，并已永久离开埃及”。一个会员国告知专家小组，埃及在平壤设有国防办事处。专家小组请埃及提供其驻平壤国防办事处活动的信息，埃及也对这项请求作出答复，指出“埃及已明确无误地表示与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国不存在军事合作”。

厄立特里亚

70. 专家小组继续对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Kim Kwang Rim 进行调查，小组以前曾报告此人是青松联合会社驻厄立特里亚的代表。[59] 专家小组向厄立特里亚询问此人的全部简历数据、活动和下落，但尚未收到答复。专家小组还继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与 Eritech(E-tech)公司之间的违禁军事合作以及 Eritech 与 Glocom 的关系。Eritech 公司在厄立特里亚国防军的授权或指示下行事，而 Glocom 是一家提供加密军事通信设备的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国公司。[60]

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[54] S/2017/742，第 24 段。

[55] 出生日期：1970 年 3 月 14 日，护照号码：563410155。

[56] S/2017/150，附件 14-25。

[57] 同上，第 182 段。

[58] S/2018/171，第 90 段；S/2017/150，第 61-71 段。

[59] S/2016/157，第 95 段。

[60] 关于专家小组以往报告的 Glocom 公司违反决议的情况，见 S/2018/171，第 173-177 段；S/2017/150，第 72-87 和 232-241 段；S/2017/742，第 52 段。另见本报告第 108-110 段。

德国

71. 专家小组对一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官 Ri Yun Thaek(别名 Ri Yun Taek)进行了调查。据德国称，他于 2012 年和 2013 年在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻柏林大使馆工作期间，试图采购一台多气体监测仪，这是一种也可用于生产化学武器的违禁两用物项。德国告知专家小组，德国阻止了这一采购企图，但由于 Ri 的外交身份而无法对其采取任何法律行动。德国随后驱逐了 Ri，并向其他欧洲联盟成员国通报了他的活动。因此，Ri Yun Thaek 派驻朝鲜民主主义人民共和国常驻维也纳联合国代表团和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻索非亚大使馆的资格认证都遭到拒绝。一个会员国称，Ri 随后被派往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻莫斯科大使馆。专家小组要求俄罗斯联邦提供信息说明 Ri 的情况。

伊朗伊斯兰共和国

72. 一个会员国告知专家小组，伊朗伊斯兰共和国是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在军事合作方面最有利可图的两个市场之一，[61] 朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司和青松联合会社(别名 Saeng Pi'l)在伊朗伊斯兰共和国的办事处“都很活跃”。该会员国还告知专家小组，最近观察到的一种模式显示，居住在伊朗伊斯兰共和国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民乘飞机往返于德黑兰和迪拜之间，他们在抵达阿拉伯联合酋长国后数小时内便飞回德黑兰。该会员国指出，这表明这些人是现金运送人。[62] 专家小组致函伊朗伊斯兰共和国，要求提供关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在该国活动的所有信息。专家小组在信中(见附件 23)指出，根据 2015 年和 2016 年与伊朗伊斯兰共和国的通信记载，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官 Kim Yong Chol 和 Jang Jong Son 曾在德黑兰和迪拜之间往返飞行超过 282 次，2016 年 3 月，这两人被指认担任朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司驻伊朗伊斯兰共和国的代表。[63] 专家小组还回顾，航空公司的信息显示，朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司总裁 Kang Myong Chol 于 2013 年访问德黑兰，青松联合会社总裁 Ri Hak Chol 于 2014 年访问德黑兰。专家小组提供的证据显示，每个被指认个人至少有两本护照及其他别名。专家小组回顾，会员国提供的信息表明，以前确定的被指认个人和被指认实体的代表现在正在使用假名或持不同护照旅行，并再次向伊朗伊斯兰共和国提出 2017 年所提要求，即提供所有派驻该国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官的姓名和护照号码。专家小组还要求提供在伊朗当局登记的所有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的护照和签证信息副本。伊朗伊斯兰共和国于 2018 年 12 月 19 日答复专家小组说，“除外交人员外，没有朝鲜国民在伊朗伊斯兰共和国境内居住”。伊朗还表示，“派驻伊朗伊斯兰共和国的朝鲜外交官迄今没有违反相关公约或安全理事会关于朝鲜的相关决议的规定”(见附件 24)。

[61] 两名小组成员指出，专家小组没有获得足够的统计资料。

[62] 两名小组成员指出，缺乏证据支持这一评估。

[63] S/2017/150，表 8 和 9。

利比亚

73. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与利比亚各当局进行军事合作的多次企图，并调查在利比亚的被指认实体和代表它们工作的外国国民。一个会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军事装备部副部长 O Chol Su 于 2015 年 3 月 23 日致函时任最高国防委员会主席兼总理助手的 Khalifa al-Ghwail，信中称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国“正在拟订维持利比亚稳定所需的防御系统和弹药的买卖协议”，还称“隶属我部的商业机构青松联合会社”将提供协议草案和其他文件。信中还提到叙利亚国民侯赛因 • 阿里所拥有的公司营销咨询局(Consulting Bureau for Marketing)的作用，据称此人是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在利比亚、苏丹和也门的军火贩运人。[64] Khalifa al-Ghwail 在 2015 年 4 月 5 日的回信中感谢 O Chol Su，并提到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国邀请利比亚技术小组访朝一事。随后利比亚国防部在 2015 年 5 月 20 日的一份文件中授权叙利亚国民侯赛因 • 阿里“代表我们在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国谈判、通信、交换信息、接收文件及技术和财务建议书”。专家小组怀疑，2015 年计划的活动与后来朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻利比亚大使与利比亚国防部于 2017 年 3 月举行的军事合作会议之间存在联系。[65] 利比亚和 Khalifa al-Ghwail 都没有答复专家小组的询问。

马达加斯加

74. 专家小组正在调查万寿台海外开发会社在马达加斯加的活动。马达加斯加在 2017 年 11 月 20 日的信[66] 中答复专家小组说，没有名为“万寿台海外开发会社”的公司在马达加斯加开展业务，也没有“朝鲜国民”在移民数据库中登记。

马来西亚

75. 2018 年 2 月 22 日，美国宣布已确定“朝鲜政府使用化学战剂 VX 在吉隆坡机场暗杀金正男”。[67] 3 月 14 日，在禁止化学武器组织(禁化武组织)执行理事会第 87 次会议上，马来西亚政府表示，是“VX 神经毒剂导致朝鲜国民金正男先生死亡”。马来西亚还指出，该国执法当局“仍在调查暗杀当天逃离马来西亚的

[64] 苏丹的答复见附件 26，护照信息见附件 30。

[65] 专家小组通过媒体渠道获得的信息显示，利比亚国防部新闻办公室在其脸书页面上公布了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与利比亚政府官员 2017 年 2 月 8 日在的黎波里会晤的报告。根据该脸书网页，利比亚国防部长 Al-Mahdi al-Barghathi 和新任朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻利比亚大使 Ju Jin Hyok 讨论了如何发展两国双边关系，“尤其是在军事合作领域”，并“商定制定一项联合行动计划，以促进的黎波里和平壤在各个领域的双边合作，特别是在技术合作领域、信息技术及军事通信领域的双边合作”。

[66] 信的原件为法文。

[67] 希瑟 • 诺尔特，美利坚合众国国务院发言人，“对朝鲜实施化学和生物武器控制及战争消除法制裁”，向新闻界发表的谈话，2018 年 3 月 6 日。可查阅：www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/03/279079.htm。

4 名朝鲜嫌疑人”。[68] 在法庭审理过程中，马来西亚警方一名调查员确认朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Ri Jae Nam 别名为 Hanamori，嫌疑人 Hong Song Hac 别名为 Chang，而 Ri Ji Hyon 别名为 Y，[69] 并指出 Ri Jae Nam 是暗杀的幕后策划者。[70] 有媒体报道说，在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Ri Jong Chol 的公寓中发现了可用于制造神经毒剂的设备，[71] Ri Jong Chol 在警方调查最初阶段先是被马来西亚拘留，随后于 2017 年 3 月 3 日被驱逐出境。

莫桑比克

76. 专家小组继续对代表被指认实体工作并前往莫桑比克的 6 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民进行调查。根据莫桑比克 2017 年 12 月的一封信，此 6 人(Kim Kwang Hyok、Kim Hyok Chan、Kim Song Chol、Ri Won Ho、Kim Sok Chol 和 Kim Jung Jong)于 2012 至 2017 年间前往莫桑比克。航空公司的记录显示，这些人在莫桑比克期间前往位于军事基地附近的偏远军民两用机场。莫桑比克尚未对专家小组关于这些人活动情况的询问作出答复，也没有答复小组关于提供 Ri Chang Su 的情况和旅行活动信息的请求。Ri Chang Su 是一名驻南非但住在莫桑比克的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官，他被确认是在莫桑比克从事违禁军事活动的海金刚贸易公司的代表。

77. 关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在莫桑比克开展的违禁渔业活动，[72] 莫桑比克于 2018 年 1 月 15 日提供证据证明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国-莫桑比克联合渔业公司 EMKIP 已被解散。4 月 11 日，莫桑比克告知专家小组，“2018 年 3 月 25 日，在悬挂朝鲜国旗作业的船只上工作的 22 名朝鲜船员最终从莫桑比克出发，返回原籍国”，并提供了有关票据和护照信息。莫桑比克告知专家小组，“4 名船员和一名经理(全部来自朝鲜)[原文如此]仍留在莫桑比克照看这些船只，并将在完成必要安排后立即返回本国。”2018 年 4 月 24 日，莫桑比克告知专家小组，与 EMKIP 业务有关的两艘雇用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船员的渔船已被注销登记，并在其他公司所有权下重新悬挂其他会员国国旗。

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[68] 关于马来西亚就 VX 神经毒剂攻击事件向禁止化学武器组织(禁化武组织)所作声明的更多信息，见禁化武组织 EC-87/NAT.14 号文件，可查阅：https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/87/en/ec87nat14_e_.pdf。

[69] 自由亚洲电台，“国防部门称，视频显示谋杀金的嫌疑人在河内恶作剧”，2018 年 3 月 20 日。可查阅：www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/kimjongnam-trial-03202018171630.html。国际刑事警察组织(国际刑警组织)于 2017 年 3 月对这 3 名嫌疑人和 O Jong Gil 发出红色通告。

[70] 自由亚洲电台，“马来西亚：金正男谋杀案的男性嫌疑人改变衣着和外表”，2017 年 10 月 26 日。可查阅：www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/kimjongnam-trial-10262017170212.html。

[71] Alastair Gale 和 Tom Wright，“朝鲜秘密军队：海外特工如何帮助朝鲜政权”，《华尔街日报》，2018 年 5 月 18 日。可查阅：www.wsj.com/articles/north-koreas-secret-army-how-operatives-abroad-aid-the-regime-1526652387。

[72] S/2018/171，第 97 和 98 段。

缅甸

78. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在缅甸的违禁活动。[73] 缅甸在 3 月告知专家小组，“自 2016 年 10 月以来，缅甸和朝鲜之间已不存在军事合作”，“目前没有缅甸技术人员驻扎在朝鲜”。[74] 专家小组于 2018 年 1 月要求缅甸提供自 2006 年 10 月以来与弹道导弹合作等军事合作有关的合同文件，但尚未收到答复。专家小组还要求提供所有缅甸技术人员从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国返回的证据，以及所有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国技术人员离开缅甸的证据。

纳米比亚

79. 关于万寿台海外开发会社在纳米比亚的资产问题，[75] 该国政府于 2018 年 2 月 12 日告知专家小组，万寿台海外开发会社于 2017 年 6 月 26 日举行了一次私人拍卖，卖掉了所有车辆和设备。纳米比亚提供了其中一辆车的买主的证词作为证据。专家小组注意到，至少有一辆客车的付款和转账是在万寿台海外开发会社被指认一个月后发生的。纳米比亚在上述信函中还说，万寿台的四辆自卸卡车还在苏德霍夫军事基地。专家小组要求就此提供更多信息，还要求提供有关万寿台持有的 23 辆车和其他重型建筑设备的信息。

荷兰

80. 2016 年，荷兰截获了经由中国运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的 4 台发电机组(见图十八)。调查突出揭示了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻欧盟某成员国外交代表 Kim Chol Yong[76] (见第 120 段)的作用。他在采购这些物项时告知欧洲联盟出口商，他是中国国民，货物将运往中国。被拦截的货物是 Kim 安排的第三批此类物项。荷兰海关当局获得的文件显示，Kim 的所有货物都靠不知情的中国物流服务供应商运送，其中包括一家位于大连的贸易公司。这些供应商将物项发送给与被指认实体 39 号室有关联的一家朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易公司。调查还发现，这三批货物的货款由 4 个主要在欧洲联盟内的不同实体支付，这些实体在实际出口中没有发挥明显作用。此案凸显了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官在代表按被指认实体指示行事的实体采购物项方面的作用，也凸显了利用第三国向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送这些物项的规避手段。

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[73] S/2018/171，第 101-103 段。


[74] 缅甸在 2018 年 3 月 15 日给专家小组的信中还表示，“国防部还重申，目前没有缅甸技术人员驻扎在朝鲜。”

[75] S/2018/171，第 108 段。

[76] 出生日期：1964 年 6 月 1 日。

图十八

截获的发电机



资料来源：会员国。

新西兰

81. 关于专家小组 2016 年对在元山飞行的飞机进行的调查，[77] 2018 年 5 月 29 日，新西兰地区法院对本国的飞机制造商太平洋航空航天有限公司(Pacific Aerospace Ltd)向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国间接出口飞机备件的行为处以 74 805 新西兰元的罚款，对“错误出口登记”行为罚款 1 000 新西兰元。判决书称，太平洋航空航天有限公司与北京通用航空公司(北京通航)成立了一家合资企业，并于 2015 年 9 月向北京通航出售了相应的飞机。北京通航于当月告知太平洋航空，已将飞机转售给环天航空有限公司(Freesky Aviation Company Limited)，后者告知太平洋航空，打算将飞机放在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国用于旅游目的，并将这一想法付诸实施，但没有改变对飞机的所有权。[78] 在 2016 年 1 月的一封电子邮件中，北京通航就尚未交付的一个飞机备件与太平洋航空接洽，明确表示该飞机位于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，这表明太平洋航空知道这些备件的最终目的地。[79] 由于此案，太平洋航空采取了新的出口管制做法。专家小组多次报告了通过多个实体转售物项以掩盖最终目的地的规避模式。

塞拉利昂

82. 有报告称朝鲜民主主义人民共和国参与了 2018 年 9 月弗里敦军营建设项目，这是第 2270(2016)号决议第 9 段禁止的活动，专家小组对此进行了调查。根据一个欧洲会员国提供的信息，该项目的地形图和试点研究是由被美国财政部指认的 Nam Nam 合作总公司(别名：Namnamhupchochong 朝鲜南南合作公司、조선남남협조총회사、朝鲜南南合作公司、Nam Nam 总公司)的工人领导。这些信息显示，此项目涉及一家几内亚公司 Guicopres。Guicopres 答复专家小组说，“虽然我们委托朝鲜进行试点研究，但地形图是由几内亚和法国工程师绘制的”。Guicopres 还指出：“因此，在本项目上从未与 Nam Nam 公司有过任何形式的协

[77] S/2018/171，第 145 段；S/2017/150，第 126-128 段。

[78] 新西兰海关诉太平洋航空航天有限公司[2018 年]新西兰地区法院 5034。

[79] S/2017/150，附件 12-10。

作或伙伴关系”。但 Guicopres 承认，“该公司[Nam Nam]曾因一次性的服务而获得报酬”。Guicopres 公司还表示，“我们已采取步骤，通知停止与该公司的所有协作”(见附件 25)。专家小组于 2018 年 12 月 12 日再次致函 Guicopres，要求提供关于 Guicopres 与 Nam Nam 公司和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民关系的详细信息和文件。2018 年 12 月 20 日，Guicopres 答复说，“我们只是在为建造弗里敦营地准备咨询文件期间与朝鲜工人接触。我们可以确认，他们[朝鲜 Nam Nam 公司]只是在初步可行性研究阶段与我们合作了几天，然后我们的测量员和地形学家便接管了工作。”(见同上)。

南非

83. 专家小组继续调查 Ri Chang Su[80] 和 Choe Kwang Su[81] 的派驻认证情况和行动，据报告，这两名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民在莫桑比克从事违禁军事合作，并持有经认证派驻比勒陀利亚朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆的外交护照。Choe Kwang Su 已返回朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，他的护照显示他是驻比勒陀利亚大使馆三等秘书。他在莫桑比克的继任者是 Ri Chang Su，其护照也显示他是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻比勒陀利亚大使馆的三等经济和商务秘书。[82] 专家小组先前报告朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2012 至 2014 年期间曾利用驻比勒陀利亚大使馆的外交官[83] 在邻国从事违禁活动。[84] 针对专家小组关于提供这些人出入境记录和财务信息的请求，南非答复说，“国际关系与合作部已查阅朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻南非外交人员编制的档案记录，必须强调指出，不存在派驻邻国的朝鲜外交官也获得认证派驻南非的机制。这种做法是朝鲜的谎报，Chung Su Ri 先生便属这种情况”。南非还说，“关于据称 Kil Jong Hun 先生、Kwang Yon 先生、Ri Chang Su 先生和 Choe Kwang Su 先生在南非持有的任何银行账户，该信息将由金融情报中心负责核实”。调查仍在继续。

苏丹

84. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与苏丹之间的军事合作项目。在本报告所述期间，专家小组获得了关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与苏丹开展更多军事合作活动的信息，包括 2016 年 9 月 28 日叙利亚军火贩运人侯赛因 • 阿里和 Chonryong 技术贸易公司[85] 之间的一封信件，信中提到今后将开展 Fagot 反坦克导弹和便携式防空导弹系统的技术转让，以便在“苏丹进行军事制造”。[86] 一个会员国还告知专家小组，与苏丹军事工业公司有关联的苏丹 Master 技术工程

80 S/2018/171，第 94 段。

81 S/2017/150，第 102 段。

82 S/2018/171，附件 28，第 138 页。

83 S/2016/157，第 173 段。

84 同上，第 173 段。

85 据报道，Chonryong 技术公司涉嫌于 2016 年向阿拉伯叙利亚共和国转让武器，见 S/2018/171，第 133 段。

86 一个会员国提供的信息。

公司[87] 于 2009 年与澳大利亚商人 Choi Chan Han (别名 Solomon Choi)进行接触，此人代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工作，因从事导弹部件和煤炭中介活动于 2017 年 12 月 16 日在澳大利亚被捕。2018 年 11 月 26 日，苏丹告知委员会，“军事工业合作(原文如此)(军事工业公司(苏丹))从未与名为“朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司”的公司打过交道，而一直与一家名为“未来电子公司(Future Electronic Company)”的公司有业务往来”。苏丹还告知委员会，“苏丹军事工业合作(原文如此)(军事工业公司)从未收到过来自朝鲜的任何货物。所有货物都来自其他国家。”针对专家小组报告的朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司驻苏丹代表 Kim Song Chol 和 Son Jong Hyok 的情况，苏丹表示，“Kim Song Chol 先生于 2013 年和 2016 年使用不同名字进入苏丹，并于 2017 年 5 月离开。自那时起，由于主管当局对他实行旅行禁令，他再也没有进入苏丹”。关于侯赛因・阿里的活动，苏丹告知委员会，“侯赛因・阿里先生曾于 2008 年提出向军事工业公司(苏丹)提供服务，但军事工业公司没有会见他，也没有与他开展任何合作”。专家小组要求提供苏丹称已被驱逐出境的未来电子公司在苏丹境内雇用的所有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民和其他雇员的姓名和护照详情。[88] 专家小组还要求提供未来电子公司与苏丹军事工业公司和苏丹 Master 技术工程公司之间的合同副本，以及项目取消的证据。专家小组还要求提供与苏丹境内联合国指认的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体或可能代表它们开展业务的其他实体有关的所有文件，这些实体包括朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司、端川商业银行、未来电子公司、Chonryong 技术贸易公司和 Chosun Keumcheong 技术贸易总公司(Chosun Keumcheong Technology General Trade Corporation)，专家小组在 2015 年 12 月至 2018 年 11 月期间一直针对这些实体向苏丹提出请求(见附件 26)。

85. 2019 年 1 月 2 日，苏丹与专家小组合作，提供了合同和索要的其他证据，苏丹称“军事工业公司与未来电子公司签署了单一框架协议。之后签订了两份执行合同，为开发 122 毫米[武器]和空投炸弹的项目提供备件”。[89] 此外，未来电子公司与苏丹 Master 技术工程公司之间的合同涉及“东部雷达恢复、防空系统、战术通信、维修和备件及培训领域”的其他各种方案和物项(见附件 27)。苏丹还就朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司的幌子公司未来电子公司和朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司代表的情况向专家小组提供合作。关于朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司代表 Kim Song Chol，苏丹说，“Kim Song Chol 先生于 2013 年首次访问苏丹，以跟踪关于 122 毫米[武器]开发合同的执行情况”。后来又第二次访问，视察一些正在安装 P-12 和 P-15 雷达的工作小组。苏丹指出，此后，Kim Song Chol“为收取某些款项，于 2016 年使用不同姓名和新护照第三次访问苏丹”。苏丹向专家小组提供了禁止 Kim Song Chol 重返苏丹的文件。关于朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司的幌子公司未来电子公

[87] 以前有报告称苏丹 Master 技术工程公司参与了朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司的火箭和导弹军事合作项目，见 S/2017/150，第 106 段。

[88] 苏丹在其 2018 年 8 月 14 日向委员会提交的国家执行情况报告(S/AC.49/2018/98)第 4 段中称，“苏丹政府驱逐了上述公司的工作人员，并禁止他们进入苏丹，最后一名工作人员于 2017 年 8 月 12 日离境”。

[89] S/2017/150，第 106 段。

司的情况，合同称该公司在第三国注册，其代表是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国护照持有者 Hong Man Bak。[90]

阿拉伯叙利亚共和国

86. 专家小组继续对下列事项开展多项调查：朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国之间的违禁活动，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国技术人员继续往返叙利亚，该国境内有代表被指认的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体工作的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，以及叙利亚军火中间商企图在中东和非洲多个会员国出售朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军事装备。

87. 2018 年，一个会员国向专家小组通报说，与违禁活动有关、为叙利亚国防工厂(Maamal al-Difaa)工作的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国技术人员在 2016 年和 2017 年间又对叙利亚进行了数次访问，其中包括 2017 年春季离开阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的 3 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民[91] (见表 2)。

表 2

访问阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国技术人员的信息

姓名	出生年份	护照号码	签发年份
Yang Kyong Song	1961	83632010	2016
Kim Jong Gil	1971	927120306	2017
Kim Thae Hyon	1966	927120305	2017

88. 该会员国称，另外 3 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专家(见表 3)于 2017 年 5 月 3 日抵达阿拉伯叙利亚共和国，受到叙利亚武装部队防空部成员 Samer Haydar 上校的接见。

表 3

访问阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专家的信息

姓名	出生年份	护照号码	签发年份
Kim Yong Chol	1970	836238472	2016
Ko Jong Myong	1974	56343410	2013
Ri Song	1960	927220125	2017

89. 叙利亚驻平壤大使馆向这三人签发了为期 3 个月的签证。[92] 他们的姓名和护照号码与曾在 2011 年 2 月、2016 年 8 月、2016 年 11 月和 2017 年 3 月往返阿拉伯叙利亚共和国从事弹道导弹和其他违禁活动的那几批朝鲜民主主义人民共

[90] 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国护照号码：836298402。

[91] 确切的离境日期已存档。

[92] 签证号码由专家小组存档。

和国技术人员的不同；这表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与阿拉伯叙利亚共和国之间的违禁军事合作有增无减。[93]

90. 此外，专家小组收到报告称，叙利亚国民代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国从事军火中介活动，企图向多个中东和非洲国家出售武器，据称他们提出为也门和利比亚的武装团体提供常规武器，并在某些情况下提供弹道导弹。一个会员国确认，被称为叙利亚军火贩运人的侯赛因 • 阿里[94] 代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行违禁军事合作，企图在利比亚(见第 73 段)、苏丹(见第 84 段)和也门(见第 97 段)出售武器。专家小组要求阿拉伯叙利亚共和国说明阿里及其设在大马士革的公司“营销咨询局”[95] 在这些国家及非洲和中东其他会员国开展活动的全部情况，但尚未收到答复。专家小组要求阿里充分说明他在过去和现在与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军事装备部、Saeng Pi’l 公司和其他被指认的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体及代表这些实体工作的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的关系，但也未收到答复。

91. 一个会员国告知专家小组，被指认为朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司驻阿拉伯叙利亚共和国代表的 Ryu Jin 已离开该国。阿拉伯叙利亚共和国尚未确认也未告知专家小组是否是根据第 2270(2016)号决议第 13 或第 14 段的规定将其驱逐出境的。专家小组从一个会员国获悉，一些被指认的个人和代表被指认实体工作的其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民(包括 Choe Jin Myong[96])继续在阿拉伯叙利亚共和国境内居住。

92. 2018 年 11 月，专家小组获悉，阿拉伯叙利亚共和国是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在与武器相关的货物和服务方面最有利可图的两个市场之一。[97] 据提供信息的会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正在继续与科学研究中心和军队供应局合作。朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司在阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的副主管名为 Rim Yong Hyok，而接替 Ryu Jin 担任驻阿拉伯叙利亚共和国首席代表的人则被称为“Kim”。专家小组致函阿拉伯叙利亚共和国(见附件 29)，要求提供在阿拉伯叙利亚共和国活动的所有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民和组织的信息，并附上了该国早些时候的答复(见同上)。阿拉伯叙利亚共和国答复了专家小组先前的询问，称“阿拉伯叙利亚共和国和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之间的现有关系”以及两国之间的“外交代表”均“符合国际法和《联合国宪章》”(见附件 31)。

[93] S/2018/171，第 125-127 段。其中一些人的姓名和护照信息已由专家小组存档。

[94] 出生日期：1942 年 1 月 1 日，护照号码：011095903；护照信息见附件 30。

[95] 最近一次公布的营销咨询局地址是阿拉伯叙利亚共和国大马士革 P.O. Box 33177，电话：963-11-3325044、3318888，传真：963-11-3331000，电子邮件：alali@net.sy。

[96] Choe Jin Myong 是从事军事装备业务的七星贸易公司(Chilsong Trading Company)的长期代表。Choe 与被指认的大玲江贸易公司(Daeryonggang Trading Corporation)驻北京代表 Han Il 合作，充当中间人，向叙利亚军火公司约纳星国际(Yona Star International)出售与武器有关的设备。见 S/2018/171，第 133 段。

[97] 两名小组成员指出，专家小组没有获得足够的统计信息。

乌干达

93. 2018 年 12 月 10 日，专家小组就一份媒体报道所述内容致函乌干达。报道称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国向乌干达提供了小武器和轻武器，还训练了乌干达特种部队，而且朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司通过朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻坎帕拉大使馆继续驻留该国。报道还说，像 MKP 集团这样的被禁合资企业继续使用新名称在该国开展业务，这些实体和附属机构与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和乌干达情报部门都有联系。[98] 专家小组在 2018 年 12 月 10 日的信中要求提供与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在乌干达开展的军事和准军事训练有关的所有合同副本，并提供这些合同被撤销和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人员离境的证据。专家小组还要求提供在乌干达的所有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民、包括所有军事顾问的姓名和护照详情。乌干达尚未作出答复。

94. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司在乌干达的存在和活动。一个会员国称，乌干达决定驱逐朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司的两名代表，[99]“导致该公司无法将据信是其在乌干达业务收益的一大笔现金转移出境。而 Yu Kyong Jin 的配偶 Ri Kyong Hui 和 Jong Kuk Chol 的配偶 Jo Su Yong 试图将这笔现金从乌干达转移出境”。该会员国还告知专家小组：“乌干达国防部高级官员可能知道与朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司的关系。这类官员参与这项活动事关重大，值得严加审查”。专家小组要求提供收缴的现金数额或据报朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司代表或其配偶未能转移出境的现金数额信息以及所用银行账户信息，乌干达尚未答复专家小组的请求。

阿拉伯联合酋长国

95. 至少到 2018 年 5 月，位于阿拉伯联合酋长国阿布扎比的 Prime Okryu 画廊在其网站(见图十九)上宣传了附属万寿台创作社的艺术家的作品，并在画廊出售了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的艺术品。网站还说，画廊隶属于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的 Okryugwan 餐饮集团(见附件 32)。专家小组于 2018 年 5 月 9 日致函阿拉伯联合酋长国，此后餐厅和画廊的网页均无法访问。专家小组获得的照片显示，画廊门上的标牌写着“画廊因装修而暂时关闭，不久即将开放”，这些照片摄于 2018 年 12 月。2019 年 1 月 2 日，阿拉伯联合酋长国答复专家小组说，“Prime Okryu 画廊的雇员中没有一人是朝鲜公民(原文如此)”，“阿拉伯联合酋长国政府已关闭了”该画廊。调查仍在继续。

[98] Joe Parkinson，“永远不要拍照：追踪突击队，朝鲜的秘密出口”，《华尔街日报》，2018 年 12 月 9 日。可查阅：https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-workforce-funds-north-koreaand-defies-sanctions-1544379764。

[99] 专家小组在 2018 年最后报告中指出，乌干达决定驱逐代表朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司行事的两名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官。见 S/2018/171，第 142 段。

图十九

Prime Okryu 画廊



资料来源：自由亚洲电台韩语服务部 Jinkuk Kim。

坦桑尼亚联合共和国

96. 专家小组继续调查海金刚贸易公司(别名 Haegeumgang)在坦桑尼亚联合共和国的活动，并继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对据称价值 1 049 万欧元的 Pechora(S-125)地对空导弹系统及其 P-12 防空雷达进行维修和升级的情况。[100] 坦桑尼亚联合共和国尚未答复专家小组的询问。

也门

97. 专家小组调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军事装备部和朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司通过已知代理人叙利亚国民侯赛因•阿里及其在叙利亚注册的公司营销咨询局向也门胡塞武装团体供应各种常规武器和弹道导弹的情况。一个会员国允许专家小组查阅了 2016 年 7 月 13 日胡塞派领导人 Zakaria Yahya al-Shami 少将向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军事装备部和朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司下属土星技术贸易公司发出的邀请函，信中请他们在大马士革会面，“讨论技术转让问题和其他共同关心的问题”。该会员国称，随后各方就“也门和朝鲜之间的合作议定书”进行了谈判，“胡塞武装驻大马士革大使 Naif Ahmad Al Qanis 和叙利亚军火中间人侯赛因•阿里”参加了谈判。据该会员国称，议定书涉及“多种军事装备，包括 Kalahnikov、PKC 机枪、RPG-7、RPG-29、Fagot 导弹、Igla 导弹、坦克、防空系统、弹道导弹”。专家小组要求 Zakaria Yahya Al-Shami 少将、Naif Ahmad al-Qanis 和侯赛因•阿里提供信息，说明他们在这些谈判中的作用以及从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国或代表该国供应此类武器的企图，但尚未收到他们的答复。

津巴布韦

98. 针对专家小组关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民和万寿台关联公司在津巴布韦开展活动的询问，津巴布韦于 2018 年 6 月 9 日提供了万寿台-博卡设计公司注销登记及其银行账户关闭的证据。[101]

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[100] S/2018/171，第 143 段。

[101] 同上，第 144 段。

奢侈品禁令执行情况

劳斯莱斯幻影

99. 专家小组调查了劳斯莱斯幻影豪华轿车 2018 年 10 月 7 日首次在平壤公开亮相一事，这明显违反了第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)㈢段及第 2094(2013)号决议第 23 段和附件四规定的奢侈品禁令，禁止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国直接或间接供应、销售或转让豪华汽车。专家小组在给劳斯莱斯汽车有限责任公司及其母公司宝马汽车公司的信中指出了一些显著特征，以帮助这些公司识别车辆(见图二十)。

图二十

2018 年 10 月 7 日在平壤看到的劳斯莱斯幻影轿车及车辆的显著特征



资料来源：美国之音。

100. 劳斯莱斯汽车公司在答复中告知专家小组，这辆车看上去是 2012 年 8 月至 2017 年 2 月在该公司古德伍德制造厂生产的第七代幻影加长轴距系列 II。劳斯莱斯汽车公司在答复专家小组询问时，强调了车辆识别号的重要性。调查仍在继续。

劳斯莱斯古思特

101. 专家小组继续调查 2017 年 1 月一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官向孟加拉国转移一辆虚假申报的劳斯莱斯古思特豪华轿车的事件，该车辆被孟加拉国海关情报部门扣押。[102] 专家小组请孟加拉国提供车辆位置信息及扣押调查报告。孟加拉国尚未答复专家小组的多次询问。

[102] S/2017/150，第 125 段。

梅赛德斯-奔驰豪华轿车

102. 专家小组继续对运到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的梅赛德斯-奔驰轿车进行调查，以确定所有车辆的车辆识别号以及是否有车辆被改装。[103] 在新加坡(见图二十一)、北京(见图二十二)和平壤会议期间，观察到其中一些梅赛德斯-奔驰轿车没有车牌，2018 年至少有一名外国国家元首在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国使用了这些轿车(见同上)。专家小组致函新加坡和中国，要求提供这些临时转运的车辆的识别号记录，或由大韩民国总统安全局进行检查，据报告该局局长当时是其中一辆车上的乘客。

图二十一

2018 年 6 月在新加坡拍到的非法获得的无车牌梅赛德斯-奔驰轿车



资料来源：YouTube。

图二十二

2018 年 6 月(左)和 2018 年 3 月(中)在北京、2018 年 9 月在平壤(右)拍到的非法获得的无车牌梅赛德斯-奔驰轿车



资料来源：路透社、平壤新闻集团/Pool via Reuters。

103. 新加坡在 2018 年 12 月 4 日的信中告知专家小组，“它要求提供车辆底盘和发动机编号，但朝鲜官员出于国家安全原因拒绝透露这一信息”。

雷克萨斯 LX 570

104. 专家小组对 2018 年 9 月朝韩首脑会议期间出现一些挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国车牌的雷克萨斯 LX 570 全轮驱动豪华车(见图二十三)一事进行了调查，

[103] 专家小组确定，其中一些梅赛德斯-奔驰轿车是在中国商人乔治·马(George Ma)的指示下，通过集装箱从美国加州长滩港运往中国大连的，乔治·马的公司 Seajet 是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国高丽航空公司的代理商，乔治·马曾在 2010 年参与向布拉柴维尔运送军火相关材料。这些车辆随后由辽宁丹兴国际货运公司通过集装箱转运。见 S/2016/157，第 118-121 段和附件 76-85。

因为这明显违反了第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)㈢段及第 2094(2013)号决议第 23 段和附件四的规定。丰田汽车公司告知专家小组，他们无法确定车辆识别号，并且“丰田公司遵守适用的联合国有关朝鲜的决议，不打算向朝鲜出口这些机动车辆，也无意在朝鲜制造这些机动车。我们只能假设这些车辆是通过隐秘渠道获得的，而且是在个人之间交换的”。丰田公司还进一步与专家小组合作，称这一代“LX 570 全轮驱动豪华车是 2012 年 1 月至 2015 年 7 月生产的”。

图二十三

在 2018 年 9 月 18 日至 20 日平壤韩朝首脑会议上看到的雷克萨斯 LX 570 型车辆



资料来源：YouTube。

伏特加酒

105. 2018 年 7 月，荷兰通知专家小组，它暂时扣押了一批疑似运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的伏特加酒。荷兰称，根据欧盟委员会第 2017/2062 号条例，伏特加酒(统一编码制度号 2208.60)被视为“奢侈品”。扣押的伏特加酒装运单据显示，这些酒在白俄罗斯生产，运往辽宁丹兴国际货运公司，该公司因涉嫌向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送梅赛德斯-奔驰豪华轿车而被专家小组调查过。装运单据中提到的另一家公司——Transit Prime 国际物流公司，电话号码和地址与辽宁丹兴国际货运公司相同。荷兰指出，辽宁丹兴国际货运公司在专家小组以前的报告中已经被点名，而且作为货运代理，不会是这批货物的最终目的地。辽宁丹兴国际货运公司网站称该公司是一家向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送货物的集装箱运输公司。[104] 专家小组致函该公司，要求提供伏特加酒最终目的地的信息。

106. 两份分别获得的伏特加酒发货合同显示，这批货物是由白俄罗斯制造商卖给格鲁吉亚一家名为 Noble House 有限责任公司的实体的，后者在这两份合同中都是买方。专家小组致函 Noble House，要求提供它与辽宁丹兴国际货运公司和 Transit Prime 国际物流公司之间的所有通信和财务交易记录。Noble House 没有按要求提供通信和财务交易记录，但答复称货物的最终目的地是中国，伏特加酒将“通过电子商务渠道”出售。Noble House 提供了一个人名、一个私人电子邮件地址和电话号码，声称这是其在中国的“贸易伙伴”。这个人、Transit Prime 国际物流公司和辽宁丹兴国际货运公司均未对专家小组的询问作出答复。

[104] 辽宁丹兴国际货运公司网站 2018 年停止运营。

四. 金融

107. 尽管 2017 年金融制裁措施有所加强，但由于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的欺骗性做法以及会员国未能识别和防止这些做法，制裁的效力被系统化削弱。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国仍可以进入国际金融体系，因其金融网络已迅速根据最新制裁措施做出了调整，采用规避手段，使非法活动难以被发现。会员国依然未采取安全理事会决议所要求的措施，包括冻结资产和驱逐在国外营业的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国银行的代表。会员国按要求须关闭其管辖范围内所有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国银行的下属机构，但一些个人被授权作为这些金融机构在国外的分支行事，使得朝鲜得以逃避这类制裁措施。通过网络攻击非法强迫资金转移，已成为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国逃避制裁的一个重要手段。自 2016 年以来，网络攻击的复杂性和规模都在增加。

108. 专家小组的金融调查还显示，会员国没有充分履行义务，冻结参与违反或逃避任何制裁措施的被指认实体或朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府成员控制的所有资产。在专家小组调查的几起案件中，会员国关闭了代表包括侦察总局在内的被指认实体行事的个人的账户，但没有冻结账户余额，允许他们向其他国家的银行转账。Glocom 和 MKP 的全球业务仍在继续，尽管专家小组过去报告了它们的非法活动，并向委员会和会员国提出指认它们并冻结其资产的建议。虽然一些会员国已按照决议的要求采取行动，限制其管辖范围内朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆和外交官的账户数量，但专家小组发现，有证据表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官通过在多个国家包括非正式派驻国开设和管理账户来规避上述规定，以从事非法商业活动。最后，专家小组调查了仍然存在的 200 多个可能的合作实体和自称的合资企业，尽管按照规定，会员国本该在 2018 年 1 月 9 日之前(即第 2375(2017)号决议通过后 120 天内)就关闭它们。此外，专家小组发现有资料表明，被专家小组视为合作实体的公司[105] 还可能违反了决议的其他规定，包括第 2321(2016)号决议第 18 段关于禁止将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交馆舍用于非外交活动的规定。专家小组还发现，一家与包括万寿台和侦察总局在内的被指认实体有联系的公司在其开展活动的另一个国家成立了合资企业。

网络攻击

109. 专家小组注意到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用网络攻击非法强迫从金融机构和加密货币交易所转移资金以逃避金融制裁的趋势。一个会员国称，“朝鲜利用网络空间作为一种不对称手段，在网络犯罪和逃避制裁方面开展非法的秘密行动。这些行动的目的是通过各种措施获得资金，以规避制裁。”(见附件 33)。美国法院文件、官员、政府声明和报告称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发起的多次网络

[105] 专家小组以前审议过两起合作活动案件，其中一个实体由至少一名非朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民和一个朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的个人和(或)实体管理、指挥或拥有，这是第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段所禁止的。见 S/2018/171，第 89 和 92 段。

攻击背后的罪魁祸首是侦察总局，该局在网络攻击中起了至关重要的作用。[106] 2017 年，第三个会员国告知专家小组，侦察总局监督和开展网络攻击行动，不仅是为了摧毁基础设施和收集情报，也是为了获取外汇。[107] 第四个会员国于 2018 年致函专家小组，提到侦察总局发动的网络攻击，并表示有报告称“以网络为工作重点的军事单位直接负责为该政权创收”。

110. 2016 年 7 月 28 日，大韩民国国家警察署称，针对网上购物中心 Interpark 的一次网络攻击是由侦察总局发起的，并说这次攻击的目的是企图“非法获取外币”(见附件 35)，这使朝鲜可以规避资产冻结。专家小组认为这是一起被指认实体企图利用网络攻击强迫转移 270 万美元以逃避制裁措施的案件。

111. 2018 年 9 月 6 日，美国政府起诉来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的黑客 Park Jin Hyok，他是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国黑客组织“拉撒路集团(Lazarus Group)”的成员，[108] 起诉罪名是他参与了“代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府工作的共谋者实施计算机入侵和网络欺诈的持续多年的广泛的阴谋。”[109] 美国表示，Park “曾前往中国，除了代表侦察总局开展活动外，还在幌子公司‘朝鲜博览会’合资企业(Korean Expo Joint Venture)里从事合法的信息技术工作”[110] (见附件 36)。专家小组要求中国政府提供资料，说明“朝鲜博览会”的活动以及作为第 2375(2017)号决议禁止的合资或合作实体可能继续运营的情况。中国表示，“中国根据专家小组提供的信息进行了调查。到目前为止，中国还没有发现任何注册为朝鲜博览会合资企业的公司，目前也没有关于 Park Jin Hyok 的信息”。

112. 美国指出，Park Jin Hyok 及其同谋者还“锁定孟加拉银行并执行了从该银行转出 8 100 万美元的欺诈性转账[……]，并在 2015 年、2016 年、2017 年和 2018

[106] 见附件 34。2017 年，媒体报道的美国国家安全局的一项评估将 WannaCry 勒索软件与侦察总局联系在一起，引用已知侦察总局曾使用的 IP 地址作为证据，见 Ellen Nakashima，“美国国家安全局已将 WannaCry 电脑病毒与朝鲜联系在一起”，《华盛顿邮报》2017 年 6 月 14 日。可查阅 https://wapo.st/2EYAVBB(美国和联合王国都作出了进一步声明，可查阅 https://bit.ly/2BK7qm6 和 https://bit.ly/2GPGUvn)。见美国财政部主管恐怖主义融资事务助理部长丹尼尔 •格拉泽 2015 年 1 月向国会发表的声明，可查阅 www.govinfo.gov/Content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg92556/html/CHRG-114hhrg92556.htm。见美国国家情报总监詹姆士 • R • 克拉珀 2015 年 1 月在网络安全国际会议上的发言：《国家情报、朝鲜和国家网络讨论》。美国国会研究事务处表示“大部分消息来源报告说，朝鲜网络行动的总部设在侦察总局”，可查阅 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44912.pdf。美国司法部 2018 年 9 月 6 日公布 Park Jin Hyok 一案的下述刑事指控，也称朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络攻击背后的黑手是侦察总局。针对索尼影视娱乐有限公司遭受攻击一事，美国指认侦察总局，美国财政部表示“朝鲜的许多重大网络行动都是通过侦察总局进行的”，见 https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9733.aspx。

[107] 该会员国告知专家小组，这是经过评估编码和属性后得出的判断。

[108] 美国政府把朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府支持的网络行为者称为“隐藏的眼镜蛇”(“Hidden Cobra”)，见 www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity。

[109] 美国加州中央区地区法院，*美利坚合众国诉 Park Jin Hyok*，案件号：MJ18-1479，刑事诉讼，2018 年 6 月 8 日。可查阅 www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download。

[110] 美国表示，“朝鲜博览会”是“隶属于朝鲜政府黑客组织之一的 110 实验室的幌子公司。这个黑客组织就是一些私人网络安全研究人员所称的“拉撒路集团”。见附件 36，题为“联邦调查局通缉犯 PARK JIN HYOK，阴谋实施电汇欺诈；共谋实施计算机相关欺诈(计算机入侵)”。

年对美国以及欧洲、亚洲、非洲、北美和南美其他国家的更多金融服务受害者进行了计算机入侵和网络抢劫，试图造成超过 10 亿美元的损失”。[111] 这 81 000 000 美元是通过 SWIFT 系统从孟加拉银行在纽约联邦储备银行的账户成功转移到菲律宾的账户，“随后通过多个银行账户、一家汇款公司和赌场中介进行洗钱处理”。[112] 菲律宾向专家小组提供了内部审计文件、银行信件、闭路电视录像和与追踪被盗资金有关的其他信息，其中大部分资金至今尚未追回。专家小组仍在对此案进行调查。

113. 专家小组还调查了另外两起出于资金动机实施的网络攻击案件，涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国试图非法强迫转移 2 000 多万美元资金。2018 年 5 月，由一个高级持续性威胁团体发起的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络攻击，通过 SWIFT 进行未经授权的交易，将 1 000 万美元从智利银行转移到主要在香港的一些账户。利用美国司法部公布的 IP 地址和其他详细信息，开源技术分析把攻击者与 110 实验室联系起来。[113] 根据美国的说法，110 实验室是侦察总局的一部分。[114] 其后在 2018 年 8 月，通过 28 个国家的 14 000 多台自动取款机同时取款，并使用 SWIFT 向一家香港公司的账户转账，共从印度的 Cosmos Bank 提取了约 1 350 万美元。针对这些自动取款机取款攻击，美国于 2018 年 10 月 2 日对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发出了“FASTCash Campaign”警报。[115] 最近的这些攻击表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在通过网络攻击获取经济利益方面越来越老练，工具和战术不断改进。对 Cosmos Bank 的攻击是一次更高级的计划周密、高度协调的行动，绕过了国际刑事警察组织(国际刑警组织)银行/自动取款机攻击缓解指南中包含的三个主要防御层。[116] 在 Cosmos Bank 一案中，攻击者不仅能够破坏 SWIFT 网络，将资金转移到其他账户，而且还同时破坏了内部银行流程，绕过交易核查程序，下令在全世界范围内向近 30 个国家转账，再让人在一个周末的时间里在这些国家通过 10 000 多次单独交易把现金提取出来。

114. 专家小组注意到，除针对法定货币的攻击外，涉及加密货币的网络攻击为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供了更多逃避制裁的途径，因为这些货币更难追踪，可以多次清洗，且不受政府监管。在 2017 年由侦察总局发起的 WannaCry 攻击中，赎金要求便是以加密货币提出的。据一项估计，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在

[111] 美国地区法院，美利坚合众国诉 *PARK JIN HYOK*，第 8 段。

[112] 同上，第 144 段。专家小组注意到，当时在菲律宾，赌场不被视为金融机构，因此不受该国反洗钱法的管制。

[113] 见附件 37 和 38。

[114] 该会员国告知专家小组，这是经过评估编码和属性后得出的判断；另见附件 36。

[115] 美国国土安全部，警报(TA18-275A) Hidden Cobra-FASTCash campaign 2018 年 10 月 2 日。可查阅 www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-275A。

[116] 见 Oleg Kolesnikov，“Securonix 威胁研究报告：CosmosBank SWIFT/自动取款机 1 350 万美元网络攻击案利用安全分析进行侦测”，2018 年 8 月 27 日。可查阅 http://bit.ly/2sgABa0。

2017 年 1 月至 2018 年 9 月期间对亚洲加密货币交易所进行了至少 5 次成功的攻击，造成 5.71 亿美元的损失(见附件 39)。[117]

115. 专家小组在上一份最后报告中提供的资料表明，负责在欧洲从事非法金融活动，包括向欧洲联盟和亚洲账户进行大规模银行转账的侦察总局特工(和家属)在信息技术领域都训练有素，技术娴熟，其中一个名叫 Kim Su Gwang 的人还设法获得了对该组织的信息系统负有重要责任的职位。[118]

建议

116. 专家小组建议安全理事会在起草今后的金融制裁措施时，考虑到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用网络攻击、通过非法为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国创造收入来规避决议的做法。

117. 会员国应加强能力，促进与其他国家政府和本国金融机构就朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络攻击进行有力的信息交流，发现并防止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用网络能力逃避制裁的企图。

118. 应将侦察总局发动网络攻击，以此作为逃避金融制裁和获取外汇的手段的相关信息增列到 1718 制裁名单侦察总局的条目中。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交人员的金融活动

119. 专家小组调查了以前派驻马来西亚的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官 Kim Jong Chol(别名 Ri Jong Chol)，他代表朝鲜 Ponghwa 贸易总公司开展业务。根据专家小组获得的文件，该公司与朝鲜金刚银行有关联。[119] 由于篇幅限制，这方面的资料载于附件 40。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的个人以驻吉隆坡大使馆外交官的身份，代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体并代表金融机构做生意，这种模式专家小组以前曾汇报告过。

120. 专家小组调查了另一名派驻欧洲联盟国家的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官 Kim Chol Yong 的银行业务行为，他在 2016 年曾协助安排试图通过中国向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送 4 台发电机组，但被荷兰拦截(见第 80 段)。Kim Chol Yong 利用在欧洲联盟金融机构的十几个银行账户在荷兰和至少其他三个欧洲联盟成员国开展业务。

121. Kim 在开设和使用银行账户时，采用了专家小组曾指出的许多逃避策略，包括：使用多个地址开立账户；以幌子公司名义开立账户；以家庭成员特别是其

[117] IB 集团，“对加密货币交易所的 14 次网络攻击造成 8.82 亿美元的损失”，2018 年 10 月 17 日。可查阅 www.group-ib.com/media/gib-crypto-summary/。另见附件 39；Priscilla Moriuchi《朝鲜转向加密货币以对抗经济制裁》，The Hill，2018 年 1 月 22 日。可查阅 https://thehill.com/opinion/international/370114-north-korea-turning-to-cryptos-to-counter-economic-sanctions。

[118] S/2018/171，附件 46。

[119] 朝鲜金刚银行(금강은행，又名金刚进出口银行、金刚银行)是一家专门为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易公司包括朝鲜 Ponghwa 贸易总公司进行进出口交易结算的银行。朝鲜 Ponghwa 贸易总公司隶属朝鲜民主主义人民共和国内阁对外经济委员会，与朝鲜平壤贸易公司有关联。

妻子和儿子的名义开立多个账户；以朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交使团的名义开立账户。在开立银行账户时，他还使用了自己姓名或共同签字人姓名的各种组合(例如 Kim Chol、Kim Chol Yong、Kim Cholyong、Chol Yong Kim)。此外，Kim 和他的妻子还是人寿保险储蓄账户(也称为“现金价值人寿保险”)的长期所有者。在 2017 年末，即上述企图发货被拦截事件发生一年多后，他们仍然能够将这些账户兑现，获得了 100 多万欧元的信贷。[120]

122. 专家小组以前曾建议会员国将所有使馆人员纳入第 2321(2016)号决议第 16 段的范围，并确保外交官不会以家庭成员或幌子公司的名义开立额外的银行账户。有关当局还应核实，外交官结束在派驻国的任期后，其银行账户是否被关闭。

123. 专家小组还调查了逃避第 2321(2016)号决议第 16 段规定的案件，在这些案件中，外交官在关闭账户时，将资金转移到非其正式派驻国的其他国家的金融机构。鉴于这一点以及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官居住在一国而同时又在其他国家经商的情况，专家小组建议会员国发布指导意见，选定一家银行作为唯一可为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆和外交官开立账户的银行，并通知所有其他银行不要为任何朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官或其家属开立账户。专家小组指出，第 2321(2016)号决议第 16 段禁止外交官以不同货币持有多个账户。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外银行代表

124. 专家小组继续调查 30 多名在国外开展业务的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金融机构的代表，包括端川商业银行、朝鲜金刚银行、外贸银行、第一信贷银行、大成银行、日心国际银行、东方银行、大同信贷银行、统一发展银行和柳京商业银行的代表。专家小组发现这些银行通过在中国、利比亚、俄罗斯联邦、阿拉伯叙利亚共和国和阿拉伯联合酋长国的代表开展业务(见附件 41-42)。专家小组注意到，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国银行的代表以前用来逃避制裁的支付办法在 2018 年被用来处理船对船移交货物的付款(见附件 43)。专家小组指出，上述所有会员国必须根据第 2321(2016)号决议第 33 段驱逐代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金融机构行事的所有个人。

125. 俄罗斯联邦在给专家小组的答复中告知专家小组，“Han Jang Su 先生是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻俄罗斯联邦大使馆商务参赞科的三等秘书，并得到俄罗斯外交部的正式认可。他于 2017 年 6 月 23 日进入俄罗斯联邦，目前在该国合法居留。没有关于与其官方身份不符的活动的信息。据称 Han Jang Su 先生利用其开展与外贸银行有关活动[……]的 Agrosoyuz 银行的执照已被中央银行吊销。”专家小组指出，由于第 2371(2017)号决议将 Han Jang Su 列为“外贸银行首席代表”，按照第 2321(2016)号决议第 33 段的规定，会员国须将其驱逐出境。专家小组还注意到，根据俄罗斯联邦联邦税务局外国法律实体认证分支机构和代表处国家登记处(RAFP)的记录，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外贸银行在莫斯科的注册办事处负

[120] 根据上述欧洲联盟条例，该账户的余额已转入他被允许持有的单一账户。

责人是“Han Zan Su”(Хан Зан Су)(见附件 44)。[121] 这一案件看上去符合专家小组指出的部分模式，即朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官利用其身份和大使馆从事违反决议的活动。[122]

侦察总局的金融活动

126. 关于侦察总局特工 Kim Yong Nam 和 Kim Su Gwang 及其家人的金融活动和资产，白俄罗斯告知专家小组，Kim Su Gwang 自 2015 年 9 月 24 日起被认可为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国副贸易代表。他与家人住在一起，直到他们于 2017 年 12 月 16 日在白俄罗斯-乌克兰边境乘坐一辆外交车辆离开。白俄罗斯表示，Kim 大部分时间都在国外度过，他的妻子在邻国购买物品，以北京一家中国公司的名义运回朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，并通过在上海一家中国银行的账户转移购货资金，这与专家小组以前关于侦察总局从 Kim Su Gwang 控制的账户在北京和上海提取现金的报告相符。[123] 此外，当另一个会员国关闭 Kim Su Gwang 和 Kim Yong Nam 的账户时(后者包括与他妻子 Kim (Djang) Tcheul(Hy)的联合账户)，其中一个账户的资金被转移到了 Kim Yong Nam 的妻子在上海同一家银行分行的账户。中国在答复专家小组关于该银行账户的询问时说，“中国没有发现[侦察总局]在中国金融机构开设任何账户”。专家小组指出，会员国有义务冻结代表侦察总局行事的所有个人的资产，其中包括为逃避制裁而由侦察总局特工以家庭成员名义设立的银行账户。

马来西亚-高丽伙伴公司集团

127. 专家小组继续对马来西亚高丽伙伴公司集团(MKP)进行调查，这是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在马来西亚的一家大型合资企业，专家小组已确定该集团与侦察总局、万寿台海外开发会社及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金融机构有联系。[124]

128. 赞比亚启动了对 MKP 的调查，并与专家小组合作。它提供的文件显示，Han Hun Il(MKP 创始人、侦察总局特工)2017 年至少两次违反旅行禁令，使用号码为 8361348791 的公务护照(2021 年 3 月 9 日到期；见附件 45)前往赞比亚。[125] 该旅行还使 MKP 马来西亚公司早前向专家小组提出的赞比亚业务是独立经营的说法遭到质疑。[126] 关于专家小组对 MKP 在下列国家的活动的最新调查结果：

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[121] 这一信息依据的是 2019 年 1 月 7 日的正式登记文件(2019 年 1 月 8 日检索)，记录显示该信息是在 2016 年 1 月 13 日输入的。

[122] S/2018/171，第 84、85、94、103、132 和 142 段；S/2017/150，第 18-21、25、91、103、161、162、182、189、208 段和表 8；S/2017/742，第 49 和 50 段。

[123] S/2018/171，第 169-172 段。

[124] 专家小组曾报告说，Han Hun Il 是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国侦察总局的特务(见 S/2018/171，第 189 和 190 段)。专家小组以往关于马来西亚-高丽伙伴公司集团(MKP)的结论见 S/2018/171，第 189-202 段。

[125] 关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民往返赞比亚与 MKP 相关公司合作的旅行，记录显示迪拜是最常用的中转点。

[126] 专家小组已经表明情况并非如此。见 S/2018/171，第 189-202 段。

赞比亚，见附件 46；马来西亚，见附件 47；乌干达，见第 155 和 156 段及附件 74。

129. 在赞比亚与 MKP 有关联的 13 家公司中，只有一家公司，即朝鲜对外建筑总公司(又名 GENCO，又名 KOGEN)，完全由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民担任董事。从赞比亚提供的资料和专家小组的进一步调查中可以看出，GENCO/KOGEN 同 MKP 一样，与万寿台海外开发会社有联系。[127] GENCO/KOGEN 和 MKP 都声称使用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的劳工建造了相同几个场馆(见附件 46-51)。事实上，万寿台、MKP 和 GENCO/KOGEN 都以某种组合声称参与了同样这些项目。此外，根据 KOGEN 的一份小册子，其在赞比亚的管理团队除 HanHun Il、Ho Un Ran 和 Yon Il 外，还有 11 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，赞比亚称这些人通过与 Yazid Merzouk 的董事关系与 KOGEN 有关联(见附件 52)。KOGEN 在赞比亚的董事还注册了另外一家公司——Chammae 建筑有限公司，拥有与 KOGEN 相同的地址、电子邮件联系方式和董事，只另加了一名董事——赞比亚商人 Sam Maurice Mbewe(国家登记卡编号 296387/74/1)。该公司于 2012 年 6 月 15 日与 KOGEN/GENCO 同时成立(见附件 59)。

130. 对 GENCO/KOGEN 在赞比亚的美元账户和当地货币银行账户的分析表明，这些账户经常有现金和支票活动，账户周转率高。它们都显示类似的模式，即支票存款后入账转账，随后定期支票提款。MKP TMS 医院的银行账户以及 Glocom 和侦察总局特工在欧洲和亚洲的银行业务也有这种情况。[128]

131. MKP 在赞比亚两家银行的公司账户是以两名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的个人——Ri Kwang Song(리광송)和 Han Chan Ho 的名义开立的。公开信息显示，2013 年，一个名叫 Kwang Song Ri 的人曾担任朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻北京大使馆参赞(李光先)(见附件 53-54)。其他公开资料显示，Kwang Song Ri 使用了리광송及别名 Ri Kwang-Son 和 Ri Kwangson，后两者转写成朝鲜文是리광선(见附件 53)。进一步的公开资料显示，一个同名人士 Ri Kwang Song(리광송)曾在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻开罗大使馆担任外交官，任期至少到 2017 年 11 月(见附件 55-56)。专家小组注意到，利用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官开立这些银行账户符合朝鲜民主主义人民共和国以往设立海外银行账户的模式。

132. 专家小组正在对 GENCO/KOGEN 公司进行的调查表明，除赞比亚外，该公司在中东、非洲和欧亚大陆的几个国家都有很大的业务范围和广泛的网络，在这些国家使用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国劳工及被禁止的合作实体和合资企业，并赚取可观的收入。据一个会员国称，GENCO/KOGEN“一直在向中东地区提供朝鲜劳工，目的是为朝鲜政府赚取硬通货”。[129] 专家小组的调查发现了 KOGEN 通

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[127] 关于 MKP 代表万寿台海外开发会社开展的业务，见 S/2018/171，第 189-202 段。

[128] 见 S/2018/171，第 156-202 段。

[129] 美国财政部，“财政部制裁支持朝鲜政府及其核扩散和武器扩散努力的个人和实体”，新闻稿，2016 年 12 月 2 日。可查阅 www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0677.aspx。

过与一家阿拉伯联合酋长国公司建立的合资企业开展活动的证据。专家小组正在继续调查这家公司(见附件 57-58)。

133. GENCO/KOGEN 在非洲的经营活动覆盖尼日利亚、科特迪瓦和赤道几内亚。在尼日利亚，该公司注册为“朝鲜对外建筑总公司 GENCO 尼日利亚公司”(见附件 60)，并把“朝鲜对外建筑总公司 GENCO”列为大股东，Kim Yong Sik 和 Kim Yong Hwan 列为小股东。在科特迪瓦，2012 年注册成立“朝鲜建筑总公司 SL(Kogen GE SL)”。[130] 非洲联盟非洲动物资源局网站把 KOGEN GE S.L.列为一个项目的执行伙伴，该项目由赤道几内亚出资，定于 2019 年结束(见附件 61)。另据报告，KOGEN 是 2016 年完工的雷博拉市体育场的承包商，资料显示 KOGEN 通过该体育场项目赚取了约 3 050 万美元(见附件 62)。当地新闻称，KOGEN 同年在赤道几内亚新开设了一个大型全国总部。[131] 专家小组尚未收到这些国家政府对其询问的答复。

134. 根据公司注册文件，GENCO 是俄罗斯联邦建筑合作实体或合资公司 LLC “SAKORENMA”[132] 的部分所有者，该公司多数股权由一名俄罗斯国民持有(见第 150-151 段和附件 76-78)。这个合作实体或合资企业在一家俄罗斯银行有账户(附件 79)。此外，该公司与其他三家公司的地址、联系信息和股东相同，这三家公司都从事建筑相关活动(见附件 63-64)。公司注册文件还显示，GENCO 在俄罗斯联邦设有两个官方代表处，一个在符拉迪沃斯托克，一个在喀山，总共正式雇用 17 名外国国民(见附件 65)。[133]

135. 除了上述这些公司，专家小组还致函俄罗斯联邦，了解使用 GENCO 名称的俄文“ZENKO”(西里尔文字：ЗЕНКО)在该国注册的四家公司的情况，这一名称与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民拥有的 GENCO 在俄罗斯联邦的官方代表处使用的名称相同(见附件 66-68)，这四家公司于 2018 获准雇用总共 301 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国劳工(见附件 68)。

[130] 公司注册号 CIYOP-12-D-221，成立日期：2012 年 1 月 25 日。


[131] “Guinea Ecuatorial Propiedad de Rusia y Corea Del Norte”，*Diario Rombe*，2016 年 4 月 5 日。2018 年 11 月 5 日查阅 http://diariorombe.es/guinea-ecuatorial-propiedad-de-rusia-y-corea-del-norte/。

[132] 公司文件列出了公司名称的俄文，既有对应首字母缩写 GENCO 的“ЗЕНКО”(zenco)，也有全称(Korea General Corporation for External Construction)：“КОРЕЙСКОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ“ЗЕНКО”КНДР(кнж 是朝鲜)。在登记文件的其他地方，列明 GENCO 是在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国注册并位于该国。见附件 76。

[133] GENCO 代表处的公司注册文件“外国分公司或办事处雇用的外国公民人数信息”一栏中的内容显示，符拉迪沃斯托克代表处的这一数字是 12，喀山办事处的数字是 5。俄罗斯法院文件提及 GENCO 代表处负责人时用的是公司文件所显示的符拉迪沃斯托克 GENCO 代表处主任姓名(Ko Yongil)的首字母(见附件 65)。

图二十四

GENCO 网络



资料来源：专家小组。

136. **专家小组再次建议指认 Han Hun Il(Edward Han)，并建议指认 MKP 马来西亚公司的 Yong Kok Yeap 和 MKP 赞比亚公司的 Yazid Merzouk。**

Glocom 的财务运作

137. 专家小组继续调查 Glocom，该公司利用广泛的个人、公司和离岸银行账户网络，包括在中国、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、新加坡和中东的个人、公司和银行账户，为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购、营销和销售军火和相关物资，其在 2016 年曾试图向厄立特里亚运送军事装备。[134] 大多数朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的幌子公司在受到公开调查后往往会关闭，之后再以新的伪装出现，但 Glocom 不同。尽管专家小组先前曾建议会员国冻结代表 Pan Systems 或 Glocom 行事的所有个人和实体的银行账户和其他资产，Glocom 仍继续积极使用其品牌。据专家小组所知，没有采取冻结行动。

138. 2018 年，Glocom 通过重新设计网站和推介一系列新产品，加强了其在线活动。它自称是一家以技术为导向的公司，从事军事通信设备和系统的研发、制造和服务。[135] Glocom 在 2018 年向 YouTube 上传了一套新的营销视频，并在 Pinterest(见附件 70)、LinkedIn 和 Instagram[136] 等平台上创建和使用社交媒体内

[134] 特别是，专家小组展示了 Pan Systems 平壤公司如何定期向在中国、印度尼西亚、马来西亚和中东工作的有中国、朝鲜、外国和代码名称的各种协助者转账，以及 Glocom 的一系列交易是如何由在中国香港注册的公司发起、并通过纽约的几家美国代理行清算的。见 S/2018/171，第 173-177 段；S/2017/150，第 72-87 段和 232-241 段；S/2017/742，第 52 段。

[135] Glocom 以前的网页曾列有在马来西亚的实际地址，但新网站没有列出任何实际地址。

[136] 2018 年，Glocom 使用与 2017 年不同的 YouTube 账户(“Support Glocom”)上传视频，但由于法律投诉，在 2018 年 9 月之后视频被删除。

容。Glocom(@GlocomSupport)在推特上宣传多种产品，在起草本报告期间，它一直发布帖子，还宣传各种军事应用软件包(见附件 69)。Glocom 在 2018 年还为客户推出了一款安卓应用。[137] 它声称其安全个人无线电装置的生产能力为每年 10 000 台，Manpack 无线电的批量生产能力为每年 6 000 台。2018 年 8 月，一份公开报告通过第二家高科技幌子公司将 Glocom 的 IP 地址与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在越南的餐馆联系起来。[138] 此外，2018 年年中，Glocom 试图通过与马来西亚和印度尼西亚的无线电技术分销公司建立关系，进一步扩大其影响力。在某些情况下，这些实体广告宣传的产品使用其他品牌，包括品牌“FACOM”。[139]

139. 尽管 Glocom 的活动构成安全理事会关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的相关决议所禁止的活动，而且其在平壤的业务由一名侦查总局特工(Ryang Su Nyo)负责经营，但 Glocom 没有被指认，虽然专家小组以前曾建议这样做。**因此，专家小组重申其先前的建议，即指认 Pan Systems[140] 参与资助和销售军火及相关物资，并附上其所有幌子公司(包括 Glocom、International Golden Services 和 International Global System)的名称作为别名。**

名称	Pan Systems Pte. Ltd.(平壤分公司)
别名	Wonbang Trading Co. , Glocom, International Golden Services, International Global System
地址	Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongcho, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
经理	Ryang Su Nyo
雇员	Pyon Won Gun、Pae Won Chol、Ri Sin Song、Kim Sung Su、Kim Chang Hyok 和 Kim Pyong Chol
电话	+850-218-111(分机：8636)

140. 专家小组继续调查被指认的金融机构，包括朝鲜大成银行、大同信贷银行和大同信贷银行金融有限公司(DCB Finance Limited)的活动。专家小组先前报告了中国国民李振刚的情况，此人自 2011 年以来一直拥有大同信贷银行 70%的外国股权，其余 30%由被指认的朝鲜大成银行持有。[141] 专家小组在 2017 年的中期报告(S/2017/742)中还提到丹东中瑞石油化工有限公司是李振刚及其家人李胜达控制的两家公司之一。[142] 此后，专家小组获得了新的公开信息，表明李振刚的丹东中瑞石油化工有限公司是一个规模庞大、目前活跃的中国公司网络的一部

[137] 该应用可以在 Glocom 网站上下载。

[138] Jason Arterburn，“外派：描绘朝鲜扩散金融系统中的海外强迫劳动情况”(C4ADS，2018 年)。

[139] 但是，Glocom 标签在一些产品上仍然清晰可见。

[140] 见 S/2017/742，第 62 段；S/2018/171，建议 1。

[141] 见 S/2017/742，第 56 段。

[142] 见同上，附件 24 和 25。

分，这些公司与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有业务往来历史，共用联系方式、建筑物、办公空间(即同一个房间)、雇员和联系人。

141. 特别是，专家小组调查发现，李振刚的丹东中瑞石油化工有限公司与专家小组先前认定与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违反相关决议的航运活动有关联的个人和实体共用地址(见附件 71)。这名个人是潘衛朝，先前在专家小组的报告中被认定与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违反决议的航运活动有关联，充当“Jie Shun”号(海事组织编号：8518780)的运营商、设在马绍尔群岛的 K-Brothers 的紧急联系人。另一个被指认实体的地址与潘衛朝位于香港的長安海運技術有限公司的地址相同。专家小组向中国询问李振刚及其与上述实体和个人的联系情况，中国答复说，“中国对此案进行了深入调查。通过对丹东中瑞石油化工有限公司的现场调查，中国发现它是一家非常小的公司，只有四名员工，过去两年营业额为 30 万美元。2018 年以来，李振刚已停止与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国做生意。中国没有关于丹东中瑞有限公司与信中提到的其他三家公司——丹东京奥贸易有限公司、在香港注册的京奥達林贸易有限公司及長安海運技術有限公司存在关联的相关信息”。

OCN 新加坡公司和 T Specialist 新加坡公司

142. 专家小组继续调查 OCN(新加坡)私人有限公司和 T Specialist 国际(新加坡)私人有限公司[143] 的金融活动。2018 年 7 月 19 日，这两家公司的董事 Ng“Leo” Kheng Wah 在新加坡法院被控 80 项与制裁有关的罪名和 80 项欺诈和共谋罪名，包括诈骗银行 9 500 多万美元和向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供价值约 600 万美元的奢侈品。特别是，Ng 被控与王志国和 T Specialist 国际“共谋”伪造多笔贸易融资贷款发票，促使新加坡和马来西亚的银行向王志国的公司 Pinnacle Offshore Trading 付款。然而，审判被推迟了四次。

143. 专家小组继续调查这些公司(见附件 72)。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Li Ik(又名 Ri Ik)一直在 OCN(新加坡)工作，直到 2018 年 1 月他的就业证被吊销；新加坡居民、中国国民王志国仍住在新加坡，但他的中国护照已被没收(见附件 73)。Li Ik 的电话记录显示，他在四大洲建立了广泛的全球联系网络，而且在通信中使用了规避策略。2014 年 2 月 15 日至 2016 年 4 月 19 日期间，他使用与两个账户相连的三个电话号码拨打了澳大利亚、中国、刚果、朝鲜民主主义人民共和国、利比里亚、马来西亚、纳米比亚、巴基斯坦、新加坡、西班牙、瑞士和联合王国的 72 个特定号码。从 Li Ik 的一部电话至少给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外贸银行和东方银行的号码打了 76 个电话。Li Ik 的电话费是用多张信用卡支付的，总信用额度为 100 万新加坡元(729 927 美元)，发卡行是新加坡一家大银行，该行要求开卡人年收入为 500 000 新加坡元或者在该银行有控制资产 300 万新加坡元。参与上述活动的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民拥有多张资本/收入要求高的银行信用卡的行为构成逃避金融制裁。附件 72 载述了专家小组上一份最后报告(S/2018/171)以来对此案所做进一步调查的结果摘要。

[143] 专家小组提及这两家公司时，其名称是可以互换使用的，因为两者拥有相同的地址和董事，即“Leo”Ng Kheng Wah。见 S/2018/171，附件 49 和 55。

柳京商业银行和高丽商业银行

144. OCN 新加坡公司向专家小组声称，它在柳京商业银行和高丽商业银行都没有权益。但它承认，其长期雇员 Ri Ik 有权签订协议出售柳京商业银行的股份。为此，他收到了三笔转账，每笔 499 970 美元，账款由王志国的公司 Pinnacle International 转入 T Specialist 在新加坡的账户；此外，他还收到 Mars Rock International 的转账 499 935 美元(转账金额共计 1 999 845 美元)，这些资金均用于购买柳京商业银行的股份。OCN 还承认它知道平壤 Bugsae 商店使用“OCN”品牌为柳京商业银行做商业促销(Ri Ik 在新加坡印制了促销海报)。中国表示，王志国上一次离开中国是在 2017 年，新加坡已经确认他是该国永久居民。

145. 专家小组重申其先前提出的指认 Ri Ik(Li Ik)、王志国和 Ri Ho Nam 的建议。[144]

合作实体和合资企业

146. 专家小组调查了在阿根廷、澳大利亚、柬埔寨、中国、日本、老挝人民民主共和国、马来西亚、马耳他、波兰、俄罗斯联邦、新加坡、泰国、乌干达、越南和赞比亚作为可能的合作实体或合资企业运作的公司。[145] 专家小组致函上述所有国家，列出了在其管辖范围内可能存在的合作实体或合资企业的信息，并要求提供这些实体的信息。在上述会员国中，阿根廷、日本和新加坡能够证明，被调查的实体要么不存在，要么不运作，要么与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国没有联系。阿根廷、澳大利亚、中国、日本、老挝人民民主共和国、波兰、俄罗斯联邦、新加坡、泰国、乌干达、越南和赞比亚答复说明了这些实体的情况以及采取的相关措施。柬埔寨、马来西亚和马耳他尚未答复专家小组的询问(见附件 74)。

澳大利亚

147. 专家小组索要关于 Sonbong Kost 合资公司(别名 Samhung Kost 合资公司和 Sam Hung KOAST 平壤合资企业，선봉코스트합영회사)[146] 的信息。澳大利亚与专家小组合作，提供了关于该公司的详细信息。

中国

148. 中国向专家小组通报如下：“2017 年 9 月 28 日，中国商务部和前国家工商行政管理总局发布公告，要求按照安全理事会决议的规定，关闭中朝合资企业和合作企业。到目前为止，所有经中国主管部门批准和登记的中国在朝鲜投资的合作企业都已关闭。所有在中国注册的朝鲜投资企业都已完成关闭并停止营业。任何现在仍在运营的中朝合资合作企业都将违反中国有关部门发布的公告。”

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[144] S/2018/171，建议 1。

[145] 专家小组根据多种来源的信息对实体展开调查，但其中只有一些实体最终符合专家小组的证据标准。

[146] 合作伙伴公司是澳大利亚的 Australia Kost/Koast Group。董事会主席是 Chun Yong-su，又名 Yong Soo Chon。“Koast”和“Kost”这两个拼写似乎都曾被相关公司使用过。

波兰

149. 波兰答复专家小组说，朝鲜-波兰航运有限公司(Chopol)已于 2018 年 6 月 19 日关闭。关于 Wonye 有限公司，波兰证实，两名主要股东(也是董事会成员)是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，其中一人已离开该国。9 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民获得了临时居留和工作许可，有效期至 2019 年 8 月 31 日。在 2018 年对该公司的一次检查中，检查人员发现了一些违规行为，包括使用民事合同而不是雇佣合同、没有获得就业中介所需要的授权。关于 Redshield 有限公司，波兰证实有两名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民担任主要股东和董事会成员。2018 年的一次检查发现，Redshield 公司雇用 42 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，其中 20 人获得了欧洲联盟长期居留身份，20 人获得了在波兰的居留和工作许可。上述所列实体中至少有一个构成违反第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段。

俄罗斯联邦

150. 俄罗斯联邦告知专家小组，“在俄罗斯，如果一个公司仅有一名[朝鲜]公民作为唯一创始人，则这类公司被严格注册为俄罗斯有限责任公司，而不是合资企业或合作实体，因此它们是俄罗斯法人，承担由此产生的一切法律后果。这类公司被认为不受安全理事会第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段或俄罗斯现行法律对[朝鲜]施加的限制。” (见附件 74)。俄罗斯联邦还于 2019 年 1 月 21 日告知专家小组，“合资企业(在俄罗斯法律中不存在这种形式的法人)”。专家小组在本报告所述期间进行的调查显示，除了违反第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段所载对合作实体的禁令外，境内设有合作实体的会员国可能也违反了该项决议的其他规定。2018 年 8 月 13 日，专家小组致函俄罗斯联邦，要求提供俄罗斯官方商业登记册中一家公司的信息，该公司列明的所有人为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，经理为俄罗斯国民。[147] 登记文件显示，该实体的地址与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻符拉迪沃斯托克总领事馆的地址相同，[148] 领事馆于 2016 年 4 月迁至该市。[149] 根据官方商业记录，该公司从事多种经济活动，包括“出租和经营自有或租赁的非住宅房地产”、“建造住宅和非住宅建筑”、“经营火车和轮船上的餐厅和酒吧”(附件 75)。专家小组认为，与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的这种合作活动是第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段所禁止的，也构成违反第 2321(2016)号决议第 18 段，除非该公司在第 2321(2016)号决议通过前已经搬走。专家小组继续进行调查。

151. 关于合作实体与可能的合资企业和被指认实体之间的联系，专家小组的调查还发现，名为朝鲜对外建筑总公司(GENCO 或 KOGEN)的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国建筑公司与在赞比亚的万寿台和 Han Hun Il(侦察总局)有联系(见第 126-135 段)，该公司(连同一名俄罗斯国民)是俄罗斯联邦萨哈林州一家合资建筑公司 LLC

[147] 俄罗斯联邦于 2019 年 1 月 21 日答复称，“我们可以报告说，调查显示，2015 年 9 月输入法律实体国家统一登记册数据库的 Pioner LLC 的地点信息不可靠。在这方面，没有发现违反安全理事会第 2321(2016)号决议第 18 段的行为。”

[148] 12A Nevskaya ul., Vladivostok, Russia, 690018。

[149] 见 https://primamedia.ru/news/500981/。

“SAKORENMA”(OOO“САКОРЕНМА”)[150] 的共同所有人(见附件 76-79)。根据俄罗斯官方记录，该公司在 2018 年 6 月竞标并赢得了俄罗斯国家机构的供应合同(见附件 78)。[151]

152. 根据公司官方注册文件，它在过去一年中曾获得政府合同。由两名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民共同拥有、一名俄罗斯国民管理、设在克拉斯诺亚尔斯克的另一家合资企业以 GENCO 的俄文名称注册，从事同一行业(建筑)。[152] 虽然被专家小组视为俄罗斯联邦境内合资企业的大部分公司由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国个人拥有或共同拥有(书面文件上也列有俄罗斯共同所有人和(或)董事)，但(除了 GENCO 以外)下列朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体是俄罗斯联邦境内合作实体的所有人，因而违反了第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段：朝鲜金刚总公司(Korea Kumgang General Corporation)、朝鲜民主主义人民共和国林业部、朝鲜民主主义人民共和国医学科学院、普刚制药公司(Pugang Pharmaceutical Company)、“三八”朝鲜贸易公司(“Eighth of March”Korean Trading Company)、朝鲜 Aprokgang 技术公司(Korea Aprokgang Technology Company)和朝鲜 Paekma 贸易公司(Korea Paekma Trading Corporation)。

153. 专家小组建议所有会员国采取必要措施，确保终止将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的财产用于第 2321(2016)号决议第 18 段所禁止的任何用途，取消所有相关登记或租约，并确保根据第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段解散涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民或实体的所有合作实体或合资企业。鉴于专家小组关于 GENCO 在多个大洲多个国家开展业务的调查结果，建议会员国鼓励其企业服务提供商保持警惕，确保这些公司不能违反决议在其他国家运营。

泰国

154. 泰国在答复专家小组关于五家合资企业的询问信时表示，泰国当局正在查找关于平壤 Haemaji 餐馆和 Mokran Korean Restaurant 的更多详细信息。泰国还告知专家小组，平壤 Okryu 餐馆由“金色先驱娱乐有限公司”(Golden Pioneer Entertainment Company Limited)经营，该公司“完全由泰国公民拥有”(见附件 74)。

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[150] 税务识别号 6501104474。专家小组注意到，直到 2018 年 6 月 29 日，LLC“SAKORENMA”的名称一直是 LLC Joint Russian-Korean Enterprise“SAKO RENMA”(俄文是 OOO СОВМЕСТНОЕ РОССИЙСКО-КОРЕЙСКОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ“САКО РЕНМА”)(见附件 77)。

[151] 在包含俄罗斯官方公司注册数据的至少两个开源数据库上的政府合同信息，见 www.rusprofile.ru/gz/2893948 和 www.kartoteka.ru/card/6503378623b837e00e8ff4b9bc1f9b27/#path_Main_Html。

[152] 根据该合资企业的官方注册信息，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国公司 GENCO 的名称被翻译成俄文 Корейское генеральное общество по строительству за рубежом“ЗЕНКО”(Koreyskoye Generalnoye Obshestvo po Stroyitelstvu za Rubezhom“ZENKO”)。见附件 65 和 76。

乌干达

155. 乌干达政府于 2018 年 7 月 6 日答复了专家小组索要关于 MKP 乌干达业务的进一步信息的请求。它承认国家住房和建筑公司与 MKP Builders SDN BHD 成立了一家合资企业，名为 NH-MKP Builders Limited。在一个项目中，国家住房和建筑公司支付了 3 627 762 美元，作为给 MKP Builders 的预付款。乌干达声称这一商业关系在 2014 年初停止了，因为当时看出 MKP Builders SDN BHD 显然无法完成建筑合同。此后，乌干达政府对 MKP 及其保险公司提起了一系列持续诉讼以求追回付款。政府坚称，在诉讼持续期间，不能解散 MKP Builders SDN BHD 或 MKP Capital Berhad。

156. 乌干达在答复中还列入了关于 Vidas 工程服务有限公司(Vidas Engineering Services Company Limited)的信息，乌干达承认该公司签约承接了几个政府出资项目。不过，它引证 Vidas 的公司注册文件，坚决否认该公司与 MKP 之间有任何联系。对于为何 Vidas 的邮寄地址、注册办公地址、电子邮件地址和商号名称出现在 MKP Capital 和 MKP Builders 在乌干达的公司注册文件中，乌干达和 Vidas 都没有做出解释。专家小组注意到，为了掩盖与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的联系，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的公司通常借助外国国民来避免将本国国民列入公司注册文件，并利用商业联系促成在国外建立存在和嵌入外国公司。乌干达最近推广宣传对 MKP Holdings 在莫罗托大理石矿的一个高价值项目的外国投资机会，专家小组询问此事，但乌干达没有答复(见同上)。

越南

157. 2017 年 12 月，越南答复专家小组说，关于在越南运营的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国商业实体和餐馆，河内有三个实体和两家餐馆，包括 Binh Nhuong 餐馆和 Koryo 餐馆。在胡志明市有 7 个实体和一家 Koryo 餐馆(旧称 Ryu Gong 餐馆)。在海防有一个实体。

赞比亚

158. 关于在赞比亚的合作实体和合资企业的信息，见附件 46。

建议

给委员会

159. 专家小组建议指认 Han Hun Il(Edward Han)、Yong Kok Yeap(MKP 马来西亚公司)及 Yazid Merzouk(MKP 赞比亚公司)，以及 Pan Systems[153] 和其所有幌子公司的名称(包括 Glocom、International Golden Services 和 International Global System)。

160. 专家小组建议委员会澄清第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段所载合资企业和合作实体的定义。

[153] S/2017/742，第 62 段；S/2018/171，建议 1。

给会员国

161. 鉴于广泛存在使用家庭成员名下账户逃避制裁的情况，专家小组建议各国政府向其金融机构提供一份名单，不仅列入经认可的外交官，也列入其家庭成员，以确保外交官不以其家属名义开设额外的银行账户。

162. 专家小组建议会员国发布指导意见，指定一家银行作为唯一可以为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆和外交官开立账户的银行，并通知所有其他银行不要为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官或其家人开立账户。

163. 专家小组建议会员国通知其金融机构不要为非经认可派驻本国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官开立账户，并将有关朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官的金融活动信息分享给记录显示其境内存在金融活动的其他会员国，以避免跨境规避制裁。

164. 会员国应通知其金融机构，只关闭(而不冻结)银行账户并不能达到决议的要求；决议规定它们必须冻结被指认的个人或实体、代其行事的个人或实体以及参与违反或逃避决议任何规定的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府所有成员控制的所有资产。

165. 会员国应根据《联合国宪章》第四十九条，酌情向其他会员国提供技术援助，帮助它们加强法律框架和相关机制，以执行决议中的金融规定。

166. 作为第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段执行工作的一部分，会员国应要求其公司注册处提取有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民担任董事或股东的所有公司的详细信息，同时铭记为这类公司进行注册可能在事实上违反了禁令。

167. 鉴于合资企业除违反第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段外，还违反了相关决议的其他规定，应向调查机构、金融情报机构和金融机构通报这些合资企业的董事和股东的姓名。

168. 专家小组建议会员国向其国家机构澄清说明，保险提供者是金融机构，因此必须遵守决议中的所有相关金融规定，包括必须根据决议要求冻结资产。

五. 与核计划和弹道导弹计划相关的近期活动

核

169. 宁边核设施仍在活动。5 兆瓦(电)反应堆自 2015 年 12 月以来一直在运行。据一个会员国说，虽然 2018 年 2 月、3 月和 4 月暂停运行几天，但每段时间都不足以关闭反应堆以进行排放，停运很可能是为了进行维护。2018 年 11 月，一个会员国告知专家小组，2018 年 9 月至 10 月，反应堆暂停运行，这两个月期间可能进行了乏燃料棒排放。2018 年 2 月至 11 月的卫星图像显示有挖掘水道活动。图像还显示在反应堆的排水设施附近建造了一栋建筑物。2018 年 6 月中旬，一个会员国观察到新建结构中有水排出。专家小组也观察到轻水反应堆西侧有一栋新建筑(见附件 80)。

170. 卫星图像显示放射化学实验室和相关蒸汽厂可能在运行。2018 年 4 月 27 日至 5 月 8 日期间，可看到烟雾，而且煤炭储量不断变化(见附件 81)，可能是在进行维护。2018 年 11 月，一个会员国向专家小组报告说，它检测到建筑物内有热变化。

171. 2018 年 5 月 24 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国举行丰溪里核试验场拆除仪式，随后朝鲜民主主义人民共和国核武器研究所发表了声明。[154] 卫星图像显示，由于 5 月份的“拆除”，地面基础设施发生了一些变化。专家小组注意到库存材料于 2018 年 11 月被移除(见附件 82)。

172. 专家小组继续监测铀浓缩厂和采矿点。专家小组观察到，2018 年在平山有废土堆被移走，这表明可能正在进行采矿活动(见附件 83)。专家小组观察到，在本报告所述期间，除了有超大型卡车定期活动外，在刚善(Kongson)可能设有的铀浓缩设施周围没有发生重大变化。

利用民用基础设施组装和发射弹道导弹

173. 2018 年 4 月，一个会员国告知专家小组，为防止已被查定的少数几个核和弹道导弹组装和制造基地受到任何可能的“斩首”袭击，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一再使用民用工厂和其他非军事设施进行相关活动。该会员国指出，这些地点拥有运输、组装和测试武器系统所必要的所有铁路线、公路和其他基础设施。向专家小组提供的一个例子是在平山卡车厂(也称为 3 月 16 日汽车厂)的火星-15 洲际弹道导弹组装设施(见图二十五)及其相关的发射场。2018 年 11 月，该会员国告知专家小组，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正在其北部边界邻近地区开发洲际弹道导弹基地。

图二十五

会员国提供的使用民用设施组装弹道导弹的例子(左)；金正恩主席在发射前三周参观卡车工厂(2017 年 11 月 4 日)(右)



资料来源：会员国，朝鲜中央通讯社。

174. 专家小组调查、确认和报告了弹道导弹活动地点，发现有证据表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国方面一直在分散其组装、储存和测试地点。专家小组发现，除

[154] “朝鲜核武器研究所声明”，朝鲜中央通讯社，2018 年 5 月 24 日。

了使用民用设施，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国还使用以前闲置或遍布各处的军事工业场所作为发射地点。它们可能位于组装或储存地点附近，最多 10 公里远。这种趋势的例子包括 2017 年 7 月 4 日和 7 月 28 日试射火星-14 洲际导弹的发射场(分别为 Panghyon 飞机厂和 Mupyong-ni)。该国最大的军民两用机场平壤顺安国际机场在 2017 年 8 月 29 日和 9 月 15 日被用于发射中程火星-12。卫星图像和弹道导弹相关图像见附件 84。

六. 制裁的意外影响

175. 为了加强人道主义豁免机制，2018 年 8 月 6 日，委员会通过了“第 7 号执行援助通知：关于获得向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供人道主义援助豁免的准则”。[155] 2018 年 1 月至 2019 年 1 月，委员会收到会员国、联合国机构和人道主义组织提出的 25 项人道主义豁免请求。[156] 截至本报告撰写之时，委员会已批准了 16 项请求，同时委员会仍在审议 7 项请求(2 项请求被撤回)。[157]

176. 会员国、联合国机构和人道主义组织表示关切的是，尽管有豁免条款，委员会也做出了努力，联合国机构和人道主义组织的人道主义方案继续受到意想不到的后果影响，使其无法在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正常运作。向专家小组通报的六个主要关切领域是：在得到豁免方面存在拖延；银行渠道崩溃；清关过程延误；愿意供货的外国供应商减少；人道主义相关物品和业务的成本增加；业务经费减少(见附件 85-87)。这些对他们执行人道主义相关方案的能力产生了负面影响。特别是，部门制裁正在影响一些人道主义敏感物品的交付(见同上)。关于专家小组对制裁给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民造成的不利人道主义后果的评估，见附件 85。

建议

177. **专家小组建议，委员会关于人道主义豁免请求的讨论应有时限，委员会内的特定小组应定期开会审查人道主义问题，以加快处理此类请求。**

178. **为了减轻会员国、联合国机构和人道主义组织的不必要负担，委员会应公布人道主义行动中使用的、属于第 2397(2017)号决议第 7 段规定受部门制裁限制的宽泛类别、需要获得向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送人道主义物资豁免的某些非敏感物品的白名单。**

179. **委员会应继续征求根据第 7 号执行援助通知准则的规定申请豁免的会员国、联合国机构和人道主义组织的反馈意见，并尽力简化申请程序，包括在计划运送**

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[155] 此外，委员会在 2018 年 4 月 24 日更新的“第 2 号执行援助通知：编写和提交国家执行报告的导则”中鼓励各国在国家报告中，酌情解释执行决议规定措施的豁免所依据的国内法律和其他相关权力来源。见 www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/implementation-notices。

[156] 专家小组注意到，一些豁免请求包含未列入清单的物项。

[157] 关于委员会批准的豁免的信息发布在网站上，见 www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests。

的货物的技术规格、所涉当事方以及提出请求和呈件的频率方面提供更大的灵活性。

180. 秘书长应要求秘书处评估制裁对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义影响。

七. 国家执行情况报告

181. 截至 2019 年 1 月，68 个会员国提交了第 2397(2017)号决议执行情况报告；83 个会员国提交了第 2375(2017)号决议执行情况报告；84 个会员国提交了第 2371(2017)号决议执行情况报告；102 个会员国提交了第 2321(2016)号决议执行情况报告；111 个会员国提交了第 2270(2016)号决议执行情况报告。[158] 尽管总体报告情况有所改善，但专家小组注意到，未提交第 2397(2017)号决议执行情况报告的国家数目仍然很大(124 个，其中包括 6 个在 2018 年担任安全理事会的非常任理事国)(见附件 88)。

182. 专家小组回顾指出，会员国应根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 17 段的要求及时提交报告。

183. 关于综合建议清单，见附件 89。

[158] 见 www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/implementation-reports，2018 年 11 月 30 日查阅。

Annex 1: Information provided to the Panel by the United States, 6 July 2018

The United States stated that if each of the below 89 port calls delivered only one third of each vessel's capacity, the associated volume would exceed the annual cap for 2018 by 30 May 2018. Fully loaded, the DPRK tankers could have exceeded the cap nearly three times over with an estimated total of 1,367,628 barrels (figure 1).

Figure 1




Figure 2: DPRK tanker deliveries to DPRK ports

Port	Ship Name *Designated	Dead Weight Tonnage	Arrival Month 2018	Delivery Volume 33% Laden	Delivery Volume 50% Laden	Delivery Volume 90% Laden
Nampo	*Ji Song 6**	1,250.00	January	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	*Sam Jong 1**	1,665.00	January	555.00	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	*Kum Un San 3*	3,279.00	January	1,093.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	*An San 1**	3,003.00	January	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Najin	*Kum Un San*	2,070.00	January	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	*Yu Phyong 5**	1,966.00	January	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	*Yu Son (Y Chun)**	3,398.00	January	1,132.67	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	*Chon Ma San**	2,750.00	January	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	*Paek Ma**	2,250.00	January	750.00	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	*Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)**	1,150.00	January	383.33	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	*Sam Jong 2**	2,507.00	January	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Wonsan	*Kum Un San 3*	3,279.00	January	1,093.00	1,639.50	2,951.10

Nampo	*Rye Song Gang 1*	3,003.00	January	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Najin	*Kum Un San*	2,070.00	January	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Wonsan	*Sam Ma 2**	1,731.00	January	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	*Ji Song 6**	1,250.00	February	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	*Sam Jong 1**	1,665.00	February	555.00	832.50	1,498.50
Wonsan	*Kum Un San*	2,070.00	February	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Wonsan	*Kum Un San 3*	3,279.00	February	1,093.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	*Chon Ma San**	2,750.00	February	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	*Yu Phyong 5**	1,966.00	February	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	*Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)**	1,150.00	February	383.33	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	*An San 1**	3,003.00	February	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	*Sam Jong 2**	2,507.00	February	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	*Rye Song Gang 1*	3,003.00	February	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	*Sam Jong 1**	1,665.00	February	555.00	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	*Yu Son (Y Chun)**	3,398.00	February	1,132.67	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	*Yu Phyong 5**	1,966.00	February	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	*Yu Jong 2**	1,206.00	March	402.00	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	*Ji Song 6**	1,250.00	March	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	*Sam Jong 2**	2,507.00	March	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	*Ji Song 6**	1,250.00	March	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Chongjin	*Un Pha 2, ex Kum Gang 3*	1,205.00	March	401.67	602.50	1,084.50
Nampo	*An San 1**	3,003.00	March	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	*Paek Ma**	2,250.00	March	750.00	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	*Rye Song Gang 1*	3,003.00	March	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	*Sam Jong 1**	1,665.00	March	555.00	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	*Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)**	1,150.00	March	383.33	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	*Kum Un San 3*	3,279.00	March	1,093.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	*Yu Son (Y Chun)**	3,398.00	March	1,132.67	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	*Wan Heng 11**	4,983.00	March	1,661.00	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	*Sam Jong 2**	2,507.00	March	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Hamhung	*Sam Ma 2**	1,731.00	March	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	*Chon Ma San**	2,750.00	March	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	*Ji Song 6**	1,250.00	March	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	*Yu Jong 2**	1,206.00	March	402.00	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	*Kum Un San*	2,070.00	March	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	*Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)**	1,150.00	March	383.33	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	*An San 1**	3,003.00	March	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	*Yu Phyong 5**	1,966.00	March	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	*Chon Ma San**	2,750.00	April	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	*Ji Song 6**	1,250.00	April	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	*Kum Pit 1*	1,091.00	April	363.67	545.50	981.90

Nampo	*Kum Un San 3*	3,279.00	April	1,093.00	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	*Paek Ma**	2,250.00	April	750.00	1,125.00	2,025.00
Chongjin	*Sam Ma 2**	1,731.00	April	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	*Nam San 8**	3,150.00	April	1,050.00	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	*Yu Son (Y Chun)**	3,398.00	April	1,132.67	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	*Wan Heng 11**	4,983.00	April	1,661.00	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	*Chon Ma San**	2,750.00	April	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	*Sam Jong 2**	2,507.00	April	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Hamhung	*Sam Ma 2**	1,731.00	April	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Wonsan	*Ma Du San*	949.00	April	316.33	474.50	854.10
Chongji	*Sam Ma 2**	1731.00	April	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Najin	*Song Won*	2101.00	April	700.33	1,050.50	1,890.90
Wonsan	*Kum Un San*	2070.00	April	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	*An San 1**	3003.00	April	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	*Kum Jin Gang 2*	2100.00	April	700.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	*Paek Ma**	2250.00	May	750.00	1,125.00	2,025.00
Chongjin	*Sam Ma 2**	1731.00	May	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	*Ji Song 6**	1250.00	May	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	*Yu Phyong 5**	1966.00	May	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	*Sam Jong 2**	2507.00	May	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Wonsan	*Chon Myong 1**	2750.00	May	916.67	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	*Myong Ryu 1*	900.00	May	300.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	*Sam Jong 1**	1665.00	May	555.00	832.50	1,498.50
Wonsan	*Kum Un San*	2070.00	May	690.00	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	*Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)**	1150.00	May	383.33	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	*Nam San 8**	3150.00	May	1,050.00	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	*An San 1**	3003.00	May	1,001.00	1,501.50	2,702.70
Hamhung	*Sam Ma 2**	1731.00	May	577.00	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	*Yu Jong 2**	1206.00	May	402.00	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	*Yu Phyong 5**	1966.00	May	655.33	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	*Yu Son**	3398.00	May	1,132.67	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	*Kum Jin Gang 2*	2100.00	May	700.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	*Ji Song 6**	1250.00	May	416.67	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	*Paek Ma**	2250.00	May	750.00	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	*Sam Jong 2**	2507.00	May	835.67	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	*Myong Ryu 1*	900.00	May	300.00	450.00	810.00
Percent Laden				**33%**	**50%**	**90%**
Total (Metric Tons)				**65,782.99**	**98,674.50**	**177,614.10**
Total (Barrels)				**506,529.05**	**759,793.65**	**1,367,628.57**

Source: Member State

Annex 2: United States submission to the Committee of 17 September 2018

UNITED STATES NON-PAPER TO THE UN 1718 DPRK SANCTIONS COMMITTEE: NORTH KOREA'S BREACH OF UNSCR 2397 REFINED PETROLEUM CAP

- UNSCR 2397 operative paragraph 5 limits the DPRK's import of refined petroleum products to 500,000 barrels per year beginning in 2018 if those transfers are a) fully reported to the Committee within 30 days, b) do not involve any individual or entity associated with the DPRK's nuclear, ballistic missile, or other prohibited activities, and c) are used to exclusively meet the livelihood needs of DPRK nationals and not used to generate revenue for the DPRK's nuclear, ballistic missile, or other prohibited activities.

- UNSCR 2375 operative paragraph 11 prohibits ship-to-ship (STS) transfers with DPRK-flagged, owned, or operated vessels. UNSCR 2094 further makes clear that any individual or entity assisting in the evasion of sanctions are also liable for 1718 sanctions.

- These STS transfers are of great concern to the United States and in our view represent the most urgent area in need of more rigorous UN member state implementation.

- Since the United States last provided the UN 1718 Committee with a report on oil tanker deliveries to the DPRK on July 12, we have information revealing that these deliveries continue. The continuing arrival of these tankers in DPRK ports confirm that the DPRK maintains its imports of illicitly sourced refined petroleum products that expand the degree to which the DPRK is violating UNSCR 2397's annual limitation on refined product imports. Further, the 1718 Committee has not received any reporting from the DPRK or other member states about these transfers in contravention of UNSCR 2397.

- We are providing updated information showing data on each of these port calls to supplement our previous reporting and to emphasize that this problem continues due to the inaction of the 1718 Committee and the objections raised by Russia and China.

- The table provided in Tab 1 lists each of the port calls by date and associated delivery volume scenarios from 1 January 2018 to 18 August 2018, which have grown substantially since our previous submission and, in aggregation, exceed the UNSCR 2397 annual quota for refined petroleum products.

- Since our last report in July summarizing transactions observed in January through May, at least an additional 59 tanker deliveries to the DPRK have occurred from June 1 through August 18, bringing the 2018 total to at least 148 deliveries, all of which involved deliveries to North Korean ports to unload refined petroleum products procured through UN-prohibited STS transfers.

- If each of these tankers was fully laden when it made its delivery, the DPRK has imported almost six times the allowable amount under UNSCR 2397. Even if these tankers were not fully laden upon delivery, the figure found in Tab 2 show the three scenarios for how much refined petroleum products

the DPRK procured in 2018 from 1 January to 18 August. All three scenarios make clear that the DPRK has obtained far more than the 500,000 barrels it is authorized to procure in 2018.

- All further transfers of refined petroleum products must be halted, period, to prevent the DPRK from procuring any additional products in violation of UNSCR 2397.

- To further underscore our confidence in the updated data on tanker deliveries, we are also providing three images—one from each of the past three months in Tabs 3 through 5—that document several of these deliveries into a DPRK port outfitted with oil unloading and storage infrastructure as well as an image of the port infrastructure more broadly in Tab 6.

- The images of these tanker ships depict DPRK-flagged vessels that are outfitted for the transport of refined petroleum products and used exclusively for that purpose when moored—or anchored—at a single point offshore mooring system. The single point mooring system consists of mooring buoys, which keep the tankers anchored in place, and an offloading buoy that connects to an underwater pipeline allowing for the physical transfer of the refined petroleum products from the tankers to onshore infrastructure.

- Specifically, this pipeline transfers the refined petroleum products to the associated onshore infrastructure including refined petroleum storage tanks, pumping equipment, a rail transfer point, and tanker truck filling station, all of which are outfitted to facilitate the unloading, storage, and transporting of the refined products to areas where the products are consumed throughout North Korea, including by the regime and military.

    - The first image in Tab 3 highlights this process by showing both marine import terminals in Nampo that are configured to import, store, and transport refined petroleum products through an offloading pier and single point mooring systems. As can be seen in the image, various DPRK tankers are at anchorage to cycle through offloading infrastructure to make individual deliveries of refined petroleum products before departing the port in search of additional, illicit STS transfer transactions.

    - The second image in Tab 4 shows the DPRK-flagged M/T MU BONG 1 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo port facility in the Taedong River on June 16, 2018. The vessel is fully loaded and is in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via an illicit STS transfer.

    - The third image in Tab 5 shows the DPRK-flagged M/T YU JONG 2 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo port facility in the Taedong River on July 21, 2018. The vessel is fully loaded and is in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via an illicit STS transfer.

    - The fourth image in Tab 6 shows the DPRK-flagged M/T AN SAN 1 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo port facility in the Taedong River on August 17, 2018. The vessel is fully loaded and is in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via an illicit STS transfer.

- We are supplementing this imagery with three storyboards that demonstrate the entire process by which North Korean tankers depart North Korean ports, rendezvous with a foreign "feeder vessel" to engage in an illicit STS transfer, and return to a North Korean port to deliver refined petroleum products.
  - The first storyboard in Tab 7 shows the entire process in which the North Korea-flagged MYONG RYU 1 conducted an STS transfer with the Panama-flagged SHANG YUAN BAO.
  - The second storyboard in Tab 8 shows the entire process in which the North Korea-flagged PAEK MA conducted an STS transfer with the Panama-flagged SHANG YUAN BAO.
  - The third storyboard in Tab 9 shows the entire process in which the North Korea-flagged MU BONG 1 conducted an STS transfer with the Sierra Leone-flagged XING MING YANG 888.
- The United States has now provided two tables documenting 148 deliveries of refined petroleum products to the DPRK and 10 images and storyboards clearly demonstrating the process by which this occurs to the 1718 Committee. This body of evidence should remove any remaining doubts that the DPRK has seriously violated the refined petroleum cap and that the Committee must urgently act to halt all refined petroleum product exports to the DPRK.

ATTACHMENTS

Tab 1: Table of DPRK tanker deliveries of refined petroleum products to DPRK ports
Tab 2: Figure of estimated volumes of refined petroleum product deliveries to DPRK
Tab 3: Image of Nampo Port marine import terminals for refined petroleum products
Tab 4: M/T Mu Bong 1 delivery at Nampo Port
Tab 5: M/T Mu Bong 1 delivery at Nampo Port
Tab 6: M/T Mu Bong 1 delivery at Nampo Port
Tab 7: Storyboard of Myong Ryu 1 STS transfer with Shang Yuan Bao
Tab 8: Storyboard of Paek Ma STS transfer with Shang Yuan Bao
Tab 9: Storyboard of Mu Bong 1 STS transfer with Xing Ming Yang 888

OBSERVED REFINED PETROLEUM DELIVERIES TO NORT KOREAN PORTS: JANUARY 1 – AUGUST 18, 2018

Port	Ship Name	Dead Weight Tonnage	Arrival Date	Delivery Volume if 33% Laden	Delivery Volume if 50% Laden	Delivery Volume if 90% Laden
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	1-Jan-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	4-Jan-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	8-Jan-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	10-Jan-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Najin	Kum Un San	2,070.00	10-Jan-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	14-Jan-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Yu Son (Y Chun)	3,398.00	15-Jan-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	18-Jan-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	18-Jan-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)	1,150.00	19-Jan-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	25-Jan-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Wonsan	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	26-Jan-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	3,003.00	27-Jan-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Najin	Kum Un San	2,070.00	28-Jan-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Wonsan	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	30-Jan-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	2-Feb-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	2-Feb-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Wonsan	Kum Un San	2,070.00	3-Feb-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Wonsan	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	8-Feb-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	11-Feb-18			

				907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	12-Feb-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)	1,150.00	16-Feb-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	17-Feb-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	17-Feb-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	3,003.00	19-Feb-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	22-Feb-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Yu Son (Y Chun)	3,398.00	24-Feb-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	28-Feb-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	3-Mar-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	5-Mar-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	8-Mar-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	10-Mar-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Chongjin	Kum Gang 3	1,205.00	10-Mar-18	397.65	602.50	1,084.50
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	13-Mar-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	13-Mar-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	3,003.00	13-Mar-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	13-Mar-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)	1,150.00	15-Mar-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	16-Mar-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Yu Son (Y Chun)	3,398.00	16-Mar-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Wan Heng 11	4,983.00	19-Mar-18	1,644.39	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	21-Mar-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Hamhung	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	21-Mar-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90


Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	22-Mar-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	24-Mar-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	26-Mar-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	Kum Un San	2,070.00	27-Mar-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)	1,150.00	29-Mar-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	30-Mar-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	31-Mar-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	3-Apr-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	3-Apr-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Kum Pit 1	1,091.00	3-Apr-18	360.03	545.50	981.90
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	4-Apr-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	6-Apr-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	12-Apr-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	13-Apr-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	Yu Son (Y Chun)	3,398.00	13-Apr-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Wan Heng 11	4,983.00	14-Apr-18	1,644.39	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	15-Apr-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	21-Apr-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Hamhung	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	24-Apr-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Wonsan	Ma Du San	949.00	26-Apr-18	313.17	474.50	854.10
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	27-Apr-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Najin	Song Won	2,101.00	29-Apr-18	693.33	1,050.50	1,890.90
Wonsan	Kum Un San	2,070.00	30-Apr-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	30-Apr-18			

				990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	2,100.00	30-Apr-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	3-May-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	5-May-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	5-May-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	7-May-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	8-May-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Wonsan	Chon Myong 1	2,750.00	8-May-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	9-May-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	9-May-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Wonsan	Kum Un San	2,070.00	13-May-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Saebyol	1,150.00	15-May-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	17-May-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	17-May-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Hamhung	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	19-May-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	21-May-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	22-May-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Yu Son	3,398.00	22-May-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	2,100.00	24-May-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	26-May-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	26-May-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	28-May-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	30-May-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	Saebyol	1,150.00	4-Jun-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00

Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	6-Jun-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	7-Jun-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	8-Jun-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	9-Jun-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Mu Bong 1 (Ryong Bong 1)	2,100.00	15-Jun-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Kum Un San	2,070.00	18-Jun-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	18-Jun-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	19-Jun-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00
Kimchaek	Yu Son	3,398.00	21-Jun-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Chongjin	Wan Heng 11	4,983.00	24-Jun-18	1,644.39	2,491.50	4,484.70
Nampo	Saebyol	1,150.00	25-Jun-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	27-Jun-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	28-Jun-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	30-Jun-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	2-Jul-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	3-Jul-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Mu Bong 1 (Ryong Bong 1)	2,100.00	3-Jul-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Chongjin	Golden	1,977.00	3-Jul-18	652.41	988.50	1,779.30
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	2,100.00	4-Jul-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	6-Jul-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Chongjin	Wan Heng 11	4,983.00	9-Jul-18	1,644.39	2,491.50	4,484.70
Wonsan	Kum Un San	2,070.00	13-Jul-18	683.10	1,035.00	1,863.00
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	2,100.00	14-Jul-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	15-Jul-18			

				412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Chongjin	Golden	1,977.00	16-Jul-18	652.41	988.50	1,779.30
Songnim	Kum Jin Gang 2	2,100.00	20-Jul-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	20-Jul-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	20-Jul-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	20-Jul-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	21-Jul-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Najin	Song Won	2,101.00	22-Jul-18	693.33	1,050.50	1,890.90
Nampo	Chon Ma San	2,750.00	23-Jul-18	907.50	1,375.00	2,475.00
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	23-Jul-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	1,966.00	23-Jul-18	648.78	983.00	1,769.40
Nampo	Saebyol	1,150.00	25-Jul-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Tong Hung 5	600.00	25-Jul-18	198.00	300.00	540.00
Nampo	Yu Son	3,398.00	26-Jul-18	1,121.34	1,699.00	3,058.20
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	2,100.00	27-Jul-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	28-Jul-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	30-Jul-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	2-Aug-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	Paek Ma	2,250.00	2-Aug-18	742.50	1,125.00	2,025.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	2-Aug-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Chongjin	Wan Heng 11	4,983.00	2-Aug-18	1,644.39	2,491.50	4,484.70
Chongjin	Rye Song Gang 1	3,003.00	4-Aug-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	1,731.00	7-Aug-18	571.23	865.50	1,557.90
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	8-Aug-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00

Nampo	Kum Un San 3	3,279.00	9-Aug-18	1,082.07	1,639.50	2,951.10
Nampo	Saebyol	1,150.00	9-Aug-18	379.50	575.00	1,035.00
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	2,100.00	10-Aug-18	693.00	1,050.00	1,890.00
Najin	Song Won	2,101.00	12-Aug-18	693.33	1,050.50	1,890.90
Nampo	An San 1	3,003.00	15-Aug-18	990.99	1,501.50	2,702.70
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	900.00	15-Aug-18	297.00	450.00	810.00
Nampo	Ji Song 6	1,250.00	16-Aug-18	412.50	625.00	1,125.00
Nampo	Nam San 8	3,150.00	16-Aug-18	1,039.50	1,575.00	2,835.00
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	1,665.00	16-Aug-18	549.45	832.50	1,498.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2,507.00	15-Aug-18	827.31	1,253.50	2,256.30
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	1,206.00	18-Aug-18	397.98	603.00	1,085.40
Percent Laden				**33%**	**50%**	**90%**
Total (Metric Tons)				108,230.43	163,985.50	295,173.90
Total (Barrels)				833,374.31	1,262,688.35	2,272,839.03



Source: Member State

Annex 3: Communication of the Russian Federation to the Committee of 21 September 2018

From: Alexey Boguslavskiy [redacted]
Sent: Friday, September 21, 2018 10:17 PM
To: Sc-1718-Committee
Cc: To: [redacted]
Subject: Re: For Action: NOP – US letter petroleum cap, draft press release and note verbale (NOTE.276)

Dear Chair, colleagues,

Russia strictly complies with the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on the DPRK and the information that is reflected in the official notifications of the 1718 Committee, including on the issue of deliveries of refined petroleum products to this country.

According to paragraph 5 of resolution 2397, the Committee notifies all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75, 90 and 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts of 500 000 barrels have been reached, and only in the latter case (95 per cent), such notification is accompanied by an information about the requirement to immediately cease further deliveries of refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year.

In the absence of the aforementioned notification of the Committee, the continued export of refined petroleum products to the DPRK is fully in line with the requirements of the DPRK sanctions regime.

The fragmentary information provided by the US regarding the cases of alleged illegal ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products to the DPRK vessels, as well as the results of the US computer modeling, are insufficient for the Committee's decision to completely cease refined petroleum export to the DPRK before the end of this year.

To take such a decision, which could have severe social, economic and humanitarian consequences for the DPRK, a full investigation and corresponding conclusions of the Panel of Experts of the Committee of 1718 are required. Such an investigation is fully in line with the mandate of the Panel.

In this regard, we suggest that the US provide the experts with appropriate information regarding reported cases of ship-to-ship transfers and the proposed methodology of petroleum calculations for them to study it thoroughly and impartially.

Upon receiving the results of such a study we are ready to return to the consideration in the Committee of the US request with a view to eventually making an objective decision.

In the meantime Russia would like to put the US request **on hold**.

Best regards,

Alexey

Source: Member State

Annex 4: Address location provided by Golden Luxury Corporation to Yuantai







Source: The Panel

Annex 5: Panel letter to Golden Luxury Corporation and their associates

United Nations Nations Unies

HEADQUARTERS • SIEGE NEW YORK, NY 10017
TEL.: +1 212 963 1055 • FAX: +1 212 963 2013

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.382

YOUR REFERENCE

10 December 2018

Dear Messrs. Wang Wei-Kwang, Mr. Lee Chun Hun, Mr. Lee Chun Hun and Ms. Chen Su Mei,

I am writing to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

According to paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017), "all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK". In paragraph 14 of the same resolution, the Security Council also decided that "all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined petroleum products" (subject to exemptions).

In this regard, the Panel is investigating possible cases of sanctions evasion involving the vessel *Ocean Explorer* (IMO:9388792) which, according to information and photographs supplied by a Member State, conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the tanker *Yuk Tung* on 28 October 2018 (see Annex 1). The *Yuk Tung* has been designated by the Security Council 1718 Committee for de-flagging and a global port entry ban for repeatedly engaging in illegal ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers and the Member State has reason to believe that the transfer to the *Yuk Tung* was ultimately destined for the DPRK, in violation of the resolutions. Furthermore, the *Yuk Tung* is listed by the United Nations and registered by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as being controlled by a UN designated entity.[1]

Mr. Jiang Xi Hai Lian, Mr. Wang Wei-Kwang (aka Wang Wi Jung), Mr. Lee Chun Hung and Ms. Chen Su Mei, et al.
Golden Luxury Corporation (GLC)
Email: bestgo.ship@msa.hinet.net
Fax +88624621059

[1] See "Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee Adds 22 Entries to Its Sanctions List, Designates 27 Vessels" UN Security Council press release, 30 March 2018 https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13272.doc.htm

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The Panel notes that your Belize-registered company was **directly involved** in this incident and in contact with **individuals acting on behalf** of the *Yuk Tung* also known to you as the vessel *Maika*. The Panel would be grateful for the assistance of you, your company **and all your associates** in providing the following information relating to the above-mentioned ship-to-ship transfer:

1) Copies of all correspondence and contracts associated with the above incident, including brokering, trading, financial transfer and vessel-related information;
2) The identity and contact details of **all persons** arranging for the transfer at sea with the *Yuk Tung/Maika*;
3) Any information at your disposal regarding the destination of the cargo aboard the *Yuk Tung/Maika*, **in particular its end user destination** including dates, times and location, as well as GPS coordinates;
4) An email address, mobile phone number through which you may be contacted;
5) The full name, nationality and copies of the seaman identity card, national identity card and passport of the Master of the *Yuk Tung/Maika*;
6) The crew list of the *Yuk Tung/Maika;*
7) The AIS/GPS of the *Yuk Tung/Maika*, showing its movements from 27 October 2018 until now;
8) The names, addresses, emails, mobile phone numbers, **and all bank account numbers of the entities and individuals listed in Annex 2;**
9) Please inform the entities and the individuals listed in Annex 2 **that they may be named in the Panel's next report to the Security Council and to contact the Panel forthwith so that the Panel may consider reflecting their views in its report.**

Paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution 2407 (2018) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal.


As the Panel intends to report on this case in its next report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within two weeks of the date of this letter. **The Panel may name Golden Luxury Corporation, your employees and any of their associates or associated individuals in our reporting and would therefore appreciate a reply from you in order to consider reflecting your views in our next report.** Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths [redacted] Mr. Jong Kwon Youn [redacted].

Yours faithfully,



Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex I. Images showing the Ocean Explorer conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with a UN designated vessel controlled by UN designated entity



Source: Member State

Annex 2. "Documentation"

金豪有限公司
GOLDEN LUXURY CORP.

Registered address: 60MARKET SQUARE, P.O. BOX 164, BELIZE CITY, BELIZE
Taiwan Office: NO.224, HE 1ST RD., ZHONGZHENG DIST.,
KEELUNG CITY 202, TAIWAN [redacted]
TEL:+886-2-24620759 FAX +886-2-24621059 Email:bestgo.ship@msa.hinet.net


INVOICE NO: A181030-41
INVOICE DATE: 10/30/2018
LOCATION: NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
PROJECT: SUPPLY BUNKER TO FISHING BOATS
MESSERS: ZEESHAN BASHIR BUILDING MATERIALS TRADING LLC
8H GALADHARI PLAZA AL RIGGA DEIRA
DUBAI UAE, DUBAI, UAE

INVOICE

DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	UNIT PRICE	AMOUNT
MARINE GASOIL	51070.90 BBL	US$100.054	US$5,109,848.00
		TOTAL	US$5,109,848.00

PLEASE REMIT BY T/T REMITTANCE IMMEDIATELY FOR FULL
INVOICE VALUE WITHOUT DEDUCTION

For and on behalf of
GOLDEN LUXURY CORP





江西海联石油化工有限公司

To：金豪有限公司

本公司委请ZEESHAN BASHIR BUILDING MATERIALS TRADING LLC及
GRACE WAY GENERAL TRADING LLC两家公司代支付货款给贵公司,请知悉!

江西海联石油化工有限公司

[illegible]

Source: The Panel

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[159] One Panel Member objected to the disclosure of the Panel's letter without an accompanying reply due to the sensitivity of the information. The Coordinator notes that it is standard practice to provide evidence of the Panel's activities and the evidence obtained in the annexes.

Annex 6: Vanguard correspondence

From: vanguard [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2018 2:08 PM
To: Hugh Griffiths
Cc: 'van.guard'
Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication # 367 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Vanguard

Dear Mr.Hugh Griffiths,

Good day.

We have to affirm that Vanguard Shipping Safety Management Consultant Co. Ltd never involved in the owner's cargo operation and finance. our company only responsible for the regulation of International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1974) Appendix IX and Chapter X1-2 issued by International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Our company is not responsible for the management of trade operation and crew management of this Virtue Base Developments Limited (IMO No.5893594), nor involved in matters such as ownership and chartering of the ship to which this company belongs and trade operation and crew management.

So we don't know the following information from Virtue Base Developments Limited (IMO No.5893594).

names, addresses, email addresses, fax numbers and other records for the individuals responsible for Virtue Base Developments.

Our company was entrusted by Mr.Lai (phone number +886978882693) at the end of May 2017, by our employee Penny to assist the applicant company IMO number, but soon after, We also cannot contact this Mr.Lai.

Hope above mention will help your investigation.

Best Regards.

汎德船舶安全管理顧問有限公司

VANGUARD SHIPPING SAFETY MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT COMPANY LIMITED.

From: Hugh Griffiths [[redacted]
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2018 8:27 PM
To: van.guard
Subject: Re: Outgoing Communication # 367 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Vanguard

Dear Vanguard,

Thank you for your email.

Is this Penny Lee 李沛瑀(Ms.) that is replying to the United Nations?

Or another employee?

I would be grateful if you could identify yourself and provide information on an important case.

Virtue Base Developments (see attachment)

This is an entity registered in the Seychelles for which you submitted an IMO number request in 2017.

Please supply the names, addresses, email addresses, fax numbers and other records for the individuals responsible for Virtue Base Developments.

I am basing this request on the attached Equatorial Guinea registry certificate.

Virtue Base Developments are shielding their identity.

However, your company, Vanguard is named as a "care of" address with a UN international organisation for Virtue Base Developments.

Please provide us with the information on the individuals behind Virtue Base Development within 24 hours.

Best regards,

Hugh Griffiths

From: van.guard [redacted]
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2018 9:56 AM
To: DPA-POE1874
Cc: ''Vanguard(汎德公司)''; Hugh Griffiths
Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication # 367 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Vanguard

Dear Mr.HUGH GRIFFITHS,

Good day.

At beginning, we have to affirm that Vanguard Shipping Safety Management Consultant Co. Ltd never involved in the owner’s cargo operation and finance. We only pay attention to ship’s safety. It’s most management company done at Kaohsiung. Besides, we have never received the Panel’s previous notice S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.1151 of 19 December 2017, only received S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.367 on 7 December 2018.

You said our company was associated with 5 ships engaged in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers. We would like to clarify as following:

1. Lighthouse Winmore (IMO number: 9635987) ─ She belongs to Mr. Hsih-Shien Chen, which was never under our management. If she holds our company's DOC, then it must be a fake certificate and please provide your evidence in hand. It's easy to find out from her SMC.

2. Billions No. 18 (IMO number: 8711021) ─ She also belongs to Mr. Hsih-Shien Chen. It changes ship's name to "SUN CROWN". And then it was sold to other people.

3. Jin Hye (IMO number: 8518572) ─ In December 2017, we were informed by Investigation Bureau about the vessel was involved with illegal transfers. Then we broke the agreement with the owner immediately and accepted Investigation Bureau and prosecutor's investigation. You may check with them. The owner was in litigation now and we are clear from the investigation. After breaking the agreement, we have delivered the deletion certificate to the owner from Flag State. The ship has left us and we didn't get further information from her.

4. Wan Heng 11 (IMO number: 8688717) ─ This vessel was never under our management. Please provide the evidence for us to report to Investigation Bureau.

5. Heng Xing (IMO number: 8669589) on 7 May 2018 ─ Please check your Annex 2 and amplify stern part of the small ship, you will clearly indicate port registration of two Chinese words "舟山"(ZHOUSHAN) that is a Chinese ship. (Please see the red column)

Source: The Panel

Annex 7: Panel letter to Hin Leong 10 May 2018

United Nations Nations Unies

HEADQUARTERS • SIEGE NEW YORK, NY 10017
TEL.: +1 212 963 1055 • FAX: +1 212 963 2013

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.78

YOUR REFERENCE

10 May 2018

Dear Mr. Evan Lim,

I am writing with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

In its 2018 final report to the UN Security Council the Panel noted the following:

"The Panel's latest investigations show that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is already flouting the most recent resolutions by exploiting global oil supply chains, complicit foreign nationals, offshore company registries and the international banking system. The Panel investigated illicit ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum comprising a multi-million-dollar business that is driving an international network of brokers and ship charterers as well as unwitting global commodity trading companies and oil suppliers.... At the same time, the heightened sanctions have created lucrative markets for Democratic People's Republic of Korea-backed traders seeking to procure petroleum while exporting the country's natural resources. The profit margins involved, coupled with the offshore nature of much of the affected oil, maritime and finance sectors, necessitate ***far greater private sector due diligence, information-sharing and self-policing*** [emphasis added]." (Executive Summary, pg. 4)[1]

Mr. Evan Lim
Project Director
Hin Leong Trading
Singapore

Email: bd@hinleong.com.sg; evanlim@hinleong.com.sg

Cc. Meng Wong See, wongseemeng@hinleong.com.sg
Seng Serene, sereneseng@hinleong.com.sg

Cc. Permanent Mission of Singapore to the United Nations

[1] The Panel's 2018 final report to the Security Council, S/2018/171, 5 March 2018, available at: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports.

1

In preparation for its midterm report to the Security Council due on 3 August 2018, the Panel is gathering information from companies trading in oil and petroleum products, as well as their suppliers and producers in the affected supply chains and regions[2] to ascertain what risk-mitigation measures, if any, such companies are taking in view of the Panel's findings.

In this regard, the Panel would be grateful for your assistance in providing the following information:

- What contractual obligations have your company or your partners considered to mitigate the risk that specific Far Eastern Free On Board (FOB) deliveries are not ultimately diverted to DPRK-controlled vessels in violation of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution 2375 (2017)?

- Do such risk mitigation measures include an "automatic information system (AIS) switch-off clause" to ensure that the performing vessel shall not switch off its AIS at any point whilst the cargo (or any part thereof) is on board the vessel?[3]

- Do such risk mitigation measures include the presentation of supporting documentation to provide evidence of full and complete delivery to the stated destination or vessel within a set number of days of delivery?

For companies still considering optimal risk mitigation measures, please find in the Annex, for your consideration, "Best Practice" contractual clauses that may be used to safeguard the integrity of global oil and petroleum product supply chains by allowing the affected sector to (a) monitor the vessels transporting their products through an "AIS switch-off clause" that guards against clandestine and prohibited ship-to-ship transfers in violation of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution 2375 (2017); (b) ensure the security of the supply chain through the submission of supporting documentation to evidence actual delivery to the stated end-user or customer.

Paragraph 5 of resolution 2407 (2018) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal.

The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council. In addition, the Panel would like to assure you that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the information of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

[2] The Panel has identified a variety of affected companies, Member States and supply chains. A smaller number of these may be found in paras. 61-73, S/2018/171.

[3] In all cases of prohibited ship-to-ship transfer identified by the Panel, the foreign-flagged vessel switched off its AIS prior to the illicit supply to the DPRK tanker.

2

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter. Should you wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths [redacted] and Mr. Neil Watts [redacted]

Yours sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex: "Best practice" contractual clauses

Annex: "Best practice" contractual clauses

Additional conditions for Specific Far East Free on Board (FOB) deliveries

In respect of Specific Far East FOB deliveries, the Buyer undertakes to the seller that in respect of each cargo delivered by the seller to the Buyer, the Buyer shall fulfill the following obligations:

A) The performing vessel for that cargo shall at all times ensure that the performing vessel does not switch off its Automatic Identification System (AIS) at any point whilst that cargo (or any part thereof) is on board the performing vessel.

B) The Buyer shall provide to the Seller within seven (7) days of completion of discharge of the Cargo from the Buyer's performing vessel, complete supporting documents evidenced to the Seller's satisfaction (in Seller's reasonable discretion) a full reconciliation of the discharged quantities of such Cargo by the Buyer's performing vessel (including, without limitation, full details of the dates of discharge (and in each case the quantity discharged) to either receiving shore facilities and/or vessels (including details of the vessel name, flag and registered owners, as applicable) against the quantities delivered by the Seller to the Buyer.

C) Where a discharge port is specified on the bill of lading issued with respect to a Cargo, the Buyer shall provide to the seller within seven (7) days of completion of discharge of such Cargo, documentary evidence that the Cargo was delivered by the performing vessel at the specified discharge port.

Hin Leong responses to best practice clauses and Panel letter

Serene Seng

From:	Serene Seng
Sent:	Tuesday, 7 August, 2018 6:16 PM
To:	'Tammy Xie'
Cc:	Nathanael Lin; Freddy Tan Jie Ren; Chee Li Li
Subject:	RE: UN Clause

Hi Tammy,

Apologies but we really cannot accept these clauses.

Regards,
Serene

From: Tammy Xie [mailto:Tammy.Xie@trafigura.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 7 August, 2018 5:14 PM
To: Serene Seng
Cc: Tammy Xie
Subject: UN Clause

Hi Serene,

I would call you to explain this.

Evan Lim

From: Evan Lim
Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2018 11:42 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Serene Seng; Wong See Meng; Nathanael Lin
Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication #78 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Hin Leong

Dear Sirs,

We refer to your emails of 10 May 2018 and 6 July 2018.

Having taken the time to review our contractual position, we are afraid that confidentiality requirements preclude us from providing the feedback sought by the Panel. We trust that the Panel will appreciate the position that we have been placed in.

Regards,

[redacted]

evan

From: DPA-POE1874 [redacted]
Sent: Friday, 6 July, 2018 12:29 AM
To: BD; Evan Lim; Wong See Meng; Serene Seng
Subject: FW: Outgoing Communication #78 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Hin Leong

Dear Mr. Evan Lim,

Grateful if you can provide us a feedback on the aforementioned Outgoing Communication. We are trying to consolidate the replies on our log and we could not find any from your end. Please do not hesitate to call us or resend to us the reply if this request has already been addressed.

Thank you very much.

Best regards,

[redacted]

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, 10 May, 2018 3:34 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Outgoing Communication #78 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Hin Leong

Dear Mr. Evan Lim,

Source: The Panel

Annex 8: *Hika* scrapping documentation

Total Tonnage		**82,718**		

CHITTAGONG - Port Position as o October 12, 2018

No.	VESSEL NAME	LDT	TYPE	STATUS
1	*Al Anbaraiah*	*15,933*	*Tanker*	*Beached October 11*
2	*Danum 156*	*2,650*	*Container*	*Beached October 09*
3	*Dawn Kanchipuram (Under Tow)*	*9,756*	*Tanker*	*Beached October 10*
4	*Giant*	*24,491*	*Crane Ship*	*Beached October 08*
5	*Hika*	*7,211*	*Tanker*	*Beached October 09*
6	ISA Winter	2,878	General Cargo	Arrived October 09
7	*Nir*	*6,043*	*Tanker*	*Beached October 08*
8	**Ocean Pride**	**7,639**	**Bulk Carrier**	**Arrived June 13**
9	*PTAP One (Under Tow)*	*7,548*	*Floating Storage*	*Beached October 11*
10	Rongdhonu	680	Hospital Ship	Arrived September 14
11	*Touyou Gou*	*3,549*	*Conveyor Reclaimer*	*Beached October 09*
Total Tonnage		**88,378**		

GADANI - Port Position as of October 12, 2018

No.	VESSEL NAME	LDT	TYPE	STATUS
		No new vessels reported this week.		

VESSELS DUE AT OUTER ANCHORAGE:
DATED: 02/10/2018:

THE CHITTAGONG PORT AUTHORITY
MARINE DEPARTMENT
LIST OF VESSELS AS PER DECLARATION MADE BY LOCAL AGENT:
www.cpa.gov.bd

SL. NO.	NAME OF VESSELS	LENGTH	DRAFT	DATE OF ARRIVAL	L.PORT CALL	FLAG	LOCAL AGENT	LINE BELONG TO	CARGO CARRIED	TYPE OF CARGO	LOADING PORTS
27	AMITY(IMO:9497517)	-	176.20	UREA	FUJE	LIBE	SSL	26/09 AT 1400	A	9.8	27500(8000CTG)
28	TAN BINH 236(IMO:9198379)	-	150.00	FELDSPAR	P.KEL	PANA	AMBL	26/09 AT 1206	B	9.7	22000
29	ATLANTIC MONTEREY(IMO:9782326)	-	199.99	SOYABEAN	CONV	SING	USL	26/09 AT 1312	A	10.5	60162
30	TRON LEGACY(IMO:9618513)	-	189.99	C.CLINK	SING	MARSH	ASLL	26/09 AT 1330	A	11.31	54230
31	CROWN VICTORY(IMO:9077252)	-	190.00	LIMESTONE	SING	BD	CMSS	26/09 AT 1530	A	11.5	43000
32	DENSA TIGER(IMO:9432476)	-	189.90	SLAG	SING	MALT	ZEBRA	23/09 AT 1340	A	10.9	41825
33	HONY FUTURE(IMO:9583823)	-	189.99	C.CLINK	CAMPA	HONG	LITMOND	27/09 AT 1612	B	11.5	54100
34	BULK PATAGONIA(IMO:9503184)	-	197.00	WHEAT	P.SAID	PANA	SEACOM	28/09 AT 0142	A	11.4	56270
35	HEILAN JOURNEY(IMO:9606778)	-	189.99	SLAG	COCHI	PANA	BASHUND	28/09 AT 1435	A	11.2	26400(28600MONG)
36	OCEAN ROSE(IMO:9351725)	-	189.99	C.CLINK	KRABI	MARSH	USL	28/09 AT 1616	A	10.5	54800
37	PIONEER C(IMO:9225500)	-	99.90	COAL	MALA	TUVA	FMS	29/09 AT 0050	C	7.3	7500
38	AGERI(IMO:958874)	-	189.99	WHEAT	P.SAID	LIBE	BASHUND	29/09 AT 1630	A	11.3	54400
39	WESTERN CALLAO(IMO:9594717)	-	177.85	MOP	KLAIP	SING	SULTAN	30/09 AT 0412	A	11.4	35300(21300MONG)
40	VTB BRAVE(IMO:	-	105.00	BALL CLAY	P.KEL	PANA	FMS	30/09 AT 0145	C	9.5	8000
41	ARIADNE(IMO:9554676)	-	189.99	STONE	MINA	LIBE	RADIANT	30/09 AT 0505	A	10.1	36600
42	DENSA EAGLE(IMO:9432488)	-	189.90	COAL	RICH	MALT	UML	30/09 AT 1620	A	12.52	51625
43	MERIDIAN EXPRESS(IMO:9596272)	-	183.00	CDSO	S.LORE	PANA	USL	01/10 AT 0400	A	10.6	41671
44	CROWN VIRTUE(IMO:9216676)	-	189.99	C.CLINK	CAMPA	BD	CMSS	30/09 AT 1642	A	12.15	50100
45	OCEAN RAHBAR(IMO:9293105)	-	189.94	C.CLINK	KRABI	PANA	SSL	30/09 AT 1817	A	11.8	52200
46	FOUR EMERALD(IMO:9416458)	-	180.00	TSP	FUJE	MALT	ASCO	01/10 AT 1136	-	8.8	26250(7000CTG)
47	RICKMERS DALIAN(IMO:9292022)	-	192.90	P.CARGO	CHENN	MARSH	HSR	01/10 AT 1430	A	8.7	2100
48	EM CORAL(IMO:9586708)	-	189.99	COAL	SING	PANA	UNIOCEAN	01/10 AT 1830	A	11.5	55000(25000MONG)
49	BASHUNDHARA-8(IMO:9119971)	-	189.99	C.CLINK	KARACI	BD	BASHUND	01/10 AT 1936	A	11.95	26000(19450MONG)
50	HAI DUONG 36(IMO:9317042)	-	121.10	WOOD PULP	FUTON	PANA	USL	01/10 AT 2330	C	7.8	7065
51	NAVIOS ULYSSES(IMO:9317494)	-	189.99	AGGREGATE	FUJA	MALT	UNIOCEN	02/10 AT 0718	A	11.47	54000
52	ASSAD ULLAH	-	[illegible]	SCRAPPING	YANG	BD	SIGMA	[illegible]	-	4.6	A/FOR BEACHING
53	RONGDHONU(IMO:[illegible])	-	48.44	SCRAPPING	OTG	BD	MITI	[illegible]	-	-	-DO-
54	DONGWOO GAS(IMO:[illegible])	-	[illegible]	SCRAPPING	BUSAN	PANA	IMS	[illegible]	C	3.1	-DO-
55	WINNING BROTHER(IMO:[illegible])	-	290.00	SCRAPPING	CHINA	PANA	[illegible]	[illegible]	C	7.86	-DO-
56	[illegible]	-	[illegible]	SCRAPPING	BELW	ST.KIT	MOSTAFA	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	-DO-
57	BANGA LANKA	-	[illegible]	SCRAPPING	-	BD	BARIDHI	R/A(04/04 AT [illegible])	-	A/FOR DELIVERY (SCRAP WITH DAMAGE CARGO)	
58	OCEAN PRIDE	-	[illegible]	SCRAPPING	SING	BD	ZEBRA	[illegible]	A	[illegible]	A/FOR DELIVERY
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
60	HIKA(IMO:[illegible])	-	[illegible]	SCRAPPING	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	-	[illegible]	-DO-
61	NIR(IMO:[illegible])	-	[illegible]	SCRAPPING	TUNJ	PALAU	FAST	01/10 AT [illegible]	C	[illegible]	-DO-
62	DANUM 156(IMO:[illegible])	-	[illegible]	SCRAPPING	P.KEL	MALA	JARWORLD	01/10 AT [illegible]	-	[illegible]	-DO-
63	TOUYOU GOU(DEAD VESSEL)(IMO:[illegible])	-	[illegible]	SCRAPPING	BATA	SING	[illegible]	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	-DO-
64	DAWAN KANCHIPURAM(DEAD VESSEL)(IMO:[illegible])	-	[illegible]	SCRAPPING	CHENN	IND	FAST	[illegible]	C	[illegible]	-DO-

60	HIKA(IMO:9033969)	-	169.77

Source: The Panel

Annex 9: Panama's reply to the Panel

MISIÓN PERMANENTE
DE PANAMÁ ANTE LA ONU
NUEVA YORK, USA

MPP NY 1288/18

La Misión Permanente de la República de Panamá saluda atentamente a la Secretaría del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas establecido en virtud de la Resolución 1718 (2006), y tiene el honor de informar las medidas adoptadas por la República de Panamá en respuesta a las notas No. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.147 de 18 de junio de 2018 y notas No. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.223 de 16 de agosto de 2018.

La Misión Permanente de la República de Panamá, a solicitud de autoridad superior, remite al Panel de Expertos el informe nacional que la Secretaría Ejecutiva del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional en coordinación con la Autoridad Marítima de Panamá comunicó al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, en los casos relativos a las naves Shang Yuan Bao y New Regent, respecitivamente.

La Misión Permanente de la República de Panamá aprovecha la ocasión para reiterar a la Secretaría del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas establecido en virtud de la Resolución 1718 (2006), las seguridades de su distinguida consideración.

02 de noviembre de 2018

Al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad
En virtud de la Resolución 1718 (2006)
Naciones Unidas
Nueva York

REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ ★ Misión Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas ★

CONFIDENCIAL

República Dominicana, por la cantidad de $619.25. Recibo de Impuestos y Tasas Anuales del 04 enero de 2017 a través del propietario Jui Chen Shipping Co., Limited, Nápoles Italia, por la cantidad de $3,968.06.

- **Detalles sobre los accionistas:** Según nuestras constancias la embarcación era operada por una sociedad que no está constituida en la jurisdicción panameña, por lo que dicha información no constan en registros.
- **Copia de la más reciente tripulación:** No consta.Una vez que es cancelada una nave del Registro Mercante Panameño, no se tiene acceso a la más reciente lista de tripulación ya que la relación entre Estado de Pabellón y la nave desapareció una vez fue cancelada.

NEW REGENT
IMO: 8312497 y Distintivo de Llamada 3FCR5, año de construcción 1983, tonelaje bruto 2,998.00, tonelaje neto 1,600.00, eslora 104 mts., manga 119 X 30 mts.

- **CANCELACIÓN:** Tanquero con registro oficial N°46483-15. El proceso de cancelación del Registro Mercante Panameño se inició el 4 de septiembre con un pliego de cargos por denuncia presentada a la Administración de la Autoridad Marítima de Panamá, consistente que la misma estaba incurriendo en actividades que violan las Resoluciones emanadas del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas emitidas en contra de la República Popular Democrática de Corea del Norte. Sin embargo, la cancelación fue efectiva con posterioridad al inicio del proceso, a solicitud de parte interesada.
- **Propietario Registrado:** Mega Glory Holding Limited, dirección 2nd floor, Abbott Road Town, tortola British Virgin Islands, teléfono 88-7-2696301, Fascimile86-7-2696313, correo electrónico lcn.crewing@gmail.co.
- **Operador Registrado**: Ocean Grow International Shipmanagement Consultant Corporation, Company IMO 5096871; dirección 4F-1, No.380, Ming Quan 2nd RD, Quianzhen Dist., Kaoshiung City 806. Taiwan; teléfono 886-7-9659989, facsimile 886-7-9660366, correo ogisco@oceangrow.com.tw, telex 051-94074828.
- **Persona de contacto responsable para responder a requerimientos de Autoridad:** Sung, Chao-Chen, Ocean Grow International Shipmanagement Consultant Corporation; 4F-1, No.380, Ming Quan 2nd RD, Quianzhen Dist., Kaoshiung City 806 Taiwan; teléfono 886-7-9659989, facsimile 886-7-9660366, correo ogisco@oceangrow.com.tw, telex 051-94074828.
- **Compañía Aseguradora para Cobertura de Daños:** Maritime Mutual, Blue Card No.3149 15A, a partir del 15 de julio de 2015 al 14 de julio de 2016, responsable Maritime Pacific R&I Services Ltd.
  Arsenal Insurance Company, Policy Reference 18/PII12/000487, con fecha de 18 de julio de 2018, responsable Yury Makhovoy, Head of Marine Insurance Department.
- **Historial de Pagos para Registro:** pago por abanderamiento (adjunto), pago efectuado por los propietarios No. Recibo10127030A, mediante cheque No.REC-138184/14-12-2017, banco Ofic. Del Reg. Aux en Tokio, fecha 26 de abril de 2018, por la cantidad de $3,708.00. Recibo No.1218407 efctuado por Ocean Grow International Shipmanagement Consultant Corporation, en el consulado de Tokyo,

CONFIDENCIAL

CONFIDENCIAL

en 03 de agosto de 2017, por la cantidad de $1,500.00. Recibo No10089959A, efectuado por los propietarios, cheque No.REC.125295/24/12/2015, en la Embajada de Panamá en Taipei, el 20 de abril de 2016 por la cantidad de $3,708.00.

- **Detalles sobre los accionistas:** Según nuestras constancias la embarcación era operada por una sociedad que no está constituida en la jurisdicción panameña, por lo que dicha información no constan en registros.
- **Copia de la más reciente tripulación:** No consta. Una vez que es cancelada una nave del Registro Mercante Panameño, no se tiene acceso a la más reciente lista de tripulación.

Acciones Preventivas tomadas a nivel nacional en torno a estas embarcaciones

Con motivo de las acciones preventivas y de protección del sistema financiero nacional, el registro mercante panameño y de las actividades relacionadas el Estado panameño adoptó las siguientes acciones en torno a estas embarcaciones:

- Se informó a los sujetos obligados financieros y no financieros acerca de los riesgos para el sistema financiero nacional representan las personas y empresas relacionadas;
- Se dio curso al congelamiento Preventivo de activos;
- Se hizo la búsqueda en la base de datos de inteligencia financiera;
- Notificó a los países interesados, sobre la medida tomada por Panamá respecto a las naves.
- De conformidad al párrafo cuarto del Artículo 51 de la Ley No. 57 de 6 de agosto de 2008 "General de Marina Mercante", una vez es iniciado el proceso de cancelación se suspende la Patente de Navegación de Servicio Internacional y por tanto, no se autorizarán prórrogas a dicho documento hasta que culmine el mencionado proceso.
- Se suspendió la emisión y/o la renovación de Certificados Técnicos, a favor de las naves SHANG YUAN BAO y NEW REGENT.
- Se notificó a los agentes residentes y a la Organización Reconocida [1]que ha efectuado los reconocimientos o ha emitido los correspondientes Certificados Técnicos, para que se abstengan de prestar tales servicios.
- A través de la Autoridad Marítima de Panamá se está trabajando en una serie de acciones que involucran el desarrollo e implementación de capacidades para el seguimiento y monitoreo de las naves que se crean pueden estar realizando actividades violatorias de las Resoluciones de la ONU.

Estás acciones incluyen:

[1]De acuerdo a la Resolución J.D. 019-2005 de 24 de noviembre de 2005, Organizaciones Reconocidas son todas aquellas organizaciones nacionales e internacionales debidamente reconocidas por la Dirección General de Marina Mercante de la Autoridad Marítima de Panamá para hacer reconocimientos y expedir certificados estatutarios a las naves de la Marina Mercante Nacional, de acuerdo a las leyes nacionales y a los convenios internacionales ratificados por Panamá.

CONFIDENCIAL

CONFIDENCIAL

- La revisión en el Sistema PurpleTRAC, de todas las naves que soliciten la inscripción en el Registro Mercante Panameño, así como, naves a las cuales se les tenga que emitir un certificado técnico, lo que permite observar cuando la nave mantiene algún tipo de restricción impuesta por un tercer Estado o por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.
- A través del equipo en el cual está programado el Sistema de Identificación y Seguimiento de Largo Alcance (LIRIT por sus siglas en inglés) que portan las naves de bandera panameña, administrado, por la compañía Pole Star, la cual lo adquirió luego de una licitación pública, se establecerá un polígono de vigilancia sobre las zonas que se consideren de mayor riesgo según la información que ha proporcionado previamente un tercer Estado.
- La Autoridad Marítima de Panamá, como medida preventiva el nombre del operador fue incluido en los procesos de cancelación para que el mismo sea del conocimiento de los funcionarios y agentes residentes, a fin de activar las alertas correspondientes y evitar la ejecución de actos que afecten los intereses nacionales y de la comunidad internacional.

CONFIDENCIAL

Annex 10: Jui Zong's reply to the Panel

瑞 榮 船 舶 管 理 有 限 公 司

JUI ZONG SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD.

5FL-2 NO.551 JIOURU 1ST ROAD, SANMIN DIST, KAOHSIUNG TAIWAN 80764 [redacted]

80764 高雄市三民區九如一路 551 號 5 樓之 2 TEL: 07-3974257 FAX: 07-3974258

DATE： 6TH, July, 2018

TO： United Nations and the Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874(2009)

ATTN： Hugh Griffiths

TEL： +1 212 963 1055

FAX： +1 212 963 2013

FROM： Jui Zong Ship Management Co., Ltd.

SUBJECT：

Re: Reference : S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.147 , Panama-flagged Shang Yuan Bao (IMO number: 8126070) involved in a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK vessel Paek Ma (IMO number: 9066978).

Dear Mr. Hugh Griffiths,

We are the ship's agency 'Jui Zong Ship Management Co., Ltd.' of the Panama-flagged Shang Yuan Bao (IMO number: 8126070). We received a letter from you on 19th-June-2018, regarding sanctions measures imposed in relation to the DPRK in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

We have contact with the ship owner 'Jui Cheng Shipping Co., Ltd.' for reply the Panel's problem. The owner indicates the vessel *Shang Yuan Bao* is too old to operation, therefore they decided to sell the vessel several months ago, and they are looking for the buyer until now. *Shang Yuan Bao* was drifting at sea and waiting for the owner's instruction because the potential buyer would like to visit the vessel. However, the DPRK vessel Paek Ma (IMO number: 9066978) seemed to took *Shang Yuan Bao* for oil supplier and closed to *Shang Yuan Bao*, that was a big misunderstanding. The DPRK vessel Paek Ma realized she had misunderstood but still asks *Shang Yuan Bao* could provide fresh water to them based on humanitarian aid, and *Shang Yuan Bao* agreed.

As above-mentioned, the vessel *Shang Yuan Bao* did not transfer bunker to the DPRK vessel Paek Ma, therefore we can not provide the information that you need.

Sincerely yours

Sophia Huang

JUI ZONG SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD.

Source: The Panel

Annex 11: Jui Zong correspondence to the Panel

From: [redacted]

Sent: Monday, October 15, 2018 10:22 PM

To: Hugh Griffiths

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Re: Outgoing Communication #147 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Jui Pang Shipping

Dear Mr. Hugh Griffith,

Please note the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau is investigating this case, we believe they shall give back our innocence, thank you.

B.RGDS

Jui Zong Ship Management Co., Ltd.

----- Original Message -----

From: [redacted]

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Sent: Monday, October 15, 2018 11:51 PM

Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication #147 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Jui Pang Shipping

Dear Sir/Madame,

I would ask that you please identify yourself for the purposes of our report. Please give your name, position and affiliation.

I would note for the record that you have provided no documentation to substantiate your claims that the prohibited ship to ship transfers "was a big misunderstanding"

Nor have you provided the contact details – email, telephone numbers, names and addresses of the entities you refer to both in your letter of 6 July 2018 nor in your email of Monday, 15 October.

Your level of involvement with the Panama-flagged Shang Yuan Bao is clear. Your excuse that the ship was transferring fresh water to the Paek Ma is not credible. Even if it were true, ***all*** ship to ship transfers are prohibited under the resolutions.

I take this opportunity to inform you that should documentation and information from you and your company are not forthcoming in the coming days, it is likely that the Panel may recommend you and your company for an assets freeze and travel ban in our next report to the Security Council.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

Coordinator, Panel of Experts

Established pursuant to UNSCR 1874

From: shipping [redacted]

Sent: Monday, 15 October, 2018 2:02 AM

To: Hugh Griffiths [redacted]

Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication #147 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Jui Pang Shipping

Dear Mr. Hugh Griffith,

Good day. We are sorry to reply you so lately because we missed this e-mail and noted this e-mail when Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau came to our office last week.

Please note we are just a port agent at Kaohsiung port, not the actual operator or shipowner. We should not suffer any unrighted wrong.

The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau is investigating the illegal action to the vessel, we believe we are innocence, thank you.

B.RGDS

Jui Zong Ship Management Co., Ltd.

Source: The Panel

Annex 12: Qihang International Shipping Management's reply to the Panel

Dear Mr.Hugh Griffiths ＆ Mr.Jong Kwon Youn：

Well received your message. We Hongkong Qi Hang International Shipping Management Co., Ltd as a ISM Management company attaches great importance to the matter. And we inquired the owner in no time, gotten the details as follows:

The registered owner of Sierra Leone's flag vessel "XING MING YANG 888" is Xing Ming Yang Hong Kong Shipping Company Co., they rented the vessel to XIAGANG HONG KONG MARITIME CO., LIMITED. And the vessel "XING MING YANG 888" is actually operated by XIAGANG HONG KONG MARITIME CO..

At early morning 11 Jun 2018, "XING MING YANG 888" was on the way to port of NingDe for repairing by the order of the charterer, and she had no any cargo on board. The duty officer received a calling on VHF Ch16 from a nearby vessel which you call vessel "MU BONG 1", they claimed to be rescued because they were no food and fresh water any more on board, and our duty officer reported to the captain immediately. Our captain considered the sake of humanitarian and in accordance with the provisions of Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Oceans on the obligation of rescue, so our captain allowed the vessel keeping alongside our vessel for supplying some food and fresh water in half an hour. Our captain claimed that all operations were no illegal activities, and all supplies during the period were lifesaving and humanitarian requirement.

All the above facts were confirmed by the owner and our crew. We request you to check all the facts in kindly, and give our vessel an unprejudiced treatment.

Best regards！

HK QIHANG INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING MANAGEMENT

2018.8.23

For and on behalf of
HK QIHANG INT'L SHIPPING MANAGEMENT LIMITED
香港啟航國際船舶管理有限公司

Authorized Signature(s)

Source: The Panel

Annex 13: Ship-to-ship transfers and coal vessels

1. Unsurprisingly, the transfers have continued to occur in international waters where there is weak or nonexistent monitoring by flag states, insurers and most traders. In the context of these transfers, the Panel notes the use of increasingly sophisticated evasion in addition to AIS manipulation which remains an overarching feature of the transfers. Other methods of evasion include physical disguise of DPRK tankers, the use of small, un-registered vessels, illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud, night transfers and use of other vessels for transshipment. The below text and figures show examples of each type of evasion.

2. The DPRK has been disguising tankers as cargo ships through the construction of fake cargo hatches[160] (see figure I) and the false reporting of these ships as cargo ships when AIS is switched on.

Figure I: Fake cargo hatches



Source: Member State

3. The below figures show the use of small, nondescript vessels not requiring an IMO number, making nationality and identity more difficult to determine, especially when the vessels obscure or paint false names (see figure II -IV for examples).

Figure II: Small ship transfer to tanker *Yu Phyong* 5 of 19 June 2018



Source: Member State

Figure III: Small ship transfer to *Ji Song* of 19 May 2018



Source: Member State

[160] Made of wood and lashed with canvas.

Figure IV: Small ship transfer to *Yu Jong 2* of 16 February 2018



Source: Member State

Vessel identity fraud

4. Larger, internationally-registered, foreign-flagged vessels are also engaging in name falsification and other forms of identity fraud along with their DPRK counterparts. On 18 May 2018, the Panama-flagged *Shang Yuan Bao* (IMO number: 8126070) obscured the name on its bow and stern before engaging in a ship-to-ship transfer with the designated DPRK tanker *Paek Ma* (IMO number: 9066978) as the "*Puma*" which was painted on the vessel's bow. (see figure V). The vessel also engaged in the now-common practice of switching off its AIS. [161] (figure VI)


Figure V: *Shang Yuan Bao* ship-to-ship transfer and disguise of name



Source: Member State

[161] The vessel's operator, Jui Zong Ship Management Co., Ltd., in Taiwan Province of China, claimed to the Panel that the vessels did not "transfer bunker to the DPRK vessel" and that DPRK tanker had requested "fresh water to them based on humanitarian aid". See annex 10.

Figure VI: *Shang Yuan Bao* AIS transmission record



Source: Windward

5. Taking advantage of the lack of monitoring, oversight and regulation by flag of convenience states, DPRK vessels have falsified their ports of registry and name to give the impression of being under a non-DPRK jurisdiction. This was seen when on 29 June the DPRK tanker *An San 1* disguised itself as the "*Hope Sea*", of Freetown, Sierra Leone (figure VII).

Figure VII: *An San 1* disguised as "Hope Sea" during 29 June illicit transfer



Source: Member State

6. In a new technique involving only non-DPRK-flagged vessels, one of which was later used to deliver petroleum to the DPRK, the former Belize-registered designated tanker *Wan Heng 11* (IMO

number: 8791667)[162] conducted a daytime ship-to-ship transfer on 10 April with the *Patriot* (IMO number: 9003550) a Russian Federation-flagged vessel.


Figure VIII: Ship-to-ship transfer between *Wan Heng 11* and *Patriot*



Source: Member State

7. Both vessels' AIS transponders appeared to be switched off at the time of the transfer although the Patriot's AIS appeared later that day, registering a draft change which indicated that a cargo had been discharged. (see figure IX)

Figure IX: *Patriot* AIS transmission record



Source: Windward

[162] The *Wan Heng 11* had already been designated (for de-flagging pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016) and prohibited from port entry pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2017) on 30 March 2018 after it was observed engaging in a ship to ship transfer with the DPRK tanker *Rye Song Gang 1* on 13 February.

8. While the *Wan Heng 11* kept its AIS transponder off following the transfer, the vessel was observed delivering cargo to Nampo, DPRK, on 15 April (figure X).

Figure X: Wan Heng 11 in Nampo, 15 April




Source: Member State, *Map*: Panel

9. The Panel notes that while the Wan Heng 11 violated paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Patriot did not violate either this provision or paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017). The Wan Heng 11 was designated for de-registration and a port call ban (and not for ship-to-ship transfer). In this context, **the Panel recommends that the Committee incorporate paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) to the designation list in order to prohibit designated vessels from conducting ship-to-ship transfers with other foreign-flagged vessels.**

10. Since 30 May 2018, Member States have continued to report further transfers. For example, a Member State reported that the designated DPRK vessel *Chon Ma San* (IMO 8660313)[163] engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with and received fuel from the *Myong Ryu 1* and the *Jin Yang 36* (金洋 36) (figure II), both of unknown nationality, on 4 June and 25 June 2018, respectively. On 29 June, the designated *An San 1* received product from another tanker of unknown nationality in the same area.

[163] Designated on 30 March 2018. The Panel previously reported that this tanker attempted to disguise its identity as the "Whale".

Figure XI: *Jin Yang 36* transfer to the *Chon Ma San* on 25 June 2018



Source: Member State

Coal vessel identity fraud and AIS manipulation

11. In 2018, the DPRK continued to violate the ban on coal exports through vessel identity fraud in order to deliver coal to Chinese ports as well as numerous, large-scale transfers of coal in international waters to small, unidentified vessels. These new strategies seem to be a response to the relatively successful curbing of the sale of coal by China and Vietnam following the adoption of resolution 2371 (2017).

12. The DPRK vessel *Kal Ma* (IMO number: 8503228) loaded coal at Nampo on 19 May and eight days later loitered off the Chinese port of Xiongyuo where it discharged its cargo before returning empty to Nampo on 9 June (figure I).

FigureXII: Kal Ma observed through satellite imagery May-June 2018




Source: Member State, Map: Panel

13. In so doing the *Kal Ma* concealed its identity and manipulated its AIS to portray itself as the "*K Ma*" and later the "*KM*"[164] both falsely broadcast as Cambodia registered. Under its false identity the *Kal Ma* indicated that its final destination was the port of Bayuquan, China, before it diverted to Xiongyuo (figures II and III). China informed the Panel that "based on the disguised name KM and the fictitious IMO number 9603128 of the vessel indicted by the Panel, the Chinese authority cannot find the record data of the vessel as well as any information showing the vessel discharging cargoes in the relevant sea area in China between 27 May and 1 June 2018. China also stated that the "Chinese Customs authority has not found any entry or exit border information for this vessel after 1 January 2018 or any record information on the vessel with the disguised IMO number. China will closely monitor the vessel Kal Ma, and prevent the vessel from conducting activities violating the Security Council resolutions in China."

164 The *Kal Ma*'s AIS transponder provided a fictitious IMO number 9603128 while broadcasting as the *KM*.

Figure XIII: Kal Ma reports false identity in AIS transmission on entering Chinese waters



Source: Windward

Annex 14: Panel letters to Primorye/Gudzon

United Nations Nations Unies

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.357

YOUR REFERENCE

28 November 2018

Dear Mr. Voitenko,

I am writing to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel would like to follow up on its letter dated 22 June 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.162) (see Annex 1), to which the Panel has not received a response to date. As Primorye Maritime Logistics is described publicly as a subsidiary of Gudzon Shipping by IHS Maritime and was registered for an International Maritime Organization (IMO) company number in June 2017 by Gudzon Shipping staff, who described Primorye Maritime Logistics as "an affiliated company" of Gudzon. As Gudzon senior management were assigned responsibilities for the departments of both companies[1], the Panel is continuing to send correspondence to the Gudzon email addresses associated with Primorye Maritime Logistics concerning the vessel *Patriot*.

The Panel kindly requests answers to questions 1 – 8 in our previous correspondence regarding the ship-to-ship transfers involving the *Patriot* and the vessel *Wan Heng 11* in order to reflect the reply of Primorye/Gudzon in the Panel's forthcoming report to the Security Council.

Mr. Alexey V. Voitenko
Director General and other responsible parties
Primorye Maritime Logistics Co Ltd (PML Co Ltd)
ul Ovchinnikova 12, Vladivostok, Primorskiy kray, 690048, Russian Federation
Emails: operator@sk-gudzon.ru; agshipping@mail.ru; logistika@sk-gudzon.ru; fleet@sk-gudzon.ru

cc: Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

[1] Confidential correspondence held on file by the Panel.

1

In addition, according to a Member State (see Annex 2), the *Patriot* engaged in two ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers in early January 2018. The Panel is conducting an independent investigation into this matter.

According to AIS data viewed on a commercial maritime platform, the *Patriot* did not transmit AIS for the period 7-8 January and 11-16 January 2018 (see Annex 3). The Panel has noted in previous reports that vessels engaging in ship-to-ship transfers switch off their AIS prior to such transfers. In the case of the documented *Patriot* ship-to-ship transfer with the *Wan Heng 11*, annex 5 of the Panel's 22 June 2018 letter noted an AIS switch off by the *Patriot* for this ship-to ship transfer.

In particular, the Panel would be grateful for your response to:

(a) the statement of the Member State (see Annex 2) and;

(b) your explanation for the AIS switch-off for the time periods 7–8 January and 11 -16 January 2018 (see Annex 3).

In addition, another Member State informed the Panel that Gudzon/Primorye is among the companies known and used by brokers who are operating outside of the DPRK and who are themselves aware of the nature and legal status of ship-to-ship transfers to DPRK-controlled vessels with whom they assist.[2]

In light of the above, the Panel would be grateful for any information on the measures your company has taken regarding **vigilance, due diligence and risk assessment** regarding the *Patriot* or any other vessels it owns, operates, manages or controls directly or through subsidiary or affiliated companies in matters relating to the United Nations Security Council's resolutions pertaining to DPRK-related ship-to-ship transfers.

In this regard, the Panel would like to also draw your attention to certain "best practice clauses" already sent to many global and regional commodity trading companies, brokers and refiners to assist them in reducing the risk that vessels under their control may wittingly or unwittingly engage in ship-to-ship transfers with vessels controlled by the DPRK (see Annex 4).

If Gudzon/Primorye decides to adapt and adopt the most relevant measures pertinent to your company, as a transporter of petroleum products, such as an AIS "switch off" undertaking, we would be grateful to receive information on this matter. Vessels that maintain their AIS at all times are statistically less likely to engage in ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-controlled vessels, wittingly or unwittingly. In addition, such measures are simple to verify as the AIS of many vessels is being monitored by the Panel.

[2] Information held on file by the Panel.

2

As the Panel intends to provide its findings in its next final report to the Security Council, your timely response is important to ensure that your reply can be taken into consideration. In the absence of any response on your part, the Panel will publish its findings based on available evidence to the Panel.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter. Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [redacted]nd Mr. Jong Kwon Youn [redacted]

Yours sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annexes

1. Panel letter dated 22 June 2018 (ref: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.162)
2. Extract from United States Department of Treasury statement, 21 August 2018
3. *Patriot* AIS data viewed through specialized maritime database for the period January 2018
4. Examples of "best practice" clauses provided to many leading global and regional commodity traders, brokers and insurers in May – June 2018

Annex 1. Panel letter dated 22 June 2018 (ref: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.162)

United Nations Nations Unies

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.162

YOUR REFERENCE

22 June 2018

Dear Sir/Madame,

I am writing to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

According to paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017), "all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK". In paragraph 14 of the same resolution, the Security Council also decided that "all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined petroleum products" (subject to exemptions).

According to specialized maritime databases, your company, **Primorye Maritime Logistics Co Ltd (PML Co Ltd)**, a subsidiary of Gudzon shipping Co. Ltd., is the owner and operator for the Russian-flagged *Patriot* (IMO number: 9003550) which conducted a ship-to-ship transfer at sea with the designated tanker *Wan Heng 11* (IMO number: 8791667) on 10 April 2018, which then transhipped the refined petroleum to the DPRK (Annex 1).

Director General
Primorye Maritime Logistics Co Ltd (PML Co Ltd)
ul Tigrovaya 20A, Vladivostok, Primorskiy kray, 690091
Russian Federation
Email: office@sk-gudzon.ru; operator@sk-gudzon.ru
CC: Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

4

The *Wan Heng 11* had previously been involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfer at sea of petroleum products to the designated DPRK-flagged tanker *Rye Song Gang 1* (IMO number: 7389704) in the East China Sea on 13 February 2018.[3] After departing the port of Nampo, DPRK, on 31 March 2018 (Annex 2), the tanker subsequently conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the *Patriot* on 10 April 2018 (Annex 3). The *Wan Heng 11* then returned to Nampo on 15 April 2018 (Annex 4). Specialized maritime tracking data shows that both tankers had switched off their AIS to hide the transfer but the *Patriot* later transmitted a draft change indicating a discharge had taken place on 10 April 2018 (Annex 5).

In its efforts to monitor the implementation of the relevant provisions of resolutions 2321 (2016) and 2371 (2017), and in order to gather reliable and verifiable information in this regard, the Panel would be grateful for the assistance of your company in providing the following information in connection with *Patriot*:

1) Explanation as to why there was a ship-to-ship transfer at sea between the *Patriot* and the designated tanker *Wan Heng 11*;
2) The type and amount of petroleum product transferred to the DPRK vessel *Wan Heng 11* on 10 April 2018;
3) Copies of the bills of lading and certificates of origin for the petroleum product carried aboard the *Patriot* prior to the transfer to the *Wan Heng 11*;
4) The identity and contact details of the point of contact or persons acting on their behalf to arrange the transfer to the *Wan Heng 11*;
5) Copies of the documents, emails and/or screenshots of mobile messages related to the transfer and its transfer confirmation sent to the buyer;
6) Copies of the invoices, remittances and bank account details for the payment for the transaction; and
7) Details of the means of communication with the *Wan Heng 11*; and
8) A copy of the crew list.

Paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution 2407 (2018) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal.

In addition to the information above related to the ongoing investigation, the Panel would be grateful for any information on the measures your company has taken regarding vigilance, due diligence and risk assessment regarding involvement of the *Patriot* or any other vessels that it owns in violations of relevant Security Council resolutions.

As the Panel intends to provide its findings in its next mid-term report to the Security Council, your timely response is important to ensure that your reply can be taken into consideration. In the absence of any response on your part, the Panel will publish its findings based on available evidence to the Panel. The Panel would like to assure you that

[3] The formerly Belize-flagged *Wan Heng 11* was subsequently designated pursuant to paragraphs 12 of resolution 2321 (2016), 6 of resolution 2371 (2017) and 6 of resolution 2375 (2017) on 30 March 2018.

5

any information that you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the information of the Security Council and the Committee.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter. Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Neil Watts (email: [redacted] or Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [redacted]

Yours sincerely,



Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annexes

1. *Patriot's* registration details
2. Images showing the tanker *Wan Heng 11* in the port of Nampo on 31 March 2018
3. Image showing the tanker *Patriot* conducting a ship-to-ship transfer to the *Wan Heng 11* on 10 April 2018 in the East China Sea
4. Images showing the tanker *Wan Heng 11* returning to the port of Nampo on 15 April 2018
5. Extract from a specialized maritime database showing that the *Patriot* switched off its AIS during transfer but later transmitted a draft change indicating a discharge on 10 April 2018

Annex 15: Vessels documented through imagery as loading and transporting DPRK coal

#	Date	Location	Vessel	Status
1	10 December 2017	Taean, DPRK	*Forever Lucky* IMO: 9003653 Current flag: unknown Former flag: Panama until 11 December 2017	Loading coal
2	30 September 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Forever Lucky* IMO: 9003653 Current flag: unknown Former flag: Panama until 11 December 2017	At anchor
3	1 February 2018	Near Qinzhou, China	*Hua Fu* IMO: 9020003 Current flag: unknown Former flag: Panama until May 2017	At pier
4	22 August 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Hua Fu* IMO: 9020003 Current flag: unknown Former flag: Panama until May 2017	Conducting STS transfer of coal
5	24 April 2018	Nampo, DPRK	*Jang Un* IMO: 8822260 Current flag: DPRK	Loading coal
6	22 May 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Jang Un* IMO: 8822260 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
7	24 July 2018	Nampo, DPRK	*Jang Un* IMO: 8822260 Current flag: DPRK	Loading coal
8	5 September 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Jang Un* IMO: 8822260 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
9	15 August 2018	Nampo, DPRK	*Ka Rim Chon* IMO: 8314811 Current flag: DPRK	Loading coal
10	21 September 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Ka Rim Chon* IMO: 8314811 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
11	21 September 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Pho Phyong* IMO: 8314811 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
12	25 May 2018	Nampo, DPRK	*Nam Dae Chon* IMO:9138680 Current flag: DPRK	Loading coal

13	10 June 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Nam Dae Chon* IMO:9138680 Current flag: DPRK		Conducting STS transfer of coal
14	24 July 2018	Nampo, DPRK	*Nam Dae Chon* IMO:9138680 Current flag: DPRK		Loading coal
15	2 August 2018	Posan Ni, DPRK	*Paek Yang San* IMO: 9020534 Current flag: DPRK		Loading bagged coal
16	5 September 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Hua Fu* IMO: 9020003 Current flag: unknown	*Paek Yang San* IMO: 9020534 Current flag: DPRK	Conducting STS transfer of coal
17	27 October 2018	Songnim, DPRK	*Lucky Star* (formerly *Asia Bridge 3*) IMO: 9015278 Flag: Togo		Loading coal
18	20 November 2018	Near Dao Bach Long Vi Island, Vietnam	*Lucky Star* (formerly *Asia Bridge 3*) IMO: 9015278 Flag: Togo		At anchor
19	16 December 2017	Nampo, DPRK	*Oriental Treasure* (renamed *Dong Pang*) IMO: 9115028 Current flag: unknown / Former flag: Comoros		Loading coal
20	6 December 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Oriental Treasure* (renamed *Dong Pang*) IMO: 9115028 Current flag: unknown / Former flag: Comoros		Conducting STS transfer of coal
21	27 March 2018	Nampo, DPRK	*Tae Yang* IMO: 9115028 Current flag: DPRK		Loading coal
22	18 April 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Tae Yang* IMO: 9115028 Current flag: DPRK		Conducting STS transfer of coal
23	27 August 2018	Songnim, DPRK	*Tae Yang* IMO: 9115028 Current flag: DPRK		Loading coal
24	25 October 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Tae Yang* IMO: 9115028 Current flag: DPRK		Conducting STS transfer of coal
25	6 December 2018	Gulf of Tonkin	*Ho Chon Gang* IMO: 8415287 Current flag: DPRK		At anchor

Source: Member State

Annex 16: Indonesia's reply to the Panel

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

No. 633/POL-202/IX/18

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honor to inform the investigation and legal process conducted by the Government of Indonesia on the shipment of DPRK cargo vessel *Wise Honest* (see Annex).

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 12 September 2018

PERMANENT MISSION OF INDONESIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel Experts
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006)
New York

325 East 38th Street, New York, NY 10016 • Tel.: (212) 972-8333 • Fax: (212) 972-9780
www.indonesiamission-ny.org • email:ptri@indonesiamission-ny.org

Investigation and Legal Process for DPRK Ship Wise Honest Pursuant to relevant UNSC Resolutions and National Laws and Regulations of the Republic of Indonesia

Background

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia has received initial informal information regarding the possible movement of DPRK flagged ship towards Indonesian waters on 31 March 2018. The ship was identified as Wise Honest (WH) with IMO number 8905490. The Ministry took coordinated steps to verify the information received with related government institutions on 1 April 2018.

Measures Taken

2. Verification measures were taken in Balikpapan as a response to the aforesaid coordination and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has managed to gather information as follows:

   - The Automatic Identification System (AIS) of WH was turned off during the ship's journey into Indonesian territorial waters and no report was made to the destined port authority for proper ship clearance;
   - During the initial identification process, the ship was noted to be sailing without hoisting the ship's nationality flag. The ship was initially reported as Sierra Leone flagged ship manned by 25 crew members of DPRK nationality;

     Note: during the further detailed inspection, Indonesian authorities found 2 documents of ship particular and crew list with different nationality, namely: Sierra Leone and DPRK.
   - WH was loaded with approximately 26.500 MT of coal with cargo documents and port clearance received from a ship-to-ship transfer (STS) from a Russian cargo ship intending to conduct STS transfer around Balikpapan waters in East Kalimantan, Indonesia, was identified to be without proper export/import documents;
   - Based on information received from another member state, the final destination/recipient of the coal upon the STS transfer in Balikpapan is to a company called Enermax, based in Goyang, South Korea;
   - Indonesian Navy decided to detain the aforesaid ship along with its crews and cargo off the Port of Semayang, Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, Indonesia, on 4 April 2018 to this date for further legal process according to relevant national laws and regulations.

Recent Developments

3. During the detainment and inspection process, on 21 July 2018 a crew member of the ship passed away due to existing pre-conditions (heart failure due to diabetic related complications) and his remains is currently attended at the local hospital morgue in Balikpapan. On 28 July 2018, a crew member is being referred by doctor in Balikpapan for treatment in a hospital in Jakarta due to loss of eye sight (traumatic optic neuropathy) and is accompanied by another crew member under the consular care of the DPRK Embassy in Jakarta. Three other crews of the ship have been deported due to acute health problems (brain tumor). Currently there are a total of 19 crew members still detained on the ship, excluding the two in Jakarta.

4. On 20 July 2018, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia received a request for Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLA) from the Embassy of United States of America in Jakarta. The request is currently being processed, including the requirement to submit a list of documents as stipulated in Article 28 of Law No.1 (2006) on MLA.

5. Based on the abovementioned measures, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia reiterates its continued commitment to the implementation of relevant UNSC resolutions on DPRK. The ship Wise Honest is currently still detained in Balikpapan for further thorough investigation and judicial process in accordance to relevant national laws and regulations, namely Law No. 17 (2008) on Sea Voyage, particularly related to sea worthiness due to ambiguous legal status of ship's nationality.

Jakarta, 5 September 2018

Annex 17: Contract for coal aboard the *Wise Honest*

CONTRACT

Contract No. : EK-AC-A-180301

Date of Issue : March 15, 2018.

The Buyers : ENERMAXKOREA CO., LTD.
Add.: [redacted] G -si,
Kyeongki-do, Korea
TEL: +[redacted] FAX: +[redacted]

The Sellers : Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited
Add.: Rooms UNIT A9 , 9/F SILVERCJRP INTERNATIONAL TOWER, 707-713
NATHAN ROAD, MONGKOK, HONG KONG
TEL: +852-96669759

Bank Name : Hang Seng Bank Limited
Account Name. : Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited
Account Number : 788-496925-883
Beneficiary Bank Address : 83 Des Voeux Road Central, HK
Beneficiary Bank Code : 024
Swift Code : HASEHKHH

The Buyer agrees to buy and The Seller agrees to sell the under mentioned goods subject to the terms and conditions stated below:

1. Description of Commodity, Specifications and technical demand:

(1) Commodity : Anthracite Coal

(2) Quality and Chemistry (Refer to the under-mentioned sample typical data):

- Size: 0 - 30mm, MAX 30mm
- Volatile Matter 5.50% MAX (Dry Basis)
- Ash 12.00% MAX (Dry Basis)
- Fixed Carbon 80.00% MIN (Dry Basis)
- Total Sulfur 0.5% MAX (Dry Basis)
- Total Moisture 8.00% MAX (As Received Basis)

(3) Packing : IN BULK

2. Total Weight : 26,000 MT ± 10%

3. Unit Price : CIF/POHANG PORT, KOREA 115.00 USD/MT

4. Total value : 2,990,000 USD

5. Shipment time : Before April 10, 2018.

6. Port of loading : EAST KALIMANTAN PORT, INDONESIA

7. Port of discharging : POHANG PORT, KOREA

8. Terms of payment : T/T Remittance

For and on behalf of
Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited
Authorized Signature(s)

(1) When the custom clearance is completed, the Buyer shall pay the goods for the weight of 5,000MT immediately.
(2) Within 7 days after the custom clearance is completed, the Buyer shall pay the goods for the weight of 5,000MT
(3) Within 25 days, the Buyer shall pay the goods for the weight of 16,000MT and the Buyer shall try to pay quickly as soon as possible.

9. Loading Terms :

(1) Within 3 working days after shipment, the seller shall notify the buyer by emailname of the commodity, quantity, the shipment date and expected date of arrival of the goods at the port of destination.

(2) Partial shipment : Not Allowed

10. Price Adjustment of Anthracite Coal (Ash) :
At the rate of $1.00/MT for each 1% in excess of 12%(Ash)
the excess shall be deducted from the total price of goods after the report of SGS is issued.

11. **Force Majeure:** Either party shall not be held responsible for failure or delay to perform all or any part of this agreement due to flood, fire, earthquake, draught, war or any other events which could not be predicted, controlled, avoided or overcome by the relative party. However, the party affected by the event of Force Majeure shall inform the other party of its occurrence in writing as soon as possible and thereafter send a certificate of the event issued by the relevant authorities to the other party within 15 days after its occurrence.

12. **Arbitration**: All disputes arising from the execution of this agreement shall be settled through friendly consultations. In case no settlement can be reached, the case in dispute shall then be submitted to the Korea Commercial Arbitration Board for arbitration in accordance with its Provisional Rules of Procedure. The decision made by this commission shall be regarded as final and binding upon both parties. Arbitration fees shall be borne by the losing party, unless otherwise awarded. The arbitration is to be held in Korea.

13. **Liability for breach of contract**: Should all or part of the contract and its appendices be unable to be fulfilled owing to the fault of one party, the party in breach shall bear the liability therefore. Should it be the fault of both parties, they shall bear their respective liabilities according to actual situations.

14. **Others**: The contract is made out in English, one for each party, both versions being equally authentic. Contract signed via facsimile is valid.

[redacted]

THE SELLERS

Hong Kong Nova
International Trade Co., Limited

For and on behalf of
Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Limited
香港諾瓦國際商貿有限公司

Authorized Signature(s)

THE BUYERS

[redacted]

Source: The Panel

Annex 18: Correspondence with Novatobacco

On 12/20/2018 00:00, [redacted] wrote:
Dear Sir,
That is an interesting way of looking at things.
The problem with your hypothesis about someone else "stealing your bank account information is as follows:
If they deposit money in your bank account, that is your bank account. So it becomes your money.
So please explain to me why anyone would wish to have money sent to your bank account unless you were going to pass it on to them?
Sincerely,
Hugh Griffiths

From: novatobacco [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2018 1:58 PM
To: Hugh Griffiths
Cc: NOVATOBACCO
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea
Dear Sir
When we make commercial offer and payment forms for customers, we will write down the bank account information of our company, so I think someone has stolen the information of our company and passed to mantioned company.
Liu ChaoFeng

novatobacco
邮箱：[redacted]

Signature is customized by Netease Mail Master

On 12/19/2018 20:24, [redacted] wrote:
Dear Sir,
Thank you for your email.
Why does the contract list your bank account number?
Sincerely,
Hugh Griffiths


From: NOVATOBACCO [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2018 10:56 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths
Subject: Re:Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea
Dear Hugh Griffith,
Thank you for your email and the notice.
We have no idea where this contract came from, nor why it has our company's seal.
The company's legal person signature does not conform to the signature on the contract.

The signature in the formal trade contract is as follows
Please see the attachment for details of the company's legal person signature.
Attached contract has not been covered by the official seal of the unit.
Upon enquiry, our company has never had any dealings with the company mentioned in the contract.
We will further protect our own interests through legal channels.
If there is any follow-up, please keep in touch, thank you.
Liu ChaoFeng General manager
Hong Kong Nova International Trade Co., Ltd

HK Nova International Trade Co. limited
Mobile: [redacted]
Skype: [redacted]
Viber: +8615810777861 Сайт: www.novatobacco.com
At 2018-12-18 18:54:48, "Hugh Griffiths" [redacted] wrote:

Dear Hong Kong Nova International Trade,

My name is Hugh Griffiths and I am Coordinator of the United Nations Panel of Experts monitoring the sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Attached is a contract that bears your company's name.
The signature on the contract appears identical to the signature that appears on your website (please see the second attachment for example).
This contract was for 25,500 (MT) tonnes of DPRK origin coal that has been seized by a Member State.
Please explain why your company with your bank account is named in this documentation.
Please provide correspondence and documentation to substantiate any response you may give, including:
1) Email correspondence and contracts to substantiate why your company is named in this contract;
2) Email correspondence and contracts to substantiate who were the other parties involved;
3) Bank account records relating to the above and to this contract.
4) Any additional background you wish to provide.
Please note that the Panel may name your company in its next report to the Security Council. We therefore invite you to provide your views so that we may consider them for inclusion in our next report to the Security Council.
Please reply within 14 days.
Sincerely,
Hugh Griffiths



Source: The Panel

Annex 19: Panel correspondence with Hamid Ali

From: [redacted]
Sent: Sunday, December 23, 2018 1:59 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths
Subject: RE: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Griffiths,

Thanks for your today email.

Regret to inform we have never did any communications with Huitong Company sothat we do not have the PIC/CEO , office/email address or other company dsta"s .Mr Jong arrange for the TT of funds which we did received only part of the agreed amount for the transhipment cost.

Best regards ,

Hamid Ali

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

-------- Original message --------
From: Hugh Griffiths [redacted]
Date: 12/23/18 2:15 AM (GMT+07:00)
To: Ery Riza [redacted]
Subject: RE: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Hamid Ali,

Thank you for this information.

Please forward any correspondence you may have had with Huitong Minerals.

Please also provide an email address and the name of someone at Huitong Minerals, together with their physical address.

Best regards,

Hugh

Hugh Griffiths

Coordinator, Panel of Experts

Established pursuant to UNSCR 1874

Mob [redacted]

Tel [redacted]

From: Ery Riza [redacted]
Sent: Friday, 21 December, 2018 9:20 PM
To: Hugh Griffiths [redacted]
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Yes , Huitong was the only company.sending funds for the trsnsjipment process

Best regards ,

Hamid Ali

On Fri, Dec 21, 2018, 10:34 PM Hugh Griffiths [redacted] wrote:

Dear Mr. Hamid Ali,

Thank you for the documentation, it is much appreciated.

From the banking documentation you have provided to us, it appears that an account in the name of "Huitong Minerals" made the payments to you in connection with the Wise Honest?

Please confirm if this was the only company.

Best regards,

Hugh

From: Ery Riza [redacted]
Sent: Friday, December 21, 2018 8:12 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Griffiths ,

Following our yesterday conversation and email exchange :

1. Mr. Eko Setyatmoko

He reconfirmed email : [redacted]

He informed being many discussion with Mr.Jong without our present and currently

follow by Mr. Park station in China but traveling regularly to Vietnam and now to Indonesia.

2. US Dollar transfer

Attached are copy of TT of received at our Bank which we have passed to Mr.Eko for his further activities.

3. Mr.Jong

Company Name : Korea Yin Myong Trading Company

ph : 850 218111 / 3818161

Representative (?) of Mr Jong in Indonesia is :

Mr. Kwak Chol Su , Hp : + [redacted]

Regret we do not other data like address etc.

We do hope these info will be useful if you need more data kindly advise me at your earliest convenience time.

Thank you

Kind regards ,

Hamid Ali

On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 6:41 PM eryriza [redacted] wrote:

OK , will check with thr right one.

Brgds

Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

-------- Original message --------

From: Hugh Griffiths [redacted]

Date: 12/20/18 6:21 PM (GMT+07:00)

To: Ery Riza [redacted]

[redacted]

Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Sir,

You provided an email address for Mr. Eko Setyatmoko: esetiatmoko@yahoo.com in your earlier email today

This email address does not work. Please provide the correct email address.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

From: Ery Riza [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2018 9:48 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths
[redacted]
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr.Griffiths ,

Your email of today refers :

1. Mr. Eko email : [redacted]

2. Mr. Jong : we never have email exchange nor phone contact from our side to him ,

also not receiving email. We will try to locate address and phone/email as you requested will take time as getting info most difficult.

Thank you.

Kind regards ,

Hamid Ali

From: Ery Riza <eryriza@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2018 11:06 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths

Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr Griffiths ,

As per your email request :

1. I will check with Mr Eko the current person in charge who being follow up for MV Wise Honest issue.
2. Funds was transfer by Telegrafic Transfer/TT to Mandiri Bank in Jakarta
3. We are more than happy to receive the latest info of product which are subject for sanction , however
   our main activities are worldwide exporting of Processed Palm Oil product like Oleochemicals etc ,
   to DPRK limited to only Consumer Items like Detetrgent , Soap & Cooking Oil.

Hope this info will usefull for your further activities.

Thank you

Best regards ,

Hamid Ali

On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:17 PM Hugh Griffiths [redacted] wrote:
Dear Sir,

Thank you for your telephone call earlier. Unfortunately the connection was not so good and I did not hear all of what you were saying.

I'd be grateful if you can write an email providing the important information.

1) Information on the subordinate of Mr. Jong, the North Korean gentleman who you said travels and may be based in China?

2) Information on how the North Koreans transferred the 760,000 USD to you by TT - you said TT was short for "telegram transfer"?

3) As to your regular meetings with a gentleman from the DPRK Embassy in Jakarta, this is your own private affair, however, there are now many business activities involving North Korea that are not allowed according to the United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Panel is happy to provide you with more information on this, should you be interested.

Best regards,

Hugh Griffiths

From: Hugh Griffiths
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2018 9:51 AM
To: Ery Riza
[redacted]
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Sir,

Thank you for the email address.

We understand your difficulties in contacting Mr. Jong. Do you normally go through the DPRK Embassy to send messages to him?

Best regards,

Hugh Griffiths

On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:31 PM Hugh Griffiths [redacted] wrote:

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your email.

1) Please provide an email address for Mr. Eko Setyatmoko.

2) We understand that you may not have Mr. Jong's passport but please provide additional information on the DPRK entity "Yingmyong", such as telephone and fax numbers, scanned copy of business card, email address, physical address, company logo etc.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

From: Ery Riza [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2018 8:35 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths
[redacted]
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Griffiths ,

Thanks for your email 20/12 , below are our response for your few questions :

1. Mr. Jong Song Ho ,

As informed previously we were introduce by Embassy who informed that Mr. Jong through the company Yinmyong are running big activities and representative biz in DPRK which we have never been in touch with this gentleman. As you might aware most Korean DPRK are very close and confidential among each other which never inform their Identity and nor their biz in details and impossible that we could have their personal profile/ name card or passport whatsoever

2. Mr. Eko Setyatmoko + [redacted]

We introduce to Mr. Jong which therefore we are not aware about the progress.

Company name : PT. Bara Makmur Sadayana

Website not available.

3. Funds were transfer to Mr. Eko through cash /TT via Bank Mandiri

For further information of Mr. Eko kindly contact Mr. Eko directly as to overcome we make some mistake on his bis/private activities.

However if you need more info kindly contact me at your earliest convenience time

Looking forward for your favourable response we remain.

Thank you.

Best regards,

A.Hamid Ali

On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 12:47 AM Hugh Griffiths [redacted] wrote:

Dear A. Hamid Ali,

Thank you for your email and the explanations contained therein.

We have a few questions to ask you to further clarify matters:

1. On the gentleman that you met at the DPRK Embassy in Indonesia, Mr. Jong Song Ho. What government agency or business company did Mr. Jong Song Ho say he was working for? Please provide all this gentleman's contact details – phone numbers, email addresses, mobile number and please scan and send us a copy of his business card. If you have a copy of his passport, please send that too.

2. Did you introduce Mr. Eko Setyatmoko to Mr. Jong?

3. Please provide us with all contact details for Mr. Eko Setyatmoko together with the name of his company and its website.

4. Regarding the payment of USD 760,000, please provide us with more information. To which person and bank account did you make this payment?

Best regards,

Hugh Griffiths

Coordinator, Panel of Experts

Established pursuant to UNSCR 1874

Mob:+[redacted]

Tel:+1 [redacted]

From: Ery Riza [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, 19 December, 2018 1:37 AM
To: Hugh Griffiths [redacted]
Subject: Re: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Hugh Griffiths ,

Your both email of Dec 18, 2018 are well received and noted , thanks for the information stated on your email.

First of all I would inform that we are not involved as a broker nor trade of the Coal being available in MV. Wise Honest.

Let me clearly inform the chronological of MV. Wise Honest calling Indonesian Territory :

1. In December 2017 we are approach by Embassy of DPRK to meet Delegation from DPRK named Mr. Jong Song Ho claim representing a famous and well established companies in many lines of Business. Their aim of visit is to explore business opportunities in Indonesia and first activity to open Korean Culture Centre in Tanjung Lesung , West Java.

2. For short term biz they offer Old Vessel to be scrapped and sell the scrapped Iron In Jakarta. The biz will be followed after Mr Jong back to DPRK and will bring all data and all vessel condition and terms during his 2nd visit to Jakarta soonest.

3. In January/February 2018 Mr. Jong was again visiting Jakarta however he was not ready for the vessel to be scrapped instead he discussed of the possibility to distribute DPRK products, he asked whether is possible to charter Vessel for Transhipment of Cargo which Coal from Russian Origin not using Korean Vessel. We agreed to find out the possibility as we are not and never involved in Vessel chartering.

4. Mr Jong were back in Jakarta in March 2018 and we have introduce Mr Eko Setyatmoko as the person who might be able to arrange for transhipment and agreed for the cost involved of this transhipment. Mr.Jong start to TT for payment of the transhipment total USD 760,000.-

5. Without any sales contract nor transhipment agreement and without prior notice MV. Wise Honest has entering Indonesian Territory. The Vessel was hold by Indonesian Navy because of license nor notice to Indonesian Authorities.

6. Mr Eko is working to release the Vessel and Cargo and he is working very hard, upon court decission Coal Cargo were belong and responsibility of Mr. EKO.

7. During this process we were called by South Korean person, Mr. Jaewon Jeon from Enermax Company who claim he has bought and paid this coal which they asked our assistancy to do quickly the transhipment and send the Vessel to Pohang Port, South Korea.

We are not involved and do not know this buyer as the transaction were done by the owner of Coal not in Indonesia.

As matter of fact we are not Broker of the previous sales to Pohang Port and we are not selling this cargo to whatever party, this cargo due to court decission is belong to Mr Eko.

For your information most of the KOREAN never have Contract with us and exchange information all are done through face to face meeting.

However if you need more data and info please do not hesitate to contact me at your earliest convenience.

You could freely call me through my mobile + [redacted]

 19-01704

Looking forward for your favourable response we remain.

Thank you.

Best regards,

A.Hamid Ali

On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:14 PM Hugh Griffiths [redacted] wrote:

Dear Sirs, Mr. Ali,

Further to my earlier email, I should stress again that the coal aboard the vessel Wise Honest cannot be sold and that it should be seized.

The Panel will be naming your company, PT Nur Kencana Lestari Inti in our next report to the Security Council.

I would advise you to reply quickly to the email below.

My colleague Jong Kwon Youn may provide advice on what the Security Council resolutions say about prohibited goods, such as DPRK coal, and their seizure.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

From: Hugh Griffiths
Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2018 11:01 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Questions from the United Nations Panel monitoring the sanctions on North Korea

Dear Mr. Ali,

My name is Hugh Griffiths and I am Coordinator of the United Nations Panel of Experts monitoring the sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

You have been named as the broker responsible for organizing a trade of 25,500 (MT) tonnes of DPRK origin coal that has been seized by Indonesia aboard the vessel Wise Honest in April 2018.

Please explain how you became involved in this prohibited trade.
Please provide correspondence and documentation to substantiate any response you may give, including:

1) Email correspondence and contracts to substantiate your role and the role of others;
2) Email correspondence and contracts to substantiate who were the other parties involved;
3) Bank account records relating to the above and to this contract.
4) Any additional background you wish to provide on previous trades with the parties concerned.


Please note that the Panel may name you and your company in its next report to the Security Council. We therefore invite you to provide your views so that we may consider them for inclusion in our next report to the Security Council.

Please reply within 14 days.

Sincerely,

Hugh Griffiths

Email attachment provided by Mr. Hamid Ali


JINMYONG TRADING GROUP PRESIDENT
JINMYONG JOINT BANK

Jong Song Ho

add: Room. No. 2204. 3211 Pyongyang Information Center.
Kyonghung-dong. Pothonggang Dist., Pyongyang. DPRK

Tel: +85-02-18111 (381-8161)
Fax: +85-02-381-4410

Source: The Panel

Email attachment provided by Mr. Hamid Ali

mandiri

Rekening Koran
(Account Statement)

Periode	: From	01 March 2018
	To	31 March 2018
Account No	: 1260007369969 - ARBAA ENERGY RESOURC	
Currency	: USD	
Branch	: KCP Jkt Permata	
Opening Balance	: 972.79	

Date & Time	Value Date	Description	Reference No.	Debit	Credit	Balance
27/03/2018 14:44:29	27/03/2018	SWIFT CODE. BMRIIDJAXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTDJP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	149,958.00	150,930.79
28/03/2018 15:58:28	28/03/2018	SWIFT CODE.BMRIIDJAXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTDJP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	159,958.00	310,888.79
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Biaya Adm		5.00	0.00	310,883.79
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Bunga		0.00	3.82	310,887.61
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Pajak		0.76	0.00	310,886.85
31/03/2018 23:59:00	31/03/2018	Biaya Meterai		0.44	0.00	310,886.41

No of Credit	3
Total Amount Credited	309,919.82
No of Debit	3
Total Amount Debited	6.20
Closing Balance	310,886.41

mandiri

Rekening Koran
(Account Statement)

Periode : From 01 April 2018
To 30 April 2018

Account No : 1260007369969 - ARBAA ENERGY RESOURC

Currency : USD

Branch : KCP Jkt Permata

Opening Balance : 310,886.41

Date & Time	Value Date	Description	Reference No.	Debit	Credit	Balance
02/04/2018 10:30:18	02/04/2018	BG 383751- Transfer 20383751		50,000.00	0.00	260,886.41
03/04/2018 08:28:34	03/04/2018	SWIFT CODE BMRIIDJAXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTDJP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	219,958.00	480,844.41
06/04/2018 11:12:55	06/04/2018	BG 383752- Transfer 20383752		10,000.00	0.00	470,844.41
10/04/2018 12:11:52	10/04/2018	BG 383754- Transfer 20383754		30,000.00	0.00	440,844.41
10/04/2018 12:13:30	10/04/2018	BG 383753- Transfer 20383753		20,000.00	0.00	420,844.41
12/04/2018 12:19:54	12/04/2018	BG 383756- Transfer 20383756		90,000.00	0.00	330,844.41
12/04/2018 12:22:59	12/04/2018	BG 383755- Transfer 20383755 KE ERY THURSINA		30,000.00	0.00	300,844.41
12/04/2018 19:56:23	12/04/2018	/RFB/ST13011804120222 Debit InTTSusp HUANG HE MINERALS (HONG KONG) CO STANDARD CHARTERED BANK		0.00	119,409.36	420,253.77
13/04/2018 10:32:31	13/04/2018	PAYMENTS FOR GOODS Debit Nostro TRADE PIONEER LIMITEDFIRST COMMERCIAL BANK		0.00	74,585.00	494,838.77
13/04/2018 11:19:42	13/04/2018	BG 383758- Transfer 20383758		100,000.00	0.00	394,838.77
13/04/2018 16:14:28	13/04/2018	/RFB/ST13011804130288 Debit InTTSusp HUANG HE MINERALS CO., LIMITEDSTANDARD CHARTERED BANK		0.00	39,391.83	434,230.60
16/04/2018 10:15:21	16/04/2018	BG 383757- Transfer 20383757		150,000.00	0.00	284,230.60
17/04/2018 11:18:15	17/04/2018	BG 383759- Transfer 20383759		60,000.00	0.00	224,230.60
18/04/2018 11:10:48	18/04/2018	SWIFT CODE BMRIIDJAXXX Debit InTTSusp HUITONG MINERALS CO LTDJP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NEW YORK, USA		0.00	4,814.00	229,044.60
27/04/2018 10:06:47	27/04/2018	BG 383760-PAYMENT INV NO QGS-180424-1 Transfer TT 20383760 QINGDAO GLOBAL SHIPPING CO., LIMITED		20,054.00	0.00	208,990.60
27/04/2018 11:00:32	27/04/2018	BG 383761- Transfer 20383761		40,000.00	0.00	168,990.60
30/04/2018 23:59:00	30/04/2018	Biaya Adm		5.00	0.00	168,985.60
30/04/2018 23:59:00	30/04/2018	Bunga		0.00	26.60	169,012.20
30/04/2018 23:59:00	30/04/2018	Pajak		5.32	0.00	169,006.88

Page 1 of 2

Source: The Panel

Annex 20: The Panel's proposal for an amended delisting procedure for vessels

Paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017) encourages Member States to consult with the flag States of relevant vessels once they are seized, inspected, and frozen (impounded). Six months after such vessels were frozen (impounded), the Committee may decide upon request of a flag State to release the vessel if adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of the resolutions. However, once the vessel has been de-registered by a flag State in compliance with the resolutions (and therefore no longer under its jurisdiction), and since it would be a violation for flag States to re-register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State, it is unlikely that a flag State will submit a request to the Committee to re-register the vessel and then submit a request for a seized or impounded vessel to be released.

To resolve this conundrum and to lessen the burden on Member States seizing or impounding a vessel in compliance with the resolutions, the Panel recommends that the Committee introduce a procedure whereby:

1) After a six-month period the vessel owner[165] may be permitted to make representation to the Committee for approval to have the vessel de-listed and released, provided that:
   a) proof of ownership of the vessel is provided; and
   b) adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of the resolutions.
2) If approved, the vessel is then de-listed from the Committee's list of designated vessels and the re-registration of the vessel approved.[166]
3) Once a period of six months has elapsed and no request for de-listing has been tendered within 31 days from that date, the Member State may approach the Committee for approval to submit the vessel for public auction to defray costs incurred.

In addition, this procedure should be published on the Committee's website under "Procedures for delisting" at https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/materials.

165 A vessel's beneficial owner is in the best position to ensure that adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of the resolutions since they are directly impacted by loss of trade.
166 The Committee's website should not remove the vessel's name, but rather indicate the date that the vessel has been de-listed in order to provide verification for flag States and companies providing vessel services.

Annex 21: Imports from and exports to the DPRK of commodities according to trade data

Table 1

States importing zinc and articles thereof and zinc ores and concentrates (HS codes 79 and 26) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Importing State	*October 2017*	*November 2017*	*December 2017*	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
India	20 950	7 901					28 851
Total	**20 950**	**7 901**					**28 851**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

1. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of $28,851 in zinc and articles thereof and zinc ores and concentrates (HS codes 79 and 26) to India in October and November 2017. All exports constituted violations of paragraph 28 of resolution 2321 (2016).

Imports from the DPRK of commodities with exemption provisions (iron and steel and articles of iron and steel, textiles, food and agricultural products, machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia, and wood)

Table 2

States importing iron and steel and articles of iron and steel (HS codes 72 and 73) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Importing State	*October 2017*	*November 2017*	*December 2017*	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
China	1 796 752	2 411 042	2 725 465	2 393 996	1 839 505	1 846 788	13 013 548
El Salvador			7 507	18 994			26 501
Ghana	20 868		9 532	283 146			313 546
India	65 189	3 194					68 383
Nicaragua	12 405	64 873	38 890	8 611	107 920	47 250	279 949
Serbia	3 186	29 981					33 167
Thailand				25 143	9 083		34 226
Total	**1 898 400**	**2 509 090**	**2 781 394**	**2 729 890**	**1 956 508**	**1 894 038**	**13 769 320**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

2. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea violated paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017) by exporting a total of $13,769,320 in iron and steel and articles of iron and steel (HS codes 72 and 73) to China, El Salvador, Ghana, India, Nicaragua, Serbia and Thailand from October 2017 to March 2018. China replied to the Panel that the "relevant data don't indicate the commodities under the items of HS code 7201", and that, under Chinese law and regulations, only items with HS codes 7201 are considered as constituting iron and steel and articles of iron and steel prohibited by the relevant resolutions.

Table 3

States importing textiles (HS codes 50–63) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Importing State	*October 2017*	*November 2017*	*December 2017*	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*Total*
China[a]	47 105 525	40 825 592	12 780 948	16 799		100 728 864
Ghana		14 173	85 040	64 985		164 198
India	234 163	15 497	5 929			255 589
Mexico		15 438				15 438
Russian Federation[b]		76 537	11 815			88 352
Thailand		26 617			3 486	30 103
Total	**47 339 688**	**40 973 854**	**12 883 732**	**81 784**	**3 486**	**101 282 544**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

[a] In a note verbale to the Committee dated 12 January 2018, China stipulated that the total value of its imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of textiles from 11 September 2017 to 10 December 2017 was $5,139,300.

[b] In a note verbale to the Committee dated 6 December 2017, the Russian Federation stated that, on 18 October 2017, 14,340 items of men's apparel were imported from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in fulfilment of two contracts.

3. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea violated the textiles import ban stipulated in paragraph 16 of resolution 2375 (2017) by exporting a total of $101,282,544 in textiles (HS codes 50–63) to China, Ghana, India, Mexico and Thailand. from October 2017 to February 2018. Only China and the Russian Federation reported to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 2375 (2017). With regard to China, the figure reported by China to the Committee of its imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is lower than indicated in Global Trade Atlas trade data, by $95,589,564. In order to benefit from the reporting exemption in paragraph 16 of resolution 2375 (2017), these two figures should have been comparable. In addition to its reporting of $5,139,300 worth of textiles imported during the period, China further replied to the Panel that all its imports "went through the customs formalities within 90 days" from the adoption of resolution 2375 (2017). With regard to the Russian Federation, the Panel notes that the unit of measurement (items of textile) is different from that reflected in table 3 (United States dollars) and **recommends that future Security Council resolutions stipulate the unit of measurement to be used by Member States in their reporting to the Committee.**

Table 4

States importing food and agricultural products (HS codes 07, 08 and 12) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Importing State	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
China[a]	10 158 965			10 158 965
Total	**10 158 965**			**10 158 965**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

[a] In a note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of food and agricultural products from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was $16,872,600 (14,900 tons).

4. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of $10,158,965 in food and agricultural products (HS codes 07, 08 and 12) to China in January 2018. China further replied to the Panel that all of its imports "went through the customs formalities within 30 days" from the adoption of resolution 2397 (2017).

Table 5

States importing machinery (HS code 84) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Importing State	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	11 736	1 296		13 032
China[a]	29 395			29 395
Costa Rica	21 053	5 017		26 070
El Salvador	73 711	1 444		75 155
India	12 961			12 961
Malaysia[c]	16 387			16 387
Total	**165 243**	**7 757**		**173 000**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

[a] In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports of machinery from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was $43,000.

[b] Malaysia replied to the Panel that "based on the statistics from Department of Statistics Malaysia (DOSM), there is no product under the HS codes of 84–85 being imported by Malaysia from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from January 2018 to February 2018".

5. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of $173,000 in machinery (HS code 84) to Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, India and Malaysia in January and February 2018. All exports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after 21 January 2018 without notification to the Committee of those imports by 5 February 2018 violated paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017). Of the above-mentioned Member States, only China provided notification to the Committee, and China further replied to the Panel that all of its imports "went through the customs formalities within 30 days" from the adoption of resolution 2397 (2017).

Table 6

States importing electrical equipment (HS code 85) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Importing State	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	5 045	6 489		11 534
China[a]	990 919			990 919
Thailand	17 584	7 596		25 180
Total	**1 013 548**	**14 085**		**1 027 633**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

a In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of electrical equipment from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was $1,346,300.

6. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of $1,027,633 in electrical equipment (HS code 85) to the Plurinational State of Bolivia, China and Thailand in January and February 2018. All exports after 21 January 2018 without notification to the Committee of those imports by 5 February 2018 violated paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017). Of the above-mentioned Member States, only China provided notification to the Committee in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017).

Table 7

States importing earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS code 25) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Importing State	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
China[a]	10 070 444			10 070 444
Total	**10 070 444**			**10 070 444**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

[a] In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was $10,434,800 (106,700 tons).

7. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of $10,070,444 in earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS code 25) to China in January 2018. China provided notification to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017), and further replied to the Panel that all of its imports "went through the customs formalities within 30 days" of the adoption of resolution 2397 (2017).

Table 8

States importing wood (HS code 44) from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Importing State	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
China[a]	2 405 718			2 405 718
Total	**2 405 718**			**2 405 718**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

[a] In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of wood from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was $2,858,500 (16,200 tons).

8. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exported a total of $2,405,718 in wood (HS code 44) to China in January 2018. China provided notification to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017), and further replied to the Panel that all of its imports "went through the customs formalities within 30 days" from the adoption of resolution 2397 (2017).

Table 9

States exporting iron, steel and other metals (HS codes 72–83) to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Exporting State	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
China[a]	1 889 683	28 791		1 918 474
Honduras		11 461		11 461
Malaysia	93 407			93 407
Total	**1 983 090**	**40 252**		**2 023 342**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

[a] China replied to the Panel that, while all of its exports in iron, steel and other metals, all industrial machinery and transportation vehicles had been processed and released before 6 January 2018, for technical reasons relating to its customs system, the clearance operations were completed when "means of transport actually left the Chinese territory". China also replied that all exports after the date are "self-use materials for diplomatic mission in the DPRK or humanitarian aids to the DPRK", for which their "export formalities are completed and in line with the requirement" of the relevant resolutions.

9. According to Global Trade Atlas data, China, Honduras and Malaysia exported a total of $2,023,342 in iron, steel and other metals (HS codes 72–83) in January and February 2018 to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which violated paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017). China replied to the Panel on the precise nature of the exports during this period (see table 9, footnote a).

Table 10

States exporting all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85) to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January–March 2018

(United States dollars)

Exporting State	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
China[a]	14 215 799	218 602	28 674	14 463 075
Honduras	38 254	16 322		54 576
India	19 412			19 412
Total	**14 273 465**	**234 924**	**28 674**	**14 537 063**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

[a] See table 9, footnote a.

10. According to Global Trade Atlas data, China, Honduras and India exported a total of $14,537,063 in all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85) from January to March 2018 to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which violatedparagraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017). China replied to the Panel on the precise nature of the exports in this period (see table 9, footnote a).

Table 11

States exporting transportation vehicles (HS codes 86–89) to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, January to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Exporting State	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
China[a]	1 803 351		55 094	1 858 445
Thailand			9 176	9 176
Total	**1 803 351**		**64 270**	**867 621**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

[a] See table 9, footnote a.

11. According to Global Trade Atlas data, China and Thailand exported a total of $1,867,621 in transportation vehicles (HS codes 86–89) between January and February 2018 to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which violated paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017). China replied to the Panel on the precise nature of the exports for the period (see table 9, footnote a).

Exports of commodities to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with exemptions (refined petroleum products and crude oil)

Table 12

States exporting petroleum (HS code 2710) to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Exporting State	*October 2017*	*November 2017*	*December 2017*	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
China[a]	245 279	484 206	480 382	115 553	261 210	473 979	2 060 609
India	16 513 783						16 513 783
Russian Federation[b]	238 173	220 632	447 774	584 783			1 491 362
South Africa			275 639	66 852	138 306		480 797
Total	**16 997 235**	**704 838**	**1 203 795**	**767 188**	**399 516**	**473 979**	**20 546 551**

Source: Global Trade Atlas collated as of June 2018.

[a] In five notes verbales from 2 January to 30 April 2018, China notified the Committee of the transfer of 2,165.1 tons of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for October 2017; 497.6 tons for November 2017; 463.214 tons for December 2017; and the further transfer of 4,032.72 tons of such products from January to March 2018. The corresponding values in United States dollars of the transfers made each month have been reported as: 1,188,000 (October 2017), 527,000 (November 2017), 490,000 (December 2017), 130,300 (January 2018), 835,800 (February 2018), and 1,592,400 (March 2018).

[b] In three notes verbales from 27 December 2017 to 31 May 2018, the Russian Federation notified the Committee of its exports of 212.54 tons of petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for November 2017; 589.664 tons for December 2017; and 4,148.381 tons from January to March 2018.

Table 13

States exporting other petroleum (HS codes 2711–2713)[a] to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018

(United States dollars)

Exporting State	*October 2017*	*November 2017*	*December 2017*	*January 2018*	*February 2018*	*March 2018*	*Total*
China[b]	1 174 266	453 852	228 645	672 618	814 742	1 318 450	4 662 573
Russian Federation[c]			184 286	216 129			400 415
Total	**1 174 266**	**453 852**	**412 931**	**888 747**	**814 742**	**1 318 450**	**5 062 988**

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

[a] China informed the Panel that it uses HS Codes 2710, 2712 and 2713 as HS Codes for refined petroleum products. China also informed the Panel that its Ministry of Commerce considers HS Code 2711.11 as "liquefied natural gas", whereas the Panel uses HS Code 2711 as a part of "condensates and natural gas liquids", prohibited by paragraph 13 of resolution 2375 (2017). The Panel has previously recommended that all Security Council resolutions on sectoral sanctions specify the HS codes (see S/2018/171, paras. 31 and 74).

[b] See table 12, footnote a.

[c] See table 12, footnote b.

12. Based upon the International Trade Centre (ITC) Trade Map, the Panel sent letters to South Africa (March-June 2018) and Turkey (March-July 2018) regarding the reported export of petroleum products (HS 2710) of 322,000 USD and 2.29 million USD respectively. Turkey clarified with supporting documentation to show that the export was made to the Republic of Korea. South Africa informed the Panel that "the letter has been forwarded to Pretoria for action."

13. The Panel sent a letter to the Republic of Korea regarding August media reports of a transfer of petroleum products to Kaesong for a planned inter-Korean liaison office. The ROK replied, "in the process of carrying out the [inter-Korean] projects, the ROK personnel used the petroleum products exclusively for the implementation of the projects, while ensuring that no transfer of economic values to the DPRK occurs." The ROK explained that "among 338,737 kg of petroleum products used for the implementation of the joint projects from January 2018 to November 2018, 4,039 kg were unused and brought back to the ROK." The Panel notes that the specific language of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) requiring Member States to notify the Committee of any transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum products is by territory as opposed to possession and does not differentiate between temporary and permanent transfers, or under whose control the items will be after transfer.

14. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea imported $20,946,917 of refined petroleum products during the last three months of 2017. Starting from 2018, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), all Member States are prohibited from supplying, selling or transferring refined petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over 500,000 barrels in total. Since January 2018, China and the Russian Federation have notified to the Committee on their supply, sale or transfer of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Although in paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) the cap was set using barrels as the unit of measurement, the unit to be used by Member States in their required notifications was not stipulated. The figures in table 14 from China after April are based solely on Member State reporting to the Committee.[167]

[167] According to the General Administration of Customs database centre, China Customs ceased reporting trade data on individual countries as from 1 April 2018 and Chinese Customs information web pages issued three web announcements on 23 May, 20 June and 20 July, each stating that the publication of customs statistics for [each month] has been temporarily suspended owing to technical reasons. See http://haiguan.info/noted395.aspx, http://haiguan.info/noted396.aspx and http://haiguan.info/noted397.aspx. See also http://english.customs.gov.cn/newsroom/statistics (accessed 30 July 2018).

Table 14
Data from Member States' notifications to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of resolution 2397 (2017)
(Tons)

Month in 2018	*China*	*Russian Federation*	*Total*
January	201.380	368.240	569.620
February	1 392.350	1 882.562	3 274.912
March	2 438.990	1 897.579	4 336.569
April	437.460	4 293.472	4 730.932
May	1 451.410	1 286.138	2 737.548
June	1 507.900	1 570.444	3 078.344
July	903.870	576.126	1 479.996
August	2 725.810	1 369.497	4 095.307
September	1 814.600	1 859.283	3 673.883
October	1 886.890	3 777.731	5 664.621
November	2 928.870	3 377.243	6 306.113
December	1 510.870	-	1 510.870
Total	**19 200.400**	**22 258.315**	**41 458.715**

Source: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum,

Crude oil

16. In Paragraph 4 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Security Council decided that all Member States should prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of crude oil to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exceeding 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons, unless the Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis for a 12-month period after the date of adoption of the resolution, 22 December 2017. Pursuant to the reporting clause contained therein, the Russian Federation reported that there were no declarations or exports of crude oil to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from January to June 2018, and China reported that the amount of the supply of crude oil by China to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was 150,500 tons from December 2017 to February 2018; 147,900 tons from March to May 2018; 108,500 tons from June to August 2018; and 118,100 tons from September to November 2018.

Recommendation

17. **The Panel recommends that the Committee agree upon a single conversion rate between tons and barrels for all refined petroleum products and specify the ton measurement referred to in the resolutions.**

Annex 22: Angola's reply to the Panel

Permanent Mission of
The Republic of Angola to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, 12th Floor, New York, NY 10017
Tel: (212) 861-5656 / Fax: (212) 861-9295

Ref. No. 8/2018-159

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honor to submit herewith the additional information to the Republic of Angola's report on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution on Democratic People's of Korea (DPRK).

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 27 August 2018

Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations

Mr. HUGH GRIFFITHS
COORDINATOR
PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

NEW YORK

Republic of Angola
Ministry of External Relations
Office of the Minister

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA'S REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON NORTH KOREA

1) This presentation aims to provide additional information to the Republic of Angola's October 2017 report on the 'Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 2321 (2016); 2356 (2017); 2371 (2017) and 2375 (2017), monitored by the Panel of Experts of the 1718 Sanctions Committee.

2) We recall that the President of the Security Council Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) acknowledged reception of the aforementioned report through N.V. Ref. S/AC.49/2017/OC.278 of 26 December 2017, addressed to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola.

3) Regarding the additional information requested, we would like to put forward the following observations:

   a) Regarding the additional information requested by the United Nations Security Council's Panel of Experts on the situation of the DPRK diplomat, Mr. JON YONG CHOL, Third Secretary at the Embassy of the Democratic Popular Republic of Korea Embassy, we inform that he left the Angolan territory on April 20 2017 on an Emirates Airlines flight EK792 (See in Annex).

   b) Regarding the reduction of diplomatic and administrative staff at the DPRK Embassy in Angola, we would like to inform that the staff was drastically reduced from 12 diplomats in 2016–2017 to 6 diplomats currently.

   c) Administrative and technical staff was reduced from 13 in 2016–2017 to 3 members of staff currently (See the list from the State Protocol Directorate in Annex).

   d) Regarding the supposed delegation of military advisers composed by 80 advisers from the DPRK which traveled from Angola to Mozambique, we are not aware of any movement or travel by military advisers from the DPRK from Angola to Mozambique in 2017.

e) As notified in Angola's report on the implementation of resolutions to 2321(2016); 2356(2017); 2371(2017); and 2375(2018), a total of 152 citizens from the DPRK left the Angolan territory on November 18, 2017, among whom were the Board of Directors, cadres and employees of the Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies—the latter under sanctions imposed by the UN and listed in Annex II of Resolution 2371(2017).

It should be mentioned that the Republic of Angola has rigorously fulfilled its responsibility regarding the exit of DPRK citizens from national territory. In this context, the responsibility of the Angolan authorities in relation to foreign nationals ends the moment they leave national territory.

We are certain that the answers presented will help enlighten the Security Council Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts on the DPRK about any pending questions from Angola's second report on the implementation of Resolutions 2321(2016); 2356(2017); 2371(2017) and 2375(2018), submitted on 21 December 2017. Angola defends the importance of maintaining Peace, Security, Stability and Prosperity in the Korean Peninsula region and has strictly abided the decisions and resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council on the matter.

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS, Luanda, August 16, 2018.

REPÚBLICA DE ANGOLA
MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES
DIRECÇÃO GERAL DO PROTOCOLO DO ESTADO

LISTA ACTUALIZADA DOS AGENTES DIPLOMÁTICOS E FUNCIONÁRIOS ADMINISTRATIVOS, CONJUGES E FILHOS DA EMBAIXADA DA R. P. D. DA COREIA ACREDITADA EM ANGOLA.

DE: DIRECÇÃO GERAL DO PROTOCOLO DO ESTADO CADASTRO

1. **KIM HYON IL** -EMBAIXADOR.
2. **KANG MYONG OK** -EMBAIXATRIZ.
3. **KIM CHOL SU** -CONSELHEIRO.
4. **KIM SUN YONG** – ESPOSA DO CONSELHEIRO.
5. **KIM JUNG HYON** – FILHO DO CONSELHEIRO.
6. **KIM JUNG GYONG** – FILHO DO CONSELHEIRO.
7. **MA KYONG HO** – CONSELHEIRO.
8. **KIM CHUN HYE** – ESPOSA DO CONSELHEIRO.
9. **MA JU MYONG** – FILHO DO CONSELHEIRO.
10. **RI KWANG CHAE** - 1º SECRETÁRIO.
11. **RI OK** -ESPOSA DO1º SECRETÁRIO.
12. **JON KI HO** -2º SECRETÁRIO.
13. **KIM RYON JONG** –ESPOSA DO 2º SECRETÁRIO.
14. **JO SONG CHOL** - 2º SECRETÁRIO.
15. **KIM KUM HUI** - ESPOSA DO 2ºSECRTÁRIO.
16. **JO WON RYONG** – FILHO DO 2º SECRÉTARIO.
17. **SONG CHOL** – FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.
18. **RI YONG GWAN** - FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.
19. **RI YONG IL** - FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.
20. **SO SU OK** – ESPOSA DO FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.
21. **RI JU RYON** –FILHA DO FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.
22. **JANG KUM SUK** - ESPOSA DO FUNCIONÁRIO ADMINISTRATIVO.

Luanda aos 27 de Novembro de 2017

REPÚBLICA DE ANGOLA
MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES
Direcção Geral do Protocolo do Estado

EMBAIXADA DA REPÚBLICA POPULAR E DEMOCRÁTICA DA **COREIA** (NORTE)

N.	TITULAR	CATEGORIA	TIPO DE CARTAO	1. MISSAO	2. VIA	PRORROGACAO	DEVOLUCAO
01	**KIM HYON IL**	**EMBAIXADOR**	**D**	**03/10/2013**			
02	KANG MYONG OK	EMBAIXATRIZ	D	03/10/2013			
03	**KIM CHOL SU**	**CONSELHEIRO**	**D**	**06/10/2016**			
04	KIM SUN YONG	ESP. CONSELHEIRO	D	06/10/2016			
05	KIM JUNG HYON	FIL. CONSELHEIRO	D	06/10/2016			
06	KIM JUNG GYONG	FIL. CONSELHEIRO	D	06/10/2016			
07	**MA KYONG HO**	**CONSELHEIRO**	**D**	**20/10/2016**			
08	KIM CHUN HYE	ESP. CONSELHEIRO	D	20/10/2016			
09	MA JU MYONG	FIL. CONSELHEIRO	D	20/10/2016			
10	**RI KWANG CHAE**	**1° SECRETÁRIO**	**D**	**12/09/2015**			
11	RI OK	ESP.1° SECRETÁRIO	D	12/09/2015			
12	**JON KI HO**	**2° SECRETÁRIO**	**D**	**08/07/2015**			
13	KIM RYON JONG	ESP. 2° SECRETÁRIO	D	08/07/2015			
14	**JO SONG CHOL**	**2° SECRETÁRIO**	**D**	**23/08/2017**			
15	KIM KUM HUI	ESP. 2°SECRTÁRIO	D	23/08/2017			
16	JO WON RYONG	FIL. 2° SECRÉTARIO	D	23/08/2017			

Source: Member State

Annex 23: The Panel's letter to Iran

United Nations Nations Unies

HEADQUARTERS • SIEGE NEW YORK, NY 10017
TEL. : +1 212 963 1055 • FAX : +1 212 963 2013

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE : S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.359

'R REFERENCE

29 November 2018

Excellency,

I have the honour to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

According to a Member State, the DPRK has its most lucrative arms-related trade with the Syrian Arab Republic and Iran. The Member State has informed the Panel that two United Nations designated entities, the Korea Mining Development Technology Corporation and Saeng Pi'l (aka Green Pine Associated Corporation) maintain offices in Iran and that these offices are active.

In addition, the Member State informed the Panel that one pattern recently observed is of DPRK nationals on flights between Tehran and Dubai whereby these individuals return to Tehran within 24 hours. The assessment is that these individuals are cash couriers.

In this regard, the Panel recalls the evidence and information derived from airline companies, various Member States and the United Nations Security Council regarding KOMID officials Mr. Kim Yong Chol (passport number 472310168) and Mr. Jang Jong Son (passport number 563110024)[168] (see Annex 1) resident in Iran and accredited as diplomats at the DPRK embassy in Tehran until their removal in 2016, and their frequent visits to Dubai as well as various locations in Pakistan.[169] The Panel's letter to Iran dated 25 November 2015 (S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.791) noted that these two individuals flew Tehran-Dubai more than 282 times between 21 October 2012 and 5 October 2015, a pattern that continued into 2016.

[168] See Table 8, S/2017/150, p.68-69

[169] See Tables 8 and 9, S/2017/150, p.68-69

The Panel also notes as indications of previous cooperation between Iran and the designated entities KOMID and Green Pine Associated Corporation the visits by KOMID President Kang Myong Chol (see Annex 1 for passport) to Iran from Dubai from 16 to 25 December 2013[170] and Green Pine Association Corporation President Ri Hak Chol between 6 and 10 October 2014.[171]

As a number of the individuals listed above and featured in Annex 1 together with other KOMID and Green Pine Associated Corporation representatives are known to have acquired new passports and/or false identities, the Panel:

- Kindly reiterates its request contained in its letter of 31 October 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.918) (see Annex 2) requesting names and passport numbers of DPRK diplomats accredited in Iran;

- Kindly reiterates its request contained in its letter of 12 October 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.678) (see Annex 3) requesting immigration and visa checks and information on 78 DPRK nationals and others under investigation by the Panel;

- In light of the lack of a substantive response from Iran on the above matters for more than 12 months and in light of the recent information provided by a Member State, the Panel is now requesting copies of the relevant passport pages of all DPRK diplomats accredited in Iran;

- A full list of all other DPRK nationals residing in, or working in Iran, together with copies of their passports, and

- A full list of DPRK entities and companies operating in Iran, their contracts with Iranian military and/or civilian institutions and entities, para-statal companies and private institutions.

As the Panel intends to report on this case in its next report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within **one month** of the date of this letter. **The Panel may name your country in our reporting and would therefore appreciate a reply from your country in order to consider reflecting your views in our next report.**

Should you wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [redacted]) and Mr. Olaf Andrieu ([redacted]).


Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[170] Flight and ticket records held on file by the Panel

[171] In our letter dated 29 August 2016, reference number S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.659, the Panel wrote to Iran requesting information on Mr. Ri Hak Chol's activities in Tehran between 6-10 October 2014 but received no substantive response.


Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 1: Copies of multiple DPRK diplomatic passports previously used by KOMID and Green Pine Associated Corporation officials while accredited in Iran, travelling to Iran or travelling between Tehran and Dubai
Annex 2: Panel letter of 31 October 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.918), requesting names and passport numbers of DPRK diplomats accredited in Iran
Annex 3: Panel letter of 12 October 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.678), requesting immigration and visa checks and information on 78 DPRK nationals and others under investigation by the Panel.






Jang Yong Son: UN designated KOMID representative formerly accredited to DPRK Embassy in Tehran






Kang Myong Chol: KOMID President who visited Iran





Ri Hak Chol, Green Pine Associated Corporation President who visited Iran between 6-10 October 2014



Annex 24: Iran's reply to the Panel

Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations
622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017 www.Iran-UN.org Tel:+1(212)687-2020 Fax:+1(212)867-7086 E-mail: Iran@un.int

In the name of God, the most Compassionate, the most Merciful

No. 106192 19 December 2018

Dear Sir,

I am writing in response to your letter dated 29 November 2018 (S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.359) with regard to the information submitted by a Member State to the Panel against the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

Contrary to claim of the above-mentioned Member State, there is no military cooperation or arms trade between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the DPRK. In fact, such a baseless allegation is a desperate politically motivated attempt against a founding Member of the Organization, abusing a United Nations mechanism that ought to be impartial and professional.

According to the latest available data and a recently held review, no entity or individual, designated pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on the DPRK, is present or active in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, the Korea Mining Development Technology Corporation and Saeng Pi'l (aka Green Pine Associated Corporation) have no office or activity in Iran.

Furthermore, there are no DPRK nationals residing in the Islamic Republic of Iran other than its diplomats.

The activities of the DPRK diplomats accredited to the Islamic Republic of Iran have so far not been in contradiction with the provisions of relevant conventions or resolutions of the Security Council on DPRK.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran strongly advises the Panel of Experts to avoid the inclusion of such unfounded accusations in its report. The Panel, in line with its mandate and the principle of professionalism, is expected to reject any unsubstantiated claim.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Eshagh Al Habib
Ambassador
and Charge d'Affaires

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations New York

Annex 25: Guicopres correspondence

GROUPE GUICOPRES 20 ans

Conakry, le 10 Décembre 2018

A

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

NEW YORK

A l'attention de Monsieur Hugh Griffiths

N° 120/PDG/GUICO/2018

Objet : Votre Courrier Réf S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.362

Monsieur,

Nous avons l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre courrier cité en objet et vous remercions pour les informations. A cet égard, nous vous informons que les coréens ont été sollicités par nous pour l'étude d'avant-projet mais que les travaux de levées topographiques ont été réalisés par les ingénieurs guinéens et français.

Il n'a jamais été question donc d'une collaboration ou d'un partenariat avec Nam Nam sur ce projet, mais plutôt d'une prestation ponctuelle de service payable à la tâche.

Dans le souci du respect de l'embargo des Nations Unies contre la République Démocratique et Populaire de Corée, nous avons pris des dispositions notifiant l'arrêt de toute collaboration avec NAM NAM.

L'entreprise Guicopres respectueuse des Accords internationaux ratifiés par le Gouvernement guinéen, ne dérogera pas aux décisions des Nations Unies auxquelles nous adhérons pleinement

En vous souhaitant par avance bonne réception du présent courrier, le Groupe Guicopres reste à votre disposition pour toute information complémentaire utile à votre compréhension.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'expression de notre considération distinguée.

Kerfalla CAMARA
Président Directeur Général

GUICOPRES BTP KALOU TRANSIT KAKANDE IMMO GMI

GROUPE GUICOPRES, Société Anonyme au Capital de 500 000 000 GNF RCCM/GC-KAL-M2/027105/2009
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Tél : +224 655 44 00 00 - E-mail : info@groupe-guicopres.com site web : www.groupe-guicopres.com

1821586E 1

Translated from French

Groupe Guicopres
Conakry, 10 December 2018
No. 120/PDG/GUICO/2018

Re: Your letter S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.362

Sir,

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter and thank you for the information contained therein. In that regard, we wish to inform you that while we commissioned the pilot study from the Koreans, the topographic mapping was carried out by Guinean and French engineers.

At no time, therefore, has there been any form of collaboration or partnership with Nam Nam on this project. Rather, that company was paid for a one-off service.

With a view to ensuring compliance with the United Nations embargo on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we have taken steps to notify the cessation of all collaboration with that company.

Guicopres respects the international agreements ratified by the Government of Guinea and has no intention of contravening United Nations decisions, to which we fully subscribe.

Trusting that this letter finds you well, Groupe Guicopres stands ready to provide any further information you may require.

Yours sincerely,

(*Signed*) Kerfalla Camara
Chief Executive

Mr. Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
New York

De : Olaf Charles Robert Andrieu [redacted]
Date : mercredi 12 décembre 2018 16:14
À : Bangoura Djibril <info@groupe-guicopres.com>
Cc : Sierra Leone Mission [redacted], Guinea <[redacted], Hugh Griffiths [redacted]
Objet : RE: Outgoing Communication # 362 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to GUICOPRES

A l'intention de Monsieur Kerfalla Camara
Président Directeur Général
Groupe Guicopres

Monsieur

Le panel d'expert rattaché au comité 1718 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies vous remercie pour votre réponse (No 120/PDG/GUICO/2018) à sa lettre du 03 décembre 2018 (S/AC.49/2018/oc.362).

J'ai l'honneur de poursuivre cette correspondance comme expert de ce panel que j'ai rejoint au mois de mai 2018 après une longue carrière, pour prendre en charge les problématiques liées à la prolifération des armes et en particulier les Armes de Destruction Massive (Missile, Nucléaire, Biologique, Chimique).

Je vous exprime notre reconnaissance pour les mesures prises par le groupe que vous dirigez pour se mettre en conformité avec les résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité.

Afin de compléter nos informations sur la compagnie Nam Nam Cooperative General Company, nous vous serions aussi reconnaissant de sonder votre personnel sur les questions suivantes et de bien vouloir nous en transmettre les réponses dans la mesure du possible d'ici 14 jours :

1. Comment, où et quand vos employés ont-ils sollicité la partie coréenne ? En particulier cela s'est-il passé à Conakry ou en Sierra Leone ?
2. Pouvez-vous nous communiquer les noms, adresses, numéros de téléphones des Nords Coréens contactés ainsi que ceux de la société Nam Nam ?
3. Vous mentionnez dans votre réponse que les attentes de votre groupe vis à vis de Nam Nam auraient été plutôt « des prestations ponctuelles de service payable à la tâche ». En l'occurrence, serait-il possible de nous transmettre les copies des documents relatifs aux offres, contrats éventuels, emails, et autres correspondances en relation avec la partie Nord-Coréenne.

Au nom du coordinateur du Panel Hugh Griffiths, je vous remercie pour votre coopération et vous prie Monsieur le Président Directeur General, d'agréer l'expression de ma considération distinguée.

Olaf Andrieu
Member, Panel of Experts
Established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Security Council
Tel.: [redacted]

https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/work_mandate

GROUPE GUICOPRES 20 ans

Conakry, le 20 Décembre 2018

A

MONSIEUR **OLAF CHARLES ROBERT ANDRIEU**

Member, Panel of Experts

Established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)

United Nations Security Council

N° 121/PDG/GUICO/2018

Objet : Votre Courrier du 12 Décembre 2018

Monsieur,

Nous avons l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre courrier daté du 12 / 12/2018 sollicitant des détails sur les questions que vous y avez indiquées et vous remercions de bien vouloir noter que :

Nous n'avons contacté les travailleurs coréens qu'à l'occasion de la préparation du dossier de consultation pour la construction du camp de Freetown.

Nous confirmons que ceux-ci n'ont travaillé avec nous que quelques jours dans le cadre des études d'avant-projet puis nos ingénieurs géomètres et topographes ont pris le relai.

Nous réitérons que notre collaboration a pris fin à ce stade.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'expression de notre considération distinguée.

Kerfalla CAMARA

Président Directeur Général

GROUPE GUICOPRES P.D.G CONAKRY

GUICOPRES BTP MALOU TRANSIT KAKANDE IMMO GMI

GROUPE GUICOPRES, Société Anonyme au Capital de 500.000.000 GNF RCCM/GC-KAL-M2/027.105/2009
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Translated from French

Groupe Guicopres
Société Anonyme au Capital de 500 000 000 GNF RCCM/GC-KAL-M2/027.105/2009
Headquarters: Rue KA003 Almamiyah – Commune of Kaloum. 4063 Conakry, Republic of Guinea
Tel: +224 655 440000 - E-mail: info@groupe.guicopres.com Website: www.groupe-guicopres.com

Conakry, 20 December 2018

No. 121/PDG/GUICO/2018

Subject: Your letter of 12 December 2018

Sir,

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 12 December 2018, in which you requested details on various issues, and we ask that you kindly note the following.

We only contacted the Korean workers during the preparation of the consultation file for the construction of the Freetown camp.

We can confirm that they only worked with us for a few days in the context of the pre-feasibility studies, and then our surveyors and topographers took over.

We reiterate that our collaboration ended at that stage.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of our highest consideration.

(*Signed*) Kerfalla **Camara**
Chief Executive Officer

Mr. Olaf Charles Robert Andrieu
Member, Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Security Council

Source: The Panel

Annex 26: The Panel's letter to Sudan

United Nations Nations Unies

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE : S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.305

R REFERENCE

28 November 2018

Excellency,

I have the honor to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel is requesting additional information and documentation from Sudan based on the information supplied by Sudan in its 26 November 2018 letter to the 1718 Committee (see Annex 1) and in its National Implementation Report to the Committee dated 27 June 2018 and published on 14 August 2018 (see Annex 2).

In your 26 November 2018 letter to the Committee you state that:

"The Military Industry Cooperation (sic) has never dealt with a company named "KOMID" and has been dealing with a company named "Future Electronic Company (FEC). All deals with the latter were signed and paid in Sudan. The Military Industry Cooperation (MIC) has never received any shipment from North Korea. All shipments were from other countries" (see Annex 1).

In your annex to your 27 June 2018 letter (National Implementation Report) you state:

"Further to inspection and verification, the Government of the Sudan has cancelled the contract between the Future Electronic Company and Sudan Master Technology and brought an end to the companies' cooperation as of 15 July 2017."

His Excellency
Mr. Omer Dahab Fadl Mohamed
Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Sudan
to the United Nations
New York

In this regard, the Panel kindly requests the following documentation:

1) A copy of the contract(s) between the "Future Electronic Company" and "Sudan Master Technology" aka Sudan Master Technology Engineering Corporation;

2) A copy of the contract(s) between the "Future Electronic Company (FEC)" and the "Military Industrial Cooperation MIC Sudan" aka Military Industrial Corporation (MIC) of Sudan[172];

3) A copy of the order(s)/decrees/correspondence nullifying the contract(s) with the above-mentioned Sudanese and DPRK entities;

4) A list of the staff of the" Future Electronic Company" that includes their names, all known aliases, passport numbers (all passport numbers used by each individual) and copies of their passports (all passports used by each individual together with departure evidence of these persons showing expulsion and final departure from the territory of Sudan[173];

5) Details of the bank account(s) of Future Electronic Company in Sudan together with a list of transfers to and from that bank account for the period 2013 – 2018, including data on foreign account numbers to which funds were transferred;

6) All documentation associated with UN designated DPRK entities, or other entities that may have operated as front companies on their behalf, including: Korea Mining Trading Development Corporation (KOMID), Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB), Future Electronic Company, Chongryong Technology Trading Corporation and Chosun Keumcheong Technology General Trade Corporation that have been the subject of Panel requests to Sudan from December 2015 until November 2018 (see Annex 3);

7) Your 26 November 2018 letter states that regarding Future Electronic Corporation "Sudan never received shipments from North Korea. All shipments came from other countries." The Panel notes that DPRK arms brokering activities, whether the arms originate from the DPRK or not, is prohibited under resolutions 1874 (2009) and clarified further in paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 2270 (2016). The Panel kindly requests copies of all documentation for shipments of arms-related goods prohibited by the resolutions that were brokered or transferred to Sudan as part of contracts with Future Electronic Company (FEC) and any other DPRK-related entity irrespective of whether such goods originated from the DPRK or "other countries".

[172] The spelling of this entity in the 29 November 2018 letter is incorrect. The correct name of the Sudanese military company that has cooperated with the DPRK is the Military Industrial Corporation (MIC) of Sudan with the following website: http://mic.sd/en/home/homepage. Please see Panel letters Panel of 2 January 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.01) for additional information on MIC.

[173] According to the National Implementation Report (NIR) dated 14 August 2018 sent by Sudan to the Security Council 1718 Committee, Sudan stated that "In the light of paragraph 3 above, the Sudanese Government expelled the staff of the aforementioned company and prohibited them from entering the Sudan. The last of the staff members left on 12 August 2017."


Please note that the Panel is investigating all of the above in an effort to better identify the overseas DPRK-related networks that continue to violate the Security Council resolutions with regard to the DPRK in African and Middle Eastern Member States;

Thank you for clarifying the situation with regard to Mr. Hussein Al-Ali's attempt to offer his services to Military Industry Corporation (MIC). His failed attempt is noted and your information on this individual will be reflected in our next report.

Regarding questions 1-7, as the Panel intends to report on these matters in its next final report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter.

Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [redacted].) and Mr. Olaf Andrieu (email: [redacted]).

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 1: Letter from Sudan to the 1718 Committee of 26 November 2018
Annex 2: Extract from Sudan National Implementation Report
Annex 3: Letters from the Panel to Sudan of
- 13 June 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.140)
- 2 January 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.01)
- 17 July 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.324)
- 11 November 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.950)
- 29 September 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.852) and
- 4 December 2015 (ref. S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.815)

Annex 1: Letter from Sudan to the 1718 Committee of 26 November 2018

Republic of the Sudan
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
New York

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

جمهورية السودان
البعثة الدائمة لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

No: SUN/552/18

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honour to refer to paragraph (75) of the report of the Panel of Experts issued on August 2018, which included a number of inquiries concerning alleged Sudan's dealing with North Korean companies and citizens. In this respect, the Mission has the honour to convey the following:

1. The Military Industry Cooperation MIC (Sudan) has never dealt with a company named "KOMID", and it has been dealing with company named "Future Electronic Company (FEC)". All deals with the latter were signed and paid in Sudan. The Military Industry Cooperation (MIC) Sudan has never received any shipment from North Korea. All shipments were from other countries.

2. Mr. Kim Song Chol entered Sudan in 2013 and in 2016, using different names, and left in May 2017. He has not entered the Sudan since that date due to the travel ban imposed on him by the competent authorities.

3. Mr. Hussein Al-Ali had offered his services in 2008 to MIC (Sudan) but MIC did not meet him or develop any cooperation with him.

4. No documents were found about the name Mr. Kotai Hun and verification is ongoing.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) the assurances of its highest consideration.

SUDAN PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

26 November, 2018

305 EAST 47TH STREET, 4TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10017 TEL: (212) 573-6033 FAX: (212) 573-6160

Annex 2: Extract from Sudan National Implementation Report

S/AC.49/2018/98

Annex to the letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

[Original: Arabic]

Report of the Sudan on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017)

Further to the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, namely, resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), the Government of the Sudan wishes to provide the following information:

1. In its note verbale dated 19 June 2017 addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) (S/AC.49/2017/73), the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations stated that the Government of the Sudan had informed all relevant governmental authorities and individuals of the provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, placing particular emphasis on paragraph 40 of Security Council resolution 2270 (2016) and subsequent resolutions prohibiting commercial or military interaction with any entities or bodies affiliated with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

2. The Government of the Sudan has established a national team comprising all relevant agencies to follow up on implementation of the Security Council resolutions concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and prepare national implementation reports for submission to the Committee.

3. Following investigation and verification, the Government of the Sudan cancelled the contract between the Future Electronic Company and Sudan Master Technology, and brought an end to the companies' cooperation as of 15 July 2017.

4. In the light of paragraph 3 above, the Sudanese Government expelled the staff of the aforementioned company and prohibited them from entering the Sudan. The last of the staff members left on 12 August 2017.

5. The Government has added the list of banned individuals compiled by the Committee to its no-entry lists. It has circulated those lists to Sudanese embassies and points of entry into the country.

6. The countries do not have resident diplomatic representation. The Sudan covers the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from its embassy in Beijing, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea covers the Sudan from Addis Ababa.

Annex 27: Sudan’s reply to the Panel

Republic of the Sudan
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
New York

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

جمهورية السودان
البعثة الدائمة لدى الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك

الرقم : س س ن/٥٦ /١/٢١

التاريخ : ٢٠١٩/٠١/٠٢م

تهدي البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية السودان لدى الأمم المتحدة تحياتها إلى لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأة عملاً بالقرار ١٧١٨ (٢٠٠٦) الخاص بجمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية وتشير الى مذكرة اللجنة بالرقم S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.305 بتاريخ ٢٨ نوفمبر ٢٠١٨ و التي تطلب فيها اللجنة معلومات حول تعامل هيئة التصنيع الحربي السودانية مع شركة Future Electronic Companyوترجو الافادة بالاتي:

١. تم توقيع عقد اطاري واحد بين شركة سمتSMT وشركة (FEC)أعقبه توقيع عقدين تنفيذيين لتركيب مكملات لمشروع تطوير 122m وقنابل الطيران ، وقد تم ابطال هذا العقد و توابعه بتاريخ ١٥ يونيو ٢٠١٧ (مرفق صورة من العقد).ولا توجد اي عقود بين هيئة التصنيع الحربي (MIC) و.(FEC).

٢. تؤكد حكومة السودان على انه تم ايقاف كآفة الانشطة مع جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية بموجب القرار الصادر عن رئاسة الجمهورية السودانية بتاريخ ٣١ مايو ٢٠١٧ (مرفق) ، كما قامت هيئة التصنيع الحربي السودانية (MIC) و شركة سمت الهندسية(SMT) باصدار اوامر ادارية تجمد اي انشطة مع جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية وتلغي كافة العقود المبرمة معها في مطلع يونيو ٢٠١٧(مرفق) .كما صدر خطاب انذار و ابعاد للسيد KIM CHOL(مرفق).

305 EAST 47TH STREET, 4TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10017 TEL: (212) 573-6033 FAX: (212) 573-6160

٣. تم تكوين لجنة وطنية من الجهات ذات الصلة في السودان بتاريخ ٢٩ مايو ٢٠١٧ لمتابعة تنفيذ التزامات الحكومة السودانية بقرارات مجلس الامن المتعلقة بالعقوبات على جمهورية كوريا الديموقراطية الشعبية.

٤. زار السيد KIM SONG CHOL السودان اول مرة في العام ٢٠١٣ لمتابعة تنفيذ العود الخاصة بتطوير 122m ثم في المرة الثانية ليشرف على بعض المجموعات التي كانت تعمل في تأهيل الرادارات الروسية P15/P12 . ثم زار السودان مرة ثالثة في العام ٢٠١٦ باسم مختلف وجواز سفر جديد وذلك للمطالبة ببعض المستحقات المالية و غادر في مايو ٢٠١٧ و لم يدخل السودان بعدها حيث تم وضع اسمه في قائمة المحظورين من دخول البلاد.

٥. لم يتم اي تعامل بنكي ولم يتم اجراء اي تحويل من خلال حسابات بنكية داخل السودان او خارجة و كانت المعاملات المالية تتم مع FEC عبر الدفع المباشر محلياً.

٦. لم تستلم شركة سمت الهندسية SMT اي شحنة من موانئ كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية وقد كانت الشحنات المستلمة وفقاً لاجراءات التخليص العادية عبارة عن مكملات ومدخلات انتاج وليس هناك منتجات كاملة.

وتغتنم البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية السودان لدى الأمم المتحدة هذه الفرصة لتجدد تحيتها للجنة مجلس الأمن التابعة للأمم المتحدة المنشأة عملاً بالقرار ١٧١٨ (٢٠٠٦).

SMT
Engineering Co.
سمت الهندسية

Date: 26/4/2017

Dear Mr. Hong ..

We have been instructed by our high authority to tell you that you are blocked to enter Sudan. This means that you cannot travel to Sudan by using your name or any other name.

This letter will be as official WORINING, accordingly you are asked to leave Sudan within one week.

With best regards

Amir A. Abdalla

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

SMT
Engineering Co.
سمت الهندسية

From : SMT
To : FEC Co.
Date : 15/06/2017

Total Pages: 1/1

Dear Sir,

Subject: Termination of Cooperation

According to the instructions given to us from our high authority we would like to inform you the following:

1. All cooperation between SMT and FEC should be terminated by the 01st of August 2017.
2. All the personnel from your side should quit the country by this date.
   We shall be ready to give any assistance for the departure of your staff.
3. The contracts which are now running should be concluded before that date or otherwise should be stopped and a situation report should be made.
4. We are ready to discuss and settle all outstanding issues between us including financial issues.

We are sure that you appreciate our situation and you will cooperate with us to settle down all issues arise from this unexpected termination necessitated by circumstances completely out of our control.

Best regards,

Amir A. Abdalla

Frame contact

This frame contract (contract) is concluded in Khartoum on 27th of January 2013 by and between:

1. Sudan Master Technology Co. Ltd.
   A company incorporated under Sudanese law, having its address in SMT Building, Gamhuria Street, Khartoum, Sudan and represented by Eng. Hasan Talha Hasan, hereinafter called (Employer) as First Part.
2. Future Electronic Company (FEC), a company registered under law of P.R. of China, having its address Haidian District ,Beijing, China And represented by Mr. Hong Man Bok, passport no. 836288402 , hereinafter called (contractor) as the Second Part.

First part and second part collectively called (parties)
The contractor offer his services to Employer in the field of rehabilitation, upgrade, maintenance of eastern Radars, air defense systems, tactical communication , maintenance and spare parts and training.
The Employer accepted the said offer.
Parties agreed their dealings to be governed by terms and conditions of this contract.

1. **Subject- matter of the contract:**
   a) The parties agreed that detailed services and/or supply in each field will be performed by purchase orders and/or contracts made by the parties.
   a) The price of each service/ good will be agreed upon on the relevant contract/purchase order according to man-hour or cost-plus for services and goods respectively.
   b) All payments will be made inside Sudan by the currency agreed upon between parties.

2. **Obligation of the Employer:**
   The Employer will be responsible for reception of the personnel of the contractor and their stay, visas, accommodation, local (in land) and medical services during their say.

Page 1 of 3

3. Obligation of the Contractor:
   a) The contractor will undertake to sell, supply, assemble, educate and train (collectively called technical assistance) according to the requirements and conditions of each contract.
   b) The contractor will be responsible for shipping the goods to Sudanese Sea/Air ports and will responsible for them throughout duration of the contract until final Acceptance by Employer, the Employer will only be responsible for clearance and transportation of goods to the site.

4. Force Majeure:
   1. Either party shall be released from the discharge of his obligations towards the other if, by reason of force majeure, he faces such circumstances that make the discharge of his obligations as specified in the contract impossible, provided that this should be not due to his omission.
   2. When it becomes impossible to implement the contract within the stated schedule by reason of force majeure, the party, who is under the influence of force majeure, shall have the right to postpone his contractual obligations for a period specified in the contract; in this case the delay in the contract execution shall be deemed to be justified.
   3. The party, who is under the influence of force majeure, shall obtain within a maximum period of 15 days as from the occurrence of force majeure an official document issued by the competent authorities in his country and legalized by the Embassy of the other party and the legal Chamber of Commerce , certifying the occurrence and the date of force majeure.

      He shall send this document to the other party by registered mail within the stated period, and he has to notify him of the termination of force majeure by the same procedure and within the same periods.

      The dates given in the legalized official documents shall be adopted for the determination of the start and end of force majeure.

Page 2 of 3

4. There shall be considered as force majeure sudden circumstances, earthquakes, flood, war, whether declared or not, revolutions, civil war, riots, strikes, insurrection, industrial strike and strike in transport sector if they entail impossibility of execution of the contract or delay in the execution of the contract.
5. Fluctuation in the prices of raw goods, labor, and foreign currency shall not be considered as force majeure.

5. **Confidentiality:**

Parties undertake to keep absolute secrecy as regards the execution of this contract and not to release or give any information on it.
All documents in connection with this contract should be classified as confidential.

6. **Dispute resolution:**

All disputes arising out of interpretation or execution of this contract or detailed contracts shall be settled amicably .failing this within one month recourse should be made to arbitration under Sudanese laws.

For Employer
Eng. Hasan Talha Hasan

For contractor
Mr. Hong Man Bok

Page 3 of 3

Republic of the Sudan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Undersecretary

جمهورية السودان
وزارة الخارجية
الوكيل

الرقم: و خ/ت د/ عمومي

التاريخ: 2018/5/29م

أمر تشكيل لجنة تنفيذ التزامات السودان تجاه قرارات مجلس الأمن المتعلقة بالعقوبات المفروضة على جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية

آخذاً في الإعتبار إلزامية قرارات مجلس الأمن على الدول الأعضاء بالأمم المتحدة وإتساقاً مع مواقف السودان فيما يتصل بمناهضة إنتشار الأسلحة النووية وأسلحة الدمار الشامل، بهذا تقرر تشكيل لجنة لمتابعة تنفيذ السودان لقرارات مجلس الأمن المتصلة بجمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية، وتتشكل اللجنة على النحو التالي :-

1. السيد السفير/ عمر صديق – مدير عام التعاون الدولي والقضايا الدولية – رئيساً
2. السيد السفير/ محمد عيسى إيدام – مدير عام الشؤون الأمريكية والأوروبية – عضواً
3. السيد السفير/ أنس الطيب – مدير إدارة القانون الدولي والمعاهدات – عضواً
4. السيد السفير/ صديق محمد عبد الله – مدير إدارة الشؤون الأمريكية – عضواً
5. السيد السفير/ كمال بشير – مدير إدارة المنظمات الدولية – عضواً ومقرراً
6. السيد ممثل وزارة الدفاع – عضواً
7. السيد ممثل وزارة المالية – عضواً
8. السيد ممثل وزارة الداخلية – عضواً
9. السيد ممثل وزارة التجارة – عضواً
10. السيد ممثل وزارة التعليم العالي – عضواً
11. السيد ممثل وزارة النقل – عضواً
12. السيد ممثل جهاز الأمن والمخابرات الوطني – عضواً
13. السيد ممثل بنك السودان المركزي – عضواً
14. السيد ممثل منظومة الصناعات الدفاعية – عضواً

Sudan - Khartoum - Tel. : +249 1 83771369 - Fax : +249 1 83761793

السودان - الخرطوم - هاتف: ٨٣٧٧١٣٦٩ ١ ٢٤٩+ فاكس: ٨٣٧٦١٧٩٣ ١ ٢٤٩+

أ. تختص اللجنة بمتابعة تنفيذ إلتزامات السودان تجاه قرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة بالموضوع.

ب. تتولى اللجنة إعداد التقرير الوطني السنوي الذي يُقدم إلى مجلس الأمن.

ج. للجنة الحق في الإستعانة بمن تراه مناسباً.

د. ترفع اللجنة تقاريرها بصفة دورية لوكيل وزارة الخارجية.

صدر تحت توقيعي في اليوم ٢٩/٥/٢٠١٨م. الموافق ١٣/رمضان/١٤٣٩هـ.

عبد الغني النعيم عوض الكريم

وكيل وزارة الخارجية

معنون إلى :

- السيد رئيس اللجنة.
- السادة أعضاء اللجنة.

صورة إلى :

- السيد مدير مكتب السيد الوزير.
- السادة مديري مكاتب السادة وزراء الدولة.

Translated from Arabic

[*Pages 1 and 2*]

Republic of the Sudan

Permanent Mission to the United Nations

New York

Ref.: *sin sin nun*/56/21/1

2 January 2019

The Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1817 (2006) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and refers to its note S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.305 of 28 November 2018, by which the Committee requested information regarding the interactions of the Sudanese Military Industry Corporation (MIC) with the Future Electronic Company (FEC). The Permanent Mission of the Sudan wishes to provide the following information:

1. A single framework agreement was signed between the companies SMT and FEC. Two executive contracts were then signed to provide parts for the project to develop 122mm [weapons] and aerial bombs. The contract and its effects were terminated on 15 June 2017. A copy of the contract is enclosed. There are no contracts between MIC and FEC.

2. The Government of the Sudan wishes to state that all activities involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been suspended pursuant to an order issued by the President of the Republic of the Sudan on 31 May 2017 (see enclosure). In early June 2017 (see enclosure), MIC and the engineering company SMT issued administrative orders freezing all activities with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and cancelled all contracts concluded with that country. A letter giving a warning and notice of expulsion was sent to Mr. Kim Chol (see enclosure).

3. On 29 May 2017, a national committee comprising the competent agencies in the Sudan was established with a view to following up implementation of the Sudanese Government's obligations under the Security Council resolutions concerning sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

4. Mr. Kim Song Chol visited the Sudan for the first time in 2013 to follow up implementation of the contracts regarding the development of 122mm [weapons]. He then visited a second time to oversee some groups that were working to install Russian P12 and P15 radars. He visited the Sudan a third time in 2016 under a different name and a new passport in order to request certain financial dues. He left in May 2017 and has not entered the Sudan since; his name has been placed on a no-entry list.

5. There have been no banking transactions, and no transfers have been processed, through bank accounts within or outside the Sudan. The financial transactions involving FEC consisted of direct payments made locally.

6. SMT did not receive any shipments from ports in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The shipments received through regular clearance procedures consisted of components and production parts, not of complete products.

The Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations takes this opportunity to convey to the Committee the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

[*Pages 8 and 9*]

Republic of the Sudan

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Under-Secretary

Ref./*waw-kha'*/*ta'-dal*/public

29 May 2018

Order establishing a committee on implementation of the obligations of the Sudan under the Security Council resolutions concerning the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Given that Security Council resolutions are binding on States Members of the United Nations, and in view of the Sudan's position against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, a committee is hereby established with a view to following up implementation of the obligations of the Sudan under the Security Council resolutions concerning the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Its composition shall be as follows:

1. H.E. Umar Siddiq, Director-General for International Cooperation and International Affairs – chair.

2. H.E. Muhammad Isa Idam, Director-General for American and European Affairs – member.

3. H.E. Anas al-Tayyib, Director of the Department of International Law and Treaties – member.

4. H.E. Siddiq Muhammad Abdullah, Director of the Department of American Affairs – member.

5. H.E. Kamal Bashir, Director of the Department for International Organizations – member and rapporteur.

6. The representative of the Ministry of Defence – member.

7. The representative of the Ministry of Finance – member.

8. The representative of the Ministry of the Interior – member.

9. The representative of the Ministry of Commerce – member.

10. The representative of the Ministry of Higher Education – member.

11. The representative of the Ministry of Transport – member.

12. The representative of the National Intelligence and Security Service– member.

13. The representative of the Central Bank of the Sudan– member.

14. The representative of the defence industry network – member.

(a) The committee shall follow up implementation of the obligations of the Sudan under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

(b) The committee shall prepare a national annual report for submission to the Security Council.

(c) The committee shall have the right to consult whomever it deems appropriate.

(d) The committee shall submit periodic reports to the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This order was issued and signed by me today, on 29 May A.D. 2018 (13 Ramadan A.H. 1439).

(*Signed*) Abdulghani al-Na‘im Awad al-Karim

Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Annex 28: Panel's vessel inspection: ship identity laundering to deceive the IMO

1. The Panel investigated a case of ship identity laundering whereby a flag of convenience vessel previously identified by the Panel as having transported prohibited coal shipments removed all identifiers, was provided with new documentation and ships' books for classification and inspection purposes and then applied for and obtained a new, legal vessel number from the International Maritime Organization. The ship in question is the Togo-flagged *Talent Ace* (IMO number: 8793873) which was previously the *Xin Sheng Hai* (IMO number: 9485617). It entered the port of Gunsan on 18 January 2018 and was subsequently detained by the Republic of Korea pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017).

2. Inspection of the vessel revealed that a new IMO number had been inserted into the vessel's super-structure (figure I) and a complete set of ship documents had been provided to allow the vessel to appear as a first-time applicant to legally obtain the number. The *Talent Ace's* engine and generator serial numbers still matched those of the *Xin Sheng Hai's* (figure II).

Figure I: New legal IMO number



Source: The Panel

Figure II: Engine serial number



Source: The Panel

3. Inspection of the ship's bow revealed that the name *"Talent Ace"* was painted over its former identity (figure III). When informed of the fraud, the International Maritime Organization cancelled the IMO number and merged the false identity with that of the *Xin Sheng Hai*.


Figure III: "Talent Ace" blacked out and painted over former names



Source: The Panel

4. The *Talent Ace*'s operator Wooheng (Hongkong) Shipping appears to be acting on behalf of the operator of the *Xin Sheng Hai* , Liberty Shipping.[174] The Panel has identified Liberty Shipping as the operator of other designated vessels as well as DPRK-flagged ships, and was itself designated by the United States on 23 February 2018.[175] The Panel found that the IMO registration address for the vessel's owner, Wynn East Import & Export Trading Pte. Ltd., is the same as that of Wooheng (Hongkong) Shipping.[176] The Panel is continuing its investigation.

Figure IV: Document recovered aboard the Talent Ace showing Wooheng using email address of Liberty Shipping, the operator of the Xin Shen Hai



总经理声明 General-general manager's declaration(SMM01)

《安全管理手册》是阐述公司安全和环境保护方针并描述安全管理体系的纲领性文件。它依据《国际安全管理规则》(ISM 规则)的要求，按照国际、国内有关公约、规则、法律、法规和本公司实际情况制定，是本公司安全管理体系建立和运行必须遵循的基本文件。

As the programmatic and basic document strictly observed by the establishment and performance of company SMS and demonstrating COMPANY SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY, Safety management manual is established by the requirements of ISM code, the international and domestic regulations, rules and laws and the actual condition of the company.

公司第 1.0 版安全管理体系文件由总经理宣布自 2017 年 11 月 1 日起颁布实施。在此我要求公司全体人员都必须认真学习、理解和掌握安全管理体系文件各项规定并严格遵照执行，确保安全和防污染各项管理和操作活动符合公司安全管理体系文件的各项要求，达到既定的安全管理目标。

I, the General Manager, hereby announce that the Safety Management System (version 1.0) for this Company come into full force and effect from Nov 01st, 2017. All staff, including crewmembers, are kindly requested to use your full efforts to study, understand, comprehend and observe in full details of this SMS requirements in order to ensure all operations for safety and environment protection are carried out in compliance with this system and to achieve the aims of safety management.

我、总经理本人在此承诺：保证尽心尽力地履行公司安全管理体系所赋予我的职责，保证提供安全管理体系持续、有效运行的资源，与各位同仁共同奋斗，确保安全和环境保护方针的有效落实。

I undertake hereby that I will, with all my belief, experience and knowledge, perform the duties imposed upon me by the SMS of this Company, provide resources for consistency and proficiency for the operations in connection with SMS and ensure the proper implementation of COMPANY SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY.

电话（Fixed Tel）：+86-411-82731009
传真（Fax No.）：+86-411-82723203
E-MAIL ADD：libertyshipping@163.com

WOOHENG(HONGKONG) SHIPPING CO., LTD
总经理：王洁
General Manager: [redacted]
Nov 1st, 2017

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[174] Wooheng (Hongkong) Shipping Co. Ltd uses the email of Liberty Shipping (Libertyshipping@163.com) (see figure IV). which has been identified as the operator of other designated vessels, as well as DPRK-flagged ships.

[175] Liberty Shipping was also the operator of the previously designated *Karo Bright* and the DPRK vessel *Sai Nal 2*

[176] Registered in Singapore (ID: 201412213D) at: 2 Venture Drive, #11-30 Vision Exchange, Singapore (608526)

Annex 29: The Panel's letter to the Syrian Arab Republic

United Nations Nations Unies

HEADQUARTERS • SIEGE NEW YORK, NY 10017
TEL. : +1 212 963 1055 • FAX : +1 212 963 2013

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE : S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.361

R REFERENCE

3 December 2018

Excellency,

I have the honor to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel is following up on its letter of 28 June 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.172) (see Annex) to which it has received no reply to date. In addition, the Panel has received information from a Member State that:

- The DPRK is continuing prohibited cooperation with the Scientific Studies Research Centre (SSRC) and the Army Supply Bureau (ASB);

- The DPRK national who replaced Ryu Jin as KOMID representative in the Syrian Arab Republic is known as "Kim". Mr. "Kim" has as his deputy a Mr. Rim Yong Hyok and both these individuals work together with Pak Kwang Il.

In addition, the Panel wishes to follow up on its letters of 1 September 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.378), 5 July 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.308), 21 October 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.904 and 905), 9 June 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.185) and 5 May 2016 (S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.117) as well as your response letter of 17 August 2017 (see Annex).

His Excellency
Mr. Bashar Ja'afari
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations
New York

The Panel wishes to reiterate its request for **a full list of the activities undertaken by these individuals and all other DPRK nationals in the Syrian Arab Republic, their contracts with Syrian companies and institutions, together with copies of their passports, and other relevant information as requested in our previous communications.**

The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council. In addition, the Panel would like to assure you that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the information of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

As the Panel intends to report on this matter in its next Final report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter.

Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [redacted]) mailto:and Mr. Olaf Andrieu (email: [redacted]).

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex:
Panel letters of 23 November 2018 (ref: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.172), 1 September 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.378), 5 July 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.308), 21 October 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.904 and 905), 9 June 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.185) and 5 May 2016 (S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC/117) and Syrian Arab Republic letter of 17 August 2017

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS
820 Second Ave., 15th Floor, New York, N. Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 661-1313
Fax: (212) 983-4439

MOST URGENT

PM/2017/324 New York, 17 August 2017

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to the letter no. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.308 dated 5 July 2017, has the honor to inform the following:


1. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has no inter-action with the two entities or individuals whose names are mentioned in the letter.
2. There are no DPRK technical companies in Syria, and the only presence of some DPRK individuals are confined in the field of sports under private individual contracts for training in athletics and gymnastics.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations avails itself of its opportunity to renew to Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), the assurances of its highest consideration.

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC * NEW YORK *

H.E. Hughs Griffiths
Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 30: Copy of the passport of Syrian arms trafficker Hussein Al-Ali



N 011095903

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR - DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND PASSPORTS

Type P Country code SYR

Issue no./N délivrance. 003-16-L068494

Given Name/Prénom HUSSEIN

Surname/Nom. AL ALI

Father Name/Nom du père. EBRAHIM

Mother Name/Nom de la mère FATIMA

Birth Date/Date de naissance 01/01/1942

Birth Place/Lieu de naissance HAMA

Sex/Sexe. M

PNSYRALALI<<HUSSEIN<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

0110959032SYR4201012M2205142051<20015660<<08

Annex 31: Reply of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Panel

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS
820 Second Ave., 15th Floor, New York, N. Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 661-1313
Fax: (212) 983-4439

MOST URGENT

PM/2019/09

New York, 11 Jan 2019

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to its letter, has the honor to inform the following:

1. The existing relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are in harmony with international law and the Charter of the United Nations and, therefore, do not violate Syria's international obligations.
2. Syria believes that the information presented to the Panel of Experts is not objective and cannot be examined, scrutinized or verified by the Syrian Government because it is superficial and based on sources that have no credibility.
3. The diplomatic representation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Syrian Arab Republic is in conformity with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and the provisions of these Conventions.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations avails itself of its opportunity to renew to Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), the assurances of its highest consideration.

PERMANENT MISSION SYRIAN ARAB REP. NEW YORK

H.E. Mr. Hughs Griffiths
Coordinator of Panel Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

CC. H.E. Mr. Christoph Heusgen
1718 Committee Chair


Annex 32: Prime Okryu Gallery website

(1) Example of Mansudae Art Studio works advertised on the website (right: Ri Gyong Nam "Winter in thick forest". left: An Chang Nam "Thick forest") (top)



Source: https://www.okryugwan.net/artgallery (accessed on 3 May 2018)

(2) Contents showing the affiliation of the gallery (bottom)



Source: https://www.okryugwan.net/?lang=en (accessed on 3 May 2018)

Annex 33: Information on DPRK cyberattacks provided to the Panel by a Member State in November 2018 (excerpt)

- Cyberspace is used by the DPRK as an asymmetric means to carry out illicit and undercover operations in the field of cybercrime and sanctions evasion. These operations aim at to acquire funds through a variety of measures in order to circumvent the sanctions.
- • The illicit activities of the DPRK rely on a particular cyber composite ecosystem. Among these well identified illicit activities are online scams and the hacking of the global SWIFT messaging system. The DPRK relies on the expertise of at least four groups of hackers specialized in espionage and sabotage, who carry out, “Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)”.

Annex 34: Excerpt on DPRK cyberwarfare capabilities from "Military and Security Developments involving the DPRK 2017", a report to Congress pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act, Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense

a variety of anti-ship cruise missiles, torpedoes, and guns. The NKN maintains one of the world's largest, albeit aging, submarine forces, with around 70 attack-, coastal-, and midget-type submarines. In addition, the NKN operates a large fleet of air-cushioned hovercraft and conventional landing craft to support amphibious operations and SOF insertion. The force is divided into East and West Coast Fleets, each operating a variety of patrol craft, guided-missile patrol boats, submarines, and landing craft.

The NKN has displayed some modernization efforts, highlighted by upgrades to selected surface ships and a small-scale program to produce modern, surface, missile-armed patrol boats and corvettes.

North Korea continues to operate and test its GORAE-class ballistic missile–capable submarine as part of its larger high-priority ballistic missile program.

SOF. North Korean SOF personnel are among the most highly trained, well-equipped, best-fed, and highly motivated forces in the KPA.

Strategic SOF units dispersed across North Korea appear designed for rapid offensive operations, internal defense against foreign attacks, or limited attacks against vulnerable targets in the ROK. They operate in specialized units, such as reconnaissance, airborne and seaborne insertion, commando, and other specialty units. All emphasize speed of movement and surprise attack to accomplish their missions. SOF may be airlifted by An-2 Colts or helicopters (and possibly Civil Air Administration transports), moved by maritime insertion platforms, or travel on foot over land or via suspected underground cross-DMZ tunnels to attack high-value targets, such as command and control nodes or airbases in the ROK.

In 2016, Kim Jong Un publicly unveiled a possible new SOF battalion of KPA Unit 525 that may be tasked with decapitation missions. During a publicized exercise in December 2016, the SOF battalion assaulted a full-scale mockup of the Blue House, the official residence of the President of the Republic of Korea, practicing helicopter insertion, probable abduction of the ROK President, and eventual destruction of the building.

Cyberwarfare Capabilities. North Korea possesses increasingly sophisticated cyber warfare capabilities, including offensive capabilities, which are capable of damaging and disruptive cyberattacks. North Korean cyber effects operations have been implicated in malicious cyber activity since 2009 and challenge widely recognized norms of state behavior in cyberspace. North Korea has invested in developing its cyber capabilities and probably views cyber operations as an appealing, cost-effective, and deniable means by which to collect intelligence and cause disruption against its highly networked adversaries, notably the ROK, Japan, and the United States. North Korea likely believes it can conduct cyber effects operations with little risk of reprisal, in part because its networks are largely separated

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 13

from the Internet and disruption of Internet access would have minimal impact on its economy. In November 2014, North Korean cyber actors using the nom de guerre "Guardians of Peace" attacked Sony Pictures Entertainment, shutting down employee access and deleting data. For these types of attacks, North Korea likely uses Internet infrastructure from third-party nations.

Pyongyang probably is increasingly using cybercrime to offset financial losses resulting from international sanctions, especially given stricter Chinese enforcement of these sanctions. For example, North Korea probably was involved in the theft of $81 million from the Central Bank of Bangladesh in February 2016. North Korean cyber actors also are using malware to blackmail individuals and companies into paying large fees to keep sensitive information (such as personally identifiable information) from being publicly released. In 2017, North Korea carried out the malicious "WannaCry" ransomware attack that spread across the world damaging civilian infrastructure, including the United Kingdom's National Health Service and Chinese firms. North Korea exploited an existing vulnerability that allowed it to encrypt a target's hard drive, then demanded payment in cryptocurrency within a set time period or else the users' data would be wiped. Even individuals and firms which paid the ransom did not recover their data.

Intelligence Services. North Korean intelligence and security services collect political, military, economic, and technical information through open sources, human intelligence, cyber intrusions, and signals intelligence capabilities. North Korea's primary intelligence collection targets remain the ROK, the United States, and Japan. They likely operate anywhere North Korea has a diplomatic or sizable economic overseas presence.

The **Reconnaissance General Bureau** (RGB) is North Korea's primary foreign intelligence service, responsible for collection and clandestine operations. The RGB comprises six bureaus with compartmented functions, including operations, reconnaissance, technology and cyber capabilities, overseas intelligence, inter-Korean talks, and service support.

The **Ministry of State Security** (MSS) is North Korea's primary counterintelligence service and is an autonomous agency of the North Korean Government reporting directly to Kim Jong Un. The MSS is responsible for operating North Korean prison camps, investigating cases of domestic espionage, repatriating defectors, and conducting overseas counterespionage activities in North Korea's foreign missions.

The **United Front Department** (UFD) overtly attempts to establish pro–North Korean groups in the ROK, such as the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and the Ethnic Reconciliation Council. The UFD is also the primary department involved in managing inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea's policy toward the ROK.

Source: https://fas.org/irp/world/dprk/dod-2017.pdf

Annex 35: Republic of Korea National Police Agency News Release: Results of the Joint Investigation Team of the Republic of Korea Police and Government -- Hacking of Consumer Information of Interpark determined to have be done by DPRK

[Unofficial translation (excerpt); Original follows]

The National Police Agency (Cyber Security Bureau) and the Government Joint Investigation Team, after an initial investigation on the recent hacking of customer information of InterPark and the blackmail to the company, state their assessment that the hacking was conducted by the DPRK's Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB).[177]

As evidence, the joint team pointed out to three main factors:
1) the IP addressed used for hacking emails and hacking commands (systematically used before by the DPRK RGB)
2) the malware used in the attack (as well as decoding and methods to remove traces of the attack) were similar to those that the DPRK used in past cyber-attacks
3) DPRK- style expressions used in black mail/cyber threat emails

This incident shows that North Korea is going beyond attacking basic infrastructure and is now trying to steal national wealth through the criminal acquisition of foreign currency. Considering the seriousness of the issue, the Government of the ROK is closely monitoring the changes in the cyberattack tactics of the DPRK.[178]

Source:http://www.korea.kr/policy/pressReleaseView.do;jsessionid=gyhqXhbdjxKTGwcXCNCQ2BVbcCWKJfVBdKGLGhyMR1cQG4kYq9DB!-1655938029?newsId=156144599&pageIndex=1

[177] 경찰청(사이버안전국)과 정부합동조사팀은 인터파크 고객정보 해킹 및 협박 사건 초동수사・조사 결과, 이번 사건이 북 정찰총국 소행인 것으로 판단하고 있다고 밝혔다.

[178] 이 사건은 북한이 우리의 기반시설 공격을 넘어, 국민의 재산을 탈취하려는 범죄적 외화벌이에까지 해킹기술을 이용하고 있는 것이 확인된 최초 사례로서, 정부차원에서도 그 심각성을 인식하고 북한의 사이버공격 전술 변화를 예의 주시하고 있다고 밝혔다.

국민행복

보도일시: 2016. 7. 28.(목) 15:30 이후 사용해 주시기 바랍니다

국민에게 책임을 다하는 희망의 새 경찰

경찰청 브리핑 www.police.go.kr KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY

사이버수사과장 총경 이재승 일반 02-3150-1605, 경비 1605	담당 경정 정석화 일반 02-3150-1459, 경비 1459	2016년 7월 28일

인터파크 개인정보 해킹 · 공갈, 북 소행으로 판단

- 경찰과 정부 합동조사팀 중간 수사 결과 -

□ 경찰청(사이버안전국)과 정부합동조사팀은 인터파크 고객정보 해킹 및 협박 사건 초동수사 · 조사 결과, 이번 사건이 북 정찰총국 소행인 것으로 판단하고 있다고 밝혔다.

□ 경찰청(사이버안전국)과 정부합동조사팀은,

○ 이번 사건이 북 해킹소행이라는 판단 근거로

① 해킹메일을 발신하거나 해커지령을 수신하기 위한 공격경유지의 IP 등이 북 정찰총국이 대남 사이버공격을 위해 구축·사용해 온 것이며,

② 해킹에 이용된 악성코드를 분석한 결과, 디코딩 · 흔적을 삭제하는 수법이 과거 북한이 사이버테러에 사용했던 악성코드와 상당부분 유사하고,

③ 협박메일에는 '총적으로 쥐어짜면' 등의 북한식 표현이 사용된 점을 들었다.

※ "총적"은 북한어로 "총체적이며 총괄적인, 또는 그런 것"이라는 의미

○ 이 사건은 북한이 우리의 기반시설 공격을 넘어, 국민의 재산을 탈취하려는 범죄적 외화벌이에까지 해킹기술을 이용하고 있는 것이 확인된 최초 사례로서, 정부차원에서도 그 심각성을 인식하고 북한의 사이버공격 전술 변화를 예의 주시하고 있다고 밝혔다.

□ 정부는 이번 사고를 계기로 유사한 협박에 대처함은 물론, 북한이 절취한 개인정보를 이용하여 제2, 제3의 또 다른 해킹 및 대국민 심리전을 자행할 것에 대비하여,

○ 국민들께 협박성 메일 수신이나 해킹 징후를 인지한 경우에는 초기에 즉각 대응할 수 있도록 관계기관에 신속히 알려주고 정부차원 합동 대응에 적극적으로 협조해 줄 것을 요청하는 한편,

○ 개인정보를 취급하는 모든 기관과 업체는 개인정보 유출로 국민들이 피해를 받지 않도록 물리적 망분리나 악성코드에 대한 상시적 점검(모니터링) 등으로 개인정보보호 및 사이버보안 대책 강화에 만전을 기해 줄 것을 당부하였으며,

○ 북한의 사이버공격에 대응하기 위해 사이버안보 관련 법률 제정을 서두르겠다고 밝혔다.

□ 경찰은 정부 합동조사팀과 긴밀한 공조수사를 진행하고 있으며, 보다 상세한 사항은 수사가 진행되는 대로 추가 발표하겠다고 밝혔다.

OPEN 이 보도자료와 관련하여 보다 자세한 내용이나 취재를 원하시면 경찰청 사이버수사과 경정 정석화(☎ 02-3150-1459)에게 연락주시기 바랍니다.

Source:http://www.korea.kr/policy/pressReleaseView.do;jsessionid=gyhqXhbdjxKTGwcXCNCQ2BVbcCWKJfVBdKGLGhyMR1cQG4kYq9DB!-1655938029?newsId=156144599&pageIndex=1

Annex 36: Wanted by the FBI, PARK JIN HYOK, Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud; Conspiracy to Commit Computer-Related Fraud (Computer Intrusion)

WANTED BY THE FBI

PARK JIN HYOK

Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud; Conspiracy to Commit Computer-Related Fraud (Computer Intrusion)



DESCRIPTION

Aliases: Pak Jin Hek, Jin Hyok Park	
Place of Birth: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)	**Hair:** Black
Eyes: Brown	**Sex:** Male
Race: Asian	**Languages:** English, Korean

REMARKS

Park attended the Kim Chaek University of Technology in Pyongyang, North Korea. He is a North Korean citizen last known to be in North Korea. Park has traveled to China in the past and conducted legitimate IT work under the front company "Chosun Expo" or the Korean Expo Joint Venture in addition to activities conducted on behalf of North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.

CAUTION

Park Jin Hyok is allegedly a North Korean computer programmer who is part of a state-sponsored hacking organization responsible for some of the costliest computer intrusions in history, including the cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, a series of attacks targeting banks across the world that collectively attempted to steal more than one billion dollars, and the WannaCry ransomware attack that affected tens of thousands of computer systems across the globe.

Park was alleged to be a participant in a wide-ranging criminal conspiracy undertaken by a group of hackers employed by a company that was operated by the North Korean government. The front company – Chosun Expo Joint Venture, also known as Korea Expo Joint Venture – was affiliated with Lab 110, one of the North Korean government's hacking organizations. That hacking group is what some private cybersecurity researchers have labeled the "Lazarus Group." On June 8, 2018, a federal arrest warrant was issued for Park Jin Hyok in the United States District Court, Central District of California, after he was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit computer-related fraud (computer intrusion).

If you have any information concerning this person, please contact your local FBI office or the nearest American Embassy or Consulate.

Field Office: Los Angeles

Source: https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/park-jin-hyok

Annex 37: Open source technical analysis of DPRK state-sponsored cyber activity (FireEye, 3 October 2018)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

APT38 is a financially motivated North Korean regime-backed group responsible for conducting destructive attacks against financial institutions, as well as some of the world's largest cyber heists. Based on widely publicized operations alone, the group has attempted to steal more than $1.1 billion.

Instead of simply obtaining accesses and moving to transfer funds as quickly as possible, APT38 is believed to operate more similarly to an espionage operation, carefully conducting reconnaissance within compromised financial institutions and balancing financially motivated objectives with learning about internal systems.

APT38 shares malware code and other development resources with TEMP.Hermit North Korean cyber espionage activity, although we consider APT38's operations more global and highly specialized for targeting the financial sector.

The group has compromised more than 16 organizations in at least 13 different countries, sometimes simultaneously, since at least 2014.

Since the first observed activity, the group's operations have become increasingly complex and destructive. APT38 has adopted a calculated approach, allowing them to sharpen their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) over time while evading detection.

Targeting and Mission

Based on observed activity, we judge that APT38's primary mission is targeting financial institutions and manipulating inter-bank financial systems to raise large sums of money for the North Korean regime. Increasingly heavy and pointed international sanctions have been levied on North Korea following the regime's continued weapons development and testing. The pace of APT38 activity probably reflects increasingly desperate efforts to steal funds to pursue state interests, despite growing economic pressure on Pyongyang. Since 2015, APT38 has attempted to steal hundreds of millions of dollars from financial institutions. Some of the publicly reported attempted heists attributable to APT38 include:

- Vietnam TP Bank in December 2015
- Bangladesh Bank in February 2016
- Far Eastern International Bank in Taiwan in October 2017
- Bancomext in January 2018
- Banco de Chile in May 2018

Shared Resources, Motivation

Malware overlaps between APT38 and TEMP.Hermit highlight the shared development resources accessible by multiple operational groups linked to North Korean state-sponsored activity. Although these are disparate operations against different targets and rely on distinct TTPs, the malware tools being used either overlap or exhibit shared characteristics indicating a shared developer or access to the same code repositories. Although APT38 is distinct from other TEMP.Hermit activity, both groups operate consistently within the interests of the North Korean state.

- Malware similarities, including code overlap and shared functions, are a primary connection between APT38 and other operations still attributed to TEMP.Hermit. For additional malware similarity details, please see the preceding section.
- APT38's increasingly aggressive targeting against banks and other financial institutions has paralleled North Korea's worsening financial condition (Figure 4). Similarly, TEMP.Hermit campaigns against U.S. defense contractors and South Korean government offices and companies is consistent with other North Korean objectives.

Links to North Korean Military Units

Based on details published in the DOJ complaint against North Korean programmer Park Jin Hyok, we know that APT38 and other cyber operators linked to TEMP.Hermit are associated with Lab 110, an organization subordinate to or synonymous with the 6th Technical Bureau in North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). The organization is believed to leverage front organizations to mask their activities, including infiltrating networks and gathering intelligence. These relationships are outlined in Figure 3.


- The DOJ complaint and open sources report that Lab 110 operates out of front companies typically based in northeast China. Identified fronts include Chosun Expo Joint Venture in Dalian and Chosun Baeksul Trading Company in Shenyang.
- Firsthand accounts, information provided by a foreign investigative agency, and common IP addresses used to access the company website and associated accounts while connecting to and from North Korea corroborate reports that Chosun Expo was a front company operated by authorities in Pyongyang.
- Similar units reportedly operate in other regions around the world, including Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and other parts of China.
- Malware developers and other adversary actors are believed to be recruited out of North Korea's universities and directly into military units, such as Lab 110. Schools reportedly feeding into these units include Kim Chaek University of Technology and Kim Il Sung Military Science University.



Figure 10. Archived website for Chosun Expo Joint Venture (Source: archive.fo)

Source: URL: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38

Annex 38: Depiction of connection between advanced persistent threat (APT) group responsible for cyberattacks on Banco de Chile and Cosmos bank in India to the Reconnaissance General Bureau



Source: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38.

Annex 39: Open source report on attacks on Crypto Exchanges, January 2017-September 2018

SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON CRYPTO EXCHANGES 2017-2018

Date	Name of Project	Country	Criminal group	Stolen in cryptocurrency	Stolen in USD
Feb 2017	Bithumb	South Korea	Unknown	-	$7 mln
Apr 2017	YouBit	South Korea	Unknown	-	$5,6 mln
Apr 2017	Yapizon	South Korea	Lazarus	3,816 BTC	$5,3 mln
Apr 2017	Ether Delta	-	Unknown	-	$266 k
Aug 2017	OKEx	Hong Kong	Unknown	-	$3 mln
Sept 2017	Coinis	South Korea	Lazarus	-	-
Dec 2017	YouBit	South Korea	Lazarus	17% of assets	-
Jan 2018	Bitstamp	Luxemburg	Unknown	18,000 BTC	$5 mln
Jan 2018	Coincheck	Japan	Lazarus	523,000,000 NEM	$534 mln
Feb 2018	Bitgrail	Italy	Unknown	17,000,000 NANO	$170 mln
Jun 2018	Bithumb	South Korea	Lazarus	-	$32 mln
Jun 2018	Coinrail	South Korea	Unknown	-	$37 mln
Jun 2018	Bancor	-	Unknown	-	$23 mln
Sept 2018	Zaif	Japan	Unknown	-	$60 mln
				TOTAL	$882 mln

Last year we warned that hackers competent enough to carry out a targeted attack might have a new target — cryptocurrency exchanges. In the last couple of years crypto exchanges suffered many attacks. Some of the exchanges went bankrupt after the hacks, i.e. Bitcurex, YouBit, Bitgrail. At the beginning of 2018 hackers' interest in cryptocurrency exchanges ramped up. The most likely cryptocurrency exchange attackers now are Silence, MoneyTaker, and Cobalt.



Dmitry Volkov
Chief Technology Officer and Head of Threat Intelligence at Group-IB

ICO: more than 56% of funds was stolen through phishing attacks

Source: https://www.group-ib.com/media/gib-crypto-summary/

Annex 40: Information on the Panel's investigation of DPRK diplomat formerly posted to Malaysia and supporting documentation

1. The Panel investigated a DPRK diplomat formerly posted to Malaysia, Kim Jong Chol (aka Ri Jong Chol), who operated on behalf of the Korea PongHwa General Trading Company, which according to documents obtained by the Panel is associated with Korea Kumgang Bank.[179]

2. The Panel obtained documentation showing that purchases made by PongHwa were being transferred to an account at Kumgang Bank in the name of the Korea General Insurance Company, an alias for the designated Korea National Insurance Company; and that payment for a shipment in 2016 was to be sent by Korea Ponghwa to the North East Asia Bank. The bills of lading for 14 shipments to Korea PongHwa General Trading Company in 2016 and 2017 indicated the shipper as Complant International Transport (Dalian) Co., Ltd, a company mentioned in previous Panel reports as the transhipper for attempted sales of luxury goods (i.e. S-class Mercedes automobiles)[180] (see below). The company's affiliation to Complant/Comtrans also links it to Hong Kong Complant International Trans, which previously owned the DPRK vessel, the Kum Sung. [181]

3. The Malaysian company with which Kim Jong Chol conducted some of his business on behalf of Korea PongHwa General Trading Company, provided the Panel with information showing that he operated under the alias Ri Jong Chol and was Deputy Director for another company, "Sinkwang Economic and Trading Group" (see below). That a DPRK individual accredited as a diplomat at the DPRK Embassy in Kuala Lumpur was doing business on behalf of at least two DPRK entities, one of which was affiliated with a DPRK financial institution, reflects patterns previously reported by the Panel.[182] Kim/Ri's daughter, Ri Yugyong, often served as Ri's translator and another DPRK individual, Yu Song Chol (aka "Mr. Brighton"), started to make payments to the company by check on behalf of Korea Ponghwa in late 2016. The Panel notes that this practice helped to obscure in bank transaction records starting in late 2016 the origin of the funds, which had previously been transferred into the account by front companies in Hong Kong and China mainland through large, well-known banks.

[179] See S/2018/171, annex 44.

[180] See Doc. S/2017/147, para 177, and page 127, footnote 36; and Doc. S/2012/422 paras. 84-85.

[181] See Doc. S/2017/147, page 127, footnote 36.

[182] The Panel has previously reported on the use of embassies of the DPRK for the country's financial operations.

Business cards of Ri Jong Chol (aka Kim Jong Chol) and Yu Song Chol





Source: The Panel

Invitation letter by Malaysian Company to the President of Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corp C-8 Company

[redacted]

Invitation Letter

Date : 01/02/2017

To : Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corp.

C-8 Company, Mr Pak Chol Ung

Address : Jungsongdong, Jung District, Pyongyang City, DPR of Korea

We, [redacted] would like to invite Mr Pak Chol Ung, president of Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corp. C-8 Company, and 1 more person in the convenient session of March, 2017 to discuss about the contract of soap noodle and purchases of some palm oil products between [redacted] and Korea PongHwa General Trading Corp.

Yours sincerely.

[redacted]

Source: The Panel

Bills of Lading for shipments from Malaysia to Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corp via Complant International Transportation (Dalian) Co. Ltd

BILL OF LADING (Not negotiable unless consigned to order)

Shipper
[redacted]

Bill of Lading No.
BLWDLC1703074/1756

Number of Original B(s)/L
(0) ZERO

[redacted]

Consignee (if 'To Order' so indicate)
KOREA PONGHWA GENERAL TRADING CORP
C-8 COMPANY
JUNGSONGDONG, JUNG DISTRICT,
PYONGYANG CITY DPR OF KOREA
ATTN : MR. PAK CHOL UNG TEL : +85 02 18652

Notify Party (No claim shall attach for failure to notify)
COMPLANT INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
(DALIAN) CO., LTD.
ROOM 1907, TIMES BULD, NO.7,
GANGWAN STREET, DALIAN, CHINA
PIC : MS. SUNNY TEL : 0086-411-82798179

Destination Delivery Agent:
MASTER INTERNATIONAL
SHIPPING AGENCY CO., LTD. (DALIAN BRANCH)
RM 2601, 26/F, CHINA LIFE INSURANCE MANSION, NO.26,
RENMIN ROAD DALIAN, 116001, LIAONING, CHINA
TEL:86-411-39858676 FAX:86-411-39858698
EMAIL:dlibiz@master-agency.com.cn

Pre-Carriage by UNI-PERFECT V.0311-379N	Place of Receipt BELAWAN, INDONESIA
Ocean Vessel/ Voy. No. EVER URBAN V.0358-132N	Port of Loading BELAWAN, INDONESIA
Port of Discharge DALIAN, CHINA	Place of Delivery DALIAN, CHINA

Final Destination

Marks & Numbers	No. of Pkgs. or Shipping Units.	Description of Goods & Pkgs.	Gross Weight	Measurement
SOAP NOODLES G2000 TEMU4518760 / EMCCVR3856 DFSU1449514 / EMCCVR3825 DRYU2725935 / EMCCVR3846 TEMU4149209 / EMCCVR3836	3200 BAGS	SHIPPER LOAD, COUNT AND SEAL 4X20'GP STC: 80MT SOAP NOODLES G2000 PACKED IN 3200 BAGS X 25KG BL SURRENDERED AT POL FREIGHT COLLECT SHIPPED ON BOARD DATED : 08/03/2017	80,240.000 KGS	100.000 CBM

Total Number of Containers or Packages (in Words) FOUR TWENTY FOOTER CONTAINER(S) ONLY

Excess Value Declaration: Refer to Clause 6 (4) (B) + (C) on reverse side

Freight petrols, charges ptc:

RECEIVED by the Carrier the Goods as specified above in apparent good order and condition unless otherwise stated, to be transported to such place as agreed, authorised or permitted herein and subject to all the terms and conditions appearing on the front and reverse of this Bill of Lading to which the Merchant agrees by accepting this Bill of Lading, any local privileges and customs notwithstanding. The particulars given above as stated by the shipper and the weight, measure, quantity, condition, contents and value of the goods are unknown to the carrier. In WITNESS whereof one (1) original Bill of Lading has been signed if not otherwise stated above, the same being accomplished the other(s), if any, to be void. If required by the Carrier on (1) original Bill of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order.

Place and date of issue PORT KLANG, 08/03/2017

By AS AGENTS FOR THE CARRIER

JURISDICTION AND LAW CLAUSE

MALAYSIA

Source: The Panel

BILL OF LADING (Not negotiable unless consigned to order)

Shipper [redacted]	Bill of Lading No. PTPDLC1703110/1768 Number of Original B(s)/L (0) ZERO
Consignee (if 'To Order' so indicate) KOREA PONGHWA GENERAL TRADING CORP C-8 COMPANY JUNGSONGDONG, JUNG DISTRICT, PYONGYANG CITY DPR OF KOREA ATTN : MR. PAK CHOL UNG TEL : +85 02 18652	**LINKER LOGISTICS (M) SDN BHD** (Company No.: 704634-P) E-mail: info@linker-logistics.com
Notify Party (No claim shall attach for failure to notify) COMPLANT INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION (DALIAN) CO., LTD. ROOM 1907, TIMES BULD, NO.7, GANGWAN STREET, DALIAN, CHINA PIC : MS. SUNNY TEL : 0086-411-82798179	Destination Delivery Agent: MASTER INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AGENCY CO., LTD. (DALIAN BRANCH) RM 2601, 26/F, CHINA LIFE INSURANCE MANSION, NO.26, RENMIN ROAD DALIAN, 116001, LIAONING, CHINA TEL:86-411-39858676 FAX:86-411-39858698 EMAIL:dlibiz@master-agency.com.cn

Pre-Carriage by THALASSA MANA V.0914-014E	Place of Receipt TANJUNG PELEPAS, MALAYSIA	
Ocean Vessel/ Voy. No. UNI-PROBITY V.0432-240A	Port of Loading TANJUNG PELEPAS, MALAYSIA CY	
Port of Discharge DALIAN, CHINA	Place of Delivery DALIAN, CHINA CY	Final Destination

Marks & Numbers	No. of Pkgs. or Shipping Units.	Description of Goods & Pkgs.	Gross Weight	Measurement
SOAP NOODLES G2000 BEAU2108809 / EMCDYJ9626 EISU2080854 / EMCDYJ9646 DRYU2669390 / EMCDYJ9656 DRYU2447520 / EMCDYJ8666	3200 BAGS	SHIPPER LOAD, COUNT AND SEAL 4X20'GP STC: 80MT SOAP NOODLES G2000 PACKED IN 3200 BAGS X 25KG BL SURRENDERED AT POL FREIGHT COLLECT SHIPPED ON BOARD DATED : 27/03/2017	80,640.000 KGS	100.000 CBM

Total Number of Containers or Packages (in Words) FOUR TWENTY FOOTER CONTAINER(S) ONLY

Excess Value Declaration: Refer to Clause 6 (4) (B) + (C) on reverse side	RECEIVED by the Carrier the Goods as specified above in apparent good order and condition unless otherwise stated, to be transported to such place as agreed, authorised or permitted herein and subject to all the terms and conditions appearing on the front and reverse of this Bill of Lading to which the Merchant agrees by accepting this Bill of Lading, any local privileges and customs notwithstanding. The particulars given above as stated by the shipper and the weight, measure, quantity, condition, contents and value of the goods are unknown to the carrier. In WITNESS whereof one (1) original Bill of Lading has been signed if not otherwise stated above, the same being accomplished the other(s), if any, to be void. If required by the Carrier on (1) original Bill of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order.
Freight petrols, charges ptc:	Place and date of issue TANJUNG PELEPAS, 27/03/2017 By AS AGENTS FOR THE CARRIER
JURISDICTION AND LAW CLAUSE MALAYSIA	

Source: The Panel

EVERGREEN LINE
A Joint Service Agreement

BILL OF LADING
PROOFREAD
NON-NEGOTIABLE

(2) Shipper / Exporter LINKER LOGISTICS (M) SDN BHD 52-1, JALAN MAHOGANI 1, BANDAR BOTANIC, 41200 KLANG SELANGOR, MALAYSIA	(5) Document No. 093700018581 (6) Export References
(3) Consignee(complete name and address) KOREA PONGHWA GENERAL TRADING CORP C-8 COMPANY JUNGSONGDONG, JUNG DISTRICT, PYONGYANG CITY DPR OF KOREA ATTN : MR. PAK CHOL UNG **	(7) Forwarding Agent-References
(4) Notify Party (complete name and address) COMPLANT INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION (DALIAN) CO., LTD. ROOM 1907, TIMES BULD, NO.7, GANGWAN STREET, DALIAN, CHINA PIC : MS. RUBY KIM *	(8) Point and Country of Origin (for the Merchant's reference only) (9) Also Notify Party (complete name and address)

(12) Pre-carriage by WAN HAI 305 N185	(13) Place of Receipt/Date PASIR GUDANG, MALAYSIA	
(14) Ocean Vessel/Voy. No. EVER URSULA 0351-129N	(15) Port of Loading PASIR GUDANG, MALAYSIA	(10) Onward Inland Routing/Export Instructions (which are contracted separately by Merchants entirely for their own account and risk)
(16) Port of Discharge DALIAN, CHINA	(17) Place of Delivery DALIAN, CHINA	

Particulars furnished by the Merchant

(18) Container No. And Seal No. Marks & Nos.	(19) Quantity And Kind of Packages	(20) Description of Goods	(21) Measurement (M³) Gross Weight (KGS)
CONTAINER NO./SEAL NO.			100.0000 CBM 80,640.000 KGS
HMCU3005897/20'/EMCDYH8056/ EITU0539568/20'/EMCDYG5946/ EITU0537098/20'/EMCDYG5956/ EITU0535351/20'/EMCDYG5956/	4 X 20'	800 BAGS 20160.000 KGS 25.0000 CBM 800 BAGS 20160.000 KGS 25.0000 CBM 800 BAGS 20160.000 KGS 25.0000 CBM 800 BAGS 20160.000 KGS 25.0000 CBM	
SOAP NOODLES G2000		SHIPPER LOAD, COUNT AND SEAL 4X20'GP: 80MT SOAP NOODLES G2000 PACKED IN 3200 BAGS X 25KG * TEL:0086-411-82798179 * THE BALANCE OF BILL OF LADING SEE ATTACHED LIST * TOTAL NUMBER OF ATTACHED 1 PAGE "OCEAN FREIGHT COLLECT" SHIPPER'S LOAD & COUNT 3200 BAGS	

(22) TOTAL NUMBER OF CONTAINERS OR PACKAGES (IN WORDS) FOUR(4) CONTAINERS ONLY

(24) FREIGHT & CHARGES	Revenue Tons	Rate Per	Prepaid	Collect
		AS ARRANGED		

(25) B/L NO. EGLV 093700018581	(27) Number of Original B(s)/L THREE (3)	(29) Prepaid at	(30) Collect at
	(28) Place of B(s)/L Issue/Date PASIR GUDANG, MALAYSIA	(31) Exchange Rate	(32) Exchange Rate
(26) Service Type/Mode FCL/FCL O/O	(33) Laden on Board ** NOT FINAL **	EVERGREEN MARINE CORP.(MALAYSIA) SDN BHD Please confirm OK within 24 hours. TEL:(07)223-1559 FAX:(07)223-1532/221-5762	

Source: The Panel

Annex 41: DPRK bank representatives subject to expulsion under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016)

Names	Title and activities **	Location **	Passport number / expiry UN Security Council designations where applicable
Jang Bom Su (aka Jang Pom Su, Jang Hyon U) 장범수	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative. Also operates in and travels to Lebanon under various aliases	Syria	22 Feb 1958; Dip PP no. 836110034, exp 1 Jan 2020 UN res 2270 (2016) designated him as "Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria" on 2 March 2016 (amended 5 Aug. 2017) KPi.016
Jon Myung Guk (a.k.a. Cho'n Myo'ng-kuk, Jon Yong Sang) 전명국 (전영상)	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative in Syria. Also travels to and operates in Lebanon under various aliases.	Syria	25 Aug. 1976 with dip PP number 836110035, expires 1 January 2020
Ryom Huibong (aka Ryo'M Hu'I-Pong) 렴희봉	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank (aka KKG bank, 금강은행 Kumgang Export and Import Bank, 金刚银行)	Dubai, UAE	18 September 1961 PP No.: 745120026 (expires 20 January 2020)
Ri Sun Chol (Aka Ri Song Chol) 리선철 (리성철)	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank Transported money of DPRK laborers in the Middle East to the DPRK	Dubai, UAE	28 March 1964 PP No.:836132137
Kwak Chongchol (Aka Kwak Jong-Chol) 곽정철	Deputy Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank	Dubai, UAE	1 January 1975 PP No.: 563220533
Ro Il Gwang 노일광	Korea Kumgang Group Bank	UAE	26 May 1983 PP No.: 836434467
Kim Kyong Il (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-il 김경일	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. The office opened at least 5 accounts at Banque International Arabe Tunisie (BIAT) in Tunisia. Two of them are in the name of a front company, Kartos. Kim Kyong Il has also been involved in transactions undertaken by Daedong Credit Bank in China.	Libya	1 August 1979; PP No. 836210029 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "FTB deputy chief representative in Libya" on 22 December (KPi.067)

Choe, Un Hyok 최은혁	Unification Development Bank (or Korea Unification Development Bank, UDB or KUDB) representative. Replaced Ri Un'So'ng. Choe Un Hyok's KUDB business card with his title of "Representative of KUDB, Moscow Russia" with the same address as the Embassy in Moscow is available in the Panel's 2017 Final Report, S/2017/150 p. 251. *Russia replied in a letter of 25 January 2018 ,"We will inform you accordingly in case we receive additional information on the whereabouts of Choe Un Hyok." The Panel has not received any additional information in reply to its two follow-up letters. .*	Moscow, Russia	19 October 1985 PP No.: 83612287 (expires March 2021)
Chu Hyo'k (Aka Ju Hyok) 주혁	Foreign Trade Bank Representative *Russia replied Chu Hyo'k is not currently residing in Russia. (see below)*		23 Nov. 1986; PP No. 836420186, issued 28 Oct. 2016 (expires 28 Oct 2021) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as an "overseas FTB Representative" on 22 December (KPi.065)
Ri U'n-so'ng (aka Ri Eun Song; Ri Un Song) 리은성	Korea Unification Development Bank representative *Russia replied that Ri U'n-so'ng is not currently residing in Russia.*		23 July 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Korean Unification Development Bank representative" on 22 December (KPi.078)
Han Jang Su (aka Chang-Su Han) 한장수	Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank The Russian Federation replied, Mr. Han Jang Su is the Third Secretary of the Commercial Counsellor's Section of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation and has been officially accredited by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He entered the Russian Federation on 23 June 2017 and is staying in the country legally. No information is available concerning activities that are inconsistent with his official status.	Russian Federation	8 Nov. 1969; PP No.: 745420176 (expires 19 Oct 2020 Designated by Resolution 2371 (2017) as "Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank"
Ku Ja Hyong (aka Ku Cha-hyo'ng) 구자형	Foreign Trade Bank Representative	Libya (also travelled to Tunisia, UAE, and Saudi Arabia 2015-2017)	8 September 1957; PP No.: 563220533; Another PP No.: 654210218 (expires 27 June 2019 - used in July 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "FTB chief representative in Libya" on 22 December 2017 (Kpi.070)

Ch'oe So'k-min 최석민	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. In 2016, Ch'oe So'k-min was the deputy representative at the FTB branch office in Shenyang. He has been associated with cash transfers from that FTB office to banks affiliated with DPRK special organizations and RGB located overseas. *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Shenyang China	25 July 1978 Res 2397(2017) designated him as "overseas FTB Representative" on 22 December (KPi.064)
Kim Tong Chol (aka: Kim Tong-ch'o'l) 김동철	Foreign Trade Bank Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Shenyang, China	28 Jan 1966; PP No.: 381337404 (expires 26 Sept 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.068)
Ko Chol Man (aka Ko Ch'o'l-man) 고철만	Foreign Trade Bank Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Shenyang, China	30 September 1967; PP No. 472420180 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.069)
Mun Kyong Hwan (aka Mun Kyo'ng-hwan) 문경환	Bank of East Land Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Dandong, China	22 August 1967; PP No. 381120660 exp. 25 March 2016 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Bank of East Land representative" on 22 December (KPi.071)
Pae Won Uk (aka Pae Wo'n-uk) 배원욱	Korea Daesong Bank Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Beijing, China	22 August 1969; PP No.: 472120208 exp 22 Feb 2017 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Daesong Bank representative" on 22 December (KPi.072)
Pak Bong Nam (aka Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong Nam; Pak Pong-nam) 박봉남	Ilsim International Bank representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Shenyang, China	06 May 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Ilsim International Bank representative" on 22 December 2017 (KPi.073)
Pak Mun Il 박문일	Korea Daesong Bank Representative	Yanji, China	DPRK / 1 January 1965; PP No.: 563335509 (expires 27/8/2018)

	China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."		Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas official of Korea Daesong Bank" on 22 December 2017 (KPi.079)
Ri Chun Hwan (Aka Ri Ch'un-hwan) 리춘환	Foreign Trade Bank Representative *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Zhuhai, China	21 August 1957' PP No: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018); PP No.: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.074)
Ri Chun Song (Aka Ri Ch'un-so'ng) 리춘성	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. Opened a Euro account at International Arab Bank of Tunisia (BAIT) on 18 July 2012 in the name of "Secretary's Delegate of the DPRK's Mission to Tripoli" (closed on 22 August 2013. *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Beijing, China	30 October 1965; PP No. 654133553 (expires 11 March 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas FTB representative" on 22 December (KPi.075)
Ri Song-hyok (Aka Li Cheng He) 리성혁	Representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank. Reportedly established front companies to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of DPRK *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Beijing, China	19 March 1965 PP No. 654234735 (expires 19 May 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank" on 22 December (KPi.077)
Pang Su Nam (Aka Pang So-Nam, Pang Sunam) 방수남	Ilsim (ILSIM) International Bank Representative *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Zhuhai, China	1 October 1964; PP No.: 472110138
Cha Sung Jun (Aka Ch'a Su'ng-chun) 차승준	Korea Kumgang Group Bank Representative. Has held several accounts in his name at Chinese banks and is suspected of operating a cover company. *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Beijing, China	4 June 1966; PP No.: 472434355

Kim Kyong Hyok (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-hyo'k) 김경혁	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Bank *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Shanghai, China	5 November 1985; PP No.: 381335989 (expires 14 September 2016)
Pak Ch'O'l-Nam 박철남	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Ban. Opened 6 bank accounts in the name "Great Prince Limited (崇王有限公司)"in banks in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China" *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Beijing, China	16 June 1971 PP No.: 745420413 (expires 19 November 2020)
Jo Chol Song (Aka Cho Ch'o'l-So'ng) 조철성	Deputy Representative for the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) Uses false entity names for the KKBC, such as "Good Field Trading Limited (城豐貿易有限公司)" and "Golden Tiger Investment Group (金虎(香港)國際投資集團有限公司)", both registered in Hong Kong. *China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."*	Dandong, China	25 September 1984 PP: 654320502 (expires 16 September 2019) Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Korea United Development Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.058)
Ho Young Il (Aka Ho' Yo'ng-il) 허영일	Hana Bank Representative In 2016, Ho Young Il was associated with a high volume of USD transactions for the FTB. *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Dandong China	DPRK/ DOB: 9 September 1968
Kim Mun Chol (Aka Kim Mun-ch'o'l) 김문철	Representative for Korea United Development Bank. Uses false entity names including "Chongryu Technical Company" or "Kyong Un Trading Company" China replied "that as a designated individual he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested the freeze of his assets.	Dandong, China	DOB 25 March 1957 Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Korea United Development Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.060)

Choe Chun Yong (Aka Ch'oe Ch'un-yo'ng) 최천영	Ilsim International Bank Representative		PP no: 654410078 Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Representative for Ilsim International Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.054)
Ko Tae Hun (Aka Kim Myong Gi) 고태훈 (or 고대훈) (aka 김명기)	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative	Transited China, Ethiopia, UAE, visited Sudan[183]	25 May 1972; PP 563120630 (expires 20 March 2018) UN Res 2270 (2016) designated him as "Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official" on 2 March (KPi.025)
Kang Min 강민	Daesong Bank representative who, in late 2016, held Chinese bank accounts. *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Beijing, China	07 May 1980; PP 563132918 (expires 04 February 2018)
Kim Sang Ho 김상호	Representative, Korea Daesong Bank As of 2015, Kim Sangho was an Office 39 official posted as a Korea Daesong Trading Company representative in Yanji, China. *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Yanji, China	16 May 1957 PP No.: 563337601 (expires: 26 September 2018)
Kim Jong Man (Aka Kim Cho'ng Man) 김정만	Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank. In 2015, he was an Office 39 official posted to Hong Kong. *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Zhuhai, China	16 July 1956; PP No.: 918320780

[183] See S/2017/150, p. 64

Kim Hyok Chol (Aka Kim Hyo'k-Cho'l, Hyok Chol Kim) 김혁철	Deputy Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Zhuhai, China	9 July 1978; PP No.: 472235761 (expires 6 June 2017)
Ri Ho Nam (aka Ri Ho-nam) 리호남	Ryugyong Commercial Bank branch representative (2014 to present) *China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."*	Beijing, China	DOB: 3 January 1967; PP No.: 654120210 (expires 21 February 2019
Ms. Kim Su Gyong 김수경	Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) Representative. Since 2011 made multiple trips around Europe, especially in France and Italy, with the assistance of her father, Kim Yong Nam, and brother, Kim Su-Gwang, RGB agents who used their status as staff members of international organizations to help her obtain visas. Kim Su-Gwang (Kim Sou Kwang) recently departed Belarus. See: S/2017/742 para 50 and S/2016/15, para 187.	Europe, also transited UAE and the Russian Federation [184]	DOB: 16 Jan 1973; PP 745120374
Mun Cho'ng-Ch'o'l 문정철	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative. Has facilitated transactions for TCB.		Res 2094 (2013) designated him as "Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official" on 7 March (KPi.012)
Choe Song Nam CHOE, Song Nam (aka CH'OE, So'ng-nam) 최성남	Representative of Daesong Bank		DOB: 07 Jan 1979; Passport 563320192 expires 09 Aug 2018
Kim Chol KIM, Chol (a.k.a. KIM, Ch'o'l) 김철	Representative of Korea United Development Bank		DOB 27 Sep 1964

[184] The Russian Federation informed the Panel that unilateral sanctions were "not an argument for suspicion of unlawful activities on Russian territory".

Paek Jong Sam PAEK, Jong Sam (a.k.a. PAEK, Chong-sam) 백종삼	Representative of Kumgang Bank		DOB 17 Jan 1964; nationality Korea, North
Ko Il Hwan KO, Il Hwan (a.k.a. KO, Il-hwan) 고일환	Representative of Korea Daesong Bank. According to a Member State, he engaged in transactions for ship-to-ship transfers in 2018 while acting as representative of Daesong Bank in Shenyang.		DOB 28 August 1967 Passport 927220424 expires 12 Jun 2022
Ri Myong Hun RI, Myong Hun (a.k.a. RI, Myo'ng-hun) 리명훈	Representative of Foreign Trade Bank		DOB 14 Mar 1969; Gender Male; Passport 381420089 expires 11 Oct 2016
Kim Nam Ung 김남웅	Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.		Passport no.: 654110043 Res 2371(2017) designated him as Representative for Ilsim International Bank
RI, Jong Won (a.k.a. RI, Cho'ng-Wo'n; a.k.a. RI, Jung Won)	The Russian Federation replied, *Mr. Ri Jong Won arrived in Russia on 5 February 2018 as an officially accredited member of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation. It is not known what information was used to determine that he is the Moscow-based deputy representative of the Foreign Trade Bank. Moreover, according to the available information, he returned to the DPRK on 8 October 2018.*		DOB: 22 Apr 1971; Passport no 654320421 expires 11 Mar 2019

Source: The Panel, Member States, UN documents

Annex 42: Information on DPRK financial institutions with overseas representatives

Names, alias, Korean and Chinese spelling	HQ address / phone / fax/ SWIFT	Security Council designations and information provided to Panel by Member States and United Nations resolutions
Bank of East Land 동방은행 aka: Haedong Bank (해동은행), Dongbang Bank, Tongbang U'Nhaeng, Tongbang Bank, 朝鲜）东方银行	BEL Building, Jonsung-Dong, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 18111 Fax: +850 2 3814410	Res 2087 (2013) on 22 January 2013 (KPe.013) Info in UN Panel reports: S/2017/150; pp 76-77 and S/2017/742, para 61. Facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation. Has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions.
Credit Bank of Korea 조선신용은행 aka Korea Credit Bank, International Credit Bank, 朝鲜信用银行	Munsu Street, Central District, Pyongyang +850 2 3818285 +850 2 3817806	
Daedong Credit Bank [JV] 대동신용은행 大同信用银行 Aka Taedong Credit Bank, Dae-Dong Credit Bank, DCB Finance Ltd, Perigrine-Daesong Development Bank	Suite 401, Potonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, (b) Ansan-dong, Botonggang Hotel, Pongchon, Pyongyang, +850 2 3814866 SWIFT: DCBK KPPY	Res 2270 (2016) on 2 March 2016 (KPe.023) Representative offices and front companies in China according to Panel: S/2017/150, paras 225-230 and S/2017/742, paras 51-56. Clients include: T Specialist International (Singapore) Ltd, OCN (Singapore) International Distribution Ptd Ltd; Pan Systems; Dalian Daxin Electron Co Ltd, Hongdae International, Yueda International Trading Co, Hing Heng, Korea Sinheung Trading Co, Hana Electronics. Joint venture with Korea Daesong Bank; majority stake acquired by a Chinese company. See current report, paragraphs XX.

Daesong Credit Development Bank [JV] 대성신용개발은행 Koryo Credit Development Bank (고려글로벌신용은행), Koryo Global Trust Bank, Koryo-Global Credit Bank, Korea Credit Investment Company (조선신용투자회사)	Daesong Credit Development Bank [Joint Venture] +850 2 381 4100 +850 2 341 4013	
First Eastern Bank	Rason, DPRK	Affiliated with Cetnral Bank and Unaforte (Italy, Hong Kong). See Panel report S/2017/150 para 221.
Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) 조선무역은행 朝鲜贸易银行 aka: Mooyokbank, Korea Trade Bank, Mooyokbank	FTB Building, Jungsong dong, Central District, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 18111 Fax: +850 2 3814467 SWIFT/BIC FTBD KP PY	Res 2371 (2017) on 5 Aug 2017 (KPe.047) State-owned bank which acts as the DPRK's primary foreign exchange bank and has provided key financial support to the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. See para X on registered office abroad.
International Consortium Bank (ICB) 국제합영은행 Hi-Fund Bank International Consortium Bank (ICB), Sungri Hi-Fund International Bank, Sungri Economic Group	Sungri Exhibition Hall, Pyongyang	Panel reporting:
Koryo Bank 고려은행 高丽银行	Koryo Bank Building, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Res 2356 (2017) on 2 June 2017 (KPe.045) Associated with Office 38 and Office 39 of the KWP. Operated by Korea Myohyang Economic Group; joint venture partner in Koryo-Global Bank.
Koryo Credit Development Bank / Daesong Credit Development Bank [JV] (Aka. Koryo-Global Credit Bank, Koryo Global Trust Bank) 고려신용개발은행 대성신용개발은행 (aka 고려글로벌신용은행)	Yanggakdo International Hotel, Pyongyang Tel: +850 2 381 4100 Fax: +850 2 341 4013	Res 2371 (2017) on 5 August 2017 (KPe.049) Joint venture with Koryo Bank

Korea Daesong Bank 대성은행 / 조선 대성은행 大成银行 aka: Choson Taesong Unhaeng, Daesong Bank, Taesong Bank According to a Member State, in 2018 the bank has used the following false names when processing transactions for ship-to-ship transfers: 조선녹색산업무역 (*Chosun Noksaek Sanop Muyok*, Korea Green Industry Trading Company/Corporation 朝鲜绿色产业贸易) and 조선신용투자회사(Chosun Sinyong Tuja Hoesa, Korea Credit Investment Company/Corporation 朝鲜信用投资公司 or 朝鲜信用投资会社).	Segori-dong, Gyongheung Street, Pyongyang Tel +850 2 818221 Fax +850 2 814576 SWIFT/BIC: KDBKKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016 (KPe.035) Owned and controlled by Office 39 of the Korea Workers' Party According to a Member State, Ko Il Hwan engaged in transactions on behaof of Korea Daesong Bank from Shenyang for ship-to-ship transfers in 2018.
Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation 조선광선은행 朝鲜光鲜银行, Korea Kwangson Finance Company, 朝鲜 蔡鲜金金朝朝, Korea Kwangson Finance Company	Jungsong-dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang	Res 2370 (2016) on 2 March 2016 Provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, a subordinate of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. Tanchon has used KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, including transfers involving KOMID-related funds. For more info see PoE report S/2017/150, p. 63.
Korea National Insurance Corporation 조선민족보험총회사 Korea Foreign Insurance Company, 朝鲜民族保险总会社	KNIC Building, Central District Pyongyang +850 2 18111/222 Ext:3418024 +850 2 3814410	See current report paras XX.

Korea Joint Venture Bank 조선합영은행 Korea Joint Bank, Korea Joint Operation Bank, Chosun Joint Operation Bank, Habyong Bank, 朝鲜合营银行	KJB Building, Ryugyong 1 dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang +850 2 381-8151, 850-2-18111-381-8151 +850 2 381-4410	
Ryugyong Commerical Bank (RCB) 류경상업은행/류상은행 Ryusang Bank, 柳京商业银行, 柳商银行	Changgwang Hotel, 5th Floor; Beijing, China; Dandong, China	Two ATMs at Pyongyang Airport and one in the lobby of Changgwang Inn. *Ryugyong Commercial Bank ATM lists an address in the Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-24* Joint Venture with OCN Pyongyang Office and Koryo Commerical Bank
Korea Unification (United) Development Bank (조선) 통일발전은행 (朝鲜)统一发展银行 aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification Development Bank, T'ongil Palchon Bank, Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea Reunification Development Bank	KUDB Building, Pyongyang SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016 (KPe.033) USA on 16 March 2016 See Panel of Experts report (S/2017/150, p 62)
Hana Banking Corporation 하나은행 aka Korea Kumsong Bank, Kumsong Bank, Single-Minded International Bank,	ISB Building, Pyongyang; Haebangsan Hotel, Jungsong-Dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang, Dandong, China SWIFT/BIC BRBKKPPIXXX	Partial Ownership by Central Bank. Overseas several Bank Card product lines for domestic use

Ilsim International Bank 일심국제은행 日心国际银行 aka. Korea Kumsong Bank, Kumsong Bank, Single-Minded International Bank, 日心国际银行	ISB Building, Pyongyang Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea SWIFT: ILSIKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.034) Affiliated with the DPRK military and has close relationship with Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) and has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.
First Credit Bank. (JV) or Cheil Credit Bank 제일신용은행 第一信用银行 aka: First Trust Bank Corporation, Jeil Credit Bank, Kyongyong Credit Bank	a) 3-18 Pyongyang Information Center, Potonggang District (as of 2016). b) i Rakrang District, Jongbaek 1-dong Tel: +850 2 433-1575 (02-433-1575) SWIFT: KYCBKPPYXXX Rakrang Tel: 961-3331, 961-0003	Belongs to Workers Party of Korea. It was established in 2008 as JV venture with Singapore's Miracle Commerce Pte. Ltd., and its CEO William Toh (aka Toh Hwee Howe) who has been involved in trade with the DPRK using his other two companies, I-Tech Intelligence Resources and Sinsar Trading Ltd.
Koryo Commercial Bank 고려상업은행 高丽商业银行 aka Korea Commercial Bank	KCB Building, Taedonggang District, Pyongyang; ; Beijing, China; Shenyang, China; SWIFT/BIC KCBKKPP1	Joint Venture with OCN and Ryugyong Commerical Bank
Tanchon Commercial Bank 단천상업은행 端川商业银行 AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank, (창광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit Bank (조선창광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank (용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank (룡악산은행)	Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang	Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003) Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID.

Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) 조선통일발전은행 (朝鲜）统一发展银行 aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification Development Bank, T'ongil Palchon Bank, Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea Reunification Development Bank	KUDB Building, Pyongyang SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY	Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.033) Information in UN POE report: S/2017/742, p. 22
Kumgang Group Bank / Kumgang Bank (KKG) **Korea Kumgang Bank** (조선) 금강은행 金刚银行 aka: Kumgang Export and Import Bank	Kumgang Bank Building, Central District, Pyongyang (The North East Asia Bank building in Pyongyang became the KKG Bank building)	Associated with Korea Ponghwa General Corporation (under External Economic Committee of the Cabinet) and Korea Pyongyang Trading Company
Kumgyo International Commercial Bank 금교국제상업은행		Affiliated with Korean Chongsong Mining Company and Changgwang Shop. See Panel report S/2017/150 para 220.
Tanchon Commercial Bank 단천상업은행 端川商业银行 AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank, (창광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit Bank (조선창광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank (용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank (룡악산은행)	Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang	Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003) Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID.

Source: The Panel, Member States, UN documents

Annex 43: Payment process used in ship-to-ship transfers in 2018

First, foreign national brokers outside the DPRK arranged imports to be facilitated by ship-to-ship transfer. Once the deal was agreed, the DPRK end recipients of the imported products transferrred funds internally to a DPRK bank with representatives operating overseas. The bank then instructed one of its overseas representatives to use foreign bank accounts it controls (often attached to front companies), to pay relevant suppliers for the product and shipping costs. The balance between the DPRK bank and the foreign accounts debited was then rectified virtually by ledger. When the actual balance of the accounts at the DPRK bank and those of its overseas representatives diverges too substantially as a result of the regular use of the ledger system, cash couriers address the imbalance by carrying bulk cash across the DPRK border. The Panel notes that this method for processing payments is almost identical to the ledger system used by Glocom for its financial transactions (S/2017/150, para. 225) as well as other DPRK front companies.

Source: Member State

Annex 44: Official registration documents for DPRK Foreign Trade Bank Official Representative Office in Moscow

ВЫПИСКА
ИЗ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО РЕЕСТРА АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ФИЛИАЛОВ, ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

08.01.2019 № 99651900000023

Настоящая выписка содержит сведения о филиале (представительстве)

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО БАНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР

Representation of the Foreign Trade Bank of the DPRK

(полное наименование филиала, представительства)

иностранного юридического лица

БАНК ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР

(полное наименование иностранного юридического лица)

НЗА 20150032826

включенные в государственный реестр аккредитованных филиалов, представительств иностранных юридических лиц по состоянию на 07.01.2019

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Сведения об иностранном юридическом лице		
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	БАНК ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР
2	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	13.01.2016
Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
3	Код и наименование страны регистрации (инкорпорации)	408, Корейская Народно-Демократическая Республика
4	Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)	Г. ПХЕНЬЯН, ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ РАЙОН, КВАРТАЛ ЗУНСОН, ЗДАНИЕ БАНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР КНДР, Г. ПХЕНЬЯН, ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ РАЙОН, КВАРТАЛ ЗУНСОН, ЗДАНИЕ БАНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР
5	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	13.01.2016
Сведения о регистрации в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
6	Наименование регистрирующего органа	ТОРГОВАЯ ПАЛАТА КНДР
7	Регистрационный номер	46
8	Особенности режима регистрации	в специальной экономической зоне

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Выписка из РАФП
08.01.2019 16:37 НЗА 20150032826 Страница 1 из 4

Information about the head of the branch, representation in the Russian Federation

Surname: Han
First name: Zan Su

Date information changed. Han Zang Su was likely appointed head of the representation in January 2016. Were someone else to take the position, that field would be updated and the effective date entered in thee corresponding box. This does not mean that we don't know anything about the entity from that date and more that we know that they haven't changed those fields since that date.


Number of foreign workers; 2

25	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	17.11.2017
Сведения о руководителе филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации		
26	Фамилия	ХАН
27	Имя	ЗАН СУ
28	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	13.01.2016
Сведения о численности иностранных граждан, являющихся работниками филиала, представительства		
29	Численность иностранных работников	2
30	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	31.03.2015
Сведения о принятом решении об аккредитации представительства иностранного юридического лица		
31	Дата принятия решения об аккредитации представительства	30.11.2007
32	Срок действия аккредитации представительства, согласно принятому решению (срок действия документа об аккредитации представительства)	29.11.2016
33	Наименование органа, представившего сведения	ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ БАНК РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ (БАНК РОССИИ)
34	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	31.03.2015
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
Сведения об основном виде экономической деятельности		
35	Код и наименование вида деятельности	70.22 Консультирование по вопросам коммерческой деятельности и управления
36	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	31.03.2015

Выписка сформирована с использованием интерактивного сервиса «Государственный реестр аккредитованных филиалов и представительств иностранных юридических лиц», размещенного на официальном сайте ФНС России в сети Интернет по адресу: https://service.nalog.ru/rafp

Выписка из РАФП
08.01.2019 16:37 НЗА 20150032826 Страница 3 из 4

Source: Russian Federation Federal Tax Service State Registry of Accredited Branches, Representative Offices of Foreign Legal Entities (RAFP), extracted from https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/# (The webportal can be searched by name, INN, or even just the Russian word for DPRK – КНДР and then scrolling to the FTB entry).




Source: Russian Federation Federal Tax Service State Registry of Accredited Branches, Representative Offices of Foreign Legal Entities (RAFP), extracted from https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/# (The webportal can be searched by name, INN, or even just the Russian word for DPRK – КНДР and then scrolling to the FTB entry).

Summary of relevant information in English:

Name of Russian Branch in English and Russian; Tax ID No. (INN)	*Name of Branch English & Russian; Short Name(s) of Foreign Branch*	*Location Address (English)*	*Full Names of Associated Individuals; Date Accredited*	*KPP #; NZA #; and Tax Organ ID*	*Date of Initial Registration*	*Document ID; Date of Document*	*# Foreign Citizens Working*
REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE OF THE BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE DPRK	BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE DPRK БАНК ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР	Apartment 37, Building 2 31 Entuziastov Highway,	Han Zan Su ХАН ЗАН СУ 2015-03-31	KPP: 774751001 NZA: 20150032826	2008-06-26	Doc. ID: 90716 Date: 2018-10-17	2

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО БАНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР Tax ID: 9909086019		Moscow, 111123		Tax Organ ID: 7747			

Annex 45: Biodata, passport and travel of Han Hun Il (Edward Han)



Name:	Han Hun Il
DOB: Passport # Expiry: A.k.a.:	2 April 1957 836134879 9 March 2021 Edward Han
Family members	Wife: Kim Mi-Kyong (김미경) • DOB: 1959 2.15 Son: Han Kumryong (한금룡, a.k.a. “Han Song” (한 성), aka: “Harvard Han” • DOB: 18 September 1984 • Worked at MKP Myanmar branch until 2013
Affiliations:	Sungri Economic Group (승리경제연합) Dispatched to Malaysia in 1995 to serve as Malaysia Representative of Mansudae Overseas Projects (MOP) Established a Mansudae branch, M.O.P. (S) Pte Ltd, in Singapore on 20 May 1994 until it was struck off the register on 30 September 2009. In 2006 his tenure with MOP expired and he was given the status of “operative “in the Reconnaissance General Bureau. He had previously served as representative of RGB in Africa before 1995. On 20 June 2006 he registered Malaysia Korea Partners (MKP) in Malaysia jointly with Yong Kok Yeap with each of them owning half the shares (175,000 Ringgit)

Former Address:]	MKP Capital LLC Berhd Registered address: 24-B Jalan Landak Off Jalan Pudu KL Business address: Lot 5, Jalan Satu Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jaya 43200 Balakong; Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia
Travels	Traveled to Zambia at least twice in 2017
Telephone: Email Website :	Tel : 603 9076 9678; Fax : 603 9075 9678 **enquiries@mkpholdings.com.my** **www.mkpholdings.com.my**

Phone Information

Phone Type	Phone Number	Extension

E-Mail Information

Address	ISP Name	ISP Country

Travel Summary

Travel Date	Processing User	Location	Event Type	Flight/Travel Number	Offloaded/Deportee
01/10/2017	WKMOSES	LUSAKA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT	Departing	EK714	
16/09/2017	BAARON	LUSAKA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT	Arriving	EK713	
01/09/2017	PKAFUKANYA	LUSAKA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT	Departing	EK714	

Vehicles

Vehicle Type	Year	Make	Model	VIN	Color	Country Registered	State/Province Registered	Registration Number	Tag	Flag Country	Radio Frequency (mHz)	Length (meters)

Cargos

Date	Cargo Type	Weight (kg)	Origin	Destination	Description

Deportee

Reason for Deportation	Action Taken	Deported From/To

Fingerprint Identity

Forename	Surname	Birth Date
HUNIL	HAN	02/04/1957

Image

Travel Information:

Source: Member States

Annex 46: Updated information on the Panel's investigation into MKP activities in Zambia

The Zambian investigation into MKP confirmed that 13 companies incorporated in the country have been linked to MKP Holdings (see section below entitled, Information on MKP companies in Zambia). Information provided by Zambia showed that MKP relies on a semi-devolved corporate model outside of Malaysia; and makes widespread use of foreign facilitators in its corporate structures to create deniability of the control relationship between Han Hun Il and other MKP companies. In particular, an Algerian national, Mohamed Yazid Merzouk, served as a director in most of the MKP Zambia entities, playing a key central management role for the network alongside several Algerian nationals sharing his last name and a small number of Zambian nationals.

Although the Panel was unable to establish the amount being paid to each individual labourer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, documents provided by Zambia showed that only 15 per cent of the total amount for each project was paid to the labourers for that project as a whole. MKP indicated to the Panel that, for its earlier projects overseas, labourers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were paid 300 dollars a month. Zambia provided the monetary values for a selection of KOGEN/GENCO projects from 2013 to 2015, valued at a total of $25 million. It did not provide a comprehensive list of the company's activities, nor did it disclose KOGEN/ GENCO contracts post-2015.

Information on MKP companies in Zambia

(For further details and a network chart, see S/2018/171, page. 72. For the most up-to-date registration information, see the end of this Annex)

NHA - MKP ESTATES DEVELOPMENT
Registration number: 120050058683
Incorporated on 29 April 2005.
Registered address: 4668, Annex National Housing Authority
Ownership:

Name	Sex	Nationality	Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk	M	Algerian	Villa No. 3Millenium Village, Longacres, Lusaka
Donovan Webster Zyambo	M	Zambian	Plot 9620, Churdleigh. Lusaka
Saviour Konie	M	Zambian	Stand 7351, Nangwenya Rd, Rhodespark, Lusaka
National Housing Authority			

Note: The Panel also notes that NHA-MKP Estate Development Ltd was still active in May 2018, when a court of appeals judge ruled on its lawsuit against the compensation board: http://www.judiciaryzambia.com/2018/05/16/appeal-no-44-2017-nha-mkp-estate-development-ltd-v-workers-compensation-fund-control-board-may-2018-justice-makunguja/ In March 2018, a newspaper article quoted a representative of the National Housing Authority as saying that more developments would be coming from MKP: https://www.dailynation.info/mkp-znbs-offloads-250-housing-units/

KOREA GENERAL COMPANY FOR EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION (KOGEN)

Incorporated 15 June 2012

Address: Plot no. 6556, Mumana Road, Olympia, Lusaka.

Nature of business: construction services.

Directors:

Name	Sex	Nationality	Address
Hang Chan Ho	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Kwanga Song	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Chun IL	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka

The management team of the company comprises eleven (ll) DPRK nationals nicluding:

1. Mr. JIN H YOK RI - is on the Board of Directors of KOCEN. He has 10 years of experience in civil engineering.
2. KUM JUN TAE holds a degree in structural engineering from PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY. He has more than 13 years' experience in building industry
3. KIM I SONG - holds a degree in structural engineering from PYONGYANG UNiVERSITY. He has more than 13 years' experience in building industry
4. HONG JONG SON and KIM HAK CHOL — the two hold degrees and diploma in structural design and construction from Pyongyang University
5. JANG YONG NAM and CHA SUN CHOC — the duo hold degree in construction material engineering from Pyongyang University
6. KIM SU JON' RI RYONC HONG IN HO, KIM TAE HWAN they hold degrees in building and civil engineering from Pyongyang University with 1 6 years' experience in building industry

The above-mentioned directors of Korean General Construction (Z) Ltd registered another company called CHAMMAE CONSTRUCTION LIMITED whose address and directors are the same as those in Korean General Construction (Z) Lid, with the addition of one director, Mr. Sam Maurice. The company, whose registration number is 1201 20102839 was also incorporated on 1 5 th June 2012.

CHAMMAE CONSTRUCTION LIMITED

Incorporated 15 June 2012

Address: Plot no. 6556, Mumana Road, Olympia, Lusaka.

Registration: 1201 20102839

Directors:

Name	Sex	Nationality	Address
Hang Chan Ho	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Kwanga Song	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Chun IL	M	Korean	Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Mr. Sam Maurice	M	Zambian	

MKP TMS HOSPITAL LTD

Incorporated 20 th April 2006

Address: Plot No. 05, Reed Buck road, Kabulonga, Lusaka
Registration: 120060062028
Chief Executive Officer is a Mr. Han Nun.
Directors:

Name	Sex	Nationality	No. of shares	Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk	M	Algerian	2,750	Villa No.3, Millenium village, Longacres, Lusaka
Abdeldjallil Merzouk	M	Algerian		Plot No. 5591, Lusemfwa road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Han Yong	F	Korean	1,500	Hse No. MC72, PHI Chainama, Lusaka
Ho Un Ran	M	Korean	500	Plot No. 5, off Reedbuck road, Kabulonga, Lusaka
Betty Mulongoti	F	Zambian	250	Plot 325, Independence avenue, Lusaka

<u>MKP MOTORS ZAMB'A LTD</u>

Company incorporated on 22 nd August 2002. Its registered business address is 2nd Floor Indeco House, Cairo Road, Lusaka. Directors of the company are in the following table:

Name	Sex	Nationality	Address
Han Hun IL	M	Korean	Malungushi Village, Kalundu
Siew KIN Wai	M	Malaysian	Malungushi Village, Kalundu, Lusaka
Yong KOK Yeap	M	Malaysian	Malungushi Village, Kalundu, Lusaka
Philip S.C Mumba	M	Zambian	Plot No.377a?12B, Kabulonga, Lusaka

<u>MKP HOLDINGS LTD</u>

Address: Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road. Kaiundu
Registration: <u>12004005417</u>
Nature of business: construction
Ownership:

Name	Sex	Nationality	Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk	M	Algerian	Villa No. 3, Millenium village, Longacres, Lusaka
Yon IL	M	Korean	Villa No. 3, Millenium village, Longacres, Lusaka

MKP MINING CORPORATION LTD

Incorporated: 16 August 2006

Registration: 1 20060063279

Address: Plot 7393 Chainda Place, South End, Cairo Road, Lusaka

Ownership:

Name	Sex	Nationality	No. of shares	Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk	M	Algerian	125,000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Dr. Stephen M Kambani	M	Zambian	125,000	A2 Handsworth UNZA, Lusaka
Derrick Munsele	M	Zambian	125,000	Plot No. 2, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe Road, Avondale, Lusaka
Charles Victor Holland	M	Zambian	125,000	Plot No. 4258 Mbeleshi, Northrise, Ndola Zambia

MKP SECURITY SYSTEMS LTD

Incorporated: 7th November 2006

Registration :1 20060000641 68

Address: Plot No. 7393, Chainda Place, "Jairo Road, Lusaka.

Ownership:

Name	Sex	Nationality	No. of shares	Address
Samson Sakala	M	Zambian	100,000	Godfrey Kangwa road, Nyumba Yanga, Lusaka
Timothy Mazembe	M	Zambian	100,000	Plot 12243, Woodlands, Ext, Chalala, Lusaka
Ngonga Oswald M Goodson Bwalya	M	Zambian	100.000	Plot 16520/1080, Kamwala, South Lusaka

MKP BUILDERS ZAMBIA LTD

Address: plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka.

Directors:

Name	Sex	Nationality	No. of Shares	Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk	M	Algerian	99.750,000	Villa No.3, Millennium Village, Longacres, Lusaka

Abdeldjallil Merzouk	M	Algerian	5,250,000	Plot No. 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka

MKP CAPITAL ZAMBIA LTD

Address is plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road Kaiundu, Lusaka

Incorporated: 4th February 2011.

Business: construction.

Directors:

Name	**Sex**	**Nationality**	**No. of Shares**	**Address**
Abdelghani Merzouk	M	Zambian	55,000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Abdeldjallil Mezouk	M	Algerian	11000000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Mohamed Yazid Merzouk	M	Algerian	87250000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Farid Merzouk	M	Algerian	11000000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Timothy Kazembe	M	Zambian		

MK IREHAB ZAMBIA LTD

Incorporated : 13 November 2011

Business: supplies of medical labs and pharmacy equipment

Adderss: Plot No. 5 Reed Buck Road, Kabulonga (address for MKP TMS Hospital)

Directors:

Name	**Sex**	**Nationality**	**No. of Shares**	**Address**
Abdeldjallil Merzouk	M	Algerian		Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Mohamed Yazid Merzouk	M	Algerian	2550000	Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Dr. Zelilah Binti Salleh Ghany	M	Zambian	2450000	Plot No. 5, Reed Buck Road, Kabulonga

OMEGA-MKP ZAMBIA LTD

Address: Stand No. 7241, Mukatasha road, industrial area, Lusaka.

Nature of busienss: security services

Directors:

Name	Sex	Address
Victor Etienne Janse Van Rensbur	M	Plot 7241, Mukatasha Road, Light Industrial Area, Lusaka
Christoffel Ohhanes Roelosfe	M	157 Ezra Road, Die Wilgers, Pretoria, South Africa
Philius Jacobus	M	Lynwoodridge, Pretoria, South Afica, 301, Minesota street
Christoffel Smit	M	Faerie Glen Pretoria, South Africa
Timothy Jim Kazembe	M	No. Tl Los Ageles Road, Lusaka
Christoffel Ohhanes Roelosfe	M	16520/1080, Kamwala South Lusaka

Motor vehicles registered in the names of Chang H Han and Korea General Company for External Construction (Z)

Owner	Registration Mark	Make
Korea General Company for External Construction	ALK9605	DAF Tipper
Korea General Company for External Construction	ALK2843	Volvo Tipper
Korea General Company for External Construction	ABF3391	Volvo
Korea General Company for External Construction	AAX5978	Toyota Dyna
Korea General Company for External Construction	ALJ1391	Toyota Regius
Korea General Company for External Construction	ACH9579ZM	Landcruiser Prado
Chan H Han	ALE7996	Toyota Noah
Chan H Han	ABE321	Toyota Camry
Chan H Han	ABD1517	Toyota Lucida

Source: Member State

Updated information from Patents and Companies Registration Agency –December 2018

NHA-MKP Estates Development, #120050058683 is shown as registered and compliant.
Chammae Construction Limited, #120120102839: is shown as registered and compliant.
MKP TMS Hospital, #120060062028: is shown as registered and compliant.
MKP Motors (Zambia) Ltd, #120010047965: shown as registered, but has some issues with timely paperwork filing….
MKP Holdings Ltd, #120040054717: shown as registered, but doesn't seem to have filed in a while.
MKP Mining Corporation, #120060063279: shown as registered, compliant.
MKP Security Systems Zambia, #120060064168: shown as registered, compliant.
MKP Capital Zambia, #120110090060: shown as registered, compliant.
MKP Builders Zambia, #120070068265: registered, partially compliant.
MKP-Irehab, #120110095546: still registered, partially compliant.
Omega-MKP Zambia, #120100086671: changed its name to Omega Risk Solutions Zambia. Still registered, compliant.

Source: Company Registry

Annex 47: MKP companies in Malaysia as of November 2018

The Panel notes that while Han Hun Il's name has been removed from the registration of one company and two other companies on which he served have been dissolved, many MKP companies appear to remain open and active in Malaysia despite the Panel's previous determination that their activity was prohibited.

(This updates the previous table of "MKP companies in Malaysia as of 15 December 2017", S/2018/171 pp. 229-232, Annex 67)

Company Name	Corporate Number	Status	Address	Directors	Shareholders	Start	Notes
M.K.P. PROJECTS SDN. BHD.	199448-D	Dissolved	Rm.1 1st. Floor, Lee Rubber Bldg 145, Jalan Tun H.S. Lee Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Abdul kudus bin datuk; Lee Kung Wah; Chong ah Kow @ Chong Ching Che; Yong Kok Yeap;	Abdul Kudus Bin Datuk; Yong Kok Yeap; Chong Ah Kow @ Chong Ching Che; Lee Kung Wah	15-Jun-90	
MKP BUILDERS SDN. BHD	386207-P	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor)Menara Klh Business Centre 2, Jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shahkuala Lumpurwilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 cheras, selangor	Han Hun Il; Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap, Fang Chee Peng	6-May-96	Han Hun Il no longer listed as shareholder (11 May 2018 registration documents listed him as shareholder)
MKP CAPITAL BERHAD	738326-V	Winding Up	24-B, Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 cheras, selangor	Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	20 June 2006	


MKP CAPITAL LLC BERHAD	980801-M	Existing	24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	2 March 2012	
MKP CORPORATION BERHAD	619741-U	Existing	24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11batu 9 Cherasselangor	Han Hun Il; Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh; Yong Kok Yeap; Ramanan Ramakrishnan, Dato';	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	26 June 2003	Previously listed as "winding up" (in 13 Nov 2017 documents)
MKP DYNAMIC ENGINEERING SDN. BHD	735910-W	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh; Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap; Muhammad Danial Bin Osman;	Karnail Singh Nijhar Amar Singh, Tansri Dato'dr; Yong Kok Yeap; Soh Pui Hoon; Han Hun Il; Ramanan Ramakrishnan	31 May 2006	
MKP DYNAMIC SDN. BHD	779980-A	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor), Menara Klhbusiness Centre, 2, Jalan Kasipillayoff Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 cheras selangor	Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh; Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap; Ramanan Ramakrishnan; Muhammad Danial Bin Osman @ Mddaud;	Yong Kok Yeap; Soh Pui Hoon; Ramanan Ramakrishnan; Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh	7 July 2012	Han Hun Il was never on the paperwork to begin

MKP HOLDINGS SDN. BHD	464492 - W	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 kaw. Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	23 June 1998	
MKP SUPPLIES SDN. BHD	1210818 - M	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Fang Chee Peng	30 Nov 2016	Address change (11 Nov 2017 docs listed address in Puchong Selangor)
MKP -WUI LOONG SYSTEM SCAFFOLDS SDN. BHD	577418 - H	Dissolved	24 -B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutua Lot 5 Jalan 1kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11 Batu 9 Cheras, Selangor	Kong Kam Wang; Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap; So Yu Shing;	Wui Loong System Scaffolds Co.Ltd; Mkp Holdings Sdn. Bhd.	17 April 2002	
Nekad Ziplem SDN. BHD	614359 - U	Existing	52 a, Jalan Landak off Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan C/O Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor)	Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap;	Jusoh Bin Awang; Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il; Sumairi Bin Hashim	7-May-03	

ELEMENT FLASH (M) SDN. BHD.	658573 - V	Existing	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 Jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shahkuala Lumpur Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5 Jalan Satu kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabalakong Selangor	Yong Kok Yeap; Chua Boon Lain; Tee Eng Soon;	Chua Boon Lain; Yong Kok Yeap; Tee Eng Soon; Fang Chee Peng	6-Jul-04	Han was never on paperwork to begin; new Fang Chee Peng (added sometime after Nov 2018)
SOSIT SDN. BHD.	749341-K	Dissolved	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kaw. Perusahaan Cheras Jaya Batu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	3-Oct-06	

Source: Malaysian corporate registry

Annex 48: Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO)'s page on the DPRK's official online portal, Naenara, compared with MKP's website showing same completed projects (red boxes added to highlight construction projects claimed by both organizations)


1116081011/http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+1645+2011-01+47+3

trade/index.php?contents+1645+2011-01+47+3 Go OCT NOV APR 16 2010 2011 2014

NEWS THE PYONGYANG TIMES KOREA KOREA TODAY FOREIGN TRADE

No. 418 1 Juche 100 2011

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Korea General Corporation for External Construction

The Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO) is a professional enterprise for overseas construction.

GENCO has gained a good reputation from many countries around the world as a credible constructor with a long history of 50 years since its inauguration in January 1961.

It has scores of affiliated building enterprises involving a number of designers, building operators and skilled workers as well as foreign languages and other experts.

GENCO has built lots of dwellings and public establishments in Kuwait, and recently completed the 64-storied Al-Fardan Tower, an ordered project, in a short span of time in Qatar.

GENCO is looking forward to contracts for construction projects such as dwelling houses, public buildings, metros, tunnels, bridges, airports, harbours and stadiums in different countries in diverse forms such as the whole construction work and dispatch of skilled workers.

Add: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea

Tel: 850-2-18111-8090

Fax: 850-2-381-4427/4410

E-mail: gen122@co.chesin.com


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Address: Sochon-dong, Sosong District, Pyongyang, DPRK E-mail: flph@star-co.net.kpflph@star-co.net.kp

Source:

https://web.archive.org/web/20111116081011/http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+1645+2011-01+47+3



https://archive.li/82wX1

COMMERCE EXTERIEUR

No. 4 (291) year 93 of Juche 2005

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Korean General Company for Overseas Construction

Founded in January of year 50 of Juche (1961), it remains always a reliable company in the construction.

With its tens of thousands of engineers, specialists and skilled workers, it is responsible for all construction work abroad since the development of plans and the start of the project until its completion .

In addition to subcontracting, she is responsible for technical services, including assistance or cooperation in this area.

In the past, she has built innumerable buildings such as public institutions, hospitals, schools, gymnasiums, housing, underground structures and dikes in many countries including Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Yemen, Libya and Mongolia.

Renowned under the name of Genco, this company is equipped with state-of-the-art equipment and construction machinery.


Those who want to trade with her, please contact :

Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
Phone : 850-2-18111-381-8090
Fax : 850-2-381-4611
E-mail : gen122@co.chesin.com

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***Sources*:** https://archive.li/82wX1 **and** https://web.archive.org/web/20051119182017/http://www.kcckp.net/fr/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+234+2004-04+8+24



https://archive.li/82wX1

COMMERCE EXTERIEUR

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With its tens of thousands of engineers, specialists and skilled workers, it is responsible for all construction work abroad since the development of plans and the start of the project until its completion .

In addition to subcontracting, she is responsible for technical services, including assistance or cooperation in this area.

In the past, she has built innumerable buildings such as public institutions, hospitals, schools, gymnasiums, housing, underground structures and dikes in many countries including Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Yemen, Libya and Mongolia.

Renowned under the name of Genco, this company is equipped with state-of-the-art equipment and construction machinery.

Those who want to trade with her, please contact :

Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Phone : 850-2-18111-381-8090


Fax : 850-2-381-4611

E-mail : gen122@co.chesin.com

First page | Previous page | Next page | Last page | Summary


Foreign Trade Editions

Annex 49: MKP website showing same completed projects (red boxes added to highlight construction projects claimed by both organizations)



Source: http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php accessed on 9 January 2019. Red box highlights the shared claim.

[redacted]



Source : www.mkphodings.com.my/construction.php

Annex 50: Archived page for GENCO/KOGEN (originally in French; Google-translated) showing images of buildings which it claims to have constructed which are also listed on the MKP website as buildings which MKP claims to have constructed.

NEWS THE PYONGYANG TIMES KOREA KOREA TODAY FOREIGN TRADE

FOREIGN TRADE
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL

No. 418 1 Juche 100 2011

First | Prev | Next | Last | Contents

Korea General Corporation for External Construction

The Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO) is a professional enterprise for overseas construction.

GENCO has gained a good reputation from many countries around the world as a credible constructor with a long history of 50 years since its inauguration in January 1961.

It has scores of affiliated building enterprises involving a number of designers, building operators and skilled workers as well as foreign languages and other experts.

GENCO has built lots of dwellings and public establishments in Kuwait, and recently completed the 64-storied Al-Fardan Tower, an ordered project, in a short span of time in Qatar.

GENCO is looking forward to contracts for construction projects such as dwelling houses, public buildings, metros, tunnels, bridges, airports, harbours and stadiums in different countries in diverse forms such as the whole construction work and dispatch of skilled workers.

Add: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea

Tel: 850-2-18111-8090

Fax: 850-2-381-4427/4410

E-mail: gen122@co.chesin.com

First | Prev | Next | Last | Contents

Source:
https://web.archive.org/web/20111116081011/http:/www.naenara.com.kp/en/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+1645+2011-01+47+3

Annonces de « Naenara » · NOUVELLES DE PYONGYANG · COREE · COREE D'AUJOURD'HUI · COMMERCE EXTERIEUR

COMMERCE EXTERIEUR

No. 291 4 l'an 93 du Juche 2005

Première page | Page précédente | Page suivante | Dernière page | Sommaire

Compagnie Générale Coréenne pour la Construction d'outre-mer















Fondée en janvier de l'an 50 du Juche (1961), elle reste toujours une société digne de confiance dans la construction.

Avec ses dizaines de milliers d'ingénieurs, de spécialistes et d'ouvriers qualifiés, elle se charge de l'ensemble des travaux de construction à l'étranger depuis l'élaboration des plans et la mise en chantier du projet jusqu'à son achèvement.

Outre la sous-traitance, elle s'occupe des services techniques, notamment l'aide ou la coopération en la matière.

Dans le passé, elle a réalisé d'innombrables constructions telles que , établissements publics, hôpitaux, écoles, gymnases, logements, ouvrages sous-terrains et digues dans de nombreux pays dont la Russie, l'Etat des Emirats Arabes Unis, le Koweït, l'Yémen, la Libye et la Mongolie.

Renomée sous l'appellation de Genco, cette compagnie est munie d'équipements et machines de construction ultramodernes.

Ceux qui veulent commercer avec elle, sont priés de s'adresser à:

Arrondissement Central, Pyongyang, RPDC

Tél.: 850-2-18111-381-8090

Fax: 850-2-381-4611

E-mail: gen122@co.chesin.com


Première page | Page précédente | Page suivante | Dernière page | Sommaire

Les Editions du Commerce Extérieur
Adresse : Commune de Sochon, arrondissement de Sosong, Pyongyang, RPDC

[Page d'accueil] [Politique] [Tourisme] [Commerce extérieur] [Arts] [Presse] [Industrie informatique] [Histoire, Mœurs] [La Corée est une] [E-magasin] [Contact] [Carte d'emplacement]

Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20070930050305/http:/www.kcckp.net/fr/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+234+2004-04+8+24

Annex 51: MKP claim to a construction project which a Member State informed the Panel was constructed by KOGEN (Mulungushi International Convention Center)



Accessed at http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php on 9 January 2019

Annex 52: List of DPRK workers working in Zambia, including Han Hun Il (RGB) and Yazid Merzouk (Algerian national)

NORTH KOREANS WORKING IN ZAMBIA
AT KOREA GENERAL COMPANY FOR EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION

NAME		PASSPORT NO.	PROJECT
1.	KWANG MYONG CHOE	65413075	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
2.	CHANG JUN RI	836131680	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
3.	CHOL MIN KIM	472434386	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
4.	JIN HYON JU	563434859	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
5.	KIM CHOL KIM	472336384	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
6.	SONG GUK KIM	472237752	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
7.	JON WON R	563431653	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
8.	SONG NAM JANG	563335550	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
9.	CHON KANG	745334987	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
10.	SONG ILJONG	654130233	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
11.	KIM RYUL	745334957	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
12.	KIM HAK CHOL	745231548	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
13.	JO JONG SIK	5633331039	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
14.	PAK KYONG NAM	563335551	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
15.	CHA SONG HWAN	563337914	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
16.	HAM YONG NAM	563433402	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
17.	OM SONGHO	472334756	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
18.	KIM YONG CHUN	563436057	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
19.	RI SONG IL	563430759	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
20.	KIM MYONG JIM	5633436035	ANGLICAN DIOCESE
1.	HANHUN IL	836134879	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
2.	YAZID MERZOUK	02141496	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
3.	SONGHUI JI	381335622	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
4.	YONG GWON KIM	927132832	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
5.	KIM IL KYONG	654133930	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
6.	KIM AE MYONG	745230207	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL
7.	KWANG CHOL JONG	745234558	MKP CAPITAL/TMS HOSPITAL

Source: Member State

Annex 53: Information showing that Kwang Song Ri served as the DPRK Counsellor in China (리광선 aliases: RI, Kwang-Son, RI, Kwangson)

THOMSON REUTERS

WORLD-CHECK ONE

WORLD-CHECK MATCH DETAILS REPORT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

CASE AND COMPARISON DATA

		Client/Submitted Data	World-Check Data
Name	×	Kwang Song Ri	Kwang Son RI
Gender	✓	Male	Male
Nationality	×		KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
Country Location	×		CHINA
Place of Birth			

KEY DATA

Source Type	PEP OB	
Category	Diplomat	
Name	Kwang Son RI	
Gender	Male	
Nationality	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	
Country Location(s)	CHINA (CHN)	
	Location 1	
	City	Beijing
	Region	Beijing
	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (PRK)	
	Location 1	
	City	Pyongyang

THOMSON REUTERS™

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

	Region	Pyongyang
Position	Embassy or Consular Staff	
Entered Date	02-Mar-2018	
Updated Date	22-Mar-2018	
Update Categorization	C2	

ALIASES

Aliases	RI,Kwang-Son RI,Kwangson
Native Character Names	리광선

KEYWORDS

World-Check Keyword(s)

Keyword	Description	Country
PEP N	PEP - National Government	
DPRK-WC	INTERNATIONAL - DPRK-WC - North Korea - Relevant World-Check Data	UNKNOWN

BIOGRAPHY

Details	BIOGRAPHY Counsellor to China (reported Sep 2013). REPORTS Mar 2018 - no further information reported. IDENTIFICATION Song Sun Rim (spouse).
Sub-Category	PEP N

CONNECTIONS / RELATIONSHIPS

Linked companies		
Linked individuals	Song Sun RIM	Individual

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

Annex 54: Open source information showing that Kwang Song Ri served as a Counsellor (参赞) at the DPRK Embassy in Beijing under the name 李光先 (리광선 aliases: RI, Kwang-Son, RI, Kwangson)



中华人民共和国外交部
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China

中文繁体 English Français Русский Español

首页 外交部 外交动态 国家和组织 资料 服务 网站地图

检索 高级

首页 > 服务 > 礼宾服务 > 驻华外交官名单

驻华使馆礼宾指南(中、英、法三种文本)
电子政务
证件办理
免税退税
通信管理
车辆管理
其它外交特权与豁免
驻华外交官名单
外国驻华领事官名单
国际组织驻华官员名单
相关资料

(DPRK)朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆
（最近更新时间：2013年9月22日）

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻华大使馆
Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic Of Korea

办公处及住宅：建国门外日坛北路
Chancery and Residence: Ri Tan Bei Lu, Jian Guo Men Wai
电话：65321186（值班） 65321154（政务处）65325018（经济处）65324308（商务处）

==========================

李光先 参赞
李光先夫人（林成顺）
Mr.Ri Kwang Son ,Counsellor
Mrs.Rim Song Sun

<u>English translation</u>

Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in China
Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(Last updated: September 22, 2013)
Office and Residence: Ritan North Road, Jianguomenwai
Chancery and Residence: Ri Tan Bei Lu, Jian Guo Men Wai
Tel: 65321186 (on duty) 65321154 (Government Office)
65325018 (Economic Office) 65324308 (Business Office)

Counsellor Li Guangxian
Mrs. Li Guangxian (Lin Chengshun)
Mr. Ri Kwang Son, Counsellor
Mrs. Rim Song Sun

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/fw/lbfw/zhwjgmd_lbfw/t527236.htm**;** archived version: https://archive.fo/CDCwJ).

Annex 55: Information showing that Kwang Song Ri served as a diplomat in Cairo, Egypt

THOMSON REUTERS

WORLD-CHECK ONE

WORLD-CHECK MATCH DETAILS REPORT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

CASE AND COMPARISON DATA

	Client/Submitted Data	World-Check Data
Name	✓ Kwang Song Ri	Kwang Song RI
Gender	✓ Male	Male
Nationality	×	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
Country Location	×	EGYPT
Place of Birth		

KEY DATA

Source Type	PEP OB	
Category	Diplomat	
Name	Kwang Song RI	
Gender	Male	
Nationality	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	
Country Location(s)	EGYPT (EGY)	
	Location 1	
	City	Cairo
	Region	Al Qahirah
	KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (PRK)	
	Location 1	
	City	Pyongyang

THOMSON REUTERS™

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

	Region	Pyongyang
Position	Embassy or Consular Staff	
Entered Date	21-Feb-2018	
Updated Date	23-Mar-2018	
Update Categorization	C2	

ALIASES

Aliases	RI,Kwang-Song RI,Kwangsong
Native Character Names	리광송

KEYWORDS

World-Check Keyword(s)

Keyword	Description	Country
PEP N	PEP - National Government	
DPRK-WC	INTERNATIONAL - DPRK-WC - North Korea - Relevant World-Check Data	UNKNOWN

BIOGRAPHY

Details	**BIOGRAPHY** First Secretary of North Korea Embassy in Egypt (reported Dec 2017). **REPORTS** To be determined. **IDENTIFICATION** To be determined.
Sub-Category	PEP N

Information/External Sources	http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/pblictn/pblictnList.do?originCd=OC0003

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

Annex 56: Information from a 26 January 2018 report by the Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification on key DPRK personnel figures (2018 북한 주요인사 인물정보) which includes DPRK diplomatic personnel worldwide.

In a publication by the Republic of Korea on key DPRK personnel, pages 809-831 contain a list of DPRK diplomatic personnel worldwide. In the original Korean document, Kwang Song Ri's name can be found under "Egypt" on page 814, item number 13, third line, first name (Egypt's entire entry listed here in the original)

Entry in Korean:

(13) 이집트(에짚트)

대 사 마동희

참 사 관 박성도


1 등서기관 리광송 최 강 최기영

Entry translated into English:

13. Egypt
    a. Ambassador- Ma Dong Hee
    b. Councilor- Park Sung Do
    c. First Office- Ri Kwang Song, Choi Kang, Choi Gee Yong


Source: http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/pblictn/pblictnList.do?originCd=OC0003#

Annex 57: UAE Company 1 Website on establishment of KOGEN UAE JV



Source: UAE Company 1 website, accessed 9 November 2018.

Annex 58: Page from UAE Company 1 brochure outlining project work



Engineering & Construction

[redacted] is enjoying significant growth in the UAE market as a result of the overall expansion of the real estate sector and construction industry in the region. Robust growth is taking place in the UAE and other Gulf countries, as seen by numerous key indicators and research studies. The transactions in real estate are reaching trillion dollars with number of building permits continuously increasing due to the continued commitment from the international community in terms of their investment in the region.

Our structural engineering projects include Residential Buildings and Estates, Commercial and Industrial Facilities, Shopping Centers and Business Parks, Office and Commercial Buildings, Hotels, Banks, Multi-storey Car Parks, Cinema Complexes, Sports Facilities, Sheds, Warehouses and Production Facilities, Public Buildings, Hospitals and large housing developments.

Dubai Recent Projects:
- Meydan Business Park
- Nakheel Waterfront Villas
- Al Mushrif Reservoir
- Cube Tower
- Falcon Training Building
- HH Sheikh Hamdan Bin Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Stadium, Nad Al Sheba

Abu Dhabi Recent Projects:
- 488 Royal Group Villas in Yas Island
- 48 Royal Group Villas in Mohamed Bin Zayed City
- Landmark 4-Star Hotel
- Civil Defence Training Academy
- Hamad Al Mansouri Tower
- Mubarak Al Mansouri Tower
- Al Wadha Mall Extension

Our Mission

Our mission is to contribute to the evolution of the fast-growing construction industry in the region and the welfare of customers through the performance of its business.

10

Source: UAE Company 1 website, accessed 13 December 2018.

Annex 59: Corporate information on Chammae Construction Limited

120120102839

PACRA

Patents and Companies Registration Agency

Computer Printout - Local Company

Local Company	**CHAMMAE CONSTRUCTION LIMITED**	**Registration Number**	**120120102839**
Date of Incorporation	15 day of June 2012	Date of FY End	29/12/2018
Registered Office	378a/b/3774, ALONG SIMON MWANSA KAPWEPWE, AVONDALE, LUSAKA, LUSAKA PROVINCE, ZAMBIA		
Postal Address	LUSAKA, LUSAKA PROVINCE, ZAMBIA		
Town / City	AVONDALE		
Country	ZAMBIA		
Certificate Signed By	Lloyd Thole		
Phone	+260973314930		
Email	kogen@yahoo.com		
Struck off/Ceased on			
Nominal capital	K 10000		
Number of Shares	10000		
Liability	Normal Company		
Articles Filed Date	15/06/2012		
Amended Articles Filed Date	04/02/2013		
Adopted Articles Filed Date			
Company Liquidated Date			
Company in Receivership Date			

[redacted]

Nature of Business

Sector
4799. Other retail sale not in stores, stalls or markets

*** - Information in this report can change any time.**

[redacted]

7490. Other professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c.
4100. Construction of buildings

Annual return

Year	Date Delivered	
2017	05/01/2018	
2016	01/02/2017	
2015	21/01/2016	
2014	15/01/2015	
2013	14/08/2013	
Class of Shares	Number authorised	Par value Per share
Ordinary	**10,000.00**	**1.00**

[redacted]

Individuals


Present forenames and surnames	Address	Nationality & NRC/ Passport No	Occupation	Director/ Partner	Secretary	Shareholder / Member	Amount	Share Class
KWANG CHON		745334987 KOREA	BUSINESSMAN		Yes			
KIM YONG SIK		836232923 KOREA	BUSINESSMAN	Yes				
HAN CHANG HO		381337615 KOREA	DIRECTOR			Yes	4,500.00	Ordinary
SAM MAURICE MBEWE		296387/74/1 ZAMBIAN	BUSINESSMAN	Yes				
RI KWANGA SONG		381131855 KOREA	DIRECTOR			Yes	1,000.00	Ordinary
RI CHUN IL		472436302 KOREA	DIRECTOR	Yes		Yes	4,500.00	Ordinary

* - Information in this report can change any time.

[redacted]

Source: Patents and Companies Registration Agency, Zambia

Annex 60: Corporate information on GENCO Nigeria



Source: Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission, http://publicsearch.cac.gov.ng/comsearch/index.php

NAME OF COMPANY:	**KOREA GEN. CO. FOR EXT. CONSTRUCTION GENCO (NIG) LIMITED**
TYPE OF COMPANY:	**Limited Liability**
COMPANY REGISTRATION NO:	**334702**
DATE OF INCORPORATION:	**5/5/1998**
BORROWING POWER:	**CAMA 1990 adopted**
COMPANY SECRETARY:	**Nil**
SHARE CAPITAL AT INCORP:	**20,000,000.00**
CURRENT SHARE CAPITAL:	**20,000,000.00**
CLASS OF SHARE:	**Ordinary Share**
PAID UP SHARE CAPITAL:	**20,000,000.00**
REG. ADDRESS OF COMPANY:	**Opposite AP filing Station, near APO Village. Abuja FCT.**

1.FIRST NATURE OF BUSINESS:
To carry on the business of construction services of every description.

2. LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS OF KOREA GENERAL COMPANY FOR EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION GENCO (NIGERIA) LIMITED 5/5/1998


NAMES	ADDRESS	NO. OF SHARES TAKEN
Korea General Co. for External Construction Genco	Opposite AP filling station, near Apo Village, Abuja FCT	19,900,000.00
Kim Yong Sik	Opposite AP filling station, near Apo Village, Abuja FCT	50,000.00
Kim Yong Hwan	Opposite AP filling station, near Apo Village, Abuja FCT	50,000.00

4. LIST OF DIRECTORS OF KOREA GENERAL COMPANY FOR EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION GENCO (NIGERIA) LIMITED 5/5/1998

NAMES		ADDRESS
Kim Yong Sik		Opposite AP filling station, near Apo Village, Abuja FCT
Kim Yong Hwan		Opposite AP filling station, near Apo Village, Abuja FCT

Source: Nigerian corporate registry

Annex 61: African Union's InterAfrican Bureau for Animal Resources lists KOGEN GE S.L. as its implementing partner for a project



AFRICAN UNION
INTERAFRICAN BUREAU
FOR ANIMAL RESOURCES

WEBMAIL

Home | About | Strategic Plans | Programmes and Projects | Tools | Media | Events | Library | search...

Project Overview > en > Programmes and Projects > Current Programmes and Projects > Fish > Inventory Projects > African Union Member States > Central Africa Region

Tuesday, 30 October 2018

Current Programmes and Projects

2014 - 2017 FishTRADE

2018 - 2019 RAFIP

Central Africa Region

On 20 September 2015.

Congo Brazaville

Project Title	Main Objectives/Scope	Timelines	Coverage	Financial Partners	Implementing Agencies/Partners
Programme d'appui au développement des filières agricoles	Améliorer durablement la sécurité alimentaire, les revenus des petits producteurs (agriculteurs, éleveurs, pêcheurs et pisciculteurs) et créer des emplois durables ou les ruraux, en particulier les jeunes et les femmes, à travers un appui au développement des filières porteuses	2012-2016	Nationale	F I D A	Pour les activités de pêche et de pisciculture, la mise en oeuvre est faite par le Ministère de la Pêche et de l'Aquaculture (MPA)
Projet d'appui à l'amélioration de la gestion des pêcheries crevettières en République du Congo	Mettre en place de manière participative un plan de gestion de la pêche crevettière au Congo, en prenant en compte non seulement les ressources ciblées et les ressources accessoires, mais aussi l'écosystème dans son ensemble	12 mois à compter de Juin 2015	Nationale	FAO	Direction générale de la pêche maritime

Replublique Democratique du Congo

Project Title	Main Objectives/Scope	Timelines	Coverage	Financial Partners	Implementing Agencies/Partners
PRODAP	Gestion durable des ressources halieutiques Protection de l'écosystème du Lac Tanganyika	2009-2014 et 2015 début du PRODAP II	Régionale	BAD	ALT
Lakes Edouard and Albert Fisheries (LEAF)	Protection de l'écosystème des Lacs Edouard et Albert Gestion durable des ressources halieutiques des deux lacs	5 ans 2015-2020	Régionale	BAD	NELSAP
Pêcherie crevettière	Planification et Aménagement des pêcheries crevettières dans l'estuaire et l'embouchure du fleuve Congo	16 mois Début juillet 2015	Nationale	EAF-NANSEN	FAO
Projet des Pêches et de L'Aquaculture au Katanga (PRODEPAK)	Production et amélioration des alevins	Clôturé en 2014, attente phase 2	Nationale	CTB	CTB

Guinee Equatoriale

Project Title	Main Objectives/Scope	Timelines	Coverage	Financial Partners	Implementing Agencies/Partners
Propuesta para la Implementación de la Producción Avanzada de la Piscicultura en la Región Continental Provincia de Kie-Ntem (Ebibeyin)	Cubrir la gran demanda de consumo de pescado fresco entre la población y generar otra actividad de apoyo a la pesca artesanal.	2015-2019	El Proyecto tiene una cobertura Nacional.	El Gobierno de Guinea Ecuatorial	Corea General Construcción S.L. (KOGEN GE S.L.)

Funded by the European Union

L4LP Menu
- Background
- Objectives
- Project Overview
- Outcomes
- Project Partners
- Project Contacts
- Steering Committees
- Achievements
- Promotional and Visibility Materials
- Stories of Change
- Frequently Asked Questions
- Reports and Documents

STRATEGIC PLAN 2014 - 2017

Opportunities
- Jobs
- Consultancies
- Procurement

Source: Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources, African Union, http://www.au-ibar.org/2012-10-01-13-08-42/news/450-en/programmes-and-projects/current-programmes-and-projects/fish/inventory-projects/820-african-union-member-states-by-region

Annex 62: Funding documentation for the Rebola Municipal Stadium in Equatorial Guinea

Not Secure | www.minhacienda.gob.gq/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/LPGE_-2017.pdf

Linea	Nombre del Proyecto	Costo Total	Total Pagos	Saldo por Pagar	PIP 2017	Recursos Externos
907	Salud para todos	266.307	145.206	121.104	31.716	12.309
908	**Juventud y Deportes**	**47.169**	**41.131**	**6.038**	**2.134**	**0**
909	**Infraestructuras**	**47.169**	**41.131**	**6.038**	**2.134**	**0**
910	2919011-0 Remodelación y adaptación del estadio de fútbol de Mongomo	6.000	5.400	600	172	0
911	2919011-1 Control y supervisión nuevo estadio de Mongomo	460	405	55	8	0
912	2919012-0 Remodelacion y adaptación del estadio de fútbol de Ebebiyin	6.000	5.400	600	172	0
913	2919012-1 Control y supervision del nuevo estadio de Ebebiyin	460	428	32	32	0
914	2919014-0 Construccion de dos Campos de entrenamiento de 500 plazas para la CAN 2012 en la comunidad de Bikuy II (Bata) y en el municipio de Machinda	3.500	3.150	350	100	0
915	2919016-0 Construccion de un campo de entrenamiento de 500 plazas para la CAN 2012 en el municipio de Bidjabidjan	1.750	1.575	175	50	0
916	2919017-0 Construccion de un campo de entrenamiento de 500 plazas para la CAN 2012 en la ciudad de Ebebiyin	1.750	1.575	175	50	0
917	2919018-0 Construccion de un campo de entrenamiento de 500 plazas para la CAN 2012 en el municipio de Megomeyen	1.750	1.575	175	50	0
918	2919020-0 Construccion del vallado del campo de futbol del antiguo estadio de Bata	324	292	32	32	0
919	2919024-0 Obra de rehabilitación del Estadio de Libertad de Bata	711	604	107	31	0
920	2919033-0 Rehabilitación del estadio de Bidjabidjan	898	509	389	111	0
921	2919041-0 Complemento sistema de imagen, videomarcadores, voz, etc. estadios Malabo y Bata	1.848	1.830	18	18	0
922	2919008-0 Construccion del estadio municipal de Rebola	11.000	9.900	1.100	632	0
923	2919015-0 Construccion, vallado, parking VIP e instalación scáner en el estadio Nkuantoma y acceso provisional al estadio de Alep	2.193	2.166	27	27	0
924	2919021-0 Instalacion de luz en el antiguo estadio de Bata	275	248	28	28	0
925	2919009-0 Urbanización y contrucción de edificios anexos del estadio de Rebola: sala de maquinas y control, agua potable, acceso parking...etc.	8.249	6.074	2.175	622	0

Source: Ministry of Treasury, Economy, and Planning, http://www.minhacienda.gob.gq/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/LPGE_-2017.pdf

Not Secure | www.diariorombe.es/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Lista-de-Obras-Primera-Parte.pdf

NUM			
592	INGENERIA Y CONSTRUCCION SA*(empresa cubana)*	Construcción del Centro de Reeducacion de Menores de Riaba.	9.786.646.155
593	INGENERIA Y CONSTRUCCION SA*(empresa cubana)*	Construcción del Centro de Reeducacion de Menores de Atom (Teguete)	8.605.366.535
594	INPROSA	Control y supervision de las obras de ampliacion del Cuartel Central de Bata.	194.600.000
595	INPROSA	Control y supervision de las obras de ampliacion del Cuartel 3 de Agosto de Bata.	298.941.744
596	INSTITUTO CALDERON DE FORMACION PROFESIONAL (ICAF)	Obras de rehabilitacion, mobiliario, equipamiento de talleres e informatica y gestion del profesorado durante 10 años y una formacion tecnica profesional de 2 años	21.129.426.349
597	INTERCOMIVES	Rehabilitacion y ampliacion de la casa Sacerdotal del Obispado de Bata	3.500.000.000
598	INTERCOMIVES	Rehabilitacion de la Iglesia, casa Sacerdotal y la urbaniacion de la iglesa de Ayene	3.124.470.088
599	INTERCOMIVES	Rehabilitacion y ampliacion de la Iglesia y Colegio Claret de Luba	7.040.478.931
600	INTERCOMIVES	Rehabilitacion de la Camara de los Representantes de Pueblo en la Ciudad de Bata.	1.349.843.393
601	IPX GE	Control de entrada, barreras y suervision de acceso al minsiterio de defensa nacional	1.375.457.323
602	Jacinta Mbang Nguema Obono.	Rehabilitacion del instituto de Enseñanza Secundaria Básica José NSUGA ANGUE de Bidjabidjan.	177.807.812
603	JLD FINANCIAL SERVICES	Construccion de un inmueble de tres plantas destinados para aulas de estudios del colegio de las misioneras de la Inmaculada Concepcion en Sampaca.	441.119.114
604	JOLL GE	Construccion de 46 viviendas sociales tipo A pareadas de 76m2 utiles en la fase 2A de Buena Esperanza, incluido el saneamiento, fontaneria y electricidad de cada edificación	1.196.000.000
605	JPC	Control y Supervision de las obras de ampliacion del edificio del Parlamento en Malabo (Makinen)	240.000.000
606	JPC	Control y supervision de las obras de rehabilitacion de las calles de Malabo, ejecutada por Sogeco	578.669.818
607	JUBROCO	Suminstro de mobiliario y equipamiento en la residencia del Delegado de Gobierno de Mbini.	55.000.000
608	JUBROCO	Proyecto de construccion de la residencia del Delegado de Gobierno del distrito de Mbini	132.090.750
609	JUBROCO	Urbanizacion de la residencia del Delegado de Gobierno de Mbini	300.000.000
610	JUMMA WORK	Control y supervision de la red de abastecimiento de agua potable, saneamiento y acometidas domiciliarias de la Ciudad de Mbini	55.000.000
611	K WATER	Mantenimiento de la planta de tratamiento y abastecimiento de agua potable de la Ciudad de Mongomo	4.401.471.472
612	KOGEN	Construccion del Estadio de Rebola	11.000.000.000
613	KOGEN	Construccion de edificios anexos del estadio de Rebola	6.749.401.148
614	LA COSTA S.L.	Canalizacion y acondicionamiento del Rio Andeme de 3,0 Km en la Ciudad de Mongomo.	13.550.000.000
615	LIMAYCONS	Mantenimiento perdiodico del Paseo Maritimo desde la entrada del hospital La Paz- Sala de recepción "Domo"	600.000.000
616	LIMPSI G.E	Instalacion de contenedores soterrados para el servicio de limpieza y recogida de basura en Sipopo y Malabo II	1.583.225.500
617	LYNX-INTER	Construcción de la Delegación de Gobierno de Niefang.	520.357.500
618	LYNX-INTER	Urbanizacion de la Delegacion de Gobierno de Niefang	300.000.000
619	M.K.H	Construccion y ampliacion de las aulas del Colegio Internado de Basile	1.466.032.903
620	M.K.H	Construccion del Colegio Internado de Basile	3.000.000.000
621	MACONSA	Urbanizacion de la Residencia del Delegado de Gobierno adjunto del Distrito Urbano nº1 de Bata	300.000.000
622	MACONSA	Proyecto de construccion de la residencia del Delegado de Gobierno Adjunto del distrito urbano n°1 de Bata	112.077.000
623	MAECI *(Americano de Origen Camerunés,amigo personal de OBIANG)*	Electrificacion de la Isla de Annobon mediante técnologia solar fotovoltaica de 5 MVA. Incluyendo las acometidas y contadores.	23.155.282.100

Source: Rombe Diary, GE Proyectos, http://www.diariorombe.es/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Lista-de-Obras-Primera-Parte.pdf

Annex 63: Registry documents for LLC “VITAL”, LLC “PRESTIZHSTROI”, and LLC “SAKO KONTRAKSHN”

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ВИТАЛ"

ОГРН 1036500601213
ИНН/КПП 6501038711/650101001
по состоянию на 01.11.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
	Наименование	
1	Полное наименование	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ВИТАЛ"
2	Сокращенное наименование	ООО "ВИТАЛ"
3	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1036500601213 05.01.2003
	Адрес (место нахождения)	
4	Почтовый индекс	693000
5	Субъект Российской Федерации	ОБЛАСТЬ САХАЛИНСКАЯ
6	Город (волость и т.п.)	ГОРОД ЮЖНО-САХАЛИНСК
7	Улица (проспект, переулок и т.д.)	УЛИЦА ПОЛЕВАЯ
8	Дом (владение и т.п.)	8
9	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2036500609055 24.04.2003
	Сведения о регистрации	
10	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица до 01.07.2002
11	ОГРН	1036500601213
12	Дата присвоения ОГРН	05.01.2003
13	Регистрационный номер, присвоенный до 1 июля 2002 года	350
14	Дата регистрации до 1 июля 2002 года	03.08.1995
15	Наименование органа, зарегистрировавшего юридическое лицо до 1 июля 2002 года	Администрация г.Южно-Сахалинска
16	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1036500601213 05.01.2003
	Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица	
17	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
18	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,693020,,,Южно-Сахалинск г,,Ленина ул,105,А,
19	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1036500601213 05.01.2003
	Сведения об учете в налоговом органе	
20	ИНН	6501038711
21	КПП	650101001

LLC “Vital”

693000, Oblast Sakhalinskaya, City of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Ulitsa Polevaya 8

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22	Дата постановки на учет	08.08.1995
23	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
24	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2056500685272 26.09.2005
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
25	Регистрационный номер	074001002912
26	Дата регистрации	08.08.1995
27	Наименование территориального органа Пенсионного фонда	Государственное учреждение - Управление Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации в г. Южно-Сахалинске Сахалинской области
28	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2066501073440 10.05.2006
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в исполнительном органе Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации		
29	Регистрационный номер	650017018665001
30	Дата регистрации	01.01.2001
31	Наименование исполнительного органа Фонда социального страхования	Государственное учреждение - Сахалинское региональное отделение Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации
32	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	01.10.2004
Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
33	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1036500601213 05.01.2003
34	Фамилия	СОН
35	Имя	ЕН СУК
36	ИНН	650101058679
37	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2116501040467 16.05.2011
38	Должность	ДИРЕКТОР
39	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2116501040467 16.05.2011
Сведения об учредителях (участниках) юридического лица		
40	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2036500609055 24.04.2003
41	Фамилия	СОН
42	Имя	ЕН СУК
43	ИНН	650101058679
44	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2116501040467 16.05.2011
45	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	25000

46	Размер доли (в процентах)	100
47	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2116501040467 16.05.2011
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности *(ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)*		
Сведения об основном виде деятельности		
48	Код и наименование вида деятельности	41.20 Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий
49	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2066501083548 02.06.2006
Сведения о дополнительных видах деятельности		
1		
50	Код и наименование вида деятельности	01.13.1 Выращивание овощей
51	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501062190 21.07.2014
2		
52	Код и наименование вида деятельности	01.13.3 Выращивание столовых корнеплодных и клубнеплодных культур с высоким содержанием крахмала или инулина
53	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501062190 21.07.2014
3		
54	Код и наименование вида деятельности	10.13 Производство продукции из мяса убойных животных и мяса птицы
55	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2166501120300 17.03.2016
4		
56	Код и наименование вида деятельности	10.39.1 Переработка и консервирование овощей (кроме картофеля) и грибов
57	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501062190 21.07.2014
5		
58	Код и наименование вида деятельности	10.71 Производство хлеба и мучных кондитерских изделий, тортов и пирожных недлительного хранения
59	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2166501120300 17.03.2016
6		
60	Код и наименование вида деятельности	10.72 Производство сухарей, печенья и прочих сухарных хлебобулочных изделий, производство мучных кондитерских изделий, тортов, пирожных, пирогов и бисквитов, предназначенных для длительного хранения
61	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2166501120300 17.03.2016
7		
62	Код и наименование вида деятельности	10.89 Производство прочих пищевых продуктов, не включенных в другие группировки

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ПРЕСТИЖСТРОЙ"

ОГРН 1106501003730
ИНН/КПП 6501218344/650101001
по состоянию на 01.11.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ПРЕСТИЖСТРОЙ"
2	Сокращенное наименование	ООО "ПРЕСТИЖСТРОЙ"
3	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Адрес (место нахождения)		
4	Почтовый индекс	693000
5	Субъект Российской Федерации	ОБЛАСТЬ САХАЛИНСКАЯ
6	Город (волость и т.п.)	ГОРОД ЮЖНО-САХАЛИНСК
7	Улица (проспект, переулок и т.д.)	УЛИЦА ПОЛЕВАЯ
8	Дом (владение и т.п.)	10
9	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Сведения о регистрации		
10	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица
11	ОГРН	1106501003730
12	Дата регистрации	14.05.2010
13	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица		
14	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
15	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,693020,,,Южно-Сахалинск г,,Ленина ул,105,А,
16	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
17	ИНН	6501218344
18	КПП	650101001
19	Дата постановки на учет	14.05.2010
20	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области

LLC “PrestizhStroi”

693000, Oblast Sakhalinskaya, City of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Ulitsa Polevaya 10

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21	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501069607 14.05.2010
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
22	Регистрационный номер	074001056976
23	Дата регистрации	19.05.2010
24	Наименование территориального органа Пенсионного фонда	Государственное учреждение - Управление Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации в г. Южно-Сахалинске Сахалинской области
25	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501076890 24.05.2010
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в исполнительном органе Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации		
26	Регистрационный номер	650020240765001
27	Дата регистрации	18.05.2010
28	Наименование исполнительного органа Фонда социального страхования	Государственное учреждение - Сахалинское региональное отделение фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации
29	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501077087 24.05.2010
Сведения об уставном капитале (складочном капитале, уставном фонде, паевых взносах)		
30	Вид	УСТАВНЫЙ КАПИТАЛ
31	Размер (в рублях)	10000
32	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
33	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1106501003730 14.05.2010
34	Фамилия	СИН
35	Имя	ВАЛЕРИЙ
36	Отчество	СЕОКУВИЧ
37	ИНН	650301082950
38	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
39	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи об исправлении технической ошибки в указанных сведениях	2106501084370 07.06.2010
40	Должность	Директор
41	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
Сведения об учредителях (участниках) юридического лица		
42	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2166501138461 07.04.2016
43	Фамилия	СОН
44	Имя	ОК СУН

45	ИНН	650101473918
46	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2166501138461 07.04.2016
47	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	10000
48	Размер доли (в процентах)	100
49	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2166501138461 07.04.2016
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности *(ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)*		
Сведения об основном виде деятельности		
50	Код и наименование вида деятельности	49.41 Деятельность автомобильного грузового транспорта
51	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501073483 03.04.2017
Сведения о дополнительных видах деятельности		
1		
52	Код и наименование вида деятельности	41.2 Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий
53	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
2		
54	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.12 Подготовка строительной площадки
55	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501073483 03.04.2017
3		
56	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.2 Производство электромонтажных, санитарно-технических и прочих строительно-монтажных работ
57	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
4		
58	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.3 Работы строительные отделочные
59	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
5		
60	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.99 Работы строительные специализированные прочие, не включенные в другие группировки
61	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1106501003730 14.05.2010
6		
62	Код и наименование вида деятельности	45.20 Техническое обслуживание и ремонт автотранспортных средств
63	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501037667 23.01.2017

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "САКО КОНТРАКШН"

ОГРН 1046500617690
ИНН/КПП 6501149002/650101001
по состоянию на 01.11.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "САКО КОНТРАКШН"
2	Сокращенное наименование	ООО "САКО КОНТРАКШН"
3	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004
Адрес (место нахождения)		
4	Почтовый индекс	693000
5	Субъект Российской Федерации	ОБЛАСТЬ САХАЛИНСКАЯ
6	Город (волость и т.п.)	ГОРОД ЮЖНО-САХАЛИНСК
7	Улица (проспект, переулок и т.д.)	УЛИЦА ПОЛЕВАЯ
8	Дом (владение и т.п.)	10
9	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004
Сведения о регистрации		
10	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица
11	ОГРН	1046500617690
12	Дата регистрации	29.04.2004
13	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004
Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица		
14	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
15	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,693020,,,Южно-Сахалинск г,,Ленина ул,105,А,
16	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
17	ИНН	6501149002
18	КПП	650101001
19	Дата постановки на учет	07.05.2004
20	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области

LLC “Sako Kontrakshn”

693000, Oblast Sakhalinskaya, City of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Ulitsa Polevaya 10

21	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	07.05.2004
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
22	Регистрационный номер	074001091194
23	Дата регистрации	21.07.2004
24	Наименование территориального органа Пенсионного фонда	Государственное учреждение - Управление Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации в г. Южно-Сахалинске Сахалинской области
25	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.10.2004
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в исполнительном органе Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации		
26	Регистрационный номер	650015078065001
27	Дата регистрации	19.07.2004
28	Наименование исполнительного органа Фонда социального страхования	Государственное учреждение - Сахалинское региональное отделение Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации
29	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.10.2004
Сведения об уставном капитале (складочном капитале, уставном фонде, паевых взносах)		
30	Вид	УСТАВНЫЙ КАПИТАЛ
31	Размер (в рублях)	10000
32	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004
Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
33	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2096501041041 27.03.2009
34	Фамилия	КИМ
35	Имя	ЕН Э
36	ИНН	650101131600
37	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501091273 17.10.2014
38	Должность	ДИРЕКТОР
39	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501091273 17.10.2014
Сведения об учредителях (участниках) юридического лица		
1		
40	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1046500617690 29.04.2004
41	Фамилия	КИМ
42	Имя	ЕН Э
43	ИНН	650101131600
44	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501091273 17.10.2014


45	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	2000
46	Размер доли (в процентах)	20
47	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2146501091273 17.10.2014
	2	
48	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1046500617690 29.04.2004
49	Фамилия	СОН
50	Имя	ЧАН ДИН
51	ИНН	650109976889
52	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2186501096043 12.04.2018
53	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	8000
54	Размер доли (в процентах)	80
55	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2136501104023 18.10.2013
	Сведения о видах экономической деятельности по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности *(ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)*	
	Сведения об основном виде деятельности	
56	Код и наименование вида деятельности	42.11 Строительство автомобильных дорог и автомагистралей
57	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501068049 24.03.2017
	Сведения о дополнительных видах деятельности	
	1	
58	Код и наименование вида деятельности	41.20 Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий
59	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501068049 24.03.2017
	2	
60	Код и наименование вида деятельности	42.21 Строительство инженерных коммуникаций для водоснабжения и водоотведения, газоснабжения
61	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501068049 24.03.2017
	3	
62	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.12 Подготовка строительной площадки
63	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2176501068049 24.03.2017
	4	
64	Код и наименование вида деятельности	46.73 Торговля оптовая лесоматериалами, строительными материалами и санитарно-техническим оборудованием
65	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1046500617690 29.04.2004

Surname: Son
Name: Chan Din
Tax ID: 650109976889


Сведения с сайта ФНС России
01.11.2018 18:29 ОГРН 1046500617690 Страница 3 из 9

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru


Annex 64: Additional information linking LLC “SAKORENMA” to LLC “VITAL”, LLC “PRESTIZHSTROI”, and LLC “SAKO KONTRAKSHN”




Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, https://trudvsem.ru



Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, https://trudvsem.ru



Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, https://trudvsem.ru



Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, https://trudvsem.ru

Annex 65: Registry documents for two GENCO Representative Offices in the Russian Federation and relevant Court documents

1. Registry documents for GENCO Repressentative office in Vladivostok

ВЫПИСКА
ИЗ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО РЕЕСТРА АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ФИЛИАЛОВ, ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

26.10.2018 № 99651800036654

Настоящая выписка содержит сведения о филиале (представительстве)

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО КОРЕЙСКОГО ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОГО ОБЩЕСТВА ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), Г. ВЛАДИВОСТОК

(полное наименование филиала, представительства)

иностранного юридического лица

КОРЕЙСКОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР)

(полное наименование иностранного юридического лица)

НЗА 20150022387

включенные в государственный реестр аккредитованных филиалов, представительств иностранных юридических лиц по состоянию на 26.10.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Сведения об иностранном юридическом лице		
Наименование		
1	Полное наименование	КОРЕЙСКОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР)
2	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
3	Код и наименование страны регистрации (инкорпорации)	408, Корейская Народно-Демократическая Республика
4	Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)	КНДР, Г. ПХЕНЬЯН, Р-ОН ТЭДОНГАН, КВАРТАЛ РЫНРА
5	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения о регистрации в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
6	Наименование регистрирующего органа	КОМИТЕТ ПО СОДЕЙСТВИЮ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ ТОРГОВЛЕ КНДР
7	Регистрационный номер	61-35

Korean General Corporation for Construction Abroad "ZENKO" (DPRK)

408, Democratic People's Republic of Korea

DPRK, City of Pyongyang, Taedonggang District, Rungra Neighborhood

Выписка из РАФП 26.10.2018 22:42 НЗА 20150022387 Страница 1 из 4

8	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения о коде налогоплательщика в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
9	Код налогоплательщика или его аналог	S-022
10	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения об уставном капитале		
11	Размер (код валюты)	1 263 782 895 000.00 (408 - Северокорейская вона)
12	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения о филиале, представительстве иностранного юридического лица на территории Российской Федерации		
13	Вид обособленного подразделения	2, Представительство иностранного юридического лица
Наименование		
14	Полное наименование	ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО КОРЕЙСКОГО ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОГО ОБЩЕСТВА ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), Г. ВЛАДИВОСТОК
15	Сокращенное наименование	ПКГО "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), Г. ВЛАДИВОСТОК
16	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Адрес (место нахождения) на территории Российской Федерации		
17	Сведения об адресе (месте нахождения)	690910, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ, ВЛАДИВОСТОК ГОРОД, ТРУДОВОЕ ПОСЕЛОК, ПОРТ-АРТУРСКАЯ УЛИЦА, ДОМ 76
18	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения об аккредитации филиала, представительства		
19	Номер записи об аккредитации (НЗА)	20150022387
20	Дата аккредитации (внесения сведений об аккредитации в РАФП)	24.03.2015
21	Налоговый орган, уполномоченный на аккредитацию филиалов, представительств иностранных юридических лиц	7747, Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 47 по г.Москве

690910, Primorski Krai, Vladivostok City, Trudovoe Village, Port-Arturskaya ulitsa, house 76

Выписка из РАФП 26.10.2018 22:42 НЗА 20150022387 Страница 2 из 4

22	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	24.03.2015
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
23	Идентификационный номер налогоплательщика (ИНН)	9909159891
24	Код причины постановки на учет (КПП)	254392001
25	Дата постановки на учет	02.06.2017
26	Наименование налогового органа	2543, Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 12 по Приморскому краю
27	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	07.06.2017
Сведения о руководителе филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации		
28	Фамилия	КО
29	Имя	ЫОНГИЛЬ
30	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017
Сведения о численности иностранных граждан, являющихся работниками филиала, представительства		
31	Численность иностранных работников	12
32	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	06.02.2018
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
Сведения об основном виде экономической деятельности		
33	Код и наименование вида деятельности	73.20 Исследование конъюнктуры рынка и изучение общественного мнения
34	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	02.06.2017

Surname: Ko
Name: Yongil

Number of foreign workers: 12

Выписка сформирована с использованием интерактивного сервиса «Государственный реестр аккредитованных филиалов и представительств иностранных юридических лиц», размещенного на официальном сайте ФНС России в сети Интернет по адресу: https://service.nalog.ru/rafp

Выписка из РАФП
26.10.2018 22:42 НЗА 20150022387 Страница 3 из 4

Source: State Register of Accredited Branches, Representations of Foreign Legal Entities, https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/#

2. Registry documents for GENCO Representative office in Khasan

ВЫПИСКА
ИЗ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО РЕЕСТРА АККРЕДИТОВАННЫХ ФИЛИАЛОВ, ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

26.10.2018 № 99651800036655

Настоящая выписка содержит сведения о филиале (представительстве)

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО КОРЕЙСКОГО ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОГО ОБЩЕСТВА ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), П.ХАСАН, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ

(полное наименование филиала, представительства)

иностранного юридического лица

КОРЕЙСКОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР)

(полное наименование иностранного юридического лица)

НЗА 20150028184

включенные в государственный реестр аккредитованных филиалов, представительств иностранных юридических лиц по состоянию на 26.10.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
	Сведения об иностранном юридическом лице	
	Наименование	
1	Полное наименование	КОРЕЙСКОЕ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР)
2	Сокращенное наименование	КГО "ЗЕНКО"
3	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
	Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)	
4	Код и наименование страны регистрации (инкорпорации)	408, Корейская Народно-Демократическая Республика
5	Адрес в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)	КНДР, Г. ПХЕНЬЯН, Р-ОН ТЭДОНГАН, КВАРТАЛ РЫНРА
6	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
	Сведения о регистрации в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)	
7	Наименование регистрирующего органа	КОМИТЕТ ПО СОДЕЙСТВИЮ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ ТОРГОВЛЕ КНДР
8	Регистрационный номер	61-35

Korean General Corporation for Construction Abroad “ZENKO” (DPRK)

408, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

DPRK, City of Pyongyang, Taedonggang District, Rungra Neighborhood

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9	Особенности режима регистрации	НЕ ИМЕЕТСЯ
10	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения о коде налогоплательщика в стране регистрации (инкорпорации)		
11	Код налогоплательщика или его аналог	S-022
12	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения об уставном капитале		
13	Размер (код валюты)	1 263 782 895 000.00 (408 - Северокорейская вона)
14	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения о филиале, представительстве иностранного юридического лица на территории Российской Федерации		
15	Вид обособленного подразделения	2, Представительство иностранного юридического лица
Наименование		
16	Полное наименование	ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО КОРЕЙСКОГО ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОГО ОБЩЕСТВА ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), П.ХАСАН, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ
17	Сокращенное наименование	ПКГО "ЗЕНКО" (КНДР), П. ХАСАН, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ
18	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Адрес (место нахождения) на территории Российской Федерации		
19	Сведения об адресе (месте нахождения)	692730, ПРИМОРСКИЙ КРАЙ, ХАСАНСКИЙ РАЙОН, ХАСАН ПОСЕЛОК ГОРОДСКОГО ТИПА, ЛИНЕЙНАЯ УЛИЦА, ДОМ 2
20	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	22.08.2017
Сведения об аккредитации филиала, представительства		
21	Номер записи об аккредитации (НЗА)	20150028184
22	Дата аккредитации (внесения сведений об аккредитации в РАФП)	26.03.2015

692730, Primorski Krai, Khasanski Region, Khasan Village of the urban type, Lineinaya ulitsa, house 2

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23	Налоговый орган, уполномоченный на аккредитацию филиалов, представительств иностранных юридических лиц	7747, Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 47 по г.Москве
24	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	26.03.2015
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
25	Идентификационный номер налогоплательщика (ИНН)	9909159891
26	Код причины постановки на учет (КПП)	253151001
27	Дата постановки на учет	29.10.2007
28	Наименование налогового органа	2502, Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 10 по Приморскому краю
29	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	15.06.2016
Сведения о руководителе филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации		
30	Фамилия	ЧВЭ
31	Имя	СОН ИР
32	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	22.08.2017
Сведения о численности иностранных граждан, являющихся работниками филиала, представительства		
33	Численность иностранных работников	5
34	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности филиала, представительства в Российской Федерации по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности (ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)		
Сведения об основном виде экономической деятельности		
35	Код и наименование вида деятельности	73.20 Исследование коньюнктуры рынка и изучение общественного мнения
36	Дата внесения в РАФП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	05.10.2016
Сведения об иных видах экономической деятельности		
1		

Surname: Chve
Name: Son Ir

Number of foreign workers: 5

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Source: State Register of Accredited Branches, Representations of Foreign Legal Entities, https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/#

3. Official court documents from the Russian Federation referencing the head of a a representative office for GENCO in Russia by the initials K.Y. These correspond to those of Ko Yongil, the registered director of GENCO's representation in Vladivostok.



АРТЁМОВСКИЙ ГОРОДСКОЙ СУД
ПРИМОРСКОГО КРАЯ

ОИЗВОДСТВО ⌄ ТЕРРИТОРИАЛЬНАЯ ПОДСУДНОСТЬ ⌄ КАЛЬКУЛЯТОР ГОСПОШЛИНЫ ⌄

ДЕЛА В ПРОИЗВОДСТВЕ СУДА

Список дел, назначенных к слушанию на 14.01.2019 Показать

Поиск информации по делам


Вернуться к списку дел

Уголовные дела


ДЕЛО № 1-416/2018

…

- 42402 (forty-two thousand four hundred and two) US dollars – transfer to head of the



- 42 402 (сорок две тысячи четыреста два) доллара США - передать главе представительства Корейского генерального общества по строительству за рубежом «<данные изъяты>» (КНДР) К.Ы. (для возвращения законным владельцам).



2006-2018 «Государственная автоматизированная система Российской Федерации «Правосудие»

Source: Artemovski City Court of Primorski Krai, https://artemovsky--prm.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&name_op=case&_id=148809085&_deloId=1540006&_caseType=0&_new=0&srv_num=1

Annex 66: Company information for entities registered with the Russian translation for GENCO ('ZENKO') and are owned—in whole or in part—by DPRK nationals, and have received authorization to employ DPRK nationals

Company name	Tax identification number	Registered Address	Associated individuals	Contact information
LLC "ZENKO" (ООО "ЗЕНКО")	7204162965	24A ulitsa Svetlaya, Tyumen, Tyumenskaya Oblast, Russia	Pak Gvan Min (ПАК ГВАН МИН) - Role: director - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number: 723020846617 Kim Gvan Ir (КИМ ГВАН ИР) - Role: owner - Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown Kim Men Kho (КИМ МЕН ХО) - Role: contact on job posting - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number: unknown	Telephone numbers +7 (345) 2757212 +7 (345) 2297166 +7 (345) 2699249 +7 (982) 9477543 Email addresses genco-37@list.ru 4bkb@bk.ru
LLC "ZENKO-15" (ООО "ЗЕНКО-15")	2536133013	Office 411, 1 ulitsa Pionerskaya, Vladivostok, Primorski Krai, Russia	Kim Sen Guk (КИМ СЕН ГУК) - Role: director - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number: 253614442780 Kim Tong O (КИМ ТОНГ О) - Role: owner - Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown Pak Chen Sik (ПАК ЧЕН СИК) - Role: contact on job posting - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number unknown	Telephone numbers +7 (914) 7350156 +7 (423) 2762279 +7 (423) 2716707 Email addresses pa.stroy@mail.ru e.gutman@vdc.ru
LLC "ZENKO-39" (ООО "ЗЕНКО-39")	2308160794	2/1 ulitsa im Bogdana Khmelnitskogo, Krasndar, Krasnodarski Krai, Russia	Ryu Chkhun Ren (РЮ ЧХУН РЁН) - Role: director - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number: 231133389520 Chan Chin Men (ЧАН ЧИН МЕН) - Role: co-owner - Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown Chen Gen Cher (ЧЕН ГЕН ЧЕР) - Role: co-owner - Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown	Telephone numbers +7 (861) 5866425 +7 (861) 8862992 +7 (905) 4953597 +7 (961) 5866425 +7 (918) 1383996 Email addresses genco39@mail.ru
LLC "ZENKO-21" (ООО "ЗЕНКО-21")	2508064689	13A ulitsa Malinovskogo, Nakhodka, Primorski Krai, Russia	Kan Sen Kho (КАН СЕН ХО) - Role: director - Nationality: unknown - Tax identification number: 250821723134 Kim Sen Khvan (КИМ СЕН ХВАН) - Role: co-owner	Telephone numbers +7 (423) 6642332 +7 (902) 0606907 +7 (4236) 712327 Email addresses

			- Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown Kim Cher Min (КИМ ЧЕР МИН) - Role: co-owner - Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown Li Syn Ir (ЛИ СЫН ИР) - Role: co-owner - Nationality: DPRK - Tax identification number: unknown	zerou333@gmail.com

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities; SPARK; Trudvsem

Annex 67: Documents showing LLC "ZENKO", LLC "ZENKO-15", LLC "ZENKO-39", and LLC "ZENKO-21" to be owned by DPRK nationals

SPARK

OOO "ZENKO" (INN 7204162965 · OGRN 1107232043490), 14/11/2018 23:25 MSK

Shareholders, EGRUL

EGRUL

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Kim Gvan Ir	—	15 000	100.00	10.03.2016

History of changes

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Kim Gvan Ir	—	10 000	66.67	04.04.2012
Pak Ton Gyun	—	5 000	33.33	04.04.2012
Kim Gvan Ir	—	10 000	66.67	12.10.2011
Kim Chkhun Ik	—	5 000	33.33	14.12.2010
Kim Gvan Ir	—	5 000	33.33	14.12.2010

Rosstat

Last updated on : 06.08.2018

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %
INOSTR.GRAZHDANIN (1)	—	15 000	100.00

History of changes

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Last updated on
Grazhdane Korei	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	15 000	100.00	06.04.2012
Grazhdanin Korei	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	10 000	100.00	26.03.2012
Kim Gvan Ir	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	10 000	100.00	13.10.2011
Kim Chkhun Ik	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	5 000	50.00	01.01.2011
Kim Gvan Ir	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	5 000	50.00	01.01.2011

Source: SPARK, https://spark-interfax.ru/

SPARK "ZENKO-15 CO., LTD" (INN 2536133013 · OGRN 1032501289952), 14/11/2018 23:26 MSK

Shareholders, EGRUL

EGRUL

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Kim Tong O	—	25 000	100.00	13.06.2018

History of changes

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Pak Chen Sik	—	25 000	100.00	22.11.2016
Kim Yn Khek	—	12 500	50.00	17.06.2015
Pak Chen Sik	—	12 500	50.00	17.06.2015
Yu En Nam	—	10 000	50.00	27.04.2012
Kim Cher En	—	10 000	50.00	26.04.2011
Li San Cher	—	10 000	50.00	25.08.2009
Tsoi In Guk	—	10 000	50.00	25.08.2009
Khvan En Gi	—	10 000	50.00	09.04.2009
Kim Sen Nam	—		—	12.05.2006
Lim En Nam	—		—	12.05.2006
Kim Sen Nam	—	10 000	50.00	28.03.2003
Lim En Nam	—	10 000	50.00	28.03.2003

Rosstat

Last updated on : 29.10.2018

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %
GRAZHDANIN KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA^KOREISKAYA NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA (1)	—	25 000	100.00

History of changes

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Last updated on
Grazhdane KNDR (2)	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	20 000	100.00	31.01.2013
Grazhdani KNDR (2)	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA	20 000	100.00	05.12.2011
LI SUN CHER	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA	10 000	50.00	30.06.2009

Source: SPARK, https://spark-interfax.ru/

SPARK OOO "ZENKO-39" (INN 2308160794 · OGRN 1092308007670), 14/11/2018 23:30 MSK

Shareholders, EGRUL

EGRUL

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Chan Chin Men	—	5 000	50.00	14.04.2010
Chen Gen Cher	—	5 000	50.00	14.04.2010

Rosstat

Last updated on : 24.10.2018

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %
Citizens of Russia (1)	—	5 000	50.00
GRAZHDANIN KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA^KOREISKAYA NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA (1)	—	5 000	50.00

History of changes

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Last updated on
Citizens of Russia, имеющий постоянное местожительство за границей	—	5 000	50.00	16.09.2016
GRAZHDANIN ROSSII, IMEYUSHCHI POSTOYANNOE MESTOZHITELSTVO ZA GRANITSEI (1)	—	5 000	50.00	05.05.2016
Grazhdanin Korei	KNDR	5 000	50.00	16.04.2015
Grazhdanin Rossii, postoyanno prozhivayushchie za granitsei	—	5 000	50.00	16.04.2015
Grazhdane Korei (2)	KNDR	10 000	100.00	23.10.2013
Grazhdane (2) - KITAI	KITAI	10 000	100.00	30.11.2012
Chan Chin Men	KITAI	5 000	50.00	30.09.2009
Chen Gen Cher	KITAI	5 000	50.00	30.09.2009

Source: SPARK, https://spark-interfax.ru/

SPARK "ZENKO-21 CO., LTD" (INN 2508064689 · OGRN 1042501608258), 14/11/2018 23:31 MSK

Shareholders, EGRUL

EGRUL

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Li Syn Ir	—	9 000	47.40	24.11.2009
Kim Cher Min	—	5 000	26.30	24.11.2009
Kim Sen Khvan	—	5 000	26.30	24.11.2009

History of changes

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
Kim Khun	—	9 000	47.37	12.09.2008
Tsoi Bon Chkhor	—	5 000	26.32	12.09.2008
Tsoi Chen Gir	—	5 000	26.32	12.09.2008
Kim Khun	—	19 000	100.00	20.07.2004

Rosstat

Last updated on : 06.08.2018

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %
GRAZHDANE KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA^KOREISKAYA NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA (3)	—	19 000	100.00

History of changes

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Last updated on
GRAZHDANE KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA^KOREISKAYA NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAYA RESPUBLIKA (3)	—	19 000	50.00	29.03.2016
GRAZHDANIN KITAI^KITAISKAYA NARODNAYA RESPUBLIKA (1)	—	19 000	50.00	29.03.2016
Grazhdane Korei (5)	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAY A RESPUBLIKA	29 000	100.00	19.11.2012
Grazhdane Korei (3)	KOREYA, NARODNO-DEMOKRATICHESKAY A RESPUBLIKA	19 000	100.00	20.01.2012

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Source: SPARK, https://spark-interfax.ru/

Annex 68: Authorizations to hire DPRK laborers awarded to LLC "ZENKO", LLC "ZENKO-15", LLC "ZENKO-39", and LLC "ZENKO-21" in 2018

Number of foreign workers

Country code

Korea, Democratic People's Republic

ООО Зенко	625056, Тюменская область, г. Тюмень, ул. Светлая 24/а	7204162965	43.99	Бетонщик	11196	8	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко	625056, Тюменская область, г. Тюмень, ул. Светлая 24/а	7204162965	43.39	Каменщик	12680	5	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко	625056, Тюменская область, г. Тюмень, ул. Светлая 24/а	7204162965	41.20	Штукатур	19727	28	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330

ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Арматурщик	11122	2	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Бетонщик	11196	4	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Каменщик	12680	2	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Облицовщик-плиточник	15220	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Плотник	16671	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Штукатур	19727	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Переводчик	25531	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Производитель работ (прораб) (в строительстве)	25865	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-15	г. Владивосток, ул. Жариковская, д.13	2536133013	41.20	Руководитель группы (специализированной в прочих отраслях)	26151	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330


ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Арматурщик	11121	26	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Бетонщик	11196	23	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Каменщик	12680	51	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Маляр	13450	23	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Облицовщик-плиточ	15220	11	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Шпаклевщик	19690	15	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Штукатур	19727	21	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО Зенко-39	350005, г. Краснодар, ул. Богдана Хмельницкого д.2 корпус 1	2308160794	41.20	Начальник бригады	24432	2	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330


ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Арматурщик	11121	20	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Бетонщик	11196	20	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Каменщик	12680	10	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Облицовщик-плиточник	15220	10	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Плотник	16671	6	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Штукатур	19727	6	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Переводчик технической литературы	25535	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408
ООО ЗЕНКО-21	Приморский край г. Находка, ул. Малиновского 13 а	2508064689	41	Производитель работ (прораб) (в строительстве)	25865	1	Корея, народно-демократическая республика	408

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330

Annex 69: Online Glocom advertisements in 2018 (Twitter and Glocom website)




Tweet from 16 December 2018. Accessed on 10 January 2019 at
https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1074529145629986818
Archived version available at:
https://web.archive.org/save/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1074529145629986818




Tweet from 7 September 2018. Accessed at
https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1038305737338847237 on 10 January 2019.
Archived version available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20190110205253/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1038305737338847237



Accessed at http://www.glocom-corp.com/2018/ on 13 January 2019



Tweet from 6 June 2018. Accessed at https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1004600845034389504 on 10 January 2019. Archived version at https://web.archive.org/save/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1004600845034389504



Tweet from 6 June 2018. Accessed at https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1007416970894028800 on 10 January 2019. Archived version at https://web.archive.org/save/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1007416970894028800



Support@Glocom @GlocomSupport · May 24
@GlocomSupport GS-2200 C4I Mobile System, glocom-corp.com




Support@Glocom @GlocomSupport · Jun 7
The modernized soldier who is equipped with @GlocomSupport radios. The GS-2500 soldier system includes GR-150 HF Manpack Radio and GR-611 Secure Soldier Radio. More details at glocom-corp.com and any question at support@glocom-corp.com. Thanks.



Support@Glocom @GlocomSupport · Jul 8

@GlocomSupport The GS-930HQ-CS is a C2 Information System designed to support operational staff in planning and executing missions. glocom-corp.com




Support@Glocom @GlocomSupport · Jun 15

@GlocomSupport GD-200 Battlefield Surveillance Radar, Range 4~10Km. Man portable radio. Suitable for border control and battlefield surveillance. Refer to glocom-corp.com for more details.



Source: @GlocomSupport twitter feed

Annex 70: Advertisement for GR-611 Secure Personal Radio”, the “GR-8600M”



Source: Pinterest https://www.pinterest.ca/pin/594404850793634523/

Annex 71: Information on shared addresses between Li Zhengang's company, Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd., an individual and an entity previously identified in association to DPRK shipping activities which have violated the resolutions

On Chinese business registry filings, Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd. lists the same registered address as a second Chinese company Dandong Jingao Trading Co., Ltd. (丹东京奥贸易有限公司). Until 14 March 2017, a Hong Kong-registered company Jingao Dalin Trading Co., Ltd. (京奧達林貿易有限公司) used an identical English and Chinese name to Dandong Jingao Trading Co., Ltd. The Hong Kong-registered company lists one and the same director and shareholder, Sun Chengguo (孫成國; simplified 孙成国), whose name is identical to that of the legal representative of Dandong Jingao Trading Co., Ltd.

On Hong Kong registry documents of Jingao Dalin Trading Co., Ltd, Sun Chengguo lists a residential address at Room 916, DL1504, Youhao Building, 158 Youhao Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China· Sun Chengguo's residential address is nearly identical to that of at least one other Chinese national whom the Panel has previously identified in association with illicit DPRK shipping operations:

PAN WEICHAO (潘衛朝) lists Room 916, DL, Youhao Building, 158 Youhao Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China, on the 2016 Annual Return for Pantech Shipping Limited (泛科海運有限公司). The Panel noted in S/2017/150 paragraph 67 footnote 74 that PAN WEICHAO acted as an emergency contact for K-Brothers—the Marshall Islands-based operator of the *Jie Shun* (IMO 8518780).

In addition, this same address: Room 916, DL1504, Youhao Building, 158 Youhao Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China is also the address listed for a United Nations designated entity, Chang An Shipping & Technology Ltd ((長安海運技術有限公司) in the Hong Kong business registry

Ship ownership records indicate that Chang An Shipping & Technology Limited was the ship manager, commercial manager, and registered owner of the *Hua Fu*
(IMO 90200003). The director of the company is GU BAOFU (顧寶富). Both Chang An Shipping & Technology Limited and the *Hua Fu* were designated by the 1718 Committee on 30 March 2018.[185]

Source: Corporate Registry documents of Hong Kong and China mainland

[185] Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee Adds 22 Entries to Its Sanctions List, Designates 27 Vessels, UN Press Release, 30 March 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13272.doc.htm

Annex 72: Panel findings in OCN / T Specialist case investigation since 2018 Panel final report (S/2018/171, paras 179-188)

OCN previously stated to the Panel that it stopped shipping products to the DPRK as of late 2012, shifting its business into China in 2013 through Wang Zhi Guo and his company, Pinnacle Offshore Trading. OCN also said that it shipped goods to Dalian as the destination port for distribution in China and had "no knowledge of the authenticity of the sale of goods in DPRK as included in your letter and no knowledge of how any such goods ended up in DPRK." However, when pressed on the business justification for shifting its sales to China of the same goods previously sold in the DPRK (including Singapore-distributed items made by Yamaha, Seiko, Montblanc and the like, which all have distributors in China), OCN admitted prior knowledge that the DPRK was the ultimate destination of their goods, stating " T Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd would sell the goods to China via the buyer of the goods, Longsheng Weida. The buyers in China at the Chinese customs will approve the goods before receiving them and allowing them to be transshipped to DPRK. Before the good were sent out, the Chinese parties will do the clearance of the goods. Our Client do not receive the receipts of the transactions between the Chinese parties to DPRK."

The company provided the Panel with multiple invoices for sales to Tianjin Longshengweida Import & Export Co, Ltd and Changzhou Jesinson Trading Co., both of which appear to be international freight forwarding companies. The Panel also launched an investigation into the role of the German company M*ül*ller + Partner in the provision of logistics for the above-mentioned companies, but still has not received answers to its inquiries dating from December 2017.

With regard to the T Specialist-owned and distributed brands, Fresh F and Watari, which have been on sale in the DPRK Bugsae / Pothonggang Ryugyong stores through at least July 2017, T Specialist stated: "It is prudent to note that the said products were originally also intended to be shipped and sold to Cyprus. However, these products were not saleable in Cyprus, hence, our Chinese counterparty suggested that we sell the products in DPRK."

OCN-Pyongyang manager simultaneously employed by OCN Singapore

OCN Singapore's relationship with Ri Ik dates back to his first visit to Singapore in 1991, at which time he was employed as a trading manager by the original Bugsae Shop. According to OCN, around 2004, Ri lk was made an employee of OCN Singapore to "assist in the sale of products to the DPRK". OCN has not provided his full terms of reference as requested by the Panel, stating that they are under the custody of Singapore investigative agencies.[186] OCN did however admit that Ri Ik had remained employed throughout most of 2017, providing a copy of the revocation dated 29 January 2018 of his Singaporean employment pass. Regarding the Panel's request for salary information, OCN stated: "Mr. Ri Ik did not draw a salary, and the value of his work done was used to off-set the sums that were due and payable to our Clients." OCN/ T Specialist Singapore stated that it had no control or interests in OCN Pyongyang, despite the fact that it was under the full control of one of its long-term employees and to which it sold a substantial amount of goods. The way in which OCN Pyongyang operated

[186] OCN stated, "Our Clients also do not have in their power, custody and/or possession, any "contract" or "communications, contracts, agreements and other forms of documentation with Ri'. The said documents, if any, have been under the custody of the investigation agencies in Singapore since 6 December 2017, and our Clients do not have copies of it, and are not able to provide you of the same."

relatively independently of OCN Singapore is common DPRK practice as already seen in the Panel's investigation of Pan Systems Singapore and Pan Systems Pyongyang.

The Panel notes, however, that Ri Ik would not have been able to set up a foreign currency account in Pyongyang without OCN Singapore's paperwork and tacit consent. Indeed, OCN Singapore ensured that the daily transactions of the account were fully managed by Ri Ik so that it could ensure plausible deniability. Ri Ik used that account to transfer payments back to OCN Singapore for items sold in the DPRK. Given the difficulty of any DPRK banks to engage in open global transactions, at least eight Hong Kong-based front companies transferred the payments into OCN Singapore's account in Singapore, including the following: Pan Ocean Investments, Hongdae International, Yun King International, Albion Commercial Ventures, Highweal Trading, Headsoon Trading, Sama Industrial, and Heping Industrial. The Panel notes that the use of multiple front companies to pay for the purchase of its goods and the break-down of payments into several series of *smaller* transactions, as done in this case, are well-known sanctions evasion tactic.

Annex 73 Information provided to the Panel by Singapore on Wang Zhi Guo (王志国) and Li Ik (aka Ri Ik).

A. Wang Zhi Guo

China Passport Number: **E2548653**
Date of Birth: **11 July 1962**
Date of expiry: **10 September 2023**
Place of issue: **Tianjin, China**



Current Address and Status in Singapore

- Wang Zhiguo is a Singapore Permanent Resident. His address is 500F Marine Parade Road, #04-23, Singapore 449289. He is currently in Singapore.
- Wang Zhiguo is a Chinese national and Singapore Permanent Resident (SPR). Wang was first issued an Employment Pass in 1995 and obtained his SPR on 14 February 2003. His Re-Entry Permit is valid until 19 July 2022.

Dates moved to Singapore

- Wang Zhiguo was first issued a Singapore Employment Pass in 1995.

Travel

- Wang Zhiguo is currently in Singapore.
- Our authorities have impounded Wang Zhiguo’s passport since 6 December 2018

B. Li Ik (aka Ri Ik)

Date of Birth: **11 February 1963**
DPRK Passport No. **745420357**
Expiry: **11 November 2020**



Current Address and Status in Singapore

- Li Ik departed Singapore on 8 June 2017 and has not returned since. Li Ik's Employment Pass was revoked in January 2018. Li Ik is not a Singapore Permanent Resident.
- Before his pass was revoked, his job title had been "Regional Business Development Manager" for OCN (Singapore) Ltd
- Li Ik first obtained his Singapore Employment Pass on 12 April 2004.
- The Singaporean authorities informed the Panel that they do not have Li Ik's employment contracts and/or assigned tasks.. His annual salary package from 2012 to 2015 was between S$92,462.75 to S$113,384.19.

Travel

- According to travel records, Li Ik traveled in and out of Singapore frequently over the past five years (in some years averaging one trip per month).
- Li Ik departed Singapore on 8 June 2017 and Singapore has not received any visa application from him to re-enter the country. All DPRK nationals require a visa to enter Singapore. Singapore informed the Panel that it does not have knowledge of Li Ik's whereabouts since then.

<u>Personal details for Mr. Li Ik provided to obtain his Singapore Employment Pass</u>:

I. Education Certificates at all levels
1) Sep. 1969 -Aug 1973 Pyongyang Sanghung Primary School
2) Sep. 1973 - Aug 1979 Pyongyang Jangsan Senior Middle Schoo

3) Sep 1979-Aug 1981 Serve in the Korean Peoples Army
4) Sep 1981-Nov 1986 Kim 11 Song's University D.P.R. of Korea

2. Curriculum Vitae (CV) of working experiences from time after leaving school

1) Dec 1986 -Dec 1990. Manager of Daesong General Corporation D.P.R. of Korea
2) Jan 1991 -Apr 1992 Manager of Korea Asia Trading Company
3) May 1992-Jul 1994 Section Chief Manager of Korea Duty-free Company
4) Aug 1994 - Chief Manager of OCN (Singapore) PTE LTD Pyongyang Office

3. Home address
Potonggang-dong 27, 3-2, Potonggang District Pyongyang D.P.R. of Korea

4. Passport number: S 190220613
Date of Birth: ll-Feb-1963
Country of issue: D.P.R. of Korea
Place of issue: Ministry of Foreign Affairs D.P.R. of Korea
Date of issue: 28-Apr-2000
Expiry date: 5 years (28-Apr-2005)

5. Religion - Atheist

Married to: Ms Ju Myong Suk
Date of Birth: 7 Dec 1963

Source: Member State

Annex 74 Cooperative entities and joint ventures and other companies investigated by the Panel: Argentina, Australia, Cambodia, China, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Malta, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia

Argentina

Argentina indicated to the Panel that searches for the firm Sonbong-Promotra JV Co. yielded no positive data in their search of financial databases nor any additional data on any links between the firm and Argentina. Argentina also stated that no nationals of the DPRK have been registered since 2004 as migrant workers.

Source: Member State

Australia

In its reply to the Panel ‘s letter on Sonbong Kost J.V. Company (a.k.a Samhung Kost J.V. Company, Sam Hung KOAST Joint Venture Pyongyang, 선봉코스트합영회사 , Australia cooperated with the Panel by providing detailed information on the company’s operational status, current officers, business activities, bank account information in an Asian country, ownership, and business history. Australia also informed the Panel that it was investigating the matter and provided the Panel with its detailed confidential initial findings. It further stated that it places the highest priority on implementing UNSC resolutions, and takes appropriate action to respond to potential breaches of sanctions. It further clarified that pursuant to UN Security Council sanctions, Australian law prohibits the establishment, maintenance, or operation of a joint venture or cooperative entity (however described) with a DPRK person or entity, a person or entity acting on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK person or entity, or an entity owned or controlled by a DPRK person or entity. Australia also indicated that it was assessing whether available information suggests that any of the funds, financial assets and economic resources of Koast Group Pty Ltd are owned or controlled. directly or indirectly, by designated individuals or entities; or the Government of the DPRK or the Workers Party of Korea.

Source: Corporate registry, Member State

Cambodia

Business name (Eng)	Location
Pyongyang (Koryo) Restaurant / Pyongyang Traditional Restaurant	400 Preah Monivong Blvd (93), Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Pyongyang Arirang Restaurant	215, 32 Jawaharlal Nehru Blvd (215), Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Pyongyang Unhasu Restaurant	#10A, Street 315, Sangkat Beung Kok I,Khan Toulkork, Phnom Penh,Cambodia, Phnom Penh 12000, Cambodia In addition to providing food services, this company is also registered as engaged in "other financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding activities," in addition to various other activities that are unusual for a restaurant to be engaged in.

Source: Open source information

China

English Name	City	Eng Address
Dae Dong Gang North Korean Cuisine	Beijing	North Tucheng East Road, Yuan Dadu Heritage Park, No. 6
Pyongyang Hae Dang Hwa - Landao Branch	Beijing	Chaoyang Menwai Dajie 12, Kunming Mall 2 (Landao Building West)
Pyongyang Mo Ran Bong - Yizhuang Branch	Beijing	Yizhuang Economic and Technological Development Zone, Ronghua Road 10, Yicheng International Center Q102
Pyongyang Rungrado - Baofusi Branch	Beijing	Zhongguancun Baofusi Bridge 81 (opposite of the Institute of Computing and Technology)
Sin Dae Jong Kim Gang Won Restaurant and Performance Hall	Beijing	1st Floor, Xinzhai Hotel, No.58 Maidian Street
Pyongyang Restaurant	Changchun	Intersection of Liberty Road and Linhe Street
Mo Ran Bong North Korea Performance Hotel	Dalian	Xinghai Square, Area E, 46
Pyongyang Restaurant	Dalian	No.94 Xinglin Street, Zhongshan District, Dalian 116001, China
Pyongyang Jindal Chae Restaurant	Dandong	Building 2 198 Donggang S Rd, Donggang Shi, Dandong Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 118300

Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant	Dandong	Binjiang Middle Rd, Zhenxing Qu, Dandong Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant	Dandong	8th Latitude Rd, Zhenxing Qu, Dandong Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 118000
Liujing Hotel	Dandong	1-2F, Jiadi Plaza, Binjiang Middle Road
Xin'an Dongge Hotel	Dandong	No.98 Jinjiang Street
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant	Harbin	202 Gogol Street, Harbin, China
Pyongyang Mo Ran Bong - Altay Branch	Hohhot	Xing'an North Road, Caoyuan City
Pyongyang Seol Kyung Restaurant	Hohhot	Olympic Hotel, Floor 2
Jindal North Korean Restaurant	Kunming	Luyou Dujia Qu, Xigong Matou 2 Dong
Pyongyang North Korean Restaurant	Nanchang	1515 Nanjing East Road, Aixi Lake
Myo Hyang San Restaurant	Qinhuangdao	Yingbin Road 298, Haigang District, Qinhuangdao, Hebei, China
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant -- Gu North Road	Shanghai	GuBei Road 1088 2 Floor, Shanghai, China
Pyongyang Arirang	Shanghai	1050 Wuzhong Rd, Minhang Qu, Shanghai Shi, China, 201103
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant - Tongmao Branch	Shanghai	First Floor 357 Songlin Rd, Pudong Xinqu, Shanghai Shi, China, 200000
Pyongyang Myo Hyang Restaurant - Putuo Branch	Shanghai	555 Caoyang Rd, Putuo Qu, Shanghai Shi, China, 200063
Pyongyang Oak Ryu Restaurant	Shanghai	439 Caoxi N Rd, XuJiaHui, Xuhui Qu, Shanghai Shi, China, 200000
Pyongyang Restaurant	Shanghai	3rd Floor, Western District, Binggu Cultural Leisure Plaza, 341 Tianshan Road
Chilbosan Hotel	Shenyang	No.79-81 Shiyiwei Road, Helping District, Shenyang 110003, China
Pyongyang Dong Myo Hyang San	Shenyang	85 Tumen Road, Shenyang, China
Pyongyang Friendship Dongmyung Restaurant	Shenyang	Antu St, XiTa HanGuo FengQing Jie, Heping Qu, Shenyang Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 110000

Pyongyang Mo Ran Bong Hotel	Shenyang	43 Harbin Road, Shenyang, China
Pyongyang Restaurant	Shenyang	106 Shifu Rd, XiTa HanGuo FengQing Jie, Heping Qu, Shenyang Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 110002
Moranbong	Shenyang	93 Xita Road
You Kyung Kim Dal Chae	Shijiazhuang	ChangAn District GuangAn Main Street 16, MeiDong International 2 Floor, Shijiazhuang, China
North Korea Pyongyang Eun Ban Restaurant	Taiyuan	Binhe Donglu and Xuefu Street, Shizi Southwest Corner, Luohe Park, No. 2 Parking Lot
Hongqing Hotel - Hongqiao Branch	Wuxi	889 Hongqiao Road (Shenzhou Building)
Liujing Hotel	Yanji	124 Xinxing St, Yanji Shi, Yanbian Chaoxianzuzizhizhou, Jilin Sheng, China, 133000

Source: The Panel, Member State, open source research

MINISO

The Panel also investigated a possible joint venture between a Hong Kong company and a DPRK company which operates a commodity chain in Pyongyang.[187] In May 2018, the company stated that Chinese Headquarters of MINISO was in charge of the international business partnership, and that the products sold to the DPRK were made in China. MINISO further stated that the international agency contract to open the Pyongyang branch was agreed between MINISO International Hong Kong Limited and “Korea Jinhwa joint corporation”[188] represented by a DPRK national Nam Song Il[189], but that contract was terminated on 15 August 2017. Supporting documents were provided. While MINISO claimed that products stopped being supplied in May 2017, the Panel obtained information that as of July 2018, the shop is still open with the original MINISO interior, but with the label “Jinhwa”, and products of several foreign brands have been sold. The Panel requested information but has yet to receive a reply from the companies (figure). The Panel recommends that the relevant Member State comply with paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017).

[187] See S/2018/171 para. 147

[188] Original name shown in the documents is “朝鲜进化合作会社”

[189] Chinese character:南誠一, A.k.a Nan Chengyi. DPRK Passport Number: PO 836337346. DOB 22 January 1955.

(Figure) MINISO brand displayed in Pyongyang branch in April 2018



Source: NK Pro

Source: The Panel, open source

Japan

Japan replied "So far [the Government of Japan] "could not confirm any information that indicates the joint ventures and cooperative entities pointed out by the Panel exist or currently operate in Japan, or information that shows relationships between the partner companies identified by the Panel and the North Korean joint ventures." Japan also stated that it went further by prohibiting all exports to and imports from the DPRK and transactions with the DPRK.

Source: Member State

Laos

Business name (Eng.)	Owner	Manager	Business type
Representative Office of Korea Dongyang 5 Trading Corporation	Ms. SOWON SOOB	Mr. SOWON SOOB	Investment Analyst on road, bridge, irrigation construction and trade
Representative Office of SK Architect and Construction	Mr. CIIIM CHAE JOON	Mr. CIIIM CHAE JOON	Investment analyst on hydro power
Pyongyang Friendship Restaurant	Ms. WANG ANHULI	Ms WANG ANHULI	Restaurant
Korea K Choeng Bong Trading Corporation	Mr. CHANGSONG KIM	Mr. CHANSONG KIM	Program design consultant

Western Restaurant	Mr. BONGJO YUN	M R. BONGJO YUN	Restaurant
Better Life Tomorrow Lao Ltd. Co	Mr. Jaekook Sin		Pharmaceutical

Source: Member State, open source

Malaysia

Business Name	Number	Address	Directors	Shareholders	Start
MKP BUILDERS SDN. BHD	386207-P	2-3-11 (3rd Floor)Menara Klh Business Centre 2, Jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shahkuala Lumpurwilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 cheras, selangor	Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	Yong Kok Yeap	6 May 1996
MKP CAPITAL LLC BERHAD	980801-M	24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	2 March 2012
MKP DYNAMIC ENGINEERING SDN. BHD	735910-W	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor	Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato'dr Amar Singh; Fang Chee Peng; Yong Kok Yeap; Muhammad Danial Bin Osman;	Karnail Singh Nijhar Amar Singh, Tansri Dato'dr; Yong Kok Yeap; Soh Pui Hoon; Han Hun Il; Ramanan Ramakrishnan	31 May 2006
MKP HOLDINGS SDN. BHD	464492-W	2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il;	Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il	23 June 1998

		Lot 5, Jalan 1 kaw. Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 batu 9 Cheras Selangor			
Nekad Ziplem SDN. BHD	614359-U	52 a, Jalan Landak off Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan C/O Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor)	Han Hun Il; Yong Kok Yeap;	Jusoh Bin Awang; Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il; Sumairi Bin Hashim	7 May 2003

*Source: C*orporate registry, open source information

Malta

According to open source information, Kormal Import and Export Company was founded 17 November 2011. "C 54431" is its corporate registration number. Kormal does not appear to have a website or a public profile beyond its appearance in various corporate registry databases. It is an "active" corporation according to Open Corporates and Malta's Registry of Companies. According to Malta's Registry of Companies and it has filed documents as recently as 2 March 2018.

- In Malta's Registry of Companies the Director of the company is Song Hui Song, with the registered address in the DPRK. According to the registry she is the sole shareholder. Kormal's secretary, Kuk Chol Jo, has the same registered DPRK address as Song Hui Song. The company's corporate registry documents list its auditor as a non-DPRK foreign national, however it is unclear whether a Maltese auditor's involvement would qualify this entity as a JV.

- According to documents on Malta's Registry of Companies, Kormal has been filing documents regularly since its inception in 2011 except for a two-year period directly after its inception until 2013. Its most recent documents are from 2 March 2018.

Source: Corporate registry and open source information

Poland

Business name	Name (other languages)	Location in DPRK	Name of partner company	DPRK nationals involved & other info	Partner HQ location
Wonye Sp. Z o.o.			Ms. Cecylia Kowalska	Mr. Jo Chol Yong (DPRK national) is President of the Board, shareholder; Mr. Kang Hong Gu, Vice President of the Board	Ul. Marynarki Polskiej 96, 80-557 Gdańsk, Poland
Redshield Sp. Z o. o.				Mr. Pak Jong Ho, President of the Board	Ul. Stołczyńska 100 D, 71-869 Szczecin, Poland

Source: Corporate registry, Member State, open source information

Russian Federation

Russian Federation communication of 8 January 2019 stated the following

В связи с запросами группы экспертов относительно деятельности на территории России совместных с КНДР предприятий сообщаем следующее.

Пунктом 18 резолюции СБ 2375 устанавливается запрет на открытие новых и дальнейшее функционирование уже существующих совместных с КНДР предприятий и кооперативных организаций. При этом в нашем прочтении под данными организационными формами предпринимательской деятельности понимаются юрлица, создаваемые на основе совместно внесенной собственности участниками из разных стран (в данном случае — из России и КНДР) при их совместном управлении предприятием и совместном распределении прибыли и рисков (при том, что в российском законодательстве такие формы организации юрлиц, как СП или кооперативные предприятия, не существуют в принципе).

В этой связи исходим из того, что деятельность представительств северокорейских компаний не регулируется международным санкционным режимом в отношении КНДР, поскольку они являются обособленными подразделениями легально функционирующих северокорейских компаний, расположенными вне места нахождения последних и представляющими исключительно интересы данных юрлиц. Согласно статье 55 Гражданского кодекса Российской Федерации представительства иностранных компаний на территории России не признаются юридическими лицами в силу того, что они «наделяются имуществом создавшими их юридическими лицами и действуют на основании утвержденных ими положений».

Более того, иностранные представительства в России проходят специальную процедуру регистрации при Торгово-промышленной палате Российской Федерации, не ведут коммерческой деятельности, не получают доходов и не платят налогов (кроме операционных - на недвижимость и т.п.). Поэтому они в принципе не могут служить источником финансирования запрещенных ракетно-ядерных программ КНДР, на пресечение которых,

собственно, и направлены действующие санкции СБ ООН в отношении КНДР.

С учетом вышеизложенного в случаях, когда на территории России функционируют официально зарегистрированные представительства не листированных по линии комитета СБ 1718 северокорейских компаний, нарушений пункта 18 резолюции 2375 мы не усматриваем.

Аналогичная ситуация наблюдается и применительно к ряду российских компаний, единственным учредителем которых является гражданин КНДР. Подобного рода предприятия зарегистрированы в качестве сугубо российских обществ с ограниченной ответственностью (а не совместных предприятий или кооперативов), что делает их российскими юридическими лицами со всеми вытекающими из этого правовыми последствиями. Ни по смыслу пункта 18 резолюции СБ 2375, ни по действующему российскому законодательству они не подпадают под категорию предприятий, на которые могут распространяться рестрикции СБ ООН в отношении КНДР.

По мере дальнейшей межведомственной проработки обращения экспертов и поступления дополнительных сведений имеем в виду соответствующим образом информировать группу.

В будущем были бы также признательны экспертам Комитета за следование сложившейся практике и направление подобного рода запросов не напрямую частным компаниям, а через постпредство. Тем более что в большинстве случаев указанные в реестрах адреса предприятий являются их юридическим, а не фактическим адресом нахождения, вследствие чего направленные таким образом обращения до адресатов попросту не доходят.

Source: Member State

English Translation

We wish to inform you of the following in connection with the inquiry made by the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the activity in Russia of joint ventures involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017) prohibits the operation of new, or the maintenance of existing, joint ventures or cooperative entities involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is our understanding that under the resolution such organizational entities are legal persons established through the joint contribution of resources by participants from different countries, in this case Russia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who jointly manage the venture, and share its profits and risks. Legal persons structured in this manner cannot exist under Russian law.

On that basis, we do not view the activities of the representative offices of North Korean companies as being covered by the international sanctions regime for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, since they are independent divisions of legally operating North Korean companies, situated in a different location and representing solely the interests of those legal persons. Under article 55 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, representative offices of foreign companies in Russia do not have the status of legal persons, because they are allocated assets by the legal persons establishing them and engage in activity as directed by those legal persons.

Furthermore, foreign representative offices in Russia are subject to special registration rules with the national Chamber of Commerce, may not engage in commercial activity, earn no revenue and pay no taxes, except on operating expenses, including for real estate. Therefore, they could not be a source of funding for the prohibited nuclear or ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which the Security Council has sought to halt by imposing sanctions against that country.

In view of the foregoing, we do not consider the activity in Russia of officially registered representative offices of North Korean companies that have not been placed on the United Nations Security Council sanctions list by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to be in violation of paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017).

Similarly, in the case of Russian companies having a sole founder who is a citizen of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, such companies are registered strictly as Russian limited liability companies, rather than joint ventures or cooperative entities, making them Russian legal persons with all the legal consequences that follow therefrom. Such companies are not considered subject to the restrictions imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the Security Council under paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017) or under current Russian law.

We shall keep the Panel of Experts informed as queries received from the Panel of Experts undergo the interagency review process and additional information becomes available.

In future, the Russian Federation would appreciate it if the Panel could follow established practice by directing its queries to the Russian Permanent Mission, rather than to the private companies. This is particularly important given that, in most cases, the company addresses indicated in the registries are that of their registered offices, rather than their actual physical address, and letters sent to the former address simply do not reach the addressees.

The Russian Federation provided the Panel with a list of companies which, after investigation, it found were closed as of January 2019. Those companies have not been included in the list below regardless of their current status in the corporate registery or whether they were in operation at some point in 2018. The list below does not include entities which corporate registration documents have listed as dissolved in 2018 including those that were in operation at some time in 2018. In the course of 2018, four companies changed their registration to being only Russian-owned.

There are no representative offices of DPRK entities in this list.

Name and Company Tax Id	Location Address	Names of DPRK Nationals and/or DPRK companies involved	Other Nationals Involved	Additional info	Type of Company
ООО "ПИОНЕР" (LLC "PIONER") Tax ID: 2502047408	12A ulitsa Nevskaya, Vladivostok, Russia, 690018	Owner is DPRK national Kim Khe Son (Ким Хе Сон) with tax identification number 254300252564.	Director is Russian national [redacted] with tax identification number [redacted]	Registered to the same address as the DPRK Consulate General in Vladivostok.	Renting and operating of real estate; construction; operation of restaurants and bars in railway cars and on ships
ООО "ПРИМАГРОСОЯ" (LLC "PRIMAGROSOYA") Tax ID: 2508110960	Office 3, 38V ulitsa Pogranichnaya, Nakhodka, Russia, 692922	Jointly owned by a Russian company, LLC "KNYAZHEVSKOE" (tax identification number 2506109736) and a DPRK entity, Korea Kumgang General Corporation.	Director is Russian national [redacted] for it with tax identification number [redacted]		Growing of cereals (except rice), leguminous crops and oil seeds
ООО "САКОРЕНМА" (LLC "SAKORENMA") Tax ID: 6501104474	8 ulitsa Polevaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Sakhalinskaya oblast, Russia	Co-owned by the Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO).	Co-owner and director is Russian national [redacted] with tax identification number [redacted].		Construction

ООО "ПОНХВА" (LLC "PONKHVA") Tax ID: 7701356953	Room 10, Structure 3, 14 pl. Spartakovskaya, Moscow, Russia, 105082	Owner is DPRK national Zo Son Sim (Зо Сон Сим), for whom a tax identification number is not specified.	Director is Russian national [redacted] with tax identification number [redacted].		Construction
ООО "КОРУС БИО-МЕД КО.ЛТД" (LLC "KORUS BIO-MED KO. LTD") Tax ID: 7720737111	28 ulitsa Moldagulovoi, Moscow, Russia, 111538	This company is engaged in ‘unspecified wholesale trade’ and is co-owned by a DPRK company, Pugang Pharmaceutical Company, and three Russian nationals.	Co-owners: [redacted] Their tax identification [redacted] are, respectively, [redacted] Note: [redacted] is also the company’s director.		Non-specialized wholesale trade
ООО "ЗАБАЙКАЛИНВЕСТСТРОЙ" (LLC "ZABAIKALINVESTSTROI")	32 proezd Energostroitelei, Chita, Russia, 672022	Owner is DPRK Li Yn Sok (Ли Ын Сок) with tax identification number 753626113575.	Director is Russian national [redacted]	The company was previously named LLC “Cholsan”.	Construction

Tax ID: 0326028065			[redacted] with tax identification number [redacted].	The same director-owner team control LLC “Chkholsan” (ООО "ЧХОЛСАН"; Tax ID 7536112799) and LLC Construction Company “RAI” (ООО СК "РАЙ"; Tax ID 7536132178)	
ООО "СК"РАЙ" (LLC Construction Company "RAI") Tax ID: 1328002427	43 shosse Aleksandrovskoe, Saransk, Russia, 430006	Co-owner is DPRK national Kim Tkhe En (Ким Тхэ Ен), for whom a tax identification number is not specified.	Director is Russian national [redacted]) with tax identification number is [redacted].		Construction
ООО с иностранными инвестициями СП "ТИСРИМОБ" (LLC JV "TISRIMOB") Tax ID: 2539069310	94 ulitsa Russkaya, Vladivostok, Russia	This company is a joint venture between the DPRK Ministry of Forestry and a Russian company, LLC "TIS", whose tax identification number is 2528004046.	Director is Russian national [redacted] with tax identification number [redacted].		Silviculture
ООО "ОРЮН" (LLC "ORYUN") Tax ID: 2540176852	10 ulitsa Krylova, Vladivostok, Russia, 690014	Owner is DPRK national Kim Khe Son (Ким Хе Сон), for whom a tax identification number is not specified.	Director is Russian national [redacted]) with tax identification number [redacted].	A DPRK restaurant named Kymgansan (Russian: КымГанСан) operates at the address registered to this company (https://www.vl.ru/kymgynsan).Open	Restaurants and mobile food service activities

				source information claims that its workers are DPRK nationals, from the chef to the waitresses to the restaurant owners (https://www.newsvl.ru/vlad/2017/09/22/163230/).	
ООО "ПХЕНЬЯН-МОРАНБОН" (LLC" PKENYAN-MORANBON") Tax ID: 2703086887	Room 1009, 15 prospekt Pervostroitelei, Komsomolsk-Na-Amure, Russia, 681003	This company's name is a russification of Pyongyang-Moranbong. It is jointly owned by a DPRK company ostensibly called Korean Trading Company "Eighth of March" and a Russian company, LLC “FOLANG”. The Russian company’s tax identification number is 2726008652.	Director is Russian national [redacted]), with tax identification number [redacted].		Restaurants and mobile food service activities
ООО "МЁХЯН" (LLC "MEKHYAN") Tax ID: 4101167437	Apt. 58, 2 ulitsa Tushkanova, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, Russia, 683031	Owner is DPRK national Li San Cher (Ли Сан Чер) with the tax identification number 410126524634.	Director is Russian national [redacted]) with tax identification number [redacted].	‘MEKHYAN’ is the Russian rendering of Myohyang.	Restaurants and mobile food service activities
ООО "АК-СТРОЙ" (LLC "AK-STROI") Tax ID: 4205255751	Room 6, Structure 6A, ulitsa	Co-owner is DPRK national Kim Sen Bok (Ким Сен Бок) with tax	Director is Russian national [redacted]		Plastering

	Krasnoarmeiskaya, Kemerovo, Russia, 650021	identification number 420555220832. This construction company is also co-owned by a Russian company, LLC "ELEKTRON-MAGAZIN", with tax identification number 4205194474.	[redacted]) with tax identification number [redacted].		
ООО "КАНСОН-ТЕКСТИЛЬ" (LLC "KANSON-TEKSTIL") Tax ID: 5018186644	Office 9, Floor 3, 34 prospekt Zavodskoi, Golitsyno, raion Odintsovski, oblast Moskovskaya, Russia, 143041	Owner is DPRK national Sim Li Khyan (Сим Ли Хян) with tax identification number 502730623502.	Director is Kim Son Khi (Ким Сон Хи) of an unspecified nationality with tax identification number [redacted].		Manufacture of outerwear
ООО "СК "ДЭСОН" (LLC Construction Company "DESON") Tax ID: 5027185855	8 ulitsa Initsiativnaya, Lyubertsy, Russia, 140000	Co-owner is DPRK national Kim Li Sen (Ким Ли Сен).	Co-owner and director is Russian national [redacted] with tax identification number [redacted].		Site preparation
ООО "ЭМА" (LLC "EMA") Tax ID: 6501196130	57 ulitsa Kryukova D.N., Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk,	Jointly owned by a DPRK entity, Korea Aprokgang Technical Development Corporation and a Russian company, LLC Private Security Company	Director is Russian national [redacted]		Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment

	Russia, 693020	“FINEKO-ROSA-2” with the tax identification number 6501160630.	[redacted] with tax identification number [redacted].		
OOO СП "РОСАЮМА" (LLC "ROSAYUMA") Tax ID: 6501253740	104 ulitsa Tikhaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia, 693005	Jointly owned by the Russian company, LLC “YUVESTA KOMPANI” with the tax identification number 6501151347 and a DPRK entity, Korea Paekma Trading Corporation.	Director is Russian national [redacted] with tax identification number [redacted].		Sawmilling and planing of wood
OOO СП "ФИТОН" (LLC JV "FITON") Tax ID: 7536033674	7 ulitsa Ugdanskaya, Chita, Russia, 672000	This company is formally registered as a joint venture. Its DPRK shareholder’s name, translated from Russian, is roughly ‘Management for the Manufacturing of Cortex Preparations’ (Russian: УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ПО ПРОИЗВОДСТВУ КОРЕПРЕПАРАТОВ МИНИСТЕРСТВА ЗДРАВООХРАНЕНИЯ КНДР).	Director is Russian national [redacted]) with tax identification number [redacted]. The Russian shareholders are the Zabaikalskaya Kraya Department of State Property and Land Issues (tax identification number [redacted]) and Russian national [redacted]) with tax identification number [redacted].		Pharmaceutical company

ООО "ЧХОЛСАН" (LLC "CHKHOLSAN") Tax ID: 7536112799	32 proezd Energostroi telei, Chita, Russia, 672022	Owner is DPRK Li Yn Sok (Ли Ын Сок) with tax identification number 753626113575.	Director is Russian national [redacted] with tax identification number [redacted].		Construction
ООО СК "РАЙ" (LLC Construction Company "RAI") Tax ID: 7536132178	Room 4, 132 ulitsa Chkalova, Chita, Russia, 672039	Owner is DPRK Li Yn Sok (Ли Ын Сок) with tax identification number 753626113575.	Director is Russian national [redacted]) with tax identification number [redacted].		Construction
ООО "РКК ФАРТ" (LLC "RKK FART" Tax ID: 3808221510	17 Aleksandra Nevskogo ulitsa, Irkutsk, Russia, 664047	Owner is DPRK national Lee Chong Nam (Ли Чен Нам), for whom a tax identification number is not specified.	Director is Russian national [redacted] with tax identification number [redacted].	According to open source reporting, RKK Fart" LLC " owns Korean restaurant "Pyongyang" at the same address in Irkutsk.	Restaurants and mobile food service activities

On 21 January 2019, the Russian Federation requested the Panel not to publish information about companies still being investigated on the basis of the requests from the Panel, as this could violate the confidentiality of the ongoing investigations and adversely affect their outcome.

Name (Eng)	Name (Korean and/or original script)	Location in DPRK/Russia	Name of Partner Company where applicable	Partner HQ /Restaurant location
Koryo Restaurant	Ресторан «Корё»	Moscow	-	Ordzhonikidze Ulitsa, 11, bld.-. 9, Moscow, Russia, 115419
Pyongyang Restaurant	Ресторан «Пхеньян»	Vladivostok	-	Ulitsa Verkhneportovaya, 68 B, Vladivostok, Primorsky kray, Russia, 690003
Pyongyang Restaurant	Ресторан «Пхеньян»	Irkutsk	ООО «РКК ФАРТ» (LLC “RKK FART”), Учредитель (owner) – Ли Чен Нам (see Annex 1 and 3)	17 Aleksandra Nevskogo ul., Irkutsk, Irkutskaya oblast, Russia, 664047
Rungrado Restaurant	Ресторан «Рынрадо»	Moscow	-	29/1 Lomonosovsky Prospekt, Moscow, Russia, 119192
Koryo Restaurant	Ресторан «Корё»	Vladivostok	-	20 A Prospekt Ocean, District "Center," Vladivostok, Primorsky kray, Russia, 690091
Rus'-Moran Restaurant	Ресторан «Русь-Моран»	Blagoveshchensk	-	Ulitsa Lenina, 108A, Blagoveshchensk, Amurskaya oblast, Russia, 675000

Source: Official State Registration Data according to SPARK system, http://www.spark-interfax.ru/en;
Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

Singapore

Singapore informed the Panel that a Singapore company, Lucky Greenbird Pte. Ltd's joint venture with Ryugyong Corporation "Taesong BAT" JV, the JV was terminated on 1 January 2018 and provided the termination notice to the Panel.[190] Singapore further stated, "Our checks have not uncovered any evidence that its funds, financial assets, and economic resources are owned or controlled by designated individuals or entities, the DPRK Government, the Worker's Party of Korea, individuals or entities acting on behalf or at their direction, and/or entities owned or controlled by them. If we find any evidence that Lucky Greenbird Pte Ltd, or any other entity, has contravened the UNSCRs and/or our laws, we will not hesitate to take the necessary action. As stated in our National Implementation Report for UNSCR 2397, there are no DPRK nationals with work passes in Singapore. Singapore has revoked the work passes of all DPRK nationals earning income in Singapore and will not grant new work passes to DPRK nationals.

Source: open source, Member State

Thailand

With regard to **Star Joint Venture Company** (aka Star JV a.k.a. Northeast Asia Telephone and Telecommunications Co., Ltd. (NEAT &T)) it informed the Panel that Loxley Pacific Co., Ltd. changed its name into Loxpac (Thailand) Co., Ltd. in 2013, that it had withdrawn its investment in Loxpac (Thailand) Co., Ltd. in 2015 and that it had connection with NEAT&T. It stated that Loxpac (Thailand) Co., Ltd ceased all of its business in the DPRK, including its operation via NEAT&T, since January 2018.

Source: Member State, open source

Name	Name (Korean or in original script)	Name of Partner Company **where applicable**	Partner HQ/Restaurant location
Pyongyang Okryu Restaurant	ร้านเพียงยอง อ็อคริว	-	Between Sukhumvit Soi 25-27, next to Radisson Blu hotel, Ekkamai Rd., Bangkok, Thailand

[190] The termination notice dated 22 November 2017, a copy of which was provided to the Panel, cited paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017) adopted on 11 September 2017.

Pyongyang Haemaji Restaurant	-	-	83, Soi 26 Sukumvit, Khlongtoi, Bangkok 10110, Thailand
Mokran Korean Restaurant		Magnolias Pattaya Boutique Resort	4/6 M.9 Maprachan Reservoir, Tambon Pong, Amphoe Banglamung, 20150 Chonburi, Thailand

Uganda

The Ugandan Government replied on 6 July 2018 to the Panel's request for further information on MKP's operations in Uganda. It acknowledged having formed a joint venture between the National Housing and Construction Company (NHCC) and MKP Builders SDN BHD, called NH-MKP Builders Limited. As part of one project, the NHCC paid out $3,627,762 as an advanced payment to MKP Builders. Uganda claims this business relationship ceased at the beginning of 2014, when it became clear that MKP Builders SDN BHD was unable to complete the construction contract. The Ugandan Government has since been involved in a series of ongoing lawsuits with MKP and its insurance companies to recover the payment, and insists that it cannot dissolve MKP Builders SDN BHD or MKP Capital Berhad while litigation continues.

Uganda's reply also included information about Vidas Engineering Services Limited, which it acknowledged having contracted to for several government-funded projects. However, it firmly denied any relationship between the firm and MKP, citing Vidas' company incorporation documents. Uganda and Vidas did not provide an explanation for the appearance of the firm's mailing address, registered office address, email address and trading name on the corporate registry documents for MKP Capital and MKP Builders in Uganda. The Panel notes that in order to mask DPRK connections, DPRK companies commonly use foreign national facilitators to avoid putting its own nationals on incorporation paperwork, leverages business contacts to facilitate the establishment of in-country presences, and embeds within foreign firms. Uganda did not respond to the Panel's inquiries pertaining to its recent promotion of foreign investment opportunities in a high-value MKP Holdings project at the Moroto Marble Mine.

No	Business name (Eng.)	Other names	Name of partner company (where applicable)	DPRK & Uganda nationals involved & other info
1.	NH MKP Builders Ltd	MKP Builders SDN	Ugandan National Housing & Construction Company Ltd.	Choi Da Hwan (identified as Korean), Ms Jane Bilek Langoya, Mhanmed A. Benomran (likely an alternate spelling of Muhamed A. Banomaran) and Henry Majoh Mukisa.
2.	MKP Builders San BHD	Vidas Engineering Services Co. Limited	Uganda's Ministry of Water and Environment ; National Housing and Construction Company (NHCC)	Yong Kyong Kin, Ms Jane Lukonga Bilan and Mr. Muhamed A. Banomaran, listed as Directors.
3.	MKP Capital Bernard Co. Limited	Vidas Engineering Services Co. Limited	National Housing and Construction Company (NHCC)	Yong Kyong and Edward Han are both listed as directors and shareholders, with nationalities as Korean. Henry Mukisa and Asa Mugenyi (both Ugandans), are also listed as directors and shareholders.

Vietnam

Koryo restaurant / formerly Ryu Gyong Restaurant (Nhà Hàng Ryu Gyong Triều Tiên; 조선 류경 식당)	Ho Chi Minh City Registered As CôNg Ty Tnhh ThưƠNg Mại Phan Minh Fmc-V.N.	30 Le Quy Don, Ward 7, District 3, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Koryo restaurant	Hanoi	No.61 Trung Hoa City, Trung Yen Urban Area, Phuong Trung Hoa, Cau Giang Paper, Hanoi Previous Address: No.7, Lot 13b, Trung Hoa City, Trung Yen Urban Area, Phuong Trung Hoa, Cau Giang Paper, Hanoi
Binh Nhuong (Pyongyang) restaurant	Hanoi	No. 28, Nguyen Thi Dinh Street, Tung Hoa Commune, Cau Giay District, Ha Noi

Source: Member State, Corporate registry and open source

Zambia

See Annex 46 on MKP companies in Zambia. Zambia replied to the Panel that it had undertaken a full investigation into the companies listed by the Panel and that it had confirmed that several DPRK and Malaysian nationals were acting as directors in MKP Holdings, and that one of the recommendations from Zambia's investigation of the network was that authorities consider repatriating DPRK nationals working in the country, in accordance with resolution 2397 (2017), including a list of 13 DPRK nationals. It is unclear to the Panel whether this covers all of DPRK nationals working in Zambia.[191]

Source : Corporate registry, Member State

[191] Yazid Merzouk informed the Panel that as of January 2018, there were seven DPRK nationals employed in MKP TMS Hospital alone, with appropriate work permits duly issued by the Zambian Immigration authorities.

Annex 75 Information on economic activities being undertaken by ООО "ПИОНЕР" (LLC "PIONER"), a JV owned by a DPRK national registered to the same address as the DPRK consulate in Vladivostok, Russian Federation

Name (Eng)	OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTYU "PIONER"
Name in Russian	ООО "ПИОНЕР"
Legal address	690018, Primorski kr, g. Vladivostok, ul. Nevskaya, d. 12 korp. A
Phone no	+7 (953) 2197535
Registration date	20.06.2013
OGRN	1132502001664
INN	2502047408
OKOPF	Limited liability companies
Main type of activity	Renting and operating of own or leased non-residential real estate
Manager	[redacted] generalny direktor

Economic Activities

Sector affiliation by OKVED (KDES Ed. 2)

Name, description	OKVED
Renting and operating of own or leased non-residential real estate (Main - EGRPO GMC Rosstat, EGRUL)	68.20.2
Construction of residential and non-residential buildings	41.20
Demolition	43.11
Performance of excavation works	43.12.3
Restaurants and mobile food service activities	56.10
Restaurants and cafes with full restaurant service, cafeterias, fast food restaurants and buffet restaurants	56.10.1
Operation of restaurants and bars in railway cars and on ships	56.10.3

Sector affiliation by OKVED

Name, description	OKVED
Restaurants and caf?s (Main - Financial Statements GMC Rosstat)	55.30
Letting of own nonresidential real estate (Main - EGRPO GMC Rosstat, EGRUL)	70.20.2
Demolition and wrecking of buildings; earth moving	45.11
General construction of buildings and civil engineering works	45.21
Restaurants	55.3

Source: Official State Registration Data according to SPARK system, http://www.spark-interfax.ru/en

Name changes

Change history

Changes to names and legal status

Address	Relevance date
Primorski krai, g. Artem, ul. Kirova, d. 64 A	14.09.2015

Registration procedures in the Federal Tax Service (FNS)

Registration date	Deregistration date	Registering authority
11.09.2015		Mezhraionnaya inspektsiya Federalnoi nalogovoi sluzhby N 12 po Primorskomu krayu
20.06.2013		Mezhraionnaya inspektsiya Federalnoi nalogovoi sluzhby N 10 po Primorskomu krayu

Registering authority

Date of changes	Registering authority
20.02.2017	Inspektsiya Federalnoi nalogovoi sluzhby po Leninskomu raionu g. Vladivostoka
17.09.2015	Mezhraionnaya inspektsiya Federalnoi nalogovoi sluzhby N 12 po Primorskomu krayu
11.09.2015	Mezhraionnaya inspektsiya Federalnoi nalogovoi sluzhby N 10 po Primorskomu krayu

Source: Official State Registration Data according to SPARK system, http://www.spark-interfax.ru/en

Registry document for "ПИОНЕР" (LLC "PIONER") dated 13 August 2018

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ПИОНЕР"

ОГРН 1132502001664
ИНН/КПП 2502047408/254301001
по состоянию на 13.08.2018 ← As of 13 August 2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
	Наименование	
1	Полное наименование	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "ПИОНЕР"
2	Сокращенное наименование	ООО "ПИОНЕР"
3	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
	Адрес (место нахождения)	
4	Почтовый индекс	690018
5	Субъект Российской Федерации	КРАЙ ПРИМОРСКИЙ
6	Город (волость и т.п.)	ГОРОД ВЛАДИВОСТОК
7	Улица (проспект, переулок и т.д.)	УЛИЦА НЕВСКАЯ
8	Дом (владение и т.п.)	ДОМ 12
9	Корпус (строение и т.п.)	КОРПУС А
10	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502055594 11.09.2015
	Сведения о регистрации	
11	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица
12	ОГРН	1132502001664
13	Дата регистрации	20.06.2013
14	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
	Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица	
15	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы по Ленинскому району г. Владивостока
16	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,690091,,,Владивосток г,,Океанский пр-кт,40,,
17	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2162543312149 07.02.2016
	Сведения об учете в налоговом органе	
18	ИНН	2502047408
19	КПП	254301001
20	Дата постановки на учет	11.09.2015
21	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 12 по Приморскому краю
22	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502055671 11.09.2015

Annotations:
- Row 2: LLC "PIONER"
- Rows 4–9: 690018 / Krai Primorski / City of Vladivostok / Ulitsa Nevskaya / House 12 / Building A
- Row 18: Tax ID: 2502047408

Сведения с сайта ФНС России
13.08.2018 20:46 ОГРН 1132502001664 Страница 1 из 7

Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
23	Регистрационный номер	035006064000
24	Дата регистрации	14.09.2015
25	Наименование территориального органа Пенсионного фонда	Государственное учреждение-Управление Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации по Первореченскому району г.Владивостока Приморского края
26	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152543281196 17.09.2015
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в исполнительном органе Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации		
27	Регистрационный номер	250241015925031
28	Дата регистрации	12.09.2015
29	Наименование исполнительного органа Фонда социального страхования	Филиал №3 г. Владивосток Государственное учреждение - Приморское региональное отделение Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации
30	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152543280822 17.09.2015
Сведения об уставном капитале (складочном капитале, уставном фонде, паевых взносах)		
31	Вид	УСТАВНЫЙ КАПИТАЛ
32	Размер (в рублях)	10000
33	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
34	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1132502001664 20.06.2013
35	Фамилия	ДАНИЛЯК
36	Имя	ЕЛЕНА
37	Отчество	НИКОЛАЕВНА
38	ИНН	650102300001
39	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
40	Должность	Генеральный директор
41	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
Сведения об учредителях (участниках) юридического лица		
42	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	1132502001664 20.06.2013
43	Фамилия	КИМ
44	Имя	ХЕ СОН
45	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
46	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	10000

Surname: Danilyak
Name: Elena
Patronymic: Nikolaevna
Tax ID: 650102300001

Surname: Kim
Name: Khe Son

Сведения с сайта ФНС России
13.08.2018 20:46 ОГРН 1132502001664 Страница 2 из 7


47	Размер доли (в процентах)	100
48	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1132502001664 20.06.2013
Сведения о видах экономической деятельности по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности *(ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)*		
Сведения об основном виде деятельности		
49	Код и наименование вида деятельности	68.20.2 Аренда и управление собственным или арендованным нежилым недвижимым имуществом
50	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
Сведения о дополнительных видах деятельности		
1		
51	Код и наименование вида деятельности	41.20 Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий
52	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
2		
53	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.11 Разборка и снос зданий
54	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
3		
55	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.12.3 Производство земляных работ
56	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
4		
57	Код и наименование вида деятельности	56.10 Деятельность ресторанов и услуги по доставке продуктов питания
58	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
5		
59	Код и наименование вида деятельности	56.10.1 Деятельность ресторанов и кафе с полным ресторанным обслуживанием, кафетериев, ресторанов быстрого питания и самообслуживания
60	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
6		
61	Код и наименование вида деятельности	56.10.3 Деятельность ресторанов и баров по обеспечению питанием в железнодорожных вагонахресторанах и на судах
62	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2152502039149 05.05.2015
Сведения о записях, внесенных в Единый государственный реестр юридических лиц		
1		
63	ГРН и дата внесения записи в ЕГРЮЛ	1132502001664 20.06.2013
64	Причина внесения записи в ЕГРЮЛ	(Р11001) Создание ЮЛ

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

Map data showing LLC PIONER address and DPRK Embassy in Vladivostock address


The below screenshot from the corporate registry document places PIONER’s location as the same as the DPRK consulate in Vladivostok, shown on screenshots from Yandex maps. In all instances, the divide between the consulate and the surrounding buildings is either noted on the map or visible from satellite imagery.

PIONER screenshot with location map from SPARK:




Source: SPARK, http://spark-interfax.ru

Screenshot from Yandex maps for 12A ulitsa Nevskaya, Vladivostok:



Source: Yandex maps, https://yandex.com/maps/

Address of the DPRK consulate in Vladivostok



Source: Representation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vladivostok, https://vladivostok.mid.ru/

Annex 76: Documents showing GENCO's partial ownership of LLC "SAKORENMA"

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ЛИЦ

Сведения о юридическом лице

ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "СТРОИТЕЛЬНАЯ ФИРМА САКОРЕНМА"

ОГРН 1036500601642
ИНН/КПП 6501104474/650101001
по состоянию на 01.11.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
	Наименование	
1	Полное наименование	ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "СТРОИТЕЛЬНАЯ ФИРМА САКОРЕНМА"
2	Сокращенное наименование	ООО "САКОРЕНМА"
3	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2186501135159 29.06.2018
	Адрес (место нахождения)	
4	Субъект Российской Федерации	ОБЛАСТЬ САХАЛИНСКАЯ
5	Город (волость и т.п.)	ГОРОД ЮЖНО-САХАЛИНСК
6	Улица (проспект, переулок и т.д.)	УЛИЦА ПОЛЕВАЯ
7	Дом (владение и т.п.)	8
8	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2036500609066 24.04.2003
	Сведения о регистрации	
9	Способ образования	Создание юридического лица до 01.07.2002
10	ОГРН	1036500601642
11	Дата присвоения ОГРН	05.01.2003
12	Регистрационный номер, присвоенный до 1 июля 2002 года	408
13	Дата регистрации до 1 июля 2002 года	11.01.2000
14	Наименование органа, зарегистрировавшего юридическое лицо до 1 июля 2002 года	Администрация г.Южно-Сахалинска
15	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1036500601642 05.01.2003
	Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту нахождения юридического лица	
16	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
17	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,693020,,,Южно-Сахалинск г,,Ленина ул,105,А,
18	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	1036500601642 05.01.2003
	Сведения об учете в налоговом органе	
19	ИНН	6501104474

Oblast Sakhalinskaya
City of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
Ulitsa Polevaya

Сведения с сайта ФНС России
01.11.2018 18:15 ОГРН 1036500601642 Страница 1 из 13

20	КПП	650101001
21	Дата постановки на учет	21.01.2000
22	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
23	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2056500686251 26.09.2005
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
24	Регистрационный номер	074001013749
25	Дата регистрации	26.01.2000
26	Наименование территориального органа Пенсионного фонда	Государственное учреждение - Управление Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации в г. Южно-Сахалинске Сахалинской области
27	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2056500780081 13.12.2005
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в исполнительном органе Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации		
28	Регистрационный номер	650021014565001
29	Дата регистрации	30.03.2000
30	Наименование исполнительного органа Фонда социального страхования	Государственное учреждение - Сахалинское региональное отделение Фонда социального страхования Российской Федерации
31	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	01.10.2004
Сведения о лице, имеющем право без доверенности действовать от имени юридического лица		
32	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2066501083757 05.06.2006
33	Фамилия	СОН
34	Имя	ЧАН ДИН
35	ИНН	650109976889
36	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2186501096054 12.04.2018
37	Должность	ГЕНЕРАЛЬНЫЙ ДИРЕКТОР
38	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2186501096054 12.04.2018
Сведения об учредителях (участниках) юридического лица		
1		
39	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2036500609066 24.04.2003
40	Полное наименование	ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ПО СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВУ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ "ЗЕНКО" КНДР
41	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501002012 13.01.2010
42	Страна происхождения	КОРЕЯ (КНДР)

Surname: Son
Name: Chan Din
Tax ID: 650109975889

General Corporation for Construction Abroad "ZENKO" of the DPRK

43	Дата регистрации	22.06.1962
44	Регистрационный номер	61-35
45	Наименование регистрирующего органа	КНДР КОМИТЕТ ВНЕШНЕЙ ЭКОНОМИКИ
46	Адрес (место нахождения) в стране происхождения	Г.ПХЕНЬЯН, ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ РАЙОН, УЛ.СЫНРИ, 25
47	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501002012 13.01.2010
48	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	16800
49	Размер доли (в процентах)	20
50	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2106501002012 13.01.2010
	2	
51	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ сведений о данном лице	2036500609066 24.04.2003
52	Фамилия	СОН
53	Имя	ЧАН ДИН
54	ИНН	650109976889
55	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2186501096054 12.04.2018
56	Номинальная стоимость доли (в рублях)	67200
57	Размер доли (в процентах)	80
58	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2136501104090 18.10.2013
	Сведения о видах экономической деятельности по Общероссийскому классификатору видов экономической деятельности *(ОКВЭД ОК 029-2014 КДЕС. Ред. 2)*	
	Сведения об основном виде деятельности	
59	Код и наименование вида деятельности	41.20 Строительство жилых и нежилых зданий
60	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2066501083757 05.06.2006
	Сведения о дополнительных видах деятельности	
	1	
61	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.21 Производство электромонтажных работ
62	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2086501077287 28.05.2008
	2	
63	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.31 Производство штукатурных работ
64	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2086501077287 28.05.2008
	3	
65	Код и наименование вида деятельности	43.32 Работы столярные и плотничные
66	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРЮЛ записи, содержащей указанные сведения	2086501077287 28.05.2008

Surname: Son
Name: Chan Din
Tax ID: 650109975889

Сведения с сайта ФНС России
01.11.2018 18:15 ОГРН 1036500601642 Страница 3 из 13

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

Registry documents of LLC "SAKORENMA", partially owned by DPRK company GENCO (Korea General Company for External Construction)

SPARK

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY "JOINT VENTURE SAKO RYONMA", 14/02/2018 21:59 MSK

Shareholders

EGRUL

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
[redacted]		67 200	80.00	13.01.2010
GENERALNOE OBSHCHESTVO PO STROITELSTVU ZA RUBEZHOM "ZENKO" KNDR	G.PKHENYAN, TSENTRALNY RAION, UL.SYNRI, 25	16 800	20.00	13.01.2010

History of changes

Name, description	Address	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Date entered in EGRUL
[redacted]		42 840	51.00	17.01.2003
GENERALNOE OBSHCHESTVO PO STROITELSTVU ZA RUBEZHOM "ZENKO" KNDR		41 160	49.00	04.01.2003

Rosstat

Last updated on : 18.09.2017

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %
Citizens of Russia(1)		67 200	80.00
Gen, obshchestvo po stroitelstvu za rubezhom "Zenko"	Koreiskaya narodno-demokraticheskaya respublika	16 800	20.00

History of changes

Name, description	Address / Comment	Share in charter capital, rubles	Share in charter capital, %	Last updated on
GEN. OBSHCHESTVO PO STROITELSTVU ZA RUBEZHOM "Z		16 800	20.00	01.02.2006
KOREISKOE GENERALNOE OBSHCHESTVO "ZENKO"		16 800	20.00	31.08.2005

Source: OKVED / SPARK

Document showing nationality for Director of Sakorenma

ЕДИНЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ РЕЕСТР ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНЫХ ПРЕДПРИНИМАТЕЛЕЙ

Сведения об индивидуальном предпринимателе

СОН ЧАН ДИН

ОГРНИП 314650120400028

Tax ID: 650109975889

ИНН 650109976889

по состоянию на 14.11.2018

№ п/п	Наименование показателя	Значение показателя
1	2	3
Фамилия, имя, отчество (при наличии) индивидуального предпринимателя		
1	Фамилия	СОН
2	Имя	ЧАН ДИН
3	Пол	мужской
4	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРИП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	314650120400028 23.07.2014
Сведения о гражданстве		
5	Гражданство	гражданин Российской Федерации
6	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРИП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	314650120400028 23.07.2014
Сведения о регистрации индивидуального предпринимателя		
7	ОГРНИП	314650120400028
8	Дата регистрации	23.07.2014
Сведения о регистрирующем органе по месту жительства индивидуального предпринимателя		
9	Наименование регистрирующего органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
10	Адрес регистрирующего органа	,693020,,,Южно-Сахалинск г,,Ленина ул,105,А,
11	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРИП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	314650120400028 23.07.2014
Сведения об учете в налоговом органе		
12	Идентификационный номер налогоплательщика (ИНН)	650109976889
13	Дата постановки на учет	23.07.2014
14	Наименование налогового органа	Межрайонная инспекция Федеральной налоговой службы № 1 по Сахалинской области
15	ГРН и дата внесения в ЕГРИП записи, содержащей указанные сведения	414650120400025 23.07.2014
Сведения о регистрации в качестве страхователя в территориальном органе Пенсионного фонда Российской Федерации		
16	Регистрационный номер	074001065807
17	Дата регистрации	23.07.2014

Surname: Son
Name: Chan Din

Citizen of the Russian Federation

Сведения с сайта ФНС России
14.11.2018 19:59 ОГРНИП 314650120400028 Страница 1 из 5

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

Annex 77: Documents Information on LLC "SAKORENMA" name change

SPARK

Search on card

General Information
Company Card
Registration Data
Economic Activities
History of changes
EGRUL transcript
Phones
Addresses
Comments

Company Structure
Shareholders
Branches, affiliates
Company's links

Management Bodies
Persons entitled to act without a warrant

Company Activities
Counterparts
Competitors
Licenses
Vacancies
Contracts (contractor)
Bank guarantees
Legal cases
Inspections
News reports

Financial Information
Taxes
Balance Sheet
Financial Statement
▶ Book-keeping report
▶ Financial Analysis

Information for internal use

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY "JOIN...

Current section ···

Change history

Add to report

Changes to names and legal status

Name, description	INN	OGRN	Legal form	Date of changes
ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "СОВМЕСТНОЕ РОССИЙСКО-КОРЕЙСКОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ САКО РЕНМА"	6501104474	1036500601642	Limited liability companies	12.04.2018

LLC "Joint Russian-Korean Enterprise Sako Renma"

History of address changes

Address	Relevance date
Sakhalinskaya obl., g. Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, ul. Sakhalinskaya, d. 48	05.01.2003

Registering authority


Change date	Registering authority
29.06.2018	MEZHRAIONNAYA INSPEKTSIYA FEDERALNOI NALOGOVOI SLUZHBY N 1 PO SAKHALINSKOI OBLASTI
02.12.2014	Mezhraionnaya Inspektsiya Ministerstva Rossiskoi Federatsii po nalogam i sboram N 1 po Sakhalinskoi oblasti

Registration actions with Federal Tax Service (FNS)

GRN	Change date	Change type	Additional information
2186501135159	29.06.2018	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, related to the alteration of constituent documents, on an application	Company name - OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTYU "STROITELNAYA FIRMA SAKORENMA"
2186501096054	12.04.2018	Entry to the Unified state register of legal entities (EGRUL) of the information, provided by the bodies, implementing issuing and replacement of identity documents of Russian citizen in Russia	A person entitled to act without a warrant - Son Chan Din, Generalny direktor, Shareholder - Son Chan Din, nominalnaya stoimost 67200 rub., dolya 80%
2146501103351	02.12.2014	Concession of license data entry to EGRUL	License - N 65-B/00039 ot 20.11.2014
2136501103990	18.10.2013	Entry to the Unified state register of legal entities (EGRUL) of the information, provided by the bodies, implementing issuing and replacement of identity documents of Russian citizen in Russia	
2136501104090	18.10.2013	Entry to the Unified state register of legal entities (EGRUL) of the information, provided by the bodies, implementing issuing and replacement of identity documents of Russian citizen in Russia	Shareholder - Son Chan Din, nominalnaya stoimost 67200 rub., dolya 80%
2116501021591	18.03.2011	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, related to the alteration of constituent documents, on an application	
2106501096073	30.06.2010	Legal entity bank accounts data entry to EGRUL	
2106501002012	13.01.2010	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, related to the adjustment of a limited liability company statute in accordance with the Federal law as of 30.12.2008 № 312-FZ	Shareholder - GENERALNOE OBSHCHESTVO PO STROITELSTVU ZA RUBEZHOM "ZENKO" KNDR, nominalnaya stoimost 16800 rub., dolya 20%
2086501156278	10.11.2008	Concession of license data entry to EGRUL	
2086501139228	28.10.2008	Concession of license data entry to EGRUL	
2086501099441	28.07.2008	Legal entity bank accounts data entry to EGRUL	
2086501077287	28.05.2008	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, related to the alteration of constituent documents, on an application	
2076501110343	25.09.2007	Concession of license data entry to EGRUL	
2066501083757	05.06.2006	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, not related to the alteration of constituent documents, on an application	A person entitled to act without a warrant - Son Chan Din, Generalny direktor
2066501083537	02.06.2006	Alteration of legal entity data, contained in EGRUL, related to errors made by the applicant in documents presented during the state registration of a legal entity earlier	
2056500780081	13.12.2005	Registration of a legal entity as an insured in	

Source: SPARK, https://spark-interfax.ru/

Annex 78: Government contracts awarded to LLC “SAKORENMA”



Not secure | zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber=365012945...

ВЕРСИЯ ДЛЯ СЛАБОВИДЯЩИХ

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ № 3650129452118000008

ISS

Размещено 17.10.2018 14:21 (MSK+8 (UTC+11) GMT+11:00)
По местному времени заказчика

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ | ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПЛАТЕЖАХ И ОБЪЕКТЕ ЗАКУПКИ | ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ ИСПОЛНЕНИИ (РАСТОРЖЕНИИ) КОНТРАКТА | ДОКУМЕНТЫ | ЖУРНАЛ СОБЫТИЙ

ОБЩАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ

Реестровый номер контракта	36501294521 18 000008
Статус контракта	Исполнение
Номер извещения об осуществлении закупки	0161300000118000305
Идентификационный код закупки (ИКЗ)	183650129452165010100100020014211243
Уникальный номер позиции плана-графика	2018086160000110020000320001
Способ определения поставщика (подрядчика, исполнителя)	Электронный аукцион
Дата подведения результатов определения поставщика (подрядчика, исполнителя)	10.04.2018
Дата размещения (по местному времени)	17.10.2018 14:21 (МСК+8)
Основание заключения контракта с единственным поставщиком	Закупка вследствие признания несостоявшимся электронного аукциона в соответствии частями 1 – 3.1 статьи 71 Федерального закона решения об осуществлении закупки у единственного поставщика (подрядчика, исполнителя)
Реквизиты документа, подтверждающего основание заключения контракта	Протокол рассмотрения единственной заявки на участие в электронном аукционе № 0161300000118000305-4 от 10.04.2018;0161300000118000305-4

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ ИЗМЕНЕНИИ КОНТРАКТА

Основание для изменения	В связи с перераспределением объема субсидии из бюджета Сахалинской области изменены денежные ассигнования в кодах бюджетной классификации

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ЗАКАЗЧИКЕ

Полное наименование заказчика	МУНИЦИПАЛЬНОЕ КАЗЕННОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕ ГОРОДСКОГО ОКРУГА "ГОРОД ЮЖНО-САХАЛИНСК" "УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ДОРОЖНОГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА И БЛАГОУСТРОЙСТВА"
Сокращенное наименование заказчика	МКУ "УДХИБ"
Дата постановки на учет в налоговом органе	10.10.2017
Идентификационный код заказчика	3650129452165010100l
ИНН	6501294521
КПП	650101001
Код организационно-правовой формы	75404
Код ОКПО	19797165
Код территории муниципального образования	64701000001 – г Южно-Сахалинск
Наименование бюджета	Бюджет городского округа "Город Южно-Сахалинск"
Уровень бюджета	30 - местный бюджет

ОБЩИЕ ДАННЫЕ

Дата заключения контракта	03.05.2018
Номер контракта	027-003-18
Способ указания цены контракта	Цена контракта
Цена контракта	98 489 397,00
Валюта контракта	Российский рубль (RUB)
Объем привлечения к исполнению контракта субподрядчиков	25% что составляет 24622349.25 в российских рублях
Дата начала исполнения контракта	05.05.2018
Дата окончания исполнения контракта	01.09.2018
Номер реестровой записи реестра банковских гарантий (исполнение контракта)	В соответствии с ч. 8.1 ст. 45 Федерального закона № 44-ФЗ информация о банковских гарантиях, предоставляемых в качестве обеспечения заявок и исполнения контрактов, с 01.07.2018 не размещается на официальном сайте ЕИС.
Размер обеспечения исполнения контракта	9 848 939,70 в российских рублях
В том числе НДС	15 023 807,00 в российских рублях
Срок, на который предоставляется гарантия	

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПОСТАВЩИКАХ

ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ	СТРАНА, КОД	АДРЕС В СТРАНЕ РЕГИСТРАЦИИ	АДРЕС, МЕСТА НАХОЖДЕНИЯ	ПОЧТОВЫЙ АДРЕС	ТЕЛЕФОН, ЭЛЕКТРОННАЯ ПОЧТА	СТАТУС
12300 Общества с ограниченной ответственностью ОБЩЕСТВО С ОГРАНИЧЕННОЙ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬЮ "СТРОИТЕЛЬНАЯ ФИРМА САКОРЕНМА" Код по ОКПО: 52997801 ИНН: 6501104474 КПП, дата постановки на учет: 650101001 04.01.2003			693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	7-4242-776539 sakorenma@yandex.ru	субъект малого предпринимательства

Source: Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, http://zakupki.gov.ru/

Not secure | zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber=365012817...

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ № 3650128177018000025

ISS

Размещено 10.07.2018 14:24 (MSK+8 (UTC+11) GMT+11:00)
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ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ | ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПЛАТЕЖАХ И ОБЪЕКТЕ ЗАКУПКИ | ДОКУМЕНТЫ | ЖУРНАЛ СОБЫТИЙ

ОБЩАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ

Реестровый номер контракта	36501281770 18 000025
Статус контракта	Исполнение
Номер извещения об осуществлении закупки	0161300000118000812
Идентификационный код закупки (ИКЗ)	183650128177065010100100440014221000
Уникальный номер позиции плана-графика	2018206160000010020000510001
Способ определения поставщика (подрядчика, исполнителя)	Электронный аукцион
Дата подведения результатов определения поставщика (подрядчика, исполнителя)	26.06.2018
Дата размещения (по местному времени)	10.07.2018 14:24 (МСК+8)
Реквизиты документа, подтверждающего основание заключения контракта	Протокол подведения итогов электронного аукциона № 0161300000118000812-3 от 26.06.2018;0161300000118000812-3

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ЗАКАЗЧИКЕ

Полное наименование заказчика	МУНИЦИПАЛЬНОЕ КАЗЕННОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ "ГОРОДСКОЙ ВОДОКАНАЛ"
Сокращенное наименование заказчика	МКП "ГОРОДСКОЙ ВОДОКАНАЛ"
Дата постановки на учет в налоговом органе	29.02.2016
Идентификационный код заказчика	36501281770650101001
ИНН	6501281770
КПП	650101001
Код организационно-правовой формы	65143
Код ОКПО	00324524
Наименование внебюджетных средств	80 - Средства государственных (муниципальных) унитарных предприятий

ОБЩИЕ ДАННЫЕ

Дата заключения контракта	09.07.2018
Номер контракта	351/МКП-2018
Способ указания цены контракта	Цена контракта
Цена контракта	3 054 730,96
Валюта контракта	Российский рубль (RUB)
Дата начала исполнения контракта	09.07.2018
Дата окончания исполнения контракта	07.09.2018
Размер обеспечения исполнения контракта	164 232,85 в российских рублях
В том числе НДС	465 975,91 в российских рублях
Срок, на который предоставляется гарантия	

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПОСТАВЩИКАХ

Organization: LLC Construction Company "SAKORENMA" OKPO Code: 52997801 Tax ID: 6501104474


ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ	СТРАНА, КОД	АДРЕС В СТРАНЕ РЕГИСТРАЦИИ	АДРЕС, МЕСТА НАХОЖДЕНИЯ	ПОЧТОВЫЙ АДРЕС	ТЕЛЕФОН, ЭЛЕКТРОННАЯ ПОЧТА	СТАТУС
12300 Общества с ограниченной ответственностью Общество с ограниченой ответственностью 'Совместное российско-корейское предприятие СаКо Ренма' Код по ОКПО: 52997801 ИНН: 6501104474 КПП, дата постановки на учет: 650101001 04.01.2003			693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	7-4242-776539 sakorenma@yandex.ru	субъект малого предпринимательства

Address, locations: 693000, Russian Federation, Sakhalinskaya Oblast, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Poelvaya, 8

Postal Address: 693000, Russian Federation, Sakhalinskaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Poelvaya, 8

Telephone, Email: 7-4242-776539, sakorenma@yandex.ru

Source: Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, http://zakupki.gov.ru/



Not secure | zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber=365012817...

ВЕРСИЯ ДЛЯ СЛАБОВИДЯЩИХ

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ № 3650128177018000023

rss

Размещено 10.07.2018 14:12 (MSK+8 (UTC+11) GMT+11:00)
По местному времени заказчика

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О КОНТРАКТЕ | ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПЛАТЕЖАХ И ОБЪЕКТЕ ЗАКУПКИ | ДОКУМЕНТЫ | ЖУРНАЛ СОБЫТИЙ

ОБЩАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ

Реестровый номер контракта	36501281770 18 000023
Статус контракта	Исполнение
Номер извещения об осуществлении закупки	0161300000118000808
Идентификационный код закупки (ИКЗ)	183650128177065010100100420014221000
Уникальный номер позиции плана-графика	2018206160000010020000490001
Способ определения поставщика (подрядчика, исполнителя)	Электронный аукцион
Дата подведения результатов определения поставщика (подрядчика, исполнителя)	27.06.2018
Дата размещения (по местному времени)	10.07.2018 14:12 (МСК+8)
Основание заключения контракта с единственным поставщиком	Закупка вследствие признания несостоявшимся электронного аукциона в соответствии частями 1 – 3.1 статьи 71 Федерального закона решения об осуществлении закупки у единственного поставщика (подрядчика, исполнителя)
Реквизиты документа, подтверждающего основание заключения контракта	Протокол подведения итогов электронного аукциона № 0161300000118000808-3 от 27.06.2018;0161300000118000808-3

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ЗАКАЗЧИКЕ

Полное наименование заказчика	МУНИЦИПАЛЬНОЕ КАЗЕННОЕ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЕ "ГОРОДСКОЙ ВОДОКАНАЛ"
Сокращенное наименование заказчика	МКП "ГОРОДСКОЙ ВОДОКАНАЛ"
Дата постановки на учет в налоговом органе	29.02.2016
Идентификационный код заказчика	36501281770650101001
ИНН	6501281770
КПП	650101001
Код организационно-правовой формы	65143
Код ОКПО	00324524
Наименование внебюджетных средств	80 - Средства государственных (муниципальных) унитарных предприятий

ОБЩИЕ ДАННЫЕ

Дата заключения контракта	09.07.2018
Номер контракта	352/МКП-2018
Способ указания цены контракта	Цена контракта
Цена контракта	8 455 626,01
Валюта контракта	Российский рубль (RUB)
Дата начала исполнения контракта	09.07.2018
Дата окончания исполнения контракта	07.09.2018
Размер обеспечения исполнения контракта	500 332,90 в российских рублях
В том числе НДС	1 289 841,26 в российских рублях
Срок, на который предоставляется гарантия	

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О ПОСТАВЩИКАХ

ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ	СТРАНА, КОД	АДРЕС В СТРАНЕ РЕГИСТРАЦИИ	АДРЕС, МЕСТА НАХОЖДЕНИЯ	ПОЧТОВЫЙ АДРЕС	ТЕЛЕФОН, ЭЛЕКТРОННАЯ ПОЧТА	СТАТУС
12300 Общества с ограниченной ответственностью Общество с ограниченной ответственностью 'Совместное российско-корейское предприятие СаКо Ренма' Код по ОКПО: 52997801 ИНН: 6501104474 КПП, дата постановки на учет: 650101001 04.01.2003			693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8	7-4242-776539 sakorenma@yandex.ru	субъект малого предпринимательства

Organization:
LLC Construction Company "SAKORENMA"
OKPO Code: 52997801
Tax ID: 6501104474

Address, locations: 693000, Russian Federation, Sakhalinskaya Oblast, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Poelvaya, 8

Postal Address: 693000, Russian Federation, Sakhalinskaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Poelvaya, 8

Telephone, Email: 7-4242-776539, sakorenma@yandex.ru

Source: Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, http://zakupki.gov.ru/

2018 Government contracts awarded to Russian JV owned by the DPRK company, GENCO (Google translated into English)

(Each contract has an embedded link to the official procurement website of the Russian Federation on which the contracts are listed)

rusprofile

Поиск по названию, адресу, руководителю, учредителям, ОГРН и ИНН

The Organization | Entrepreneurs | About us | Data sources

Home › LLC "Sakorenma" › Government Procurement

OOO "Sakorenma"

Date from 05.10.2012 before 27.07.2018 OK | Status All | Amount All

Role Provider | Counterparty All

Information about the concluded contracts

07/09/2018

3650128177018000023 44-FZ

Amount: 8,455,626.01 ₽

Status: Execution

Role: Supplier

Counterparty: MCP "Urban Vodokanal"

The subject of procurement:

- Execution of works on the project: "Overhaul of water supply networks of Mira Ave. - ul. Frontier »

on the website of the State procurement

3650128177018000025 44-FZ

Amount: 3,054,730.96 ₽

Status: Execution

Role: Supplier

Counterparty: MCP "Urban Vodokanal"

The subject of procurement:

- Execution of works on the object: "Overhaul of water supply networks of Pobedy Ave."

on the website of the State procurement

05/03/2018

3650129452118000008 44-FZ

Amount: 98,489,397.00 ₽

Status: Execution

Role: Supplier

Counterparty: MKU "UDHIB"

The subject of procurement:

- Performance of works on the object "Major repairs and repair of yard territories and driveways to the courtyards of MKD"

on the website of the State procurement

01/09/2018

3650123897517000113 44-FZ

Amount: 186 000 000.00 ₽

Status: Discontinued

Role: Supplier

Counterparty: MKU "UKS" Cities of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk


The subject of procurement:

- performance of works on the objects: "Major repairs and repair of yard territories and driveways to the courtyards of MKD"

on the website of the State procurement

Source: https://www.rusprofile.ru/gz/2893948

Information on Government contracts from a Russian official business registry aggregator



Source: https://www.kartoteka.ru/card/6503378623b837e00e8ff4b9bc1f9b27/#path_Main_Html

Annex 79: Bank details for LLC "SAKORENMA"

МК на выполнение работ по объекту «Капитальный ремонт и ремонт дворовых территорий и проездов к дворовым территориям МКД»

Контракта сообщения Сторона, получившая его, обязана направить ответ на это сообщение.

14.4. В случае если ответ на сообщение не будет получен направившей сообщение Стороной по истечении срока, указанного в п. 14.3. Контракта либо если Стороны не придут к соглашению по возникшим разногласиям, спор подлежит передаче на рассмотрение в арбитражный суд Сахалинской области.

15. ПРОЧИЕ УСЛОВИЯ.

15.1. Во всем остальном, не предусмотренном настоящим Контрактом, стороны руководствуются действующим законодательством РФ.

15.2. В качестве неотъемлемой части к настоящему контракту прилагаются:

1.Техническое задание (Приложение № 1);

2.Смета (Приложение № 2);

3.Документ, предусмотренный законодательством РФ для обеспечения исполнения контракта (Приложение № 3).

16. АДРЕСА И БАНКОВСКИЕ РЕКВИЗИТЫ СТОРОН

16.1 **ЗАКАЗЧИК:**

Муниципальное казенное учреждение городского округа «Город Южно-Сахалинск» «Управление дорожного хозяйства и благоустройства» юридический адрес: 693000, Сахалинская область, г. Южно-Сахалинск, ул. Хабаровская 49; почтовый адрес: 693000, Сахалинская область, г. Южно-Сахалинск, пр. Победы, 62 А; тел. 8 (4242) 300-971 (доб.13), факс 8 (4242) 300-831; e-mail udhib@yuzhno-sakh.ru; ИНН/КПП: 6501294521/650101001; УФК по Сахалинской области (ДФ администрации г.Ю-Сахалинска, МКУ «Управление дорожного хозяйства и благоустройства» л/с 03902000140); Отделение Южно-Сахалинск г.Южно-Сахалинск; БИК 046401001; р/с: 40204810200010000021; ОГРН 1176501008254

16.2. **ПОДРЯДЧИК:**

Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Совместное российско-корейское предприятие СаКо Ренма юридический/почтовый адрес: 693000, Российская Федерация, Сахалинская область, Южно-Сахалинск, Полевая, 8; Телефон: 7 (4242) 776-539, факс: 7 (4242) 771-949, E-Mail: sakorenma@yandex.ru; ИНН/КПП: 6501104474/650101001; Банковские реквизиты: [redacted] БИК: 040813713; Рас/с: 40702810908560002335; Кор/с: 30101810708130000713.

Limited Liability Corporation "Joint Russian-Korean Enterprise SaKo Renma", Legal Address: 693000, Russian Federation, Sakhalinskaya Oblast, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Polevaya, 8; Telephone: 7 (4242) 776-539, fax: 7 (4242) 771-949, E-Mail: sakorenma@yandex.ru; Tax ID/KPP: 6501104474/650101001; Bank details: BIK: 040813713; Checking account: 40702810908560002335; Correspondent account: 30101810708130000713.

ПОДПИСИ СТОРОН

Настоящий контракт подписан электронной цифровой подписью:

Лица, имеющего право подписи от имени ЗАКАЗЧИКА	**Лица, имеющего право подписи от имени ПОДРЯДЧИКА**
Начальник	Генеральный директор
________________ Е.С.Кулик	___________________ Сон Чан Дин

Source: Municipal Contract No. 027-003-18, accessed via Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, http://zakupki.gov.ru/

Annex 80: Yongbyon 5MW (e) Reactor and Light Water Reactor



Annex 81: Yongbyon Steam Plant



Map No. 4589.2 United Nations
August 2018

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)


Annex 82: Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site



Map No. 4592.2 UNITED NATIONS
January 2019

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

Annex 83: Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant




Map No. 4592.3 UNITED NATIONS
January 2019

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

Annex 84: Ballistic missile infrastructure and parade imagery

1. The Panel identified a then newly-constructed concrete launch pad[192] used for the 29 August intermediate range Hwasong-12 launch at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport (see figure I) It was built sometime after the last available Planet Lab image of 12 August 2017 (left). Planet Lab imagery dated 2 September shows vegetation burnt as a result of the 29 August launch (centre).

Figure I



Source: Images courtesy of Planet Labs, Inc

Figure II: Images showing the newly constructed launch pad at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport on 29 August 2017



Source: Korea Cemtral News Agency

[192] Location of the launch pad: (39°15'40.96"N 125°40'32.79"E)

2. A Member State confirmed the imagery analysis of the Panel concerning the partial dismantlement of Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite rocket launch site[193] and of the vertical missile-engine test stand[194] (figure III). Dismantlement may be reversed as only light or moveable parts, such as the metal superstructure, were dismantled.

Figure III



[193] Location of the rocket launch pad: 39°39'36.22"N 124°42'19.27"E;

[194] Location of the engine test stand: 39°39'11.32"N 124°42'51.30"E;

3. The Panel monitored developments at the Hoejung-ni Missile Operating base and the railway station[195]

Figure IV



[195] Location of the underground facility: 41°21'56.17"N 126°55'42.32"E and rail station, 41°23'6.65"N 126°54'28.58"E

4. A new type of short-range ballistic missile[196] was unveiled at the military parade of 8 February 2018 celebrating the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army. Furthermore, the parading of four Hwasong-15 missiles mounted on transporter erector launchers demonstrated the intercontinental strike capability and the mobility of the weapon system (see figure V) as well as the three ICBM Hwasong-14. The 12 ballistic missile systems, consisting of six Pukguksong-2 and six Hwasong-12, were also displayed.

Figure V: New type of short-range ballistic missile (top left and right); Hwasong-15 (bottom)




Source: Korean Central Television screengrab, courtesy of Martyn Williams.

[196] On 15 April 2017, military parade of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

5. A Member State informed the Panel that the Pukguksong-2 casing is built from a new composite casing which was exhibited during a military parade and during a test launch of Pukguksong-2, as well as during the 23 August 2017 visit of Chairman Kim Jong Un to the Chemical Material Institute (CMI) at Hamhung[197] :

Figure VI



Source: Member State - KCNA

[197] Located at 39°57'27.01" N 127°33'22.88"E, in new building, 250 m to the east of the older CMI structures. The materials are wound from composite fibers.

Annex 85: The Panel's assessment of humanitarian consequences of UN Security Council sanctions for the civilian population of the DPRK

1. Impartial humanitarian operations are a critical lifeline for millions of civilians in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Severe humanitarian needs persist including high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, and lack of access to essential health services, clean water and sanitation. More than 40 per cent of the population (10.3 million people) is undernourished[198] and one in five children is stunted.[199] Over nine million people have limited access to essential health services.[200] A severe shortage of basic drugs persists. Over one-third of household drinking water is contaminated. One in ten children suffers from diarrhea.[201]

2. According to paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017), sanctions measures are "not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK" or "to affect negatively the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK". To assess the situation, the Panel gathered information from various sources including close to 20 non-governmental organizations and all UN agencies operating in the country on how humanitarian operations have been affected by the process for applying for humanitarian exemptions, the sectoral sanctions and the lack of a viable banking channel (annexes 86 and 87). The Panel notes that the implementation of sectoral sanctions in particular has had an impact on the activities of international humanitarian agencies working to address chronic humanitarian needs in the country.

3. Pursuant to paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Committee has broad authority to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis, inter alia, to facilitate humanitarian assistance in the DPRK. To strengthen the mechanism for humanitarian exemptions, in August 2018 the Committee adopted Implementation Assistance Notice (IAN) No. 7: "Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the DPRK", offering recommendations to Member States and international and non-governmental organizations regarding the exemption request procedures. While the Committee received and reviewed exemption requests for humanitarian assistance before the adoption of the IAN No. 7, its adoption was a welcome step towards streamlining and expediting the processing of exemption requests, and raising expectations that this would significantly improve the Committee's review and approval process for exemption requests.

4. Based on an initial assessment of the practice for the first five months since the adoption of the IAN No. 7, humanitarian agencies have experienced various challenges. Among others, the process requires a very generous lead time in planning shipments of humanitarian goods, including locating suppliers and financial agents willing to bid or contract for the provision of goods and services before an exemption is obtained. Any changes to planned suppliers, shipping routes, item specifications, or quantities between those indicated in the approved exemption request and at the time of the actual shipment may render the exemption invalid. The long lead time perceived to

[198] 2018 Needs and Priorities Plan

[199] 2017 DPR Korea Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) Findings Report; https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/better-indicators-children-dpr-korea-challenges-persist-new-data-situation-children

[200] 2018 Needs and Priorities Plan https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DPRK%20NP%202018%20110418%20FINAL.pdf

[201] 2017 DPR Korea Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) Findings Report; https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/better-indicators-children-dpr-korea-challenges-persist-new-data-situation-children

be necessary for the exemption approval process could also make it difficult for humanitarian agencies to respond effectively to contingencies such as a natural disaster or an outbreak of disease.

5. The Committee has received 25 humanitarian exemption requests during the reporting period. Two requests were withdrawn, 16 requests were approved, while seven requests remain under consideration by the Committee.[202]

6. Expediting the review and approval by the Committee of exemption requests for humanitarian programs, starting with requests currently before the Committee, will help to alleviate the suffering of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Furthermore, the Committee should consider ways to allow more flexibility with regard to the requirement of exemption requests being submitted every six months, which causes additional delays and prolongs the already lengthy six to eight months' lead time required for offshore procurement.

Sectoral sanctions

7. The sectoral sanctions imposed pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) include prohibition of the transfer to the DPRK of "all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85), transportation vehicles (HS codes 86 through 89), and iron, steel, and other metals (HS codes 72 through 83)", also affecting a number of humanitarian-sensitive items (see annex 87). This paragraph does not include any direct mention of humanitarian exceptions, other than civilian passenger aircraft spare parts. The Committee must, therefore, consider requests for humanitarian exemptions to these sanctions, based on paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017), which allows the Committee to "on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions."

8. Paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) covers several goods which are vital to agriculture or public health programs, including a variety of agricultural machinery and medical equipment (annex 87). Prohibited goods include machinery and parts for food processing factories; pumps, filters, pipes, and drilling equipment necessary to address critical humanitarian needs, such as providing clean water to prevent diarrhea, one of the main killers of children in the DPRK, and food security to reduce high malnutrition rates.

9. It should be noted that obtaining exemption requests from the Committee is but one stage of the process of importing relief items into the DPRK. For example, non-governmental organizations' submissions can be subject to delays with Member States before they reach the Committee. Non-governmental organizations have little visibility and no control over when the Member State submits their request to the Committee. The continued risk adverse approach taken by suppliers and some transit countries' authorities also continues to cause delays to the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance.

Breakdown of the Banking Channel

10. Paragraph 33 of resolution 2270 (2016) prohibits the establishment or maintenance of correspondent accounts with DPRK financial institutions unless approved by the Committee. In August 2016, the Committee approved an exemption for Russia-based Bank Sputnik CJSC to maintain a correspondent relationship with the DPRK's Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) in order to facilitate transactions for United Nations agencies in the country.[203] Given that most of the operational transactions occur outside the DPRK when procuring materials and paying expatriate staff salaries, only 10 per cent of program funds are used within the country to cover on-site operational expenses such as fuel and local staff salaries.[204]

[202] Information about the exemptions approved by the Committee are posted on the website: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests.

[203] See: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/correspondent-account-approvals.

[204] Letter from the UN Country team to the Panel on the Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Operations in DPRK, 14 December 2018.

11. The Committee's action of 11 August 2016[205] enabled a mechanism whereby the UN Secretariat in New York could transfer U.S. Dollars to Commerzbank AG in Germany, which would convert the Dollars to Euros and remit payment in Rubles to Bank Sputnik in the Russian Federation. Bank Sputnik would then hold the payment in the FTB correspondent account, and – lacking an electronic payment clearing system with the FTB – remit cash to Pyongyang for deposit and use by United Nations agencies. However, since September 2017, when Commerzbank cancelled its participation in DPRK-related transactions no alternative arrangements have been found, effectively closing the humanitarian banking channel. [206] This collapse of the banking channel resulted in a shortage of cash in-country, and will make it difficult for United Nations agencies to implement activities. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations have increasingly had to rely on staff carrying large amounts of cash on their person when traveling to the DPRK.[207]

12. The challenges to aid agencies posed by UN financial sanctions have been compounded by de-risking – the phenomenon by which financial institutions and other private-sector actors categorically reject all transactions tied to a high-risk jurisdiction. This has been spurred by the threat of secondary sanctions by various Member States. Disaggregating the specific impact of UN financial sanctions on humanitarian organizations operating in the DPRK from that of unilateral sanctions measures and regulations can be difficult.

[205] Information about the correspondent accounts approved by the Committee are posted on the website: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/correspondent-account-approvals

[206] Section 208(d) of the DPRK Policy and Sanctions Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 USC 9228) delegates authority to the executive branch to facilitate a humanitarian banking channel to the DPRK; however, it does not appear that this authority has been used. Additionally, the U.S. government cannot compel a financial institution to service any particular market as banks make their own compliance and risk-related decisions.

[207] Letter from the UN Country team to the Panel of Experts on the Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Operations in DPRK, 14 December 2018.

Annex 86: Examples of impact of sanctions on the implementation of humanitarian activities in the DPRK

	Sector	UN agency or NGO or both	Items impacted	Status	Impact of delay/denial
1	**Water and Sanitation**	Both			For the WASH sector as a whole, from the planned 367,618 people to receive clean water in 2018, at least 229,235 people, including an estimated 16,000 under-five children will not receive clean drinking water due to delays resulting from need to obtain exemptions and funding shortfalls. This places children at risk of diarrhoea, one of the main killers of children, which is caused by consumption of unsafe drinking water, poor hygiene practices and inadequate health services.
2	**Water and Sanitation**	UN	This included some essential supplies required for four gravity-fed water systems (which were part of a larger procurement).	Exemption request approved by the Committee with significant delay on 18 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018.	Significant delay in agency being able to complete four gravity-fed water systems, placing 61,284 people, including an estimated 4,300 under-five children, at risk of diarrheal death associated with drinking contaminated water.
3	**Water and Sanitation**	NGO	Spare parts for mobile drilling rig, drill bits (6” and 8”), sludge pump, and others.	Exemption request submitted to Member State 17 May 2018; still pending.	Unable to complete installation of 35 wells with handpumps, to provide communities with access to safe water. The majority of these wells were due to supply rural kindergartens, schools and health centres with clean water.
4	**Health**	UN	Emergency Reproductive Health kits 6A & 12	Exemption request pending submission to the Committee.	Delay in implementation of emergency response project, as a result 150,000 pregnant women who are due to deliver during the project period will not have access to safe delivery, and about 22,000 of the pregnancies who are likely to face complications during delivery will not have access to blood transfusions if required. These may result in a negative impact on the maternal mortality ratio that now stands at 58 per 100,000 live births.
5	**Health**	UN	Heaters for immunization clinics	Exemption request submitted to the Committee on	Fast tracking exemptions to facilitate the humanitarian response to DPRK’s harsh winter impact is critical. Delays may inadvertently contribute to children

				24 January 2019. Under consideration.	undressing for immunization in temperatures that go as low as minus 20 degrees Celsius. Moreover, vaccines are rendered ineffective when they freeze due to the lack of heaters.
6	**Health**	UN	9 units of ambulance vehicles. Spare parts of vehicles used to distribute TB and malaria supplies, and to conduct monitoring and supervision visits	Exemption request approved with significant delay on 18 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018.	9 units of ambulance vehicles. Spare parts are required to ensure regular maintenance of the five vehicles previously allocated to MoPH for the implementation of the tuberculosis (TB) and malaria programs. These vehicles have been used exclusively for the distribution by MoPH of TB and malaria program supplies from central to lower level health facilities, and for supervision and monitoring of activities in the field. Without these vehicles there will be serious challenges to implement the programs. DPRK is one of the 30 TB high burden countries in the world. In 2017, there were a total of 100,553 TB cases (5,211 children under 15, i.e. 5% of all cases). Only 14 % of TB cases are tested for drug resistance due to lack of diagnostic resources in-country. Multi-drug-resistant (MDR) TB is a very severe type of TB with substantial risk to transform curable TB into incurable (with increased mortality and massive public transmission of the disease by non-cured patients) and the affordable TB treatment into unaffordable in resource-limited settings. The likelihood of ongoing MDR transmission is very high.
7	**Health**	UN	Refrigerators	Exemption request approved by the Committee with significant delay on 19 October 2018. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018.	The delays caused by the exemption process is resulting in additional financial burdens for agencies. For example, purchase orders cannot be issued before the Committee's approval and sometimes grants may expire before such approval is granted. In May 2018, an agency placed an offshore procurement through its supply division for refrigerators using grants expiring in December 2018. The exemption for these items was received

					on 19 October 2018. By this time the cost had increased from $2,400 per unit to $2,994 per unit, and the agency had to reduce the number of refrigerators purchased for its health program from 20 to 16.
8	**Health**	UN	Medical equipment for maternal and neonatal emergencies	Exemption request approved by the Committee with significant delay on 19 October 2018. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018.	Non-availability of program supplies resulting in delays for the referral of emergency cases to health facilities. This will result in increased mortality. Because requests for exemptions can only be submitted once every 6 months, offshore procurement can only be initiated then and not before. Considering that lead time for offshore procurement is 6-8 months, it can take up to 9 to fully equip the maternity wards.
9	**Health**	NGO	Assistive and mobility devices (wheelchairs, crutches, walking stick, walker, hearing aid and glasses)	Exemption request approved by the Committee on 30 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to a Member State on 12 October 2018 and to the Committee with significant delay on 3 January 2019.	People living with disabilities identified as requiring assistive and mobility devices have been waiting more than 10 months for these items.
10	**Food security and agriculture**	UN	Irrigation equipment	Exemption request pending submission to the Committee.	As agricultural activities are time-bound, the implementation will be delayed by at least one cropping season with impacts on the food security and food diversity of the affected population, raising the risk of increased rates of undernutrition, especially amongst the most vulnerable people.

11	**Food security and agriculture**	UN	Agricultural equipment (2-WT, corn thresher, mini rice mill)	Exemption request pending submission to the Committee.	As agricultural activities are time-bound, the implementation will be delayed by at least one cropping season. This will affect the ability to achieve the increase in food production which is needed to address need for food security and food diversity. Without access to suitable amounts and diversity of food, vulnerable people are at increased risk of malnutrition.
12	**Food security and agriculture**	UN	Sea buckthorn processing equipment	Exemption request pending submission to the Committee.	As agricultural activities are time-bound, the implementation will be delayed by at least one cropping season. This will affect the ability to achieve the increase in food production which is needed to address need for food security and food diversity. Without access to suitable amounts and diversity of food, vulnerable people are at increased risk of malnutrition.
13	**Food security and agriculture**	NGO	• Plastic round arc type greenhouses • Potato storage systems • Ventilation system • Diesel generator	Exemption request submitted to Member State in May 2018; still pending.	This will result in an inability to produce vegetable seeds during the winter period to be used during the 2019 early vegetable production in 2019 season. This will result in farmers being unable to produce thousands of kilograms of vegetables which are vital for people's food security and dietary diversity to prevent higher rates of malnutrition. Lack of appropriate storage for seed potatoes, or for vegetable, legume and grass seeds. Lack of electricity means unable to run the seed machinery that has been installed.
14	**Food security and agriculture**	NGO	Six bio-digester sets	Exemption request submitted to Member State in May 2018; still pending.	Unable to complete energy production project without bio-digester. The biogas digesters properly treat animal and human waste generated in the facilities. A benefit of the digesters is the production of methane-rich biogas, which is to be used for cooking especially during the winter. They are used to produce food for people and animals; negative impacts on the health of livestock will have serious consequences on the nutritional status of the most vulnerable people, further limiting their dietary intake and diversity.
15	**Food security**	NGO	Iron bar, Gabion wire	Exemption request	Unable to complete project that would protect 2,140 square meters of

	and agriculture		(3t), Electrical Welder and others	submitted to Member State in May 2018; still pending.	agricultural land against flooding. During past five years, 95 people died, 4,054 houses were destroyed, 450 buildings demolished, 20.000 ha arable land damaged due to flooding in these areas. Without these activities the lives of thousands of people are at risk, as well as their ability to produce sufficient food due to the negative impacts of floods on agricultural land.
16	**Food security and agriculture**	NGO	Veterinarian kits	Exemption request approved by Committee on 29 January 2019. The exemption request was initially submitted to a Member State on 20 October 2018 and was submitted to the Committee with significant delay on 15 January 2019.	Due to delays in receiving the kits, veterinarians will lack essential medicine and equipment for spring 2019, which is a particularly sensitive period for goats' health (parasites, diarrhea…) Livestock morbidity and mortality has severe impacts on the nutritional status of vulnerable people, especially children. Without this source of essential protein they risk increased levels of malnutrition and other health concerns.
17	**Food security and agriculture**	NGO	Distribution and consumption equipment, including bowls, cups, tricycles, stainless steel churns, hygiene tools, water tanks	Exemption request approved by Committee on 29 January 2019. The exemption request was initially submitted to a Member State on 20 October 2018 and was submitted to the Committee with significant delay on 15 January 2019.	Without this equipment, children will not have access to yoghurt and other milk products that is essential for their dietary diversity. The lack of dietary diversity in DPRK, including lack of protein and essential vitamins and minerals, contributes to high rates of malnutrition. Projects such as this that provide children with supplementary foods are essential to prevent more children becoming malnourished.
18	**Food security and agriculture**	NGO	Greenhouses and gardening equipment, including tunnel greenhouses,	Exemption request submitted to a Member State on 20 October	Without these items, kindergartens will not be able to grow and harvest vegetables, which are essential to provide children with an adequate diet during the lean season. Young children rely on food provided at kindergarten; without this

			gardening tools, sprayers, seeds	2018; still pending.	they risk not receiving adequate nutrition and face the risk of malnutrition due to lack of adequate, nutritious food.
19	**Food security and agriculture**	NGO	Equipment and tools for the micro-scale project for people living with disabilities.	Exemption request approved by the Committee on 30 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to Member State on 12 October 2018 and to the Committee with significant delay on 3 January 2019.	The activity is delayed by more than nine months. Self-help group of people living with disabilities are waiting to start their livelihood activities.
20	**Nutrition**	NGO	Milk processing equipment including pasteurizer, cream separator, butter machine, storage tank, lactoscan, lab equipment, stainless steel tools and churns, detergent, gloves and clothes.	Exemption request approved by the Committee on 24 July 2018. The exemption request was initially submitted to a Member State on 20 April 2018 and submitted to the Committee on 12 June 2018.	Materials delivered end of November 2018, a delay of six months. Milk processing activities will not begin until 2019, with impacts on the nutrition status of affected children who rely on the supplementary milk to increase their dietary diversity and prevent malnutrition.
21	**Disaster Risk Reduction**	NGO	Raw material (cement, doors, iron rod, sanitary ware, poly propylene pipe, Hollow iron rod for hand rail, water tap and window etc.) for the refurbishment of community building (safe shelter)	Exemption request approved by the Committee on 30 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to Member State on 12 October 2018 and to the Committee with significant delay on 3 January 2019.	The activity is delayed by more than nine months. Community is not well equipped to mitigate impacts of future disasters as do not have access to community safe shelter

22	**Disaster Risk Reduction**	NGO	Raw material (cement and gabions) for the rehabilitation of canal embankment	Request for exemption submitted to Member State on 12 October 2018; application is under review.	The proposed canal embankment rehabilitation would mitigate the impact of future natural hazards (flood) and save the life of persons with disabilities and community. Without this project, vulnerable people are at risk of future floods.

Source: Letter from the UN Country team to the Panel of Experts on the Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Operations in DPRK, 14 December 2018; updated on 31 January 2019.

Annex 87: Humanitarian-sensitive items prohibited under sectoral sanctions in resolution 2397 (2017)

Category	HS Code	Comment
Hand-tools for agriculture (shovels, hoes, spades, etc…)[208]	HS 8201	
Blades for agricultural, horticultural or forestry machines	HS 820840	
Dryers for agricultural products	HS 841931	
Agricultural spraying machines	HS 842449	
Irrigation equipment	HS 842482	
Agricultural machinery for soil preparation (ploughs, seeders, etc…)	HS 8432	
Harvesting and threshing machinery	HS 8433	
Presses, crushers for fruit juices etc…	HS 8435	
Miscellaneous agricultural equipment	HS 8436	
Machines for cleaning and sorting grains and legumes	HS 8437	
Misc. machines for industrial processing of food and drink	HS 8438, excluding HS 843840 (brewery machinery)	This category includes machinery and spare parts for NGO-supported food processing factories.
Tractors & spare tractor parts	HS 8701 for tractors, multiple categories for spare parts	Tractors and spare parts are not only needed for general agricultural support activities, but also for food security efforts at medical clinics and schools.
Agricultural trailers, farm wagons, and carts	HS 8716, multiple subheadings	
Prefabricated greenhouses, animal sheds	HS 940690	Several NGOs have supported the use of greenhouses in the DPRK for private crop cultivation and for food security/nutritional enhancement at medical facilities and schools serving vulnerable populations.

[208] Agriculture helps with diversifying diet and thus contributes to alleviating food insecurity, high malnutrition and stunting rates.

Category	HS Code	Comment
Nail clippers	HS 821420	A U.S. NGO shipment of hygiene kits to DPRK medical facilities was seized at customs in transit due to the presence of nail clippers in the kits; it was released after six weeks.
Sterilizers for medical use	HS 841920	
Portable sprayers	HS 842441	Used for malaria control.
UV lamps for disinfection	HS 853939	Used for infection control.
Ambulances	HS 8703, not separately categorized from other vehicles	Needed by many medical care centers due to very poor transportation networks and infrastructure.
Carriages for disabled persons	HS 8713	Several NGOs have worked to provide support for persons with disabilities in the DPRK.
Medical appliances, including ultrasound and cardiograph machines, syringes, needles, catheters, dental and ophthalmic equipment, etc…	HS 9018	Essential to the delivery of medical care.
Mechano-therapy appliances, such as artificial respiration machines	HS 9019	
Orthopedic appliances for persons with disabilities	HS 9021	Several NGOs have worked to provide support for persons with disabilities in the DPRK.
X-ray machines	HS 9022	Essential for TB diagnosis and general medical support. Accessories supporting digitization of images is essential to affordability/sustainability.
Medical, surgical, dental, or veterinary furniture (ie operating tables, hospital beds)	HS 9402	Critical to providing basic care for patients.

Category	HS Code	Comment
Metal water tanks	HS 7309, HS 7310, HS 7611	
Pumps for liquids, including pumps for household water systems	HS 8413	Necessary for providing clean water to households, clinics, etc…, as well as for agricultural purposes.
Water heaters	HS 841911 (gas), 841919 (solar), HS 851610 (electric)	
Machinery for filtering or purifying water	HS 842121, HS 842199 (for parts)	Lack of clean water is a major contributing factor to persistent high rates of diarrhea and malnutrition among vulnerable populations.
Machinery for water well drilling	HS 843049	Critical to long-term sustainable clean-water interventions.

Category	HS Code	Comment
Metal tubes, pipes, pipe fittings, etc…	HS 7303-7307 (iron and steel); separate HS codes for copper, aluminum, lead etc...	Used for the provision of clean water.
Roofing, siding, flooring, roof drainage equipment	Included in HS 730890 (sheet metal) and HS 761090 (aluminum)	After Typhoon Lionrock hit the DPRK in 2016, several NGOs responded by providing roofing materials to help rebuild schools, clinics, etc…
Screws, bolts, nails, staples, etc…	HS 7317-7318	These are common items which are often components of humanitarian-sensitive goods, or part of the packaging thereof
Stoves, ranges, grates, cookers, barbecues, etc…	HS 7321, HS 851660	Clean cook stoves provide significant health and environmental benefits, compared to cooking over open fires.
Iron, steel, or aluminum wire	HS 732620, HS 7605	Has numerous agricultural applications.
Aluminum foil	HS 7607	Has medical/laboratory uses.
Refrigerating and Freezing Equipment	HS 8418, as well as other categories for refrigerated trucks.	Refrigeration and refrigerated trucks are essential for the storage and transportation of certain health-related goods such as vaccines, diagnostic reagents, etc....
Generators	HS 8502	Generators are important as a primary or back-up power supply to medical clinics, etc… which require a steady energy supply.
Electric transformers and inductors	HS 8504	Necessary for the steady supply of electricity to medical and laboratory equipment, as well as for agricultural functions.

Electric storage batteries	HS 8507	Necessary component to storing energy from solar panels and other off-grid energy sources, and used in many humanitarian applications.
Centrifuges and centrifugal dryers	HS 8421	Items in this category are used for medical laboratory diagnostics (including for TB and MDR-TB) as well as water purification. This category also includes biosafety cabinets and HEPA filters, which have important medical applications.
Electrical apparatus (ie switches, relays, fuses, surge protectors)	HS 8536	Necessary for the steady supply of electricity to medical and laboratory equipment.
Solar panels	HS 854140	Important source for off-grid or backup energy supply, including in medical clinics etc...
Insulated wires, cables	HS 8544	Necessary for the steady supply of electricity to medical and laboratory equipment.
Microscopes	HS 9011-9012	Important for medical laboratory diagnostics.
Miscellaneous office supplies (printers and print cartridges, flash drives, barcode scanners, staplers, scissors, binders, paper clips, etc…)	Multiple HS categories	Humanitarian agencies have previously supplied local partners with basic office supplies and equipment to assist with administration, data collection, and patient record-keeping.

Sources: Humanitarian organizations

Note on methodology: The above tables identify humanitarian goods which are prohibited for export to the DPRK under paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) including those strictly humanitarian in nature, as well as those serving a broader array of purposes including humanitarian (such as electrical equipment necessary for hospitals and clinics). The tables are not intended to be comprehensive.

While these items align with certain categories of goods with the Harmonized System (HS) codes administered by the World Customs Organization, which are referenced in Resolution 2397, there is not always a straightforward correlation between the lay categorization of certain goods and the HS code system. In some cases, even the most specific (six digit) HS codes may still be so broad as to lump humanitarian-sensitive goods together with other types of goods. For example, machinery for water well drilling is included in the same general category as all "boring and sinking machinery." In other cases, a certain category of humanitarian-sensitive good – spare parts for tractors, for example – may be spread across multiple HS categories.

Additionally, although resolution 2397 (2017) only refers to goods categorized under HS chapters 72-89, a number of humanitarian-sensitive goods that are categorized outside of this range nonetheless contain prohibited components. For example, X-ray machines are categorized under HS 9022, but also incorporate various types of metal and electronic components which could be categorized under HS chapters 72-89. In October 2018, the Committee provided an exemption allowing UNICEF to ship X-ray machines into the DPRK, implying that the Committee would otherwise consider shipment of such devices as prohibited.

Finally, it is noteworthy that some of the IT and communications equipment prohibited for export to the DPRK by paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) may also have humanitarian uses, including such as USB flash drives, portable media players, mobile phones, radios, etc.

Annex 88: Member States yet to submit implementation reports pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 2397 (2017)

Africa

1. Algeria
2. Angola
3. Benin
4. Botswana
5. Burkina Faso
6. Burundi
7. Cabo Verde
8. Cameroon
9. Central African Republic
10. Chad
11. Comoros
12. Congo
13. Côte d'Ivoire (*UNSC non-permanent member 2018-2019*)
14. Democratic Republic of the Congo
15. Djibouti
16. Kingdom of Eswatini
17. Ethiopia (*UNSC non-permanent member 2017-2018*)
18. Gabon
19. Gambia
20. Ghana
21. Guinea
22. Guinea-Bissau
23. Kenya
24. Lesotho
25. Liberia
26. Libya
27. Madagascar
28. Malawi
29. Mali
30. Mauritania
31. Mauritius
32. Morocco
33. Mozambique
34. Namibia
35. Niger
36. Nigeria
37. Rwanda
38. Sao Tome and Principe
39. Senegal
40. Seychelles
41. Sierra Leone
42. Somalia

Americas

50. Antigua and Barbuda
51. Bahamas
52. Barbados
53. Belize
54. Bolivia (*UNSC non-permanent member 2017-2018*)
55. Brazil
56. Costa Rica
57. Cuba
58. Dominica
59. Ecuador
60. El Salvador
61. Grenada
62. Guyana
63. Haiti
64. Honduras
65. Jamaica
66. Nicaragua
67. Paraguay
68. Peru (*UNSC non-permanent member 2018-2019*)
69. Saint Kitts and Nevis
70. Saint Lucia
71. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
72. Suriname
73. Trinidad and Tobago
74. Uruguay
75. Venezuela

Asia

76. Afghanistan
77. Bahrain
78. Bangladesh
79. Bhutan
80. Brunei Darussalam
81. Cambodia
82. Indonesia (*UNSC non-permanent member 2019-2020*)
83. Iran
84. Jordan
85. Kazakhstan (*UNSC non-permanent member 2017-2018*)
86. Kuwait (*UNSC non-permanent member 2018-2019*)
94. Saudi Arabia
95. Syria
96. Timor-Leste
97. Turkmenistan
98. Uzbekistan
99. Yemen

Europe

100. Andorra
101. Azerbaijan
102. Bosnia and Herzegovina
103. Croatia
104. Iceland
105. Ireland
106. Luxembourg
107. Republic of Moldova
108. San Marino
109. Slovenia
110. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Oceania

111. Australia
112. Fiji
113. Kiribati
114. Marshall Islands
115. Micronesia
116. Nauru
117. Palau
118. Papua New Guinea
119. Samoa
120. Solomon Islands
121. Tonga
122. Tuvalu
123. Vanuatu

43. South Africa (*UNSC non-permanent member 2019-2020*) **44.** South Sudan **45.** Tanzania **46.** Tunisia **47.** Uganda **48.** Zambia **49.** Zimbabwe	**87.** Kyrgyzstan **88.** Lebanon **89.** Malaysia **90.** Maldives **91.** Myanmar **92.** Nepal **93.** Oman	

Source: The Panel

Annex 89: Recommendations

To the Security Council:

1. The Panel recommends that future Security Council resolutions stipulate the unit of measurement to be used by Member States in their reporting to the Committee.

2. The Panel recommends that the Security Council, when drafting future financial sanctions measures, take account of DPRK cyberattacks to circumvent the resolutions by illegally generating revenue for the DPRK.

3. The United Nations Secretary-General should request the Secretariat to carry out an assessment of the humanitarian impact of sanctions in the DPRK.

To the 1718 Committee:

4. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate the following vessels for illicit transfers of petroleum products in violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017):

Myong Ryu 1 (IMO number: 8532413), DPRK flag
Song Won (IMO number: 8613360), DPRK flag
Jin Yang 36 (金洋 36), flag unknown
Xing Ming Yang 888 (IMO number 8410847), Sierra Leone

5. The Panel reiterates its recommendation for the designation of Han Hun Il (Edward Han) and also recommends the designation of Yong Kok Yeap and Yazid Merzouk of MKP Malaysia and MKP Zambia.

6. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendations for the designation of Pan Systems[209] to be accompanied by the names of all of its front companies (including Glocom, International Golden Services, International Global System) as aliases, for involvement in the financing and sales of arms and related materiel.

Name:	Pan Systems Pte. Ltd. (Pyongyang branch)
A.k.a:	Wonbang Trading Co., Glocom, International Golden Services, International Global System
Address:	Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Director:	Ryang Su Nyo;
Employees:	Pyon Won Gun, Pae Won Chol, Ri Sin Song, Kim Sung Su, Kim Chang Hyok and Kim Pyong Chol;
Telephone:	+850-218-111 (ext. 8636).

7. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendation to designate: Ri Ik (Li Ik), Wang Zhi Guo and Ri Ho Nam

8. Information about cyberattacks conducted by RGB as a means to evade financial sanctions and to gain foreign currency should be added to the RGB's entry on the 1718 Sanctions List.

209 See S/2017/742, para. 62 and S/2018/171, page 77 (Recommendation 1).

9. The Panel recommends tha the Committee clarify the definition of joint ventures and cooperative entities contained within paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017).

10. The Panel recommends that the Committee include the provision in paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) to the vessel designation criteria and incorporate it into the existing lists of designated vessels as appropriate.

11. The Panel recommends that the Committee amend the delisting procedure to allow Member States to request delisting on behalf of a vessel owner (for the Panel's proposal for amended procedure for delisting for vessels, see annex 20).

12. In order to allow more effective due diligence by flag States, other Member States and the maritime-related industries, the Committee should consider consolidating the designated vessels in one document. Information provided on the vessels should include the measures obligated under the relevant resolutions such as asset freeze, denial of port entry, and cancellation of registration or vessel services. Incidents of deregistration reported to the Committee should also be reflected to prevent inadvertent re-registration.

13. The Panel recommends that discussions in the Committee on humanitarian exemption requests be time-bound and that focus groups within the Committee meet on a regular basis to examine humanitarian issues with a view to expediting the processing of such requests.

14. In order to alleviate unnecessary burdens on Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations, the Committee should publish a whitelist of certain non-sensitive items used in humanitarian operations that fall under the broad categories of items subject to the sectoral sanctions in paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) requiring an exemption for humanitarian shipment into the DPRK.

15. The Committee should continue to seek feedback from Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations applying for exemptions under the terms of the IAN No. 7 guidelines and work to streamline and simplify the application process to the extent possible, including by providing greater flexibility regarding the technical specifications of planned shipments, the parties involved, and the frequency of requests/submissions.

To Member States:

16. Flag States should inform the Committee and the Panel of vessels that they deregister.

17. Flag States should monitor the AIS of their vessels and those illegally sailing under their flag to better ensure implementation of the resolutions.

18. Members States should consider introducing a regulatory requirement for P&I insurance and re-insurance companies to include AIS screening and an "AIS switch off" clause in their contracts for at-risk vessels operating in the relevant regions.

19. Member States should consider introducing a regulatory requirement for petroleum product trading, refining and producing companies to include end-use delivery verification measures and AIS screening clause as well as an "AIS switch-off" clause in their contracts.

20. Member States of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) should consider measures to improve information-sharing and maritime regulation enforcement by flag States and other interested parties.

21. Member States should consider introducing legislation to ensure that global and regional banks operating in their jurisdiction introduce AIS screening and vessel due diligence risk assessment clauses into letters of credit, loans and other financial instruments for global and regional commodity traders and brokers trading in oil and petroleum products in higher risk Free on Board (FoB) markets in the affected areas.

22. Member States and relevant international organizations should ensure that the global and regional commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and in those at-risk segments of the Free on Board (FoB) market and/or engaging in ship-to-ship transfer in the affected international waters adopt contractual language that includes an effective end use delivery verification mechanism.

23. Member States and relevant international organizations should ensure that the global and regional commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and those segments of the affected Free on Board (FoB) markets assess the AIS history of all vessels they intend to supply with products banned under the resolutions.

24. Member States should ensure that the provisions on financial sanctions in the resolutions take account of DPRK cyberattacks to circumvent the resolutions by illegally generating revenue for the DPRK.

25. Member States should enhance their ability to facilitate robust information exchange on the DPRK's cyberattacks with other governments and with their own financial institutions, to detect and prevent attempts by the DPRK to employ its cyber capabilities for sanctions evasion.

26. Given the pervasive use of accounts in the names of family members to evade sanctions, the Panel recommends that governments provide their financial institutions with a list not only of accredited diplomats, but of their family members to ensure that diplomats do not establish additional bank accounts in their names.

27. The Panel recommends that Member States issue guidance for a single bank to be identified as the only bank that can hold accounts for the DPRK embassy and diplomats and that all others are advised not to hold accounts for DPRK diplomats or their family members.

28. The Panel recommends that Member States advise their financial institutions not to open accounts for DPRK diplomats not accredited to their country and to share information on the financial activities of DPRK diplomats with other Member States where records show there has been financial activity to avoid cross-border circumvention of sanctions.

29. Member States should advise their financial institutions that only closing bank accounts (as opposed to freezing) does not meet the requirements of the resolutions, which stipulate that they must freeze all assets controlled by designated individuals or entities, those operating on their behalf, as well as of any members of the DPRK Government that are engaged in violating or evading of any of the provisions of the resolutions.

30. Member States should offer technical assistance to other Member States to help them strengthen their legal frameworks and related mechanisms to implement the financial provisions in the resolutions, as appropriate and in line with Article 49 of the UN Charter.

31. As part of their implementation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017), Member States should request their corporate registries to extract the details of all companies with DPRK national director or shareholders (which de facto violates the ban).

32. Given that joint ventures have violated other provisions of the resolution in addition to paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017), the names of those directors and shareholders should be shared with investigation agencies, financial intelligence units and financial institutions.

33. The Panel recommends that Member States clarify with their national agencies that insurance providers are financial institutions and therefore subject to all of the relevant financial provisions in the resolutions, including the need to freeze assets under the resolutions.